(b) The nature and extent of common residence: Roger and I maintained separate residences throughout our relationship, although we spent a lot of time at each other's places. Between 2005 and 2008, Roger's house at 245 William Street, Devonport was like a 'second home' to me. I was around there often, I helped him with the 'Spunky Stuff' business, we often ate there, I often slept over there, I kept some clothes there. Between about 2010 and the date of Roger's death, our relationship developed again to the point where my home was like a 'second home' to Roger. He always knew he could get clean clothes and a meal at my place, and he slept over reasonably often, although the common bonds between us (by this stage) were our friendship and companionship, rather than sex. For at least the last 3 years before Roger's death he would come round to my place almost daily for a hot meal, he would bring his washing round for me to do, he would water and maintain the vegetable garden he built for me, he would assist with household maintenance and he would stay over probably 2 to 3 nights a week. By this stage he was keeping clothes, shoes and bathroom toiletries at my place;

(c) Whether or not a sexual relationship exists: Roger and I maintained a sexual relationship throughout the whole of our relationship, except between the period from about 2008 to early 2010;

(d) The degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between the parties: Roger and I always kept separate bank accounts. I organised and paid most of Roger's accounts for him via online banking. I had a card tied to the 'Spunky Stuff' bank account and that allowed me to do the banking and pay bills on behalf of 'Spunky Stuff'. However, this was always Roger's business. I was the volunteer helper. Roger would let his personal bills and other correspondence build up, then bring them to me to sort out. Roger was at no point financially supporting me although he took me on buying trips for the Spunky Stuff business. In later years he either bought or built various items to improve my home - for example, he built me some raised garden beds, he built a drinks bar in my garage, he bought me a spa bath. In the 2 or 3 years before Roger's death, it was sometimes the case that I would have to lend him money, and although I was not really in a financial position to do so, I did this because of our friendship. Roger always paid me back eventually;

(e) The ownership, use and acquisition of property: Roger and I never owned or leased any property together;

(f) The degree of mutual commitment to a shared life: I would say that our lives became very much intertwined over the period of our relationship. As previously stated, I became very friendly with Roger's Mum, Doreen. Roger became very friendly with my daughter and son-in-law, Michelle and Steven Shephard and their children. We all socialised together. Roger and I had other friends, such as Suzanne and Stanley Gall, with whom we socialised. Between about 2010 and the date of Roger's death, Roger knew he was welcome at my place any time. He had his own key, and he was often there. We continued to socialise with friends and family. I visited Roger's mother, Doreen, frequently in the months leading up to her death and helped and comforted her as best I could. There was a part of Roger's life that I knew about but did not get involved with, except to help look after him, this being his drinking. Approximately 6 weeks before Roger's death, he stayed at my place for a period of 3 weeks to dry out, which he did, but he started drinking again once he went back to his place. There was also a part of Roger's life that he kept to himself, this being the 'bondage';

(g) The care and support of children: Roger had no children of his own. We had no children together. Roger assisted in various ways my daughter Michelle and her family, as a family friend, but this was a mutual thing - for example, Michelle's husband Steven assisting with the renovation to Roger's Ashburner Street property. Roger was always welcome at their place;

(h) The performance of household duties: Between 2005 and 2008 I would often cook and clean for Roger at his place. Between about 2010 and the date of Roger's death, my home became like a haven for him. He was often there. I would cook for him, and do his washing and make sure he had a shower and kept himself clean and tidy while he was there. He would do household maintenance jobs at my place. Despite maintaining separate residences, we were a couple and looked after each other. When I was sick or ill, Roger would look after me, just as I would do for him;

(i) The reputation and public aspects of the relationship: I refer to the matters previously deposed to in this my affidavit. Also, there are others such as my daughter Michelle and my friend Suzanne Gall, who can speak to this.

13 Gradually, Roger started coming around to my place, at 1/22 Berkeley Court, again. This would have been, I think, in early 2010. It was some months before Roger's mother Doreen died, which was 26 November 2010. I had a strict rule that he could not drink at my place. Also, he would never drink when we went out together. Roger then started spending nights at my place, and our time together just increased. Sex was not that important anymore. We were more like 'family'.

