1. Both parties have referred, in their materials, to matters which were raised in the course of the mediation. Section 55 of the SAT Act provides that evidence of anything said or done in the course of a mediation is not admissible at any later stage of the proceeding unless, among other things, all parties agree to the admission of the evidence or it is evidence of orders made or directions given at the mediation or the reasons for such directions or orders.
2. In this case, the information about what was said or done in the mediation was initially raised by the Practitioner. The Respondent has submitted that it has no objection to the information about the mediation being used in this proceeding. In any event, s 55 of the SAT Act only precludes anything said or done in a proceeding from being admissible at a later stage of the same proceeding. It says nothing about the use of anything said and done in mediation in one proceeding in another proceeding. Accordingly, in determining this matter I have had regard to the information about the mediation which has been referred to by the parties.

1. As I have already identified, r 9 of the SAT Rules requires review applications to be commenced within 28 days of the decision-maker giving notice of the reviewable decision, although that time can be extended by the Tribunal under r 10 of the SAT Rules.
2. As the Tribunal recently identified in Heidelberg Materials Australia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission,[1] by reference to McHugh J's decision in Gallo v Dawson,[2] the purpose of the discretion to extend time is to 'ensure that those [R]ules which fix time for doing acts do not become instruments of injustice'.[3]
3. The discretion to extend time is guided by the following four primary, but not exhaustive, considerations:[4]
   1. the length of the delay;
   2. the reasonableness of the reason or explanation for the delay;
   3. whether there is an arguable case for review; and
   4. whether an extension would cause prejudice to any other person.

1. The Decision was made on 27 February 2024. The delay of approximately 17 months from the expiry of the time for commencing a review provided for in r 9 of the SAT Rules is, therefore, extremely significant.
2. In Heidelberg, the Tribunal said of a delay of 10 months that it was 'so extraordinary as, if an extension to commence the proceeding were granted, to greatly undermine the utility and purpose of the 28 day period ...'.[5] I would adopt that description of the delay in this case.

1. The Practitioner says that the extension of time is warranted because the Affirmed Decision is having an 'ongoing negative impact on [his] career and life'. By that, he is referring to the fact that on 28 March 2025, upon having to give notice to the designated local regulatory authority in NSW (NSW DLRA) of the disciplinary outcome in Western Australia (WA), a condition was imposed upon his NSW practising certificate that he may only practise as an employee of a law practice.
2. In the course of a directions hearing in relation to this matter the Practitioner referred to the condition as another 'penalty' imposed for the conduct dealt with in the Decision/Affirmed Decision. Clearly that characterisation is incorrect. It may be a consequence of the conduct dealt in the Affirmed Decision, but it does not form part of the disciplinary sanction imposed by the Board and nor is it a disciplinary sanction being imposed by the NSW DLRA.
3. The Practitioner must have been aware of r 9 of the SAT Rules and the requirement to commence a review application within 28 days given that he is a legal practitioner and that he had previously commenced a review of the Decision. If he was not aware of the time limit, he ought to have been. In any event, he does not explain the delay by claiming to have been unaware of the time limit.
4. In my view, it is not unreasonable to expect a practitioner who is considering resolving a disciplinary matter in a way which includes a finding that they engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct to turn their mind to the impact such a finding may have upon any future application for a practising certificate.
5. In any event, I do not accept that the Practitioner had not turned his mind to the possible impact of the finding that he had engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct. On the basis of the materials submitted by the Practitioner himself in support of his Second Review Proceeding, I find he had actual knowledge of the potential relevance of the Decision at the time the review of the Decision was on foot. The reasons for that conclusion follow.
6. The Practitioner said, at page numbered 59 of the material filed on 6 August 2025,[6] that he had been 'attempting to reach a quick resolution with the [Respondent] so [he] could begin practising in New South Wales'. He also said that as part of resolving the First Review Application he agreed to 'remove the most significant comments' which were contained in the Decision 'that would definitely impact [his] application in New South Wales'. Accordingly, while he may not have appreciated the precise consequence that the Amended Reasons for Decision and the Affirmed Decision would have, he was certainly alert to the possibility that a disciplinary finding made by the Board in Western Australia could impact on his ability to practise in NSW.
7. The Practitioner also says, at pages 5 - 6 of the materials which he filed with this application on 24 July 2025, that he did not prepare for the mediation and that the mediation was premature, suggesting perhaps that he does not regard it as fair that he be now bound to the outcome agreed through that mediation process.
8. The Tribunal ordered that the First Review Proceeding be listed for mediation with the consent of the parties. The mediation took place one month after the date on which it was listed. The Practitioner did not resist the mediation on the grounds that it was premature at the time, and he had a month in which to prepare for it. He made no formal application to the Tribunal to have the mediation rescheduled and he does not say that he made such an application at the commencement of the mediation.
9. Finally, on 30 May 2024, the Practitioner informed the Board that he 'fully accepted the [Affirmed Decision]' and was satisfied that the proceeding had been resolved 'fairly and convincingly' and requested that his application for review be withdrawn.
10. That the Practitioner did not, perhaps as a result of his lack of preparation, fully appreciate the consequence of the agreement he reached at the mediation is not, in my view, a reason to allow him an extension of time to review the Decision/Affirmed Decision some 18 months after the Decision was first made and 17 months out of time.
11. I do not find the explanation for the delay to be a compelling reason for allowing an extension of time to commence the Second Review Proceeding given the length of the delay.

