On occasions, prior to the return trip some or all of the members would stop at a cafe in Portarlington.

On 9 July 2014 at about 08.45, the applicant was riding his bicycle in a westerly direction along the Esplanade, Portarlington when he collided with the rear of a parked truck. The truck was lawfully parked on the roadway immediately adjacent to 46 the Esplanade. There was no one in the truck. The truck's ignition was turned off.

As a result of the collision, the applicant sustained a number of injuries, including T2 complete paraplegia.

The purpose of the ride on 9 July 2014 was not connected with the farm operated by the applicant. The applicant intended to work on the farm when he returned from the ride.

1. I received a large number of statements in this matter. The statements are in accord with the Statement of Agreed Facts. On the morning of the hearing, I received an amended further statement from Mr Wilson, dated 6 June 2016. Based on the unchallenged statement, I also accept that prior to the ride Mr Wilson completed some tasks associated with his farm work.

1. Mr Wilson contends that when he collided with the parked vehicle, he was travelling back to his place of employment and that relying on the ordinary natural meaning of the words "travelling to and from his place of employment", he is covered by the legislative provision.
2. The TAC referred me to a line of authorities in which the phrases 'travelling to' and 'travelling from' imported a connection between the employment and the travelling. The TAC contended that the travelling must in some sense be connected to the employment. Accordingly, because the purpose of the ride was recreational and had no connection whatsoever to Mr Wilson's work, he is not covered.
3. The TAC further contended that because Mr Wilson resides at the same geographical location as his place of employment, when he left that geographical location for private purposes, he left his home.

1. Mr Wilson invited me to consider the language employed in the text of the legislation, considered in its context. He referred me to the following passage from the decision of the High Court of Australia in Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Territory Revenue (NT) [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] :

This Court has said on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself... The language which has actually been employed in the text of the legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of the provision in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy

1. This is of course consistent with section 35 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) which provides that in the interpretation of an Act:

A construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act or subordinate instrument (whether or not that purpose or object is expressly stated in the act or subordinate instrument) shall be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object

1. The TAC, in support of its contention that there must be some connection between the employment and the travel, referred me to a number of authorities in which the phrase (or like phrase) "travelling to or from his place of employment" had been the subject of judicial consideration.
2. In Adcock v Commonwealth [1960] HCA 24; (1960) 103 CLR 194, the High Court held that section 9A of the Commonwealth Employees Compensation Act had no application to an employee who lived at his place of employment. Fullagar J said (at 203 - 204):

[the phrases "travelling to" and "travelling from"] both import the existence of some connection between the travelling and employment. The employment must be in some sense the occasion of the travelling.

1. In Australian Coastal Shipping Commission v Averell [1969] HCA 38; (1969) 122 CLR 348 at 351, the High Court said

in a series of cases,... The Court has considered the meaning and application of section 9A of the Commonwealth Employees Compensation Act and has established, not without dissent, that a worker can only be said to be travelling to or from his employment if there is a "real connection between the journey and the employment in the sense that the immediate purpose of the employee in making the journey must be either to enter upon the duties which his employment imposes upon him or to absent himself temporarily from those duties", to use the language of Fullagar J. In The Commonwealth v Wright what has been found to be implicit in the section is the necessity for a journey from a place of abode, permanent or temporary, to a place where the duties of employment are to be performed.

1. Further, in Jamieson v Repatriation Commission per Fitzgerald J in Davey v Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd [1953] S.A.S.R 35 Napier C.J. said at 38-39:

It seems to me that "travelling to or from his place of employment" refers to a seamen who is joining his ship or going home. It may, perhaps, apply when a sailor is going on or returning from leave, and whether the place in which he spends his leave is his permanent home or a temporary residence, but it does not cover a seamen going to a race meeting, or to a public house for a drink, or, as in the present case, for a stroll ashore to post a letter. On the facts and evidence, the appellant was not travelling to or from the ship. He was returning from a walk ashore.

Without either suggesting that what was said by Napier C. J. affords a judicial substitute for the statutory language or attempting an exhaustive explanation of what is meant by the provision, His Honour's statement is clear authority for the proposition that an employee (or a member of the services) who resides at the place where he is employed will not be travelling to his place of employment if he left it for private purposes, is not returning from a period of even temporary residence elsewhere, and his immediate purpose returning is that the place to which he is travelling is the place which he resides. No more is needed to defeat the appellants claim.

1. Both parties referred me to the words of the Honourable Mr Cameron (the then Minister for WorkCover) during the second reading of the Transport Accident (Amendment) Bill 2000:

The bill also extends access to TAC benefits to a cyclist who is injured in a collision with a parked vehicle while riding to or from work. Honourable members will be aware that if a cyclist, such as a bicycle courier, collides with a parked motor vehicle during the course of his or her work duties, he/she is eligible for WorkCover benefits. However, as the respective Acts currently stand, neither WorkCover nor the TAC provide access to benefits for cyclists injured in a collision with a parked vehicle while on their way to or from work. That anomaly is now corrected

