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Cases Cited: Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304; [2018] HCA 15
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24
New South Wales v Wojciechowska [2025] HCA 27
Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 210
Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2023] NSWCATAP 34
Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (No 2) [2023] NSWCATAP 104
Wojciechowska v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCA 191

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: Paulina Wojciechowska (Plaintiff)
Commissioner of Police, New South Wales Police Force (First Defendant)
New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Second Defendant)

Representation: Counsel:
P Wojciechowska (Plaintiff) Self - Represented
H Ryan (First Defendant)
Solicitors:
NSW Crown Solicitor (First Defendant)
Submitting Appearance (Second Defendant)

File Number(s): 2023/222388

JUDGMENT

1. These reasons concern a notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 16 October 2025. The purpose of the motion is to substantially expand a summons filed on 13 July 2023.

2. The notice of motion is supported by an affidavit of the plaintiff dated 15 October 2025. The affidavit annexes a draft summons upon which the plaintiff would like to proceed. In addition, the motion seeks some amendments to the draft summons. There is a final version of the proposed summons commencing on p 76 of the Court Book which was used by the parties for the purposes of their submissions.

3. In addition to the affidavit of 15 October 2025, there are also affidavits from the plaintiff dated 10 November 2025 and 5 March 2026, respectively.

4. The first defendant relied on an affidavit of Ms Alice Zhou dated 27 November 2025. Ms Zhou is a solicitor employed by the Crown Solicitor for New South Wales.

5. There is a second defendant (the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT)) which did not appear at the motion. The second defendant has filed a submitting appearance.

6. The plaintiff filed written submissions on 11 November 2025. I will quote the whole of the submissions:

“The grant of leave to amend the originating process advances the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).”

7. The brevity of the submission should not be overly criticised. It encapsulates the only viable point open to the plaintiff; namely that allowing the plaintiff to agitate the whole of her grievances in a single hearing is the most “just, quick and cheap” means of resolving her concerns in accordance with s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).

8. The plaintiff did make more detailed oral submissions but did not, in my view, develop a better point than the s 56 argument.

9. The first defendant, in somewhat more extensive written submissions, endeavoured to demonstrate why the expansion of the summons is far from just, and would not be cheap. In addition, the first defendant submitted that there is no explanation for why the plaintiff’s application had not been made earlier and there are “no compelling reasons” to grant leave.

10. I do note the concession by the first defendant that no substantial prejudice had been suffered by the delay.

11. The history of the litigation between the parties is complex. I think a chronology of events relevant to the current proceedings will help. The chronology is derived from the Court Book and the relevant judgments.

| Date | Event | | September 2018 | Officers of the New South Wales Police Force (NSWPF) attended the property of the plaintiff in NSW. She was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Police, both during and after their visit to her property. | | 5 June 2020 | The plaintiff applied to the NSWPF under the Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (GIPA Act), for access to information relating to a police station, including GPS data for police vehicles and names and ranks of certain persons. | | 6 July 2020 | An authorised officer of the NSWPF decided that parts of the information sought were not held by the NSWPF but also allowed access to some information. | | 29 July 2020 | The NSWPF made a supplementary decision to provide access to additional information. | | 31 August 2020 | The plaintiff applied to the Information Commissioner to review both decisions of the NSWPF. | | 11 November 2020 | The Information Commissioner determined that the NSWPF’s decisions were justified. | | 24 November 2020 | The plaintiff applied to NCAT seeking administrative review of the NSWPF’s decisions on 6 and 29 July. | | 18 December 2020 | The plaintiff made an application that NCAT decline to determine the application for review on the basis that it invokes federal jurisdiction where a matter is between a State and a resident of another State. | | 19 April 2021 | Review hearing proceeded before Senior Member Dinnen of the Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division of NCAT. Certain confidentiality orders were made orally, and the plaintiff then sent an email requesting reasons for the orders. It was also determined that, contrary to the plaintiff’s application, NCAT had jurisdiction to hear and determine the review application. | | 16 July 2021 | NCAT affirmed the decision of the NSWPF that it did not hold certain information sought by the plaintiff or to provide access to other information she sought (Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police [2021] NSWCATAD 210). | | 13 August 2021 | The plaintiff sought leave to appeal NCAT’s decision of 16 July 2021 (as well as the confidentiality orders made) to NCAT’s Appeal Panel. | | 17 December 2021 | Hearing of the NCAT Appeal of the decision of 16 July 2021 before Principal Member Simon and Senior Member Lucy. | | 7 February 2023 | NCAT’s Appeal Panel refused to grant leave to appeal the NCAT decision of 16 July 2021, dismissed the appeal, prohibited the publication and disclosure of confidential material filed by the Commissioner in the proceeding, and made directions for the making of a costs application (Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2023] NSWCATAP 34). | | 16 February 2023 | The Appeal Panel made orders varying the timetable for the costs application. | | 12 April 2023 | The Appeal Panel made orders on the papers dispensing with an oral hearing on the issue of costs, noting that no materials were received from the plaintiff and also ordered the plaintiff to pay the Commissioner $7,309.76 (Wojciechowska v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (No 2) [2023] NSWCATAP 104). | | 5 July 2023 | The Commissioner filed a certified copy of the costs order in the NSW Local Court, which made an order directing the plaintiff to pay the $7,309.76 (under s 78(3) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), a certificate so filed operates as a judgement of the court). | | 13 July 2023 | The plaintiff commenced these current proceeding by summons, seeking, inter alia, that orders made by the NCAT Appeal Panel on 7 February, 16 February and 12 April 2023, and the order of the Local Court on 5 July 2023, be set aside and declared invalid, on the basis that the Appeal Panel lacked power to make its orders, because to do so involved impermissibly exercising federal judicial power. | | 17 August 2023 | The NSW Court of Appeal delivered a judgement (in proceedings to which the plaintiff was also a party) dealing with similar legal issues to the current proceedings – whether NCAT exercises judicial power when it determines GIPA Act proceedings and thus cannot determine GIPA Act applications made by interstate residents (like the plaintiff) because of the Burns v Corbett (2018) 265 CLR 304; [2018] HCA 15 limitation (Wojciechowska v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCA 191). The Court of Appeal unanimously determined that NCAT does not exercise judicial power when determining applications under the GIPA Act. The Court also concluded that NCAT does exercise judicial power when it determines applications under the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW), partly because of the enforceability of orders made under the Act by using the mechanism in s 78 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW). | | 6 August 2025 | The High Court allowed the State’s appeal in New South Wales v Wojciechowska [2025] HCA 27, effectively saying that the availability of the s 78 registration mechanism in the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) does not make an order of NCAT to pay an amount an exercise of judicial power. | | 16 October 2025 | The plaintiff filed a notice of motion seeking leave to amend her originating process and file the draft summons annexed to her affidavit of 15 October 2025. |

