"These articles are in addition to those contained in Schedule 1 of the Unit Titles Act 1975. If there are any inconsistencies between these articles and the provisions contained in the said Schedule 1, these articles shall prevail."

1. The Applicants say article 16.1 is relevant because the Respondent's claim that Schedule 1, Article 4(f) of the model articles requires a majority vote at a general meeting for animal approvals is incorrect as the Respondent's articles replace those model articles to the extent that there is any inconsistency and as such the matter should have been decided by the management committee and not by a majority vote at a general meeting and therefore the Respondent's claim that a general meeting was legally required is incorrect.
2. The Applicants further submit the Respondent has demonstrated bias in the decision-making process and provides the following examples:
   1. Pre-judging the application with statements such as "owners here are against dogs" before considering the application.
   2. Ignoring facts specific to the application, as there was no evidence of nuisance or damage, yet these were raised as concerns.
   3. Irrelevant considerations - Worrying about "precedent" for pets instead of assessing the 2nd Applicant's disability-related need. The Applicants say allowing an assistance dog does not mean every pet dog has to be permitted and that all applications should be assessed on merit.
   4. False representations - Claims of a "no dogs" policy when no such policy exists in the articles.
3. The Applicants also make reference to the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) in particular ss.9(2) and 25 and that s.9(2) recognises assistance animals in training that meet hygiene and behaviour standards, whilst s.25 makes it unlawful to discriminate in accommodation by refusing an assistance animal.
4. The Applicant further submits that the NT Anti-Discrimination Act 1992 assists them in their application as s.19(1)(j) prohibits discrimination in accommodation on the ground of disability, whilst s.20 makes it unlawful to impose a condition that disadvantages a person with a disability unless it is reasonable.
5. The Applicant submit that refusing the 2nd Applicant's assistance dog without evidence of nuisance or risk is not reasonable.
6. The Applicants then go on to address aspects of the Respondent's first written submissions as follows:

"Not fully qualified" - The Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) protects assistance animals in training.

"Potential nuisance or damage" - There is no evidence of any such risk as the dog is trained, controlled, and meets behaviour standards.

"Precedent for other animals" - The issue is a disability need, not a general pet request; each case must be assessed individually.

1. "Alternative supports" - the dog provides unique, ongoing support that cannot be replaced by other measures.
2. In terms of the Respondent's reliance on and citing of the matter of Yerriah v The Proprietors of Unit Plan 24/84 [2019] NTCAT 22 (Yerriah) as addressing similar facts and issues as this application, they say the facts of that matter are distinguishable as against the facts in this case and submit as follows:
   1. Mr Yerriah sought permission to keep a small dog, Marcus, in his apartment at the Marrakai Apartments.
   2. By-law 4(t) of that body corporate had a strict "no pets" rule, except for birds or fish with written approval. Pets already approved before 2001 could remain under a grandfather clause.
   3. Mr Yerriah attempted to Change the By-law: by proposing changes in 2017 and 2018 to allow small dogs under conditions (e.g. carried through common areas), but these motions failed.
   4. The dog in that matter had a certificate from Therapy Dog International, which however it did not meet NT legal standards for assistance animals.
   5. The Tribunal in that matter upheld the body corporate's decision to refuse the dog on the basis that the by-Iaw was valid, as reflected in the default position in Schedule 1 of the UTA, and was not found to be unreasonable, oppressive, or unjust under section 106(1)(c) of the UTA.
   6. The above matter considered the NSW decision in Yardy v Owners Corporation SP 57237 [2018] NSWCATCD 19, in which the Owners Corporation had a by-law allowing pets only with written approval, and had refused and application for a dog to be allowed to live within the unit complex without giving reasons. The Tribunal found the refusal to be harsh and oppressive under NSW law and allowed the dog to stay. This Tribunal distinguished Yardy on the basis that the presumption in NSW is to allow dogs as pets in unit complexes under that jurisdiction, which is the juxtaposition to the presumption in the NT, which is for non-allowance of pets without express approval of the body corporate.
3. The Applicants submit the difference in this matter to the decision in Yerriah is that the Respondent's articles explicitly allow animal applications and require decisions to be made reasonably. The Applicants had provided medical evidence, committed to full compliance with the pet application process, and proposed practical measures to minimise impact on other residents.
4. The Applicants further submitted that their dog meets the legal definition under s.9(2) of the DAA and that most importantly their application is for an assistance animal in training - not a pet - and is protected under s.25 of the DAA and s.19(1)(j) of the ADA.
5. Finally, the Applicants submit that if the Tribunal in Yardy intervened to prevent unfair treatment of a pet, then the legal imperative to protect a disability support animal is an even stronger ground for the Tribunal to intervene and make orders in favour of the Applicants.
6. The Respondent's further submissions in response to the Applicant's further submissions are as follows:

1. The Unit Titles Act 1975 (NT) ("UTA") provides:
   • Section 32(1): a committee must be constituted for each body corporate, and subject to the Act, it performs all duties and functions and may exercise all powers of the corporation.
   • Section 32(2): the committee exercises its powers as the corporation in general meeting directs, or in the absence of such a resolution, as the committee thinks fit.
   • Section 34(a): the body corporate remains responsible for the control, management and administration of common property and the enforcement of the Articles.
2. The effect is that the committee is empowered to decide animal applications under the Articles, unless reserved to general meeting. At the same time, the corporation in its general meetings retains power to resolve the matter under s 32(2).

1. The corporation's registered Articles provide:
   • Article 8.1-8.6: animals are prohibited unless there is "specific written consent of the Body Corporate." Consent may be given subject to conditions and must not be withheld for guide dogs for visually impaired residents.
   • Article 16.1: the registered Articles prevail over the default Articles in Schedule 1 where inconsistent.
2. Although Article 8 governs, and it does not stipulate that approval must be given by general meeting, under s 32(1)-(2) UTA, the committee was empowered to determine the application, but the corporation in general meeting was equally entitled to resolve it. The referral to an Extraordinary General Meeting ("EGM") therefore, although not required, was lawful.
3. Although the corporation was not required to, they elected to mirror the democratic process in Article 4(f) of Schedule 1 by calling a general meeting, and they were not prevented from doing so by the UTA or the registered articles of the Corporation.

Tribunal's Role under s 106(1)(c) UTA

1. Under s 106(1)(c) of the UTA, the Tribunal may vary or revoke a decision of a body corporate only if it is "unreasonable, oppressive or unjust."
2. The Tribunal's task is to consider, in the strata context, whether the decision was unfair in the circumstances. The fact that another outcome might also have been open does not of itself establish that the decision made was unreasonable, oppressive or unjust.

1. Section 9(2) of the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) ("DDA") defines an assistance animal. The Northern Territory has no statutory accreditation scheme and no prescribed training organisations. Certificates issued by NT providers do not establish assistance animal status under the DDA.
2. The Respondent submits that by extension, the dog cannot meet the criteria of a dog "trained.. to assist a person with a disability..." in s(2)(c) where no such accredited or recognised provider has provided the training.
3. Even if the dog may one day meet the statutory criteria, the body corporate was required to decide the application based on the animal's status and the information before it at the time. The Tribunal also has no jurisdiction to enforce rights under the DDA as the DDA is federal law and does not confer jurisdiction on NTCAT.
4. The corporation was therefore entitled to treat the dog as a pet subject to the Articles.

1. The correct question under s 106(1)(c) is whether the decision was unreasonable, oppressive or unjust.
2. The Tribunal has considered this test in Yerriah v The Proprietors of Unit Plan 24/84 [2019] NTCAT 22. In that case, the Tribunal upheld the enforcement of a "no pets" by-law, holding that the refusal of a pet application was not unreasonable, oppressive or unjust. The Tribunal emphasised that the decision was consistent with a valid by-law that reflected the statutory default, and that the refusal was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
3. The Articles in this matter are slightly different, in that Article 8.1 permits the body corporate to give consent in appropriate cases. That distinction does not alter the analysis. Here, the Applicant's request was in fact circulated and considered at a properly convened meeting. The fact that proprietors generally adopt a cautious stance against dogs is consistent with Article 8.1, which establishes prohibition as the baseline. The important point is that the request was considered, and the decision to refuse was a valid and reasoned exercise of discretion - not a blanket or arbitrary disposal.
4. The decision was therefore not unreasonable, oppressive or unjust.

1. The Applicant has suggested that the proprietors' predisposition against dogs shows prejudice. That is misconceived.
   • Article 8.1 establishes that animals are prohibited unless consent is granted. The default position is therefore "no dogs" unless permission is given.
   • A predisposition consistent with the Articles is not prejudice or bias; it is the starting point prescribed by the corporation's rules.
   • What matters is that the proprietors were presented with the Applicant's request, considered it, and resolved not to grant consent.

