Wong v Registrar-General of New South Wales

1. The appellant holds grievances relating to property dealings and a stamp duty payment that occurred from 2002.
2. The Notice of Appeal provides the orders sought by the appellant are: "That the documents sought by the Applicant be provided to the Applicant within 7 days".
3. The appellant's application for access to information under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (GIPA Act) made on 15 August 2024 requested information "pertaining to 6/SXXXX82 and 9/SPXXXX43". The respondent conducted searches and located five documents responsive to the appellant's request for information.
4. The respondent originally determined, on 3 September 2024, to redact some of the information in the five documents on the basis the redacted information was personal information. The appellant sought external review of the respondent's decision and on 27 March 2025 the Information Commissioner provided a review report making no recommendations to the respondent. The Information Commissioner noted the appellant's claim that other relevant information was held by the respondent. The Information Commissioner was satisfied the respondent had conducted reasonable searches and that no further information responsive to appellant's request for information was held by the respondent.
5. During the Tribunal proceedings it appears the respondent established the redacted information was open access information that was publicly available for a fee and the respondent provided informal access to the information to the appellant. The Tribunal's written reasons for decision specify that the orders of 28 April 2025 formally recognise the informal access to the information already provided by the respondent to the appellant.
6. In both the first instance and these appeal proceedings the appellant identified the Commissioner for Fair Trading as the respondent in the originating documents. The respondent submitted that the proper respondent is the Registrar-General of New South Wales as the statutory entity established under the Real Property Act 1900 responsible for overseeing the NSW Torrens Title land register**.** At the hearing it was agreed the proper respondent is the Registrar-General of New South Wales.

1. An appellant is entitled to appeal from an internally appealable decision on any question of law or, with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on "any other grounds" (s 80(2)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NCAT Act)).
2. In Unique Commercial Group Pty Ltd v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 ("Cusumano") at [25]-[40], the Appeal Panel set out the authorities and principles concerning questions of law within s 80 of the NCAT Act, including:

(1) Absent leave to appeal, the question of law is the subject matter of the appeal and the question of law should be articulated with precision;

(2) A question of law means a pure question of law;

(3) A "pure question of law" does not depend on facts not found;

(4) A mixed question of fact and law is not a question of law.

(5) An appeal is "on" any question of law and must not be hypothetical or arid; and

(6) An appeal is against orders and not reasons.

1. In John Prendergast & Vanessa Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [13], the Appeal Panel identified a failure to afford procedural fairness as a question of law, at [13]. In Cusumano (at [32(3)]), after summarising potential questions of law identified in Prendergast the Appeal Panel listed a number of further questions of law and considered a question of law could include:

"Whether the Tribunal's decision was vitiated by bias, or a reasonable apprehension of bias, relates to and intersects with the fair hearing rule, and may encompass or be related to the procedural fairness question: Mark Aronson, Matthew Groves and Greg Weeks, Judicial Review of Administrative Action and Government Liability (Thomson Reuters, 6th ed, 2017) 643."

1. It may be appropriate and necessary, in an internal appeal when a question of law arises as to whether proceedings were procedurally fair, to make findings about what occurred in the proceedings: see Donohoe v Albulario [2025] NSWSC 9 where Basten AJ observed at [33]:

"To the extent that there is a fact/law dichotomy, the facts which are not to be reviewed by the appeal court dealing with a question of law are the facts relevant to the matter in dispute. There is a categorical distinction between the facts in dispute (what part of the building was completed?) and facts relating to the composition or conduct of the Tribunal." (footnote omitted)

1. The Appeal Panel has a discretion to grant leave which will generally only be exercised in the following circumstances: Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 at [84(2)]:

"Ordinarily it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal only in matters that involve:

(a) issues of principle;

(b) questions of public importance or matters of administration or policy which might have general application; or

(c) an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision and not merely peripheral, so that it would be unjust to allow the finding to stand;

(d) a factual error that was unreasonably arrived at and clearly mistaken; or

(e) the Tribunal having gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result so that it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed, (citations omitted)"

1. In an internal appeal, an appellant must demonstrate that either an error was made on a question of law, or that leave to appeal should be granted. It is not sufficient for an appellant to disagree with the outcome and to contend that there should have been a different outcome: Brahmbhatt v Osorio [2023] NSWCATAP 188 at [28].
2. We proceed on the basis of those legal principles.

1. The Notice of Appeal and Reply to Appeal, both with attachments, were before the Appeal Panel, as were the Tribunal's written reasons for decision and orders of 28 April 2025.
2. Both parties provided material to the Appeal Panel that was before the Tribunal at first instance including the original decision of the respondent, the Information Commissioner's review report, and the material provided to the Tribunal by each party, including submissions, bundles of documents and correspondence.
3. The appellant also provided to the Appeal Panel two written submissions lodged 22 October 2025 with attachments.
4. The respondent also provided to the Appeal Panel a transcript of the Tribunal proceedings on 28 April 2025 and written submissions lodged 20 November 2025.