37 From the beginning, I told Roger that I would never marry again. The subject of marriage did come up from time to time, but I told Roger I was not going down that road again. Basically, it was Roger's drinking that was the problem. I had previously been married to an alcoholic for 15 years and had no wish to repeat the experience. Roger wanted me to, at least, move in with him. He brought this up on a number of occasions. However, I always refused. This was mainly because of his drinking and the way he lived. I felt that, by having separate residences, I could turn a blind eye to Roger's drinking binges. Also, I felt that by not living together, we did not take each other for granted."

1. The associate judge set out the submissions made by counsel for the appellant below, Mr McTaggart SC, as follows:

The relevant facts in the present case for determining whether a significant relationship existed are, as contained in the affidavit evidence, as follows:

• The deceased and Ms Wiggins met in about 2004 via an online dating service. She was about 52 years old at the time, single, and living at 1/22 Berkley Court, Devonport, where she still lives. The deceased was about 10 years younger than her, single and lived at 245 William Street, Devonport. He had never been married, had no children and no siblings. Ms Wiggins was divorced. She had been married and divorced several times. Her last marriage ended in divorce in about 2000. She has one child, by her first marriage - Michelle, aged about 44. Her daughter is married, and she and her husband have two children (affidavit of Applicant 7 April 2016 at [1 - 2].
• They were going out, on and off, for about 12 months before they decided to get serious. Serious as far as Ms Wiggins was concerned was that the deceased was the love of her life, he was her only sexual partner and she would not be seeing anyone else. This was in about 2005 (at [3]).
• By about 2008, the deceased's drinking was a real problem. Plus, he had an affair with someone else when he went to Melbourne to buy stock. He admitted the affair to Ms Wiggins. She told him that they were finished (at [8]).
• The relationship resumed from about 2010 until the deceased's death in 2015. During the intervening years between 2008 and 2010 they stayed in touch and were still on reasonably friendly terms, but not as close as they had been and were again from about 2010 (at [17a]).
• Therefore, the duration of the relationship existed from about 2005 through until about the time of the deceased's death in 2015. There was a cooling off period between about 2008 and 2010.

• They maintained separate residences throughout the relationship. However, between 2005 and 2008 the deceased's house was like a second home to Ms Wiggins. She was often around there. She helped him out with his business. They often ate there. She often slept over there. She kept clothes there (at [17b]).
• Between about 2010 and the date of the deceased's death, their relationship developed again to the point where her home was like a second home to the deceased. He got clean clothes and a meal there. He slept over reasonably often. In the last three years before his death he would come around to her place almost daily for a hot meal. He would bring his washing around for her to do. He would water and maintain her vegetable garden that he had built for her. He would assist her with household maintenance. He would stay over probably 2 - 3 nights a week. By this stage he was keeping clothes, shoes and bathroom toiletries at her place (at [17b]).

• There was a sexual relationship between 2004/2005 and 2008. It resumed from the recommencement of their relationship in 2010 (at [17c]).

The degree of financial dependence or interdependence

• They always kept separate bank accounts although the deceased arranged a credit card for the applicant (Fiona Sullivan at [25(1)]). She organised and paid, with his money, most of the deceased's accounts for him via online banking for his business and privately. He bought or built various items to improve her home. On occasions she would loan him money which he paid back (at [17d]).

• They never owned or leased any property together (at [17e]).
• He bought or built various items to improve her home (at [17d]).
• They share each other's homes as detailed above (at [17b]).