12. The above chronology refers to “confidential” orders and material. I note that when dealing with the objections to the first defendant’s affidavit material the plaintiff took objection to the description of “confidentiality” which she said was a conclusion and not a fact. I said I would proceed on the basis that the description was the opinion of the deponent and not a statement of fact.

13. The original summons seeks a judicial review of three decisions made in the NCAT. The decisions were made on 7 February 2023, 16 February 2023, and 12 April 2023, respectively. The orders requested also include setting aside a Local Court order of 5 July 2023.

14. The proposed summons maintains complaints against the NCAT decisions of 7 February 2023, 16 February 2023, and 12 April 2023. The orders of the Local Court remain under attack. The new summons is again styled as an application for judicial review, but the “Type of Claim” refers to an appeal. The subheading to the new pleading is a “SUMMONS SEEKING LEAVE TO APPEAL (PART 50)”. The quest for judicial review seems to have receded.

15. An appeal under pt 50 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) must be filed within 28 days of the “material date” (r 50.3). Rule 50.2 defines the material date as the date of the decision. Clearly the appeals here are well out of time so leave to continue will be required. Leave is contemplated by the proposed summons. No doubt waiting for the Court of Appeal and High Court decisions will be a relevant factor.

16. In her affidavit of 10 November 2025, the plaintiff gives some explanation as to why she initially chose the judicial review path. To the extent that I understand the explanation, the decision seems to have been governed by the plaintiff’s anxiety about being in the Supreme Court, expense and that the costs order made by NCAT was made without jurisdiction or power.

17. In her affidavit dated 5 March 2026 the plaintiff says:

“If I am not granted the leave to amend, I intend to file summons seeking leave to appeal and then I will seek to consolidate this proceeding with the proceeding I intend to commence by filing the summons seeking leave to appeal.”

18. The statement just quoted highlights what I have said above about the plaintiff’s reliance on s 56. She is effectively saying that it would be much more time and cost effective for her to be granted leave to amend rather than have to file a separate summons, followed by a consolidation of the two proceedings.

19. On 2 March 2026, the plaintiff sent an email to the first defendant asking:

“Which of my grounds, if dropped, would make you consent to my proposed amended summons?”

20. The first defendant replied on 4 March 2026 stating that the first defendant “would consider his position if a different draft amended summons were provided.” The first defendant then set out what were considered to be proper amendments to the summons. The plaintiff did not take up the suggestions made by the first defendant.

