Wilson v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2026] NSWSC 636 | Case summary | Zoe

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HIS HONOUR: The plaintiff has filed two summons seeking review of two decisions by the Law Society of New South Wales (“the Law Society”) in respect of his practising certificate.
In the original summons, the plaintiff sought a merits review of the decision of the Law Society to issue his practising certificate with conditions. The Law Society then made a decision on 20 February 2026, cancelling the plaintiff's practising certificate. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a further summons seeking review of that decision.
As set out in s 100 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (NSW), there is a right of appeal for review in respect of decisions made about practising certificates. The plaintiff, as the holder of an Australian practising certificate, is entitled to come to Court seeking a merits review of the decision. That is what the plaintiff is doing in these proceedings.
The matter comes before me today for the purposes of determining a motion originally filed by the plaintiff on 25 March 2026, in which he seeks orders to the effect of “preventing, prohibiting, recusing, injuncting and restraining” two persons from having any involvement in these proceedings, being:
Ms K Morgan SC, senior counsel for the defendant in these proceedings; and
Ms J Ball, a partner at Clayton Utz and said to be a current member of the Council of the Law Society and a former President of the Law Society.
The second motion is a motion filed by the defendant, the Law Society, seeking to strike out a notice to produce served by the plaintiff on 19 May 2026.
The defendant seeks to strike out the notice to produce, on the basis that it does not comply with r 21.10(1)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”). At the commencement of the hearing today, the plaintiff objected to the defendant’s motion proceeding today on the basis that the motion and affidavit had not been filed. However, he plainly had the documents and accepted that he had read them.
I initially indicated that the matter would proceed because the point raised by the defendant seemed to be a discrete point, and the plaintiff presents as a solicitor of considerable experience, well able to understand and make legal arguments. However, at the end of the hearing, the plaintiff revisited his objection, again suggesting that the motion should not proceed because it had not been properly filed, but also maintaining that he felt unable to deal with the defendant’s submissions on the strike out application because he had not received any written submissions.
I pointed out to the plaintiff that I had not many any order for service of written submissions, but he said that he needed time to consider any submissions in response.
In these circumstances, I stood the hearing of the defendant's motion over, part heard, for further hearing until 4pm on 26 May 2026.
This judgment only deals with the plaintiff’s application that neither Ms Morgan nor Ms Ball have any ongoing involvement in the proceedings.

Ms Morgan clearly is involved in the proceedings as she is Senior Counsel retained by the defendant.
The point raised by the plaintiff in respect of Ms Morgan is more complex. It is to the effect that, as she is married to McHugh JA, a judge of the New South Wales Court of Appeal and is the daughter-in-law of the Hon Michael McHugh AC KC, formerly a High Court judge, then she should be precluded from acting in these proceedings. Indeed, the plaintiff initially named Ms Morgan as “Mrs McHugh”, but I directed that he file an amended motion correcting her name.
The reason that it is asserted that she should be precluded in acting in these proceedings is that:
McHugh JA is said to have acted for the plaintiff in earlier proceedings. There appears to be no dispute that McHugh JA was retained and did so act for the plaintiff in an application for freezing orders at some stage in the past, perhaps 15-20 years ago; and
Mr Michael McHugh appeared as a mediator in a case involving the plaintiff at some point, after he left the High Court in the period 2021-2023.
The plaintiff submits that both McHugh JA and Mr McHugh would therefore potentially be in receipt of confidential information. He also points to the fact that McHugh JA, in his position as a judge of the Court of Appeal, heard a case involving him and that, at the outset of that case, his Honour made a number of statements relating to, firstly, his earlier involvement with the plaintiff when he acted for him back in 2006, and, secondly, information that he had gleamed that morning to the effect that his wife, Ms Morgan, had been retained by the Law Society to act for the Law Society in this case.
The plaintiff says that in all these circumstances, a fair minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that Ms Morgan be prevented from acting in the proceedings: Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561; [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [76] (Brereton J). See also The Estate of Tabain [2025] NSWSC 690 at [23] (Slattery J).
Ms Morgan appears on this application. She was instructed by the Law Society to do so. She volunteered that the circumstances of her appearance are slightly unusual, but that the Law Society maintains she is quite entitled to appear and oppose the plaintiff's application.