• Their lives became very much intertwined over the period of the relationship. Ms Wiggins became friendly with the deceased's mum, Doreen. The deceased became very friendly with Ms Wiggins' daughter and son-in-law and their children. They all socialised together. The deceased and Ms Wiggins had other friends with whom they socialised (at [17f]).
• The deceased had a key to Ms Wiggins' place (at [17f]). Ms Wiggin had keys to the deceased's dwellings, vehicle and home safe (at [21] also at [8] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).
• When she was sick or ill, the deceased would look after her. She would do the same for him (at [17h]).
• The deceased had told Ms Wiggins that he wanted to leave his estate to her, as well as set up a trust for her grandchildren, and make a donation to the Devonport Dogs Home. He said he would get around to making a will one day (at [23]).
• In the last 3 - 4 years before he died the deceased would visit Ms Wiggins almost every day. If they had nothing special planned, such as an outing, they would have lunch together, and morning and afternoon tea. He would stay over 2 nights a week. He sometimes stayed for longer - for example, when she was sick or when he was sick. She cooked for him. On the other days when he came around, they would spend the day together and he would go home, usually around 3pm (at [5] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017). She would do his washing. Whenever he stayed over, they would share the same bed (at [6] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017). He would also cook for her at her place (at [13] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).
• The deceased kept a number of personal items at Ms Wiggins' place, including clothes, shoes, toiletries, an electric shaver and his tablets (medications). There was space in her wardrobe, and space in her bathroom for his things (at [6] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).
• The understanding they had was that he was her only sexual partner and she would not be seeing anyone else. They could turn up at each other's place at any time (at [8] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).
• They had also travelled together (at [17 - 19] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).
• The deceased wanted to marry Ms Wiggins and live with her, but Ms Wiggins did not due to his drinking binges and so that they did not take each other for granted (at [37] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).

• The deceased had no children of his own. They had no children together. The deceased assisted Ms Wiggins' daughter and her family (at [17g]).

• Between 2005 and 2008 Ms Wiggins would often cook and clean for the deceased at his place. From about 2010 to the date of his death, she would cook for him, do his washing and make sure he had a shower and kept himself clean and tidy whilst he was at her place. He would do her household maintenance (at [17h]).
• In the last 3 - 4 years before he died, the deceased was at Ms Wiggins' place almost every day. The deceased would shower and change his clothes most days at her place. She cooked for him most days when he was there (at [5] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017).

The reputation and public aspects of the relationship

• Ms Wiggins named the deceased her next of kin when she went into hospital for surgery and on travel insurance documents. He did likewise (at [16 - 17] and [22] of the Applicant's affidavit of 9 October 2017) including on records relating to his firearms licence (Sullivan at [5]).
• Their family and friends considered them a couple. They attended social functions together (affidavits of Michelle Lee Shephard; Steven Allan Shepard; Suzanne Maree Gall; Susanne Marie Ward; Leanne Margaret Sefton).
• The deceased advised Faith Tampion that the applicant was his 'lady friend' and had been for some time and that her daughter and son-in-law and their children were his family and that they were very good to him (Tampion [9 and 13]). He advised Pamela Planner that they had a sexual relationship (Planner [4])."

1. The associate judge also set out, and addressed in turn, four criticisms of the appellant's evidence made by senior counsel for the respondents below, Ms Taglieri SC. They were as follows:

"11 ... In her submissions at the conclusion of the evidence counsel for the respondents expressly informed me that she made no assertion that Ms Wiggins was untruthful. Counsel, however, did say that careful scrutiny of the evidence revealed some exaggeration in the account of the relationship. She gave four examples.

12 The first example was Ms Wiggins' evidence that Mr Tapping was not close to his mother. A careful review of Ms Wiggins' evidence reveals that between 2005 and 2008 Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping would take Mr Tapping's mother grocery shopping every fortnight followed by lunch. Mr Tapping nursed his mother towards the end of her life in 2010 when she was bedridden. Mr Tapping was very upset when his mother died. Having regard to the whole of Ms Wiggins' evidence I do not regard her as having exaggerated so as to be misleading in connection with Mr Tapping's relationship with his mother.

13 The second example given was Ms Wiggins' evidence that she paid bills for Mr Tapping. When viewed as a whole, however, Ms Wiggins' evidence makes it clear that she was not asserting that she was paying Mr Tapping's bills out of her own funds. Occasionally she would lend him money but that is all. Ms Wiggins would use her laptop and printer to process Mr Tapping's payments and create hard copy records for him. I find no tendency to exaggeration or misleading element in this evidence.

14 The third example was Ms Wiggins' evidence that she and Mr Tapping ceased sexual relations between 2008 and 2010. In cross-examination she said that on an overseas trip with Mr Tapping during this period the couple had shared a bed and had sexual relations. Ms Wiggins' case does not include a claim that a significant relationship was in existence between 2008 and 2010 and so this admission provides no adequate basis for a conclusion that her evidence was misleading.

