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[2026] NSWDC 126
General information, not legal advice.
District Court of NSW
2026-05-05
Cole DCJ
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Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Williams v Australian Postal Corporation t/as Australia Post [2026] NSWDC 126
Hearing dates: 23 April 2026
Date of orders: 5 May 2026
Decision date: 05 May 2026
Jurisdiction: Civil
Before: Cole DCJ
Decision: (1) To the extent provided for in these orders, the Amended Notice of Motion filed by the plaintiff on 21 April 2026 is granted, and the remainder of the Amended Notice of Motion is dismissed.
(2) Transfer District Court proceedings No 2026/00056151 to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
(3) No order as to costs.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — Jurisdiction — Transfers to and from other courts – Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 144(2) – transfer from District Court to Supreme Court
Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 144
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), s 138B; Sch 2 – Australian Consumer Law, ss 18, 21, 232, 234, 236, 237, 243, 267(4), 272
District Court Act 1973 (NSW), ss, 44(1), 135
Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW), ss 28, 30(3)
Cases Cited: The NTF Group Pty Ltd v Pa Putney Finance Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 324 FLR 261; [2017] NSWSC 1194
Man Hay Lau v Anglican Community Services [2025] NSWDC 193
Mahommed v Unicomb [2017] NSWCA 65
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Michael Williams (Plaintiff) (self-represented)
Australian Postal Corporation trading as Australia Post (First Defendant)
Star Track Express Pty Ltd trading as Star Track (Second Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
C Amato (Defendants)
Solicitors:
Corrs Chambers Westgarth (Defendants)
File Number(s): 2026/56151
Publication restriction: Nil
By Amended Notice of Motion, dated 21 April 2026, the plaintiff, Mr Michael Williams, seeks the transfer of these proceedings to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
The defendants, Australian Postal Corporation, trading as Australia Post (‘Australia Post’), and Star Track Express Pty Ltd, trading as StarTrack (‘StarTrack’), whilst providing written and oral submissions in response to the plaintiff’s application, have essentially taken a neutral stance to the transfer sought.
The proceedings concern six alleged instances of the loss of a parcel sent to the plaintiff’s business address using the services of one or other of the defendants between and including 11 August 2025 and 17 November 2025. Further instances of conduct between January 2024 and January 2026 by the defendants with respect to deliveries are alleged, including non-delivery, mis-delivery, unattended delivery contrary to instructions and inaccurate delivery completion records, causing loss to the plaintiff.
To summarise, briefly and non-comprehensively, the plaintiff sues in contract, bailment, conversion, detinue and negligence and seeks damages for economic and non-economic loss. The plaintiff seeks restitution. The plaintiff also alleges misleading and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct pursuant to ss 18 and 21 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) and Schedule 2 of the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) and seeks remedies under the ACL including damages under s 236 and orders under s 237, s 232 and s 243. It may be that orders under s 234 of the ACL will also be sought in the course of the proceedings. The plaintiff also “pleads consumer guarantee rights” under Chapter 3, Part 3-2 Division 1 of the ACL, and seeks “damages/compensation” under s 267(4) and s 272, together with “declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent ongoing breaches” under s 18 and s 21 of the ACL.
144 Transfer of certain proceedings from District Court to Supreme Court
(1) This section applies to proceedings under Subdivision 2 of Division 8 of Part 3 of the District Court Act 1973.
(2) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it lacks, or may lack, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the proceedings, the District Court must order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court.
(3) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (2)—
(a) are to be continued in the Supreme Court—
(i) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and
(ii) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court, or
(b) if the Supreme Court so orders, are to be remitted to the District Court and continued in the District Court as if they had not been transferred.
(4) The District Court has, and may exercise, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of proceedings the subject of an order by the Supreme Court under subsection (3)(b), including such jurisdiction as is necessary to determine any question arising in any such proceedings.
(5) If, during proceedings to which this section applies, the District Court decides that it is appropriate to do so for any reason other than the reason referred to in subsection (2), the District Court may order that the proceedings be transferred to the Supreme Court.
(6) Proceedings that are transferred to the Supreme Court under subsection (5), are to be continued in the Supreme Court—
(a) as if the proceedings had been duly commenced in the Supreme Court on the date on which they were commenced in the District Court, and
(b) as if any cross-claim in the proceedings had been duly made in the Supreme Court on the date on which it was made in the District Court.
(7) Subject to the rules of court applicable in the Supreme Court, the power of the Supreme Court to make orders as to costs includes a power to make orders with respect to the costs of—
(a) the application for, and the making of, an order under subsection (2) or (5), and
(b) any step taken in the proceedings before an order under subsection (2) or (5) was made.