The first basis on which the plaintiff’s application might succeed is that there is a real and tangible possibility of the misuse of confidential information. The plaintiff submits that that is likely to have already occurred, having regard to the “discussions”, which the plaintiff asserts must have taken place between McHugh JA and Ms Morgan at home, that morning, before the commencement of the case which McHugh JA was hearing.
He makes his submission based on the transcript of what McHugh JA said at the outset of that hearing, in the process of asking the parties whether there was any difficulty in his Honour hearing the case.
The problem with the plaintiff’s submission on this issue is that, on a fair reading of the transcript, there can be no suggestion or inference that there was any disclosure of any confidential information.
All that is said to have happened is that McHugh JA was informed by Ms Morgan that she was retained to act for the Law Society in a case involving the plaintiff. The plaintiff conceded of course that Ms Morgan was never in receipt of confidential information about him because she had not previously appeared for him. There could not be any suggestion, in those circumstances, that Ms Morgan provided confidential information to McHugh JA and there could not be any suggestion of even a possibility that that occurred.
The only inference from the plaintiff’s reliance on the conversation between Ms Morgan and McHugh JA would thus be that McHugh JA provided confidential information to Ms Morgan, and that she should be restrained from acting because she is now in receipt of that confidential information.
There is no evidence put forward by the plaintiff to support that proposition. His submission is to the effect that it must have occurred, because they are husband and wife and were talking about the case at home.
Firstly, there is no evidence that they were talking about the case. The evidence is limited to the information provided by Ms Morgan that she had been retained. Secondly, the plaintiff has not identified any information that McHugh JA might have had, which he says there was a risk might be passed on to Ms Morgan.
McHugh JA appeared for the plaintiff back in 2006, in respect of an application for freezing orders. It is difficult to understand what information he might be passing on, and, indeed, I would not accept without evidence to the contrary that McHugh JA was likely to be passing on confidential information to Ms Morgan.
The second basis on which the application might succeed is what is said to be a duty of loyalty owed by the former legal representative to the former client. Again, I accept that that principle applies, but I do not understand how it could be said to apply in this case.
The current application is not being made in respect of any ongoing involvement of McHugh JA in any case of the plaintiff. It is made in respect of the ongoing involvement of Ms Morgan. She has not previously acted for the plaintiff. The proposition that in some way Ms Morgan should be restrained from acting, because her husband had previously acted for the plaintiff, cannot be accepted.
I do not accept the proposition advanced by the plaintiff that the wife of a person who previously acted for him should be restrained from acting in proceedings against him. It is to be hoped that the law, and the practice of the law, has long since moved on from the idea that the knowledge of the husband is the knowledge of the wife, or vice versa.
The third basis on which the plaintiff’s application might succeed is said to be the Court's inherent jurisdiction to ensure the proper administration of justice. Whilst the plaintiff really relied on all three bases, he did emphasise at the end of his submissions that a fair-minded observer or, more correctly, a fair minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice required that Ms Morgan not be allowed to continue to act.
He was quite adamant that the public would be, in some way, horrified by Ms Morgan acting in these proceedings.
Of course, the Court should be cautious before making any orders precluding counsel from appearing. In general terms, the basis for any disqualification must be exceptional circumstances. It may be that if I was satisfied that the partner of a legal practitioner would or might reveal confidential information exceptional circumstances would be satisfied.
However, as I have already said, there is no evidence on which such a finding could be made.
I am thus left with the final submission that the proper administration of justice requires that Ms Morgan be precluded from acting for the Law Society in these proceedings. This is essentially an evaluative decision, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case.
Those facts and circumstances include the risk of confidential information being provided, and any other matters relating to the involvement of counsel in earlier proceedings, and in any earlier involvement with the plaintiff.
Ms Morgan has had no earlier involvement with the plaintiff. As such, I do not accept that because she is the wife of McHugh JA and the daughter in law of Mr Michael McHugh, that she should be precluded from acting.
I do not accept that a fair minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that she be precluded from acting.
In those circumstances, the plaintiff's motion is dismissed.
At the request of the plaintiff, I will make an order that there is to be no publication of these proceedings, or this judgment, until further order of the court at the conclusion of the hearing of the defendant’s notice of motion at 4pm on 26 May 2026.

Wilson v Council of the Law Society of New South Wales [2026] NSWSC 636 | Case summary | Zoe