Wood v Lee-Joe

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 The matter before the Court is the proceedings commenced in this Court on 17 April 2014, as amended on 14 May 2014, being an amended application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from interlocutory orders of the Federal Circuit Court given on 24 February 2014 at Sydney: Wood v Lee-Joe [2014] FCCA 309. 2 The amended application for extension of time and leave to appeal concerned, in part, the question of Mr Wood's standing under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) to bring the application on behalf of Ms Neilson as carer for her. The judge of the Federal Circuit Court had made an interlocutory decision that Mr Wood did not have that standing. The primary judge had also refused an application for an injunction to prevent action to evict Ms Neilson from certain premises because, among other things, his Honour had found Mr Wood had no standing. 3 In this Court, the matter had been stood over for some period so that the Federal Circuit Court could give a final judgment in the matter, the final hearing being on 7 July 2014. That final judgment was given on 20 February 2015 (Wood v Lee-Joe (No. 3) [2015] FCCA 354) and involved, relevantly, a conclusion that Ms Neilson was not a person who needed a litigation guardian and an order was made dismissing the application filed by Mr Wood on 28 April 2014 to the extent that it sought to amend the application to show that the application was brought by Ms Neilson by her litigation guardian, Mr Wood. The judge of the Federal Circuit Court also dismissed the proceedings under s 46PO of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 because Mr Wood, his Honour found, did not have standing to bring the proceedings on behalf of Ms Neilson. 4 When the matter was called this morning, there was no appearance on behalf of the applicant. Ms Keith, who appeared for the respondent, handed to me a letter from Mr Robert Spence, the legal representative who had previously appeared in the matter, both in the Federal Circuit Court and in this Court, on behalf of Mr Wood. 5 That letter dated 18 February 2014 indicated that Mr Wood's state of health was not good. It referred to a heart operation, to Mr Wood being in hospital and to some further advice, albeit second or third-hand, that Mr Wood's state of health was, or may be such, that there was now serious doubt as to his capacity to act as litigation guardian for Ms Neilson. 6 In those circumstances, the question arises as to what the utility is of the proceedings that are in this Court. I should note that, at present, there is no appeal either filed or foreshadowed in relation to the 20 February 2015 judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (Wood v Lee-Joe (No. 3) [2015] FCCA 354) and that any such challenge appears itself to be now outside the time of 21 days fixed by the Federal Court Rules for an appeal to this Court from the Federal Circuit Court: see Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 36.03. 7 The relief sought in this Court in relation to Mr Wood's standing has been overtaken by events in the sense that, although the judge of the Federal Circuit Court made an interlocutory order to that effect, that issue is now picked up in the 2015 judgment of the Federal Circuit Court, and if that matter is sought to be agitated in this Court, it can be done in any challenge to the 2015 judgment of the Federal Circuit Court: that issue is now part of the final judgment: see Gerlach v Clifton Bricks Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 22; (2002) 209 CLR 478. To that extent therefore, the claim for an extension of time and leave to appeal in relation to the earlier interlocutory judgment clearly has no further utility. 8 The balance of the application in this Court, as amended on 14 May 2014, relates to what was said to be an error on the part of the primary judge in refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction, or an injunction to prevent various steps being taken by the respondent. 9 Those steps related to the occupation of certain premises and the sale of those premises and the proceeds of sale of the premises. Each of those steps has now been taken by the respondent. The owner of the premises has recovered possession. The premises have been sold and the proceeds of the sale have been dealt with in the ordinary course. So, again, that part of the application before this Court in relation to the interlocutory orders made by the Federal Circuit Court serves no further purpose subject matters and is now, in effect, moot. 10 In those circumstances, the orders I make are that the application for extension of time and leave to appeal, as filed on 17 April and as amended on 14 May 2014, be dismissed and I order the applicant to pay the costs of the respondent as agreed or assessed. I certify that the preceding ten (10) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Robertson.