1. Where a proceeding has been dismissed under s 46 of the SAT Act, s 49 of the SAT Act provides that another proceeding of the same kind in relation to the same matter cannot be commenced without leave of a judicial member of the Tribunal.[7] In this case the order made was that the First Review Proceeding was withdrawn by consent and so the requirement in s 49 to seek leave of a judicial member before a proceeding of the same kind can be commenced in respect of the same subject matter does not apply. Nevertheless, that does not mean that commencing another proceeding of the same kind in relation to the same subject matter could never be an abuse of process.
2. The Respondent has applied to have the Second Review Proceeding dismissed on the basis that it is an abuse of process. That application would only need to be resolved in the event that leave to commence the proceeding is given. However, the Respondent submits that I should find that the current proceeding is unarguable or, at best, has a weak prospect of success on the basis that it constitutes an abuse of process.
3. Section 47 of the SAT Act provides:

(1) This section applies if the Tribunal believes that a proceeding -

(a) is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or

(2) If this section applies, the Tribunal may order that the proceeding be dismissed or struck out and make any appropriate orders.

(3) The Tribunal's powers to act under subsection (2) are exercisable only by a legally qualified member.

(4) The Tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of a party or on its own initiative.

1. The effect of s 47(1) and s 47(2) of the SAT Act is that the Tribunal may order that a proceeding be dismissed or stuck out where it believes that a proceeding is:

(a) frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance; or

1. The power in s 47(2) is only exercisable by a legally qualified member.[8] The Tribunal may act under s 47(2) on the application of a party or on its own initiative.[9]
2. The principles which apply where the Tribunal is considering an application to dismiss a proceeding as an abuse of process were set out by the Tribunal in Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa.[10]
3. The power to summarily terminate an action should be used sparingly and only in cases where the basis upon which the power can be exercised has been clearly demonstrated.[11]
4. A proceeding which amounts to an unjustified or unreasonable use of legal proceedings or the use of legal proceedings in a way which causes significant unfairness or oppression to another party or which, if maintained, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute is an abuse of process.[12] While the categories of case where a proceeding might amount to an abuse of process is not closed, common examples of proceedings which are an abuse of process are those which seek to relitigate issues already determined in earlier proceedings or to use a new proceeding to challenge a prior binding decision.[13]
5. The Practitioner is seeking to have the Tribunal review the Affirmed Decision, in circumstances where it came to be affirmed when the Decision was the subject of review proceedings in the Tribunal. Given that the First Review Proceeding was resolved by the making of an order under s 46(1) of the SAT Act that the Practitioner have leave to withdraw the proceeding and the proceeding be withdrawn, the Tribunal has not made any findings in relation to the merits of the Decision/Affirmed Decision. It would not, therefore, be an abuse of process in the sense that it seeks to relitigate matters determined in earlier proceedings.
6. The Respondent says that this proceeding is an abuse of process because:

1. the Decision has been the subject of a review proceeding; 2. the matter went to mediation;

1. following the mediation the respondent was asked to reconsider the Decision;