15 The fourth example given was Ms Wiggins' evidence that Mr Tapping had said to her on several occasions that he wished 'to leave his estate to me, as well as set up a trust for my grandchildren, and make a donation to the Devonport Dogs' Home'. Against this, there is evidence in an affidavit filed on behalf of Ms Wiggins and sworn by a longstanding friend of Mr Tapping saying that Mr Tapping said to her that he intended to leave his estate to Ms Wiggins' daughter, the daughter's husband and children. Ms Wiggins would only know what was said to her and I find nothing in this aspect of the evidence to justify a conclusion that her assertion concerning Mr Tapping's statement was exaggerated, selective or misleading."

1. The associate judge observed that the four criticisms being the only challenge to the evidence presented on behalf of the appellant that, having read her affidavits and seen and heard her, he had no reason to doubt the veracity of her evidence and he accepted it all.
2. His Honour then went on to make his factual findings "as the result of that evidence".
3. He also found that the facts set out in the submissions of the appellant's counsel, reproduced earlier in his reasons, were "all made out".
4. Notwithstanding that he had embraced all of the appellant's evidence and all of her counsel's submissions based on it, at [21] of his reasons the associate judge nonetheless set out his findings of fact as follows:

"21 Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping were in a relationship which was enduring, caring and, subject to one event in 2008, involved exclusivity in sexual relations, at least so far as Ms Wiggins knew. She said in her oral evidence that she assumed that any bondage activity engaged in by Mr Tapping, referred to in par 17(f) of her affidavit reproduced earlier in these reasons, did not involve sexual intimacy. There was a mutual commitment to companionship, family and support of a non-financial nature. The relationship existed for about ten years between 2005 and 2015, subject to a cooling off and substantial cessation of sexual intimacy between 2008 and 2010. Mr Tapping treated, and was treated by Ms Wiggins' daughter and her family, as part of the family. Ms Wiggins treated Mr Tapping's nearest relative, being his mother, as part of her family, accompanying her and Mr Tapping on fortnightly grocery shopping trips followed by lunch up until 2010 when Mr Tapping's mother's health and then her death intervened. Mr Tapping and Ms Wiggins were exclusively accompanied by each other at events involving partners. Mr Tapping performed handyman tasks for Ms Wiggins and the family of her daughter. Ms Wiggins provided domestic assistance to Mr Tapping. Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping assisted each other in times of ill health. Mr Tapping would nominate Ms Wiggins as his next of kin in documents requiring such nomination such as hospital admission documents and travel insurance documents. Ms Wiggins nominated Mr Tapping as her next of kin, along with her daughter, in such documents. The fact that the couple never had or contemplated having children is of no significance as Ms Wiggins was aged in her fifties at the time of the commencement of the relationship. The fact that there was no cohabitation is accounted for by Mr Tapping being an alcoholic, a hoarder and leaving his house dirty and in a mess involving washing up being left on benches for lengthy periods of time and clothes left on the floor. Ms Wiggins kept a clean and tidy house and would not live in the type of environment which Mr Tapping was content with. The fact that Ms Wiggins would never have married Mr Tapping is explained by her having been a party to four failed marriages in the past, the last to an alcoholic, and her desire not to commit to a fifth."

1. At [22]-[25] the associate judge set out his reasons for refusing the appellant's application as follows:

"22 The ultimate question for me is whether I am persuaded that the relationship was a significant relationship within the meaning of the Relationships Act 2003. Although the absence of any single feature or combination of features specified in the Relationships Act, s 4(3) is not necessarily determinative against a finding that a significant relationship existed, there is a powerful feature standing in the way of the declaration sought in the circumstances of the present case. Although neither partner was wealthy, property and financial resources were never shared or mixed. Ms Wiggins wanted to keep her property and finances totally within her own control. She made only a small non-financial provision for Mr Tapping in her will. Mr Tapping, although having expressed orally a desire to make provision for Ms Wiggins or her family in his will and having no close relative to receive his bounty, did not leave a will. Mr Tapping suffered from diabetes and did not modify his eating habits or lifestyle to accommodate the condition. He must have known that premature death was a possibility. Despite this there is no evidence of any attempt by him to put his testamentary wishes into writing. Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping did not accept for themselves the financial aspects which, in the ordinary course of a shared life and by virtue of statute, go with the existence of a significant relationship. Another feature, which counts against the making of the declaration sought by Ms Wiggins, but to a lesser extent, is that, although explained, there was not cohabitation and there was never any mutual intention of cohabitation occurring sometime in the future.