1. The body corporate is the collective of proprietors, and its decisions represent the community's view about how it wishes to live together under the Articles. Section 106(1)(c) of the UTA provides an important safeguard, allowing the Tribunal to set aside decisions that are unreasonable, oppressive or unjust. At the same time, care must be taken not to undermine the purpose of community decision-making. Where a decision has been made in accordance with the UTA and Articles and is rational and consistent with the scheme's baseline rules, it will generally not be unfair to uphold the outcome even if others might have reached a different conclusion. Overturning such a decision can itself risk unfairness to the majority of the proprietors who bought into the scheme on the basis of the existing Articles and who have exercised their rights consistently with them.
2. The Respondent submits that a decision reached by the majority in accordance with the statutory requirements is presumed valid unless:
   1. it is made outside the powers conferred by the Act or Articles; or
3. it is exercised for an improper purpose or in a manner that no reasonable body corporate could adopt, neither of which apply in the present matter.

1. The Applicant has submitted that the proprietors did not see all relevant material. The documents not circulated were her own medical records, which she requested not be distributed for privacy reasons. The body corporate respected that instruction. All other material she authorised was provided. The decision was therefore made on the information she chose to present.

1. The body corporate acted lawfully and within its powers under the Unit Titles Act 1975 (NT) and its registered Articles. The EGM was not required, but was a lawful mechanism for deciding the application.
2. Under s 106(1)(c) UTA, the Tribunal may only intervene if the decision was unreasonable, oppressive or unjust. As confirmed in Yerriah, a refusal of consent to keep a dog is not unreasonable, oppressive or unjust where it is consistent with valid Articles, rationally based, and not arbitrary or capricious. That is precisely the case here. The decision was procedurally proper, rational, and within the range of outcomes open to the body corporate. It should therefore be upheld.

1. I have given careful consideration to the written submissions of the parties and the evidence filed. To begin with, I do not accept the Applicants' submissions with respect to the Commonwealth DAA. That Act does not confer any jurisdiction on this Tribunal so that no determination can be made by me on any matter that may arise based on that legislation.
2. Similarly, any reliance on the ADA (NT) in these proceedings is also misplaced. The Tribunal may only hear a discrimination claim if a complaint has been made to the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner and either:

(a) The Commissioner accepts the claim and upon investigation determines there is a case to answer and refers the matter to the NTCAT for determination; or

(b) If the Commissioner declines to refer the matter to the NTCAT, the complainant may self-refer the matter on their own motion. This has not occurred in this instance.

1. Turning to the merits of this application, the facts are generally similar to those in Yerriah. Both Applicants had claimed the dog in question was a necessity as a "care dog" or "comfort dog" to provide support for psychological illness or injury.
2. In Yerriah, it was determined by (then) Member O'Reilly held "the decision by the body corporate to effectively adopt and enforce the statutorily created default position cannot be said to be unreasonable, oppressive or unjust". Whilst it is true that the facts in this matter are slightly varied in that article 8 gives the body corporate a discretion to allow pets on application by a unit owner, where as in Yerriah there was a clear prohibition, this cannot in my view be interpreted as meaning there is a legitimate expectation that an application for approval to house a pet within the unit complex will be granted.
3. I agree with the Respondent that the process instigated by the Respondent to hold a general meeting of members to determine the Applicants' request was a lawful act and reasonable in all the circumstances. I am further satisfied that the Respondent did all that was reasonably possible to provide all the information the Applicants had provided for consideration by the membership of the Respondent and the determination by a majority of the membership was both reasoned and lawfully open to them to make.
4. I therefore find the decision of the membership of the Respondent to refuse the Applicants' request to house their pet dog was not "unreasonable, oppressive or unjust" and was a fair and reasonable decision open to them. Similarly, a member of the Respondent could not have sought to have a decision to grant the request overturned if the majority had found in favour of the Applicants.
5. For the foregoing reasons, the application is dismissed.
6. I note there is no application by the Respondent for their costs. The respondent has leave to make a costs application within 7 days of the date these orders and reasons are published, however I note the starting position under the NTCAT Act that parties should bear their own costs and the requirements under s.132 to be met for that position to be altered.
7. If an application for costs is filed within the time allowed, the Applicants may file and serve submissions in reply within 7 days from the date the costs application is filed.
8. Should no application for costs be filed by the Respondent within the time allowed, the file shall be closed.