1. the Decision was reconsidered and affirmed but the reasons for the Affirmed Decision were amended; 2. the Applicant notified the Tribunal and the Respondent that he was content with the Affirmed Decision and wished to withdraw the First Review Proceeding; 3. after the First Review Proceeding was withdrawn, the Applicant informed the Tribunal and the Respondent that he 'fully accept[ed]' the outcome and that the proceedings had been resolved 'fairly and convincingly'; 4. the First Review Proceeding was concluded over a year ago; 5. the delay is extraordinary; 6. the parties in both matters are identical; 7. the reasons for the desire to review the Affirmed Decision is a concern with the decision made by another body in relation to a practising certificate in NSW; 8. there is no cogent evidence that a change in the decision of the Respondent would alter the decision of the NSW DLRA;

1. at the time of the Affirmed Decision the Applicant had actual knowledge of the possibility that the decision made by the Respondent could impact upon his application for a practising certificate in NSW;

1. there has been no change of circumstances that warrant revisiting the matter and there is nothing of substance raised in the Second Review Proceeding that could not have been raised in the First Review Proceeding; 2. there is a public interest in ensuring that the Tribunal's limited resources are not wasted by facilitating a party who resolved a matter over a year ago challenging the same decision once they no longer consider it to be satisfactory; 3. the Respondent is entitled to finality in litigation; and 4. the Respondent has already been put to the time and expense of resolving the First Review Proceeding and should not be put to more costs by this Second Review Proceeding.
2. The Practitioner's submissions concern what he says was a lack of access to the letter from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to the Respondent which initiated the disciplinary proceedings which led to the making of the Decision and the Affirmed Decision. His complaint seems to be not only that he did not have access to the correspondence at the time of the mediation, which was itself unfair, but that, now that he has seen the correspondence, the Respondent's disciplinary inquiry and consequently the Decision and the Affirmed Decision went impermissibly beyond the issue which was referred by the AAT, such that the Affirmed Decision is invalid.
3. By letter dated 24 October 2023, the Respondent informed the Practitioner that it had commenced an investigation into particular conduct and identified that the investigation had been commenced following referral of concerns by the AAT.[14] Whether the investigation went beyond the scope of what was identified by the AAT as its concerns with his conduct is irrelevant. The Practitioner's submission that he has strong prospects of succeeding on the Second Review Proceeding because the Affirmed Decision is infected by an error which he did not appreciate at the time, is mistaken. The Respondent is entitled to initiate its own investigations and s 283(1) of the Uniform Law expressly permits the Respondent to extend the scope of an investigation so as to include conduct identified during the course of an investigation. The Respondent is correct in its submission that to limit its power to investigate in the way for which the Practitioner appears to contend would undermine one of the main objectives of the Uniform Law, being the proper regulation of the profession.
4. The Practitioner also submits that he has a case with strong prospects of success because the Affirmed Decision was made on the basis of 'inferences from documents whose accuracy and context are disputed' and that his conduct (in failing to attend a directions hearing) 'amounted to an isolated administrative error in the context of a genuine family emergency'.
5. I do not accept that the Practitioner's case could be characterised as strong. The Amended Reasons for Decision were made in reliance on the Practitioner's own submissions and admissions and upon undisputed contemporaneous documents. The Amended Reasons for Decision reveal that the conduct was not isolated and that his misunderstanding of AAT procedure and his obligations was persistent, including having continued during the Respondent's investigation into his conduct. In my view it would be difficult to overcome the inferences and factual findings which I consider can be drawn from the relevant materials.
6. Indeed, it is my conclusion that the Applicant's prospects of success are not strong and that it is quite likely that, for the reasons advanced by the Respondent, it is likely that the Second Review Proceeding would be dismissed as an abuse of process were he to be granted the extension required to commence it.