23 Every case will turn on its own particular facts and there will always be points of factual distinction between cases. For example in Brownell v Robinson [2017] TASSC 5, the relationship included a six year attempt by the couple to have a child through an IVF program. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, the fact that it was made demonstrated a mutual commitment to jointly taking on the long term responsibility for a child, including the financial responsibility.

24 Having regard to the lack of commitment by Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping to take on any financial responsibility for each other in life or in death when neither was independently wealthy and having regard to the fact that there was no cohabitation, I am unpersuaded that the relationship amounted to a significant relationship within the meaning of the legislation.

1. Counsel for the appellant, Mr McTaggart SC, submits that in the circumstances of this case the absence of permanent cohabitation in the one home is of very modest weight as a factor against the existence of a significant relationship. He notes that Brett J held in Brownell v Robinson [2017] TASSC 5 at [20] that the Tasmanian legislation extends to a wide variety of relationships in keeping with the reality of modern society, and makes no reference to the requirement that two persons must live together on a genuine domestic basis as husband and wife but instead they must have a relationship as a couple.
2. Moreover counsel for the appellant submits that at [21] of his reasons the associate judge specifically found that the fact that there was no cohabitation was accounted for by the deceased being an alcoholic, a hoarder and leaving his house dirty and in a mess, whereas the appellant kept a clean and tidy house and would not live in the type of environment which Mr Tapping was content with.
3. As to the associate judge's reasoning concerning what his Honour described at [24] as "the lack of commitment by Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping to take on any financial responsibility for each other in life or in death when neither was independently wealthy, counsel for the appellant submitted in his written argument:

"39 In the circumstances of this case the absence of permanent cohabitation in the one home is of very modest weight as a factor against the existence of a significant relationship

40 That Ms Wiggins only made a small non-financial provision for Mr Tapping in her will is explained by the fact that she is not wealthy and has a daughter and grandchildren. Mr Tapping had no children. He was not close to his next of kin. Mr Tapping's failure to make a will does not suggest that he did not wish his estate to benefit Ms Wiggins or her daughter and her family. He expressed his wish to benefit them, but he did not get around to making a will. He may have assumed that as his partner, Ms Wiggins would receive his estate if he made no will.

41 In the circumstances of this case the failure of Ms Wiggins to making financial provision for Mr Tapping in her will and the failure of Mr Tapping to make a will are of very modest weight as a factor against the existence of a significant relationship.

42 When they met, Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping were both at a stage in life where they were financially independent, albeit that Ms Wiggins was a disability pensioner. There was no need for either to take on any financial responsibility for the other.

43 Ms Wiggins paid Mr Tapping's accounts via his online banking for his business and privately. He arranged a credit card for her. She had the keys to his home safe. He bought and built various items to improve her home. On occasion she would loan him money which he paid back.

44 There are many de facto relationships where there is never any intermingling of finances or property: Spencer v Burton [2016] 2 Qd R 215; [2015] QCA 104 per Ann Lyons J at [121] with whom Holmes and Gotterson JJA agreed.

45 In the circumstances of this case the financial independence of each party is of modest weight as a factor against the existence of a significant relationship."

1. In short, Mr McTaggart submits that the associate judge elevated the financial independence of the appellant, the deceased, and to a lesser extent, the absence of permanent cohabitation in the one home, above the other indicia, which strongly supports the conclusion that their romantic relationship was of importance or consequence and therefore a significant relationship. He submits that:

"The composite picture must be looked at and any attempt to isolate individual factors and attribute to them relative degrees of importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error: Taisha v Peng (2012) 296 FLR 350; (2012) 48 Fam LR 150; [2012] FamCA 385 per Cronin J at [13]; see also S, CM v M, SS & Ors at [28]."