1. The appellant sought to provide additional material, in the appeal, namely four documents: a copy of a cheque dated 6 September 2001, a photograph of letterboxes, a tax invoice dated 1 December 2003 and a title search dated 27 May 2005.
2. The respondent also provided a chronology to assist the Appeal Panel's consideration of the appellant's additional evidence.
3. A party seeking to rely on further or fresh evidence in an appeal may only do so with the leave of the Appeal Panel: see QP v RP [2014] NSWCATAP 59 at [34]- [37].
4. The principles relevant to a grant of leave to rely on further or fresh evidence in internal appeals were set out in Ros v Commissioner of Police [2020] NSWCATAP 70 at [33]:

"There are a number of other authorities which set out the principles on which the Appeal Panel might consider an application for admission of further evidence. Generally speaking, the further evidence sought to be admitted would have to relate to the Tribunal's decision at first instance and have been evidence which was relevant at the time to that decision (BCL v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 18 at [26]- [28]). Whether it is likely the further evidence would have produced a different result at the Tribunal is relevant: BCL v NSW Trustee and Guardian [2014] NSWCATAP 18 at [26]- [28]; Mielczarek v Commissioner of Fair Trading [2016] NSWCATAP 217; Building Professionals Board v Hans [2008] NSWADTAP 13. Any potential prejudice to the other party upon the receipt of further evidence is also relevant: Lettau v Artwork Transport Pty Ltd at [25]. Whether the further evidence would allow the Appeal Panel to consider whether, with the benefit of hindsight, it has been demonstrated that serious injustice has resulted or will, in fact, result from the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion, may also be relevant: ZNX v ZNY [2020] NSWCATAP 41 at [25]... "

1. The respondent opposed the grant of leave to admit the appellant's additional material on the basis that the additional material was not relevant.
2. At the hearing of the appeal the appellant submitted her additional material was relevant to the appeal to show the documents provided to her by the respondent were wrong. The appellant also agreed all of her additional material was available to her before the first instance proceedings commenced. Further, the appellant was unable to explain or establish how the decision might have been different relying on that additional material.
3. We are not persuaded that the appellant's additional material is relevant to this appeal and do not consider it likely that the additional material would have produced a different result at the Tribunal hearing. This is because all the information held by the respondent relevant to the appellant's access application has been provided in full to the appellant.
4. Further, there is no suggestion the respondent did not conduct reasonable searches on the basis of the appellant's additional material, for example there is no evidence to demonstrate that because of the existence of a document in the additional material it is likely the respondent held other information responsive to the appellant's request for information.
5. Therefore we decline the appellant's application for leave to rely on her additional material. Further, we do not consider the respondent's chronology with attachments relevant to the appeal and we also decline leave for the respondent to rely on that material.

1. We adopt the "more generous or benevolent approach" endorsed by the Court of Appeal (Griffiths AJA, Meagher and Kirk JJA agreeing) in Kudrynski v Orange City Council [2024] NSWCA 33 at [50]- [51] to discern questions of law in this appeal because the appellant is self-represented.
2. The appellant has raised myriad issues in voluminous material focussed on the payment of stamp duty, property dealings and interactions with officers of the respondent and others. In essence, she considers the information contained in the documents she received from the respondent is wrong and should be changed.
3. Doing the best we can we consider the appellant has raised the following grounds of appeal:

(1) a ground of procedural fairness, in that the appellant was unfairly denied the opportunity to present her case; and

(2) a further ground of jurisdictional error, in that the Tribunal was wrong to dismiss her further issues on the basis that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.

1. The Tribunal is required to afford both parties procedural fairness: s 38(2) of the NCAT Act. The Tribunal is also to take such measures as are reasonably practicable to ensure that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be heard or otherwise have their submissions considered in the proceedings: s 38(5)(c) of the NCAT Act. How the requirement for fairness is satisfied will depend on the circumstances of the particular case. The Tribunal is required to consider whether the parties have been given the opportunity to provide all relevant material to enable it to determine all of the relevant facts in issue.
2. Following review of the material, particularly the transcript, we consider the appellant had an appropriate opportunity to present her case and has not demonstrated that any other steps that may have been taken would have resulted in a different decision. The appellant has been provided with all the information responsive to her request for information held by the respondent The appellant has not established any further responsive information was or is held by the respondent. In these circumstances, the appellant has not demonstrated to the Appeal Panel that a serious injustice has resulted from the Tribunal member's conduct of the proceedings.
3. The Appeal Panel finds that there is no error of law on this ground and the appeal on the ground of procedural fairness should not be allowed.

1. We consider the decision of the Tribunal to dismiss the remainder of the appellant's issues on the basis the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to be an "ancillary decision" because it was a "decision concerning whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with a matter": s 4(1) NCAT Act. Further, we consider an appeal ground that the Tribunal made an error in determining jurisdiction to be a question of law: see Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v Price [2025] NSWCATAP 44 at [18].
2. In the proceedings, the appellant sought administrative review of the respondent's decision to refuse full access to information under the GIPA Act. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction when considering an administrative review under the GIPA Act to deal with any further issue relating to property dealing, stamp duty or previous interactions between the appellant and staff of government agencies. Once all issues relating to the request for information were resolved, it was appropriate for the Tribunal to dismiss any issues remaining.
3. We consider the appellant has not established the Tribunal erred in determining the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to deal with any issue beyond administrative review of the respondent's decision to refuse full access to information it held responsive to the appellant's request for information under the GIPA Act.
4. The Appeal Panel finds that there is no error of law on this ground and the appeal on a ground of jurisdictional error should not be allowed.

1. The respondent cannot be required to produce information it does not hold. Nor is administrative review of a decision made under the GIPA Act about access to information a pathway to amend property dealings. The remedies the appellant appears to seek are not available in these proceedings.
2. Beyond an assertion of public importance, the appellant has not established any issue of principle, nor question of public importance, matter which might have general application, nor reasonably clear injustice, nor unreasonable or mistaken factual error, nor unorthodox Tribunal fact finding. We do not discern any such error on the part of the Tribunal.
3. Therefore so far as leave might be required, we would not grant leave.

1. In this appeal, no error on a question of law has been established and no leave has been granted. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.