1. The Practitioner submits that refusing the extension of time required to commence the Second Review Proceeding would cause him prejudice which he described as 'irreversible and profound'. He says that he would be 'permanently bound by' the Affirmed Decision and the findings made in the Amended Reasons for Decision.
2. That the finding made in the Amended Reasons for Decision and the Affirmed Decision would permanently bind the Practitioner unless it is set aside is obviously correct. But that of itself should hardly be surprising and must have been understood by the Practitioner at the time he agreed to withdraw his First Review Proceeding. It cannot be the case that a practitioner can simply be permitted to challenge a disciplinary finding and the reasons for it, to which the practitioner agreed, a long time after the finding is made and the penalty is imposed simply because they come to better appreciate the consequences of such a finding upon them and decide that it no longer serves their interests to have the finding on their record.
3. In circumstances where the prospects of succeeding on the merits of any review application are not strong, the prejudice to the Practitioner arising from not being allowed to have the Affirmed Decision reviewed by the Tribunal could not be said to be 'profound'.
4. Additionally, the Practitioner's concerns arise only because of the effect that the Affirmed Decision has had on his ability to practise in New South Wales. It is not directly the result of anything arising from the Respondent's conduct.
5. Finally, the Respondent says that there is nothing before the Tribunal to establish that the variation or setting aside of the Affirmed Decision on review or the variation of the Amended Reasons for Decision would change the decision of the NSW DLRA. It says, for example, that there is no letter from the NSW DLRA to indicate that, absent the finding made in the Affirmed Decision and the Amended Reasons for Decision, they would not have imposed the condition that the Practitioner must only practise as an employed solicitor. While I accept that there is no such material before the Tribunal, in determining this application I am willing to proceed on the basis most favourable to the Practitioner and assume that the removal of the Affirmed Decision and the disciplinary sanction from the Practitioner's record may well mean that the condition imposed on the Practitioner's NSW practising certificate would be revoked.
6. The Practitioner obviously wishes to practice as a sole practitioner or as the principal of a firm and is precluded from doing so by the condition imposed on his practising certificate by the NSW DLRA. However, there is nothing in the materials filed by the practitioner in support of his application that deals with his prospects of obtaining work as an employed solicitor. In the absence of any evidence as to that issue it is not possible to characterise the impact of the condition, however, I will proceed on the basis that the existence of the condition would make finding work as an employed solicitor more difficult than it would be without such a condition and also that the Practitioner does not desire to practise as an employed solicitor at all, preferring to work for himself.
7. I do accept that there is prejudice to the Practitioner in the refusal of the extension of time necessary to commence the Second Review Proceeding.

Conclusion on application for extension of time

1. Despite there being some prejudice to the Practitioner from a refusal to extend time and permit him to commence the Second Review Proceeding, in circumstances where the delay has been extreme, the reason for the delay is unsatisfactory, and the prospects of success are not good, I find that the required extension of time to commence the Second Review Proceeding should not be granted and the application should be dismissed.

1. The Respondent seeks an order that the Practitioner pay its costs of the application.
2. No submissions have been made by either party in relation to that issue.
3. Without finally deciding the matter, I would be inclined to the view that, having been entirely unsuccessful in the matter, the Practitioner should pay the Board's costs. I would encourage the parties to confer to see if agreement could be reached about the issue of costs so that neither party is put to any greater costs in having to make or resist a costs application in the Tribunal. In case that agreement cannot be reached, I will order that the parties have until 12 May 2026 to lodge with the Tribunal and give to the other party, any submissions and affidavits on which they intend to rely in relation to the issue of costs.

1. The Applicant's application for leave to make his application for review of the decision of the Respondent affirmed on 28 May 2024, pursuant to r 10 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), is refused.
2. Proceeding VR 57 of 2025 is dismissed.
3. By 12 May 2026 each party is to lodge with the Tribunal and give to the other party any written submissions and affidavits on which they intend to rely in relation to the Respondent's application that the Applicant pay its costs of the proceeding pursuant to s 87 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Heidelberg Materials Australia Pty Ltd and Western Australian Planning Commission [2025] WASAT 66 (Heidelberg).

[2] Heidelberg at [43] referring to Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; 64 ALJR 458 (Gallo v Dawson) at [2] and Heidelberg at [43].

[3] Gallo v Dawson at 459 quoted in Heidelberg at [45].

[5] Heidelberg at [56] - [57].

[6] The materials provided are not sequentially numbered.

[10] Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2019] WASAT 143 at [11] - [20].

[11] General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125 (Barwick CJ) at 128 - 129 in connection with the power to strike out proceedings under the High Court Rules 1952 (Cth).

[12] Legal Services and Complaints Committee and McCardle [No 2] [2023] WASAT 131 (McCardle) at [117] - [119], [121].

[14] Affidavit of Francis Xavier Hall FXH 2 and particularly paras 2 - 3 and 31.