1. Neither of the approaches in construction adopted by the parties is controversial.
2. As a starting point, it is of course important to look to the natural meaning of the words and the context in which they appear.
3. It is equally important to look to relevant authorities.
4. It is of note in this case that the authorities were not dealing with any provisions of the Act. The authorities variously dealt with section 9A of The Commonwealth Employees Compensation Act 1930 to 1967 (Cth) which was directed to benefit injured employees who had travelled to and from employment by the shortest convenient route for the journey; section 5AA (1) of the Seaman's Compensation Act 1911-1964 (Cth), which provided compensation for personal injury by an accident caused to a seaman "while he is travelling to or from his employment"; and section 107M(1) of the Repatriation Act 1920 (Cth) which referred to "an accident that happened to the member while he was travelling to or from his place of employment on defence service or peacekeeping service".
5. I agree with the submissions of Mr Wilson that the nexus to employment in each of these legislative provisions is arguably clearer than under the relevant Act. It is always necessary to exercise a degree of caution before preferring judicial consideration of differently worded sections in different legislation to the natural and ordinary wording of the Act and its broader statutory purpose. Historical considerations cannot displace the text, its context and the purpose of the provision.
6. I commence then with a consideration of the relevant legislative provision.

What do the words 'travelling to or from his or her place of employment' mean?

1. On any reading of the provision, in order for Mr Wilson to succeed, I need to determine whether at the time of the accident, Mr Wilson was travelling to or from his place of employment.
2. I agree with Mr Wilson that it does not necessarily follow when giving the words their natural meaning that the purpose of the journey must be for employment purposes.
3. Similarly, there is nothing in the text of the provision which would require the cyclist to be commuting to or from his or her home or place of abode.
4. There is nothing contained in the words of the sub-section to restrict the meaning in that way.
5. There is nothing in the purpose and objects of the Act to infer such an unnecessarily narrow construction of the words. Why, for example, should an individual travelling to his or her place of employment from a recreational lunchtime ride not be covered by the provision?
6. Nevertheless I consider the words of the section do require, in line with the authorities, some connection to be made between travelling and the place of employment. The legislature has seen fit to connect the one to the other in order for an individual to qualify for entitlement to compensation under the Act.

1. Clearly the travel must either commence or end at the place of employment. It is not enough that an individual is travelling to or from a particular geographical location. That geographical location must be the individual's place of employment.
2. When the geographical location is both an individual's home and place of employment, I do not consider that it is sufficient to show that the individual was travelling to or from an address. It must be shown that he or she was travelling to his or her place of employment.
3. This is a question of fact to be determined having regard to all of the circumstances.
4. Sometimes, for example, intervening factors may lead to a finding that the travel to or from the place of employment has ceased and another journey has begun.
5. Sometimes, there will be a dispute as to whether a particular geographical location is actually a cyclist's place of employment for the purpose of the Act.

1. On this construction, none of the anomalies suggested by Mr Wilson arise. A lunchtime recreational ride may well be covered if indeed an individual was travelling to or from their place of employment.
2. There is nothing anomalous about a group of cyclists on an early morning ride being treated differently where some are travelling to their place of employment and others are not. The legislative provisions are not designed to cover all cyclists.
3. It would not matter what activities the person travelling to their place of employment was engaging in once they arrived at their place of employment - they would be covered.

Was Mr Wilson 'travelling to or from his place of employment'?

1. Mr Wilson both resides and works at 208 Princes Street. The geographical location is both his place of residence and place of employment.
2. If 208 Princes Street was only his home address and Mr Wilson had never been employed or worked at that address, he would clearly not be entitled to compensation under section 3(1A)(c) of the Act.
3. Conversely, if 208 Princes Street was only his place of work, and Mr Wilson had never lived at that address, he would in my opinion be entitled to compensation upon establishing that he was travelling to or from that address.
4. The only way to establish if Mr Wilson was travelling to or from his place of residence or his place of employment is to examine all the facts to see whether those facts connect the travel to his place of employment or his place of residence.
5. In this case, it is known that the travel engaged in by Mr Wilson was entirely recreational. It was a recreational ride with friends. It was akin in this way to the usual activities engaged in by a person in their private capacity, travelling from home. It is impossible on any construction to connect the travel to Mr Wilson's place of employment.
6. Mr Wilson was at pains to show he had conducted work activities on the day in question and intended engaging in further work activities upon his return. His evidence was, however, completely silent as to whether he had engaged in any home-based activities, such as breakfast, dressing, washing, changing into cycling gear and so on.
7. I do not consider that what Mr Wilson was doing in the moments before travel to be a determinative consideration in this case. From one moment to the next, an individual who works from home may be switching between the performance of home-based activities and employment-related duties.
8. A much more accurate picture is gleaned from the known fact that the ride was purely recreational. I am satisfied that when Mr Wilson travelled, on 9 July 2014, he did so from his place of residence and not his place of employment. He was travelling back to his place of residence when he struck the parked vehicle. He was at no relevant time for the purpose of compensation under the Act travelling to his place of employment. It was, in the words of the TAC, 'simply a coincidence that the address was the same address as his place of employment.'
9. It is on this basis that his application must fail.

1. I accept the submission of Mr Wilson that the legislation is beneficial legislation which should be constructed in his favour where there is ambiguity. I do not, however, consider that there is any ambiguity. It is not ambiguity in the legislative provisions which leads to complexity when an individual works from home. It is that the place of employment and place of residence are the same. It is then a question of fact as to where Mr Wilson was travelling to or from.
2. On the day in question, Mr Wilson took a recreational bike ride. He did not need to travel to his place of employment because he was already there. His desire to interpose a recreational bike ride into his day had no connection whatsoever to travel to or from his place of employment.
3. I will affirm the decision of the respondent.