(8) The making of an order under subsection (2) or (5) does not invalidate any order previously made by the District Court in the proceedings.
135 Jurisdiction in proceedings under the Fair Trading Act 1987
The Court has the same jurisdiction as the Supreme Court, and may exercise all the powers and authority of the Supreme Court, in any proceedings in which relief is sought under the Fair Trading Act 1987 and where the amount of the claim concerned does not exceed the amount for the time being specified in section 44(1)(a).
28 Application of Australian Consumer Law
(1) The Australian Consumer Law text, as in force from time to time—
(a) applies as a law of this jurisdiction, and
(b) as so applying may be referred to as the Australian Consumer Law (NSW), and
(c) as so applying is a part of this Act.
(2) This section has effect subject to sections 29, 30 and 31.
The plaintiff argued, in effect, that the District Court has power to transfer these proceedings to the Supreme Court under s 144 of the Civil Procedure Act because, under the Fair Trading Act, the ACL applies “as a law of this jurisdiction”, being the jurisdiction of the State of New South Wales. In his statement of claim, the plaintiff seeks remedies under the ACL, as I have said above, at [4]. Those parts of the plaintiff’s claim amount to claims for relief under the Fair Trading Act for the purposes of s 135 of the District Court Act. The requirement of s 144(1) of the Civil Procedure Act is therefore satisfied. I accept this argument.
The power to transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court must be exercised if “the District Court decides that it lacks, or may lack, jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the proceedings (s 144(2) Civil Procedure Act)”.
The ACL, in s 232, confers power upon “a court” to grant an injunction in specified circumstances. The ACL, in s 234, confers power on the court to grant an interim injunction in specified circumstances. Sections 232 and 234 of the ACL are in Division 2 of Part 5-2 of the ACL.
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) provides, in s 138B:
Conferring jurisdiction on State and Territory Courts
(1) Jurisdiction is conferred on the several courts of the States and Territories in relation to any matter arising under this Part or the Australian Consumer Law in respect of which a civil proceeding is instituted by a person other than the Commonwealth Minister or the Commission.
(3) The jurisdiction conferred by subsection (1) on the several courts of the States is conferred within the limits of their several jurisdictions, whether those limits are as to locality, subject matter or otherwise.
(4) The jurisdiction conferred by subsection (1) on the several courts of the Territories is conferred to the extent that the Constitution permits.
(5) This section is not to be taken to enable an inferior court of a State or a Territory to grant a remedy other than a remedy of a kind that the court is able to grant under the law of that State or Territory.
As I have said, the Fair Trading Act applies the ACL as a law of New South Wales and the District Court Act, in s 135 confers upon the District Court “the same jurisdiction as the Supreme Court” and “all the powers and authority of the Supreme Court” in any proceedings in which relief is sought under the Fair Trading Act where the amount of the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court (subject to exceptions not presently applicable).
The Fair Trading Act also provides, in s 30(3):
30 Meaning of generic terms in Australian Consumer Law for purposes of this jurisdiction
…
(3) In the following provisions of the Australian Consumer Law (NSW), court means the Supreme Court—
(a) section 218,
(b) Division 2 of Part 5-2,
(c) Division 4 of Part 5-2,
(d) sections 246, 247, 248 and 250.
As I have said, ss 232 and 234 of the ACL are in Division 2 of Part 5-2.
In The N**TF Group Pty Ltd v Pa Putney Finance Australia Pty Ltd (2017) 324 FLR 261; [2017] NSWSC 1194 (‘NTF’), Parker J considered the question of whether the District Court had jurisdiction in relation to proceedings in which a remedy was sought under s 237 of the ACL, which is in Division 4 of Part 5-2 and is therefore also subject to s 30(3) of the Fair Trading Act in the same way as ss 232 and 234 of the ACL. Parker J said:
- It is also necessary to consider whether the District Court would have had jurisdiction to entertain the applicants’ cross-claim for relief under the ACL, given the invocation of s 237(1). Having regard to FTA ss 30(2) and (3) (quoted at [29] above), in my opinion, the District Court is relevantly in the same position as the Local Court. The District Court has power to entertain a claim for damages under ACL s 236, but lacks power to entertain a claim under ACL s 237(1), which is reserved to this Court. The Commonwealth jurisdiction conferred by s 138B is, or at least is arguably, limited by analogy in the same way.
- It remains to be considered whether these conclusions are affected by DCA s 135, which provides:
135 Jurisdiction in proceedings under the Fair Trading Act 1987
The Court has the same jurisdiction as the Supreme Court, and may exercise all the powers and authority of the Supreme Court, in any proceedings in which relief is sought under the Fair Trading Act 1987 and where the amount of the claim concerned does not exceed the amount for the time being specified in section 44 (1) (a).