21. It is important for me to take into account that the plaintiff is self-represented and may not have the background and skills necessary for the drafting of a sensible pleading. At the same time however, the plaintiff is far from an inexperienced litigant and lists her occupation as a solicitor. As illustrated by the chronology her appearances have encompassed many jurisdictions extending from NCAT to the NSW Court of Appeal and ultimately the High Court (New South Wales v Wojciechowska [2025] HCA 27).

22. The plaintiff being self-represented raises a significant point in relation to her motion. It became clear during argument that the primary focus of the plaintiff’s concerns is on the costs order made against her in the Local Court which was for the sum of $7,309.76. I asked the first defendant if this sum was being pursued and was told that it was.

23. I also pointed out to the plaintiff that, should she ultimately lose the substantive proceedings, the costs order made in the Local Court would, in terms of relative size, pale into insignificance. The plaintiff said she appreciated this fact but emphasised the following:

24. There were issues of principle dictating the necessity to review decisions of the NCAT Appeal Panel.

25. It was in the public interest to examine how the Appeal Panel makes costs orders.

26. The relevant legislation was “for everyone”, not just the rich.

27. All self-represented litigants, no matter how imperfect their pleadings and submissions might be, deserved the right to be heard.

28. All of the above noble sentiments are important and relevant to the administration of justice. Meritorious assertions should be considered by the courts. The difficulty here is that many of the complaints the plaintiff wishes to agitate have already been dealt with (in some instances going all the way to the High Court). In addition, on some topics, the plaintiff had chosen not to take part. An example relates to some proceedings before the Appeal Panel with the plaintiff choosing not to make any submissions.

29. In Ground 1(d) of the proposed summons, for example, the plaintiff makes allegations of the Appeal Panel denying her procedural fairness. On my understanding she simply did not participate in the proceedings.

30. The plaintiff accepted that her grounds were not perfect, but she said “perfection is not an objective in this exercise”. She is perfectly correct, but that does not mean that her grounds may raise untenable points or not be understandable.

31. Again, by way of example, Ground 1(b) has already been dealt with in the Court of Appeal. There are a number of assertions about the jurisdiction of the Local Court (Grounds 29 – 32), but there is a strong probability that no appeal lies from the Local Court. Section 39 of the Local Court Act 2007 (NSW) restricts appeals as of right to questions of law.

32. In addition, because the Local Court order arose from the application of s 78 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), it is even arguable that the plaintiff was not a party to the proceedings in the Local Court and therefore, in any event, would not have any right of appeal.

33. Also, the terms of s 78 suggest that there is no obligation to give reasons. All that is required is certification by the registrar of a court having appropriate jurisdiction.

34. There are numerous complaints about the Appeal Panel which seem to arise from allegations of fact (for example Grounds 5, 8 and 9), which would render them not susceptible to appeal. There are some grounds, for example Ground 19, which are very general and have no particularisation.

35. The plaintiff said that any absent particulars could be supplied in submissions. Submissions can fill gaps and requests for particulars can be made. But to allow general statements in a pleading which are uncertain against a background of ultimately a complaint of a costs order of the size in the present case, is I think to allow an expansion of a case that is not justified.

36. In respect of proposed Ground 31 the first defendant suggested the possibility that the plaintiff might like to be referred for pro bono assistance. This Ground relates to the High Court decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51; [1996] HCA 24. The plaintiff in reply did not take up the suggestion of assistance. Absent her interest I do not propose to refer her for assistance, leaving Ground 31 as vague and probably incapable of response.

37. Although I have singled out some grounds for particular mention, I have examined all of the proposed grounds to find at least one which seems to have substance and clarity of meaning. I have not been able to do so, although I accept that within all of the grounds is the plaintiff’s concern about, especially, the Appeal Panel’s powers in relation to making costs orders.

38. I have considered giving the plaintiff ‘another go’, but have decided against that course. I think her notice of motion, notwithstanding her advocacy for self-represented litigants, and her perceived righting of wrongs should not overcome the dictates of s 56 and case management.

39. It would certainly not be cheap to allow the large expansion of the plaintiff’s claim, and it would not be just to impose upon the first defendant the need to answer a claim in which many of the assertions have been dealt with at the highest level, some are obviously doomed to failure, and some are too confusing to understand.

40. The motion also seeks leave to join the Registrar of NCAT as a party. The reason seems to be because the Registrar issued a certificate purporting to exercise “federal judicial power.” Joining a party can be done under r 6.24 of the UCPR, if the joinder “is necessary to the determination of all matters in dispute in any proceedings.” NCAT is already a party and there is no separate need to join the Registrar.

41. As to costs, they must follow the event.

42. I make the following orders:

43. The notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 16 October 2025 is dismissed.

44. The plaintiff is to pay the first defendant’s costs of the motion.

45. If necessary to state, the costs recoverable pursuant to Order (2) are not payable until the completion of the proceedings.

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