- DCA s 135 was enacted in 1992: Statute Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1992 (NSW), Sch 1. The explanatory note states:
The proposed amendment confers on the District Court (which currently has jurisdiction to hear matters under the Trade Practices Act 1974 of the Commonwealth) the same jurisdiction as the Supreme Court has in relation to proceedings under the Fair Trading Act 1987 (provided that the amount of the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court).
- The note leaves it unclear as to what the enactment of s 135 was designed to achieve. The District Court already had jurisdiction to award damages for contraventions of the FTA under FTA s 68 up to its jurisdictional monetary limit. In this context, the reference to the District Court’s jurisdiction in matters under the TPA is puzzling: for reasons given above, that jurisdiction would appear to have been similarly limited.
- Yet the new power conferred is limited to cases where “the amount of the claim concerned” does not exceed that monetary limit.
- One possibility is that the limitation of jurisdiction only applies in the event that a claim is made for a monetary amount; on this view, the District Court is invested with full jurisdiction to determine any FTA claim, subject only to a limit in monetary damages which may be awarded. This seems an unlikely view of the provision.
- It seems to me that s 135 presupposes that a claim has been made for a monetary sum and simply gives the Court jurisdiction to grant any available non-monetary relief in connection with that claim under the FTA. On this view, the effect of the provision is somewhat limited; but it would mean that if a claim for damages were made under ACL s 236 which fell within the Court’s jurisdictional limit, the Court could instead exercise jurisdiction to make alternative orders under s 237(1). It appears that this was how White J saw the provision operating in Provectus Software (referred to below). On this view, s 135 would not make any difference in the present case, no monetary claim being made in the cross-claim.
- If it had been necessary to consider whether the applicants’ cross-claim could have been brought as a cross-claim in the District Court, I would not have been satisfied that it could.
44 Actions
(1) Subject to this Act, the Court has jurisdiction to hear and dispose of the following actions:
(a) any action of a kind:
(i) which, if brought in the Supreme Court, would be assigned to the Common Law Division of that Court, and
(ii) in which the amount (if any) claimed does not exceed the Court’s jurisdictional limit, whether on a balance of account or after an admitted set-off or otherwise,
other than an action referred to in paragraph (d) or (e),
…
(c) any action brought to recover an amount not exceeding $20,000, which is the whole or part of the unliquidated balance of a partnership account, or the amount or part of the amount of the distributive share under an intestacy or of a legacy under a will,
(c1) subject to paragraph (c), any action arising out of a commercial transaction in which the amount (if any) claimed does not exceed the Court’s jurisdictional limit, whether on a balance of account or after an admitted set-off or otherwise,
It was relevant to the decision in NTF that the proceedings in that matter would not have been assigned to the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court and those proceedings were therefore not encompassed in s 44(1)(a)(i) of the District Court Act.
The plaintiff submitted that, on the basis of the decision of Parker J in NTF, I should form the view that the District Court may lack jurisdiction to hear and dispose of these proceedings. The defendant acknowledged that there is no authority which “squarely determines whether the District Court has jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief pursuant to ss 232 and 234 of the ACL”.
Having regard to the decision of Parker J in NTF, and in the absence of an authoritative decision in relation to ss 232 and 234 of the ACL, I determine that the District Court may lack jurisdiction to hear and dispose of those parts of the plaintiff’s claim which seeks relief under ss 232 and 234 of the ACL. Pursuant to s 144(2) of the Civil Procedure Act, I must transfer the proceedings to the Supreme Court (see Mahommed v Uni**comb [2017] NSWCA 65 at [52] and [55]).
All of the plaintiff’s claim relies upon elements of the course of conduct alleged against the defendants. The plaintiff and the defendant argued that it would not be efficient or economical to split the plaintiff’s claim. I agree. The whole of the proceedings should be transferred.
I note that, pursuant to s 144(3)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act, if the Supreme Court determines that the District Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim, the Supreme Court may remit the matter to the District Court.
The Amended Notice of Motion of 21 April 2026 originally sought various procedural orders in addition to the order transferring the proceedings to the Supreme Court, but the plaintiff accepted that the procedural issues would be for the Supreme Court to determine if the matter were transferred and did not pursue those parts of the Amended Notice of Motion.
The following orders will issue:
To the extent provided for in these orders, the Amended Notice of Motion filed by the plaintiff on 21 April 2026 is granted, and the remainder of the Amended Notice of Motion is dismissed.
Transfer District Court proceedings No 2026/00056151 to the Supreme Court pursuant to s 144(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW).
No order as to costs.
**********
Williams
Australian Postal Corporation t/as Australia Post