1. The respondent's counsel, Ms Taglieri SC, submits that the associate judge did not isolate individual factors and individually attribute degrees of importance to them, but rather considered the evidence relevant to all factors prescribed by s 4(3) of the Relationships Act, and having "qualitatively evaluated them correctly in the context of all the evidence", was not persuaded of the existence of a significant relationship.
2. Counsel for the appellant submits that it is important to emphasise that the associate judge did not make a finding that the appellant was not in a significant relationship with the deceased, but was simply not persuaded that she was, so in fact, declined to make the declaration sought by her. Ms Taglieri submits that the onus was on the applicant to establish that she was in a significant relationship with the deceased, and not on the respondent to establish that she was not. She submits that this Court should not interfere even though it may not agree with the conclusion.
3. In response to the appellant's written submissions as set out above, counsel for the respondent submits in her written argument as follows:

"34 At [39] the Appellant submits that in this case the absence of permanent cohabitation in one home has very modest weight as a factor indicative of the existence of a significant relationship. The Associate Judge's reasons demonstrate that he did give it modest weight and took into account the deceased's 'almost daily' visits and overnight sleeps two to three days a week.

35 The Appellant's submission at [40] is irrelevant. There are no erroneous findings of fact or law about the deceased not having made a Will. It was open for the Associate Judge to take into account the unchallenged evidence that the deceased had expressed a desire to provide for the Appellant's daughter and grandchildren in his Will, not the Appellant herself. The submission about what assumptions may have been made by the deceased are not founded in any evidence before the court. The submission has no merit whatsoever and should be ignored for the purposes of the deliberation of the Court on appeal.

36 The merit of the Associate Judge's conclusion that there was no financial dependence or interdependence between the Appellant and the deceased is demonstrated by what the Appellant submits at [41] - [44] of her written submissions. In fact and law, the absence of shared finances and interdependence was an express consideration to be taken into account for the purposes of section 4(3) of the Relationships Act.

37 The Appellant's submissions, that the composite picture must be looked at is precisely the approach taken by the Associate Judge. This is clear from his reasons for decision at [8], [9] and [22] of the judgment .

38 The Associate Judge did not isolate individual factors and individually attribute degrees of importance to them. Rather, he considered the evidence relevant to all factors prescribed by section 4(3) Relationship Act, qualitatively evaluated them correctly in the context of all the evidence. He was not persuaded of the existence of a significant relationship.

39 The Associate Judge's absence of satisfaction does not constitute error of fact, law or discretion. It merely demonstrates that the Appellant failed to discharge her onus."

1. I prefer the appellant's submissions to those of the respondent. In my view the associate judge did not properly heed the following analysis of Brett J in Brownell v Robinson (above) at [31], which was impliedly approved by the Full Court in Brownell v Robinson [2017] TASFC 11:

"31 ... The determination of the question of whether a relationship between two persons is a significant relationship will ultimately involve a determination of fact after the Court has taken into account all of the circumstances of the relationship, including the factors referred to in s 4(3). In considering the application of the indicia in s 4(3), the Court must have regard to the flexibility implied by s 4(4). It must also allow for the possibility that a significant relationship can exist in a wide variety of forms and circumstances. However, ultimately, the determination of the existence of a significant relationship will depend upon a finding that the parties have a relationship as a couple, which implies that the relationship is, or at least has been based on the type of mutual attraction and commitment commonly understood as a romantic relationship. It must be a relationship which is important or of consequence to the parties to that relationship. It is appropriate also to have regard to the legislative consequences of a finding of the existence of a significant relationship, in assessing the degree of significance required for a determination that it will fall within the definition. However, it is not necessary in my view that the relationship be, in the words of counsel, 'akin to a marriage relationship or even a de facto relationship under the repealed legislation'. The judgment must be made within a legislative framework which is intended to be flexible enough to recognise the existence of the diversity of relationships within modern society. Whilst the nature and extent of common residence, and degree of financial dependence or interdependence between the parties are relevant factors in assessing whether two persons are in a significant relationship, neither of those factors can be considered a precondition to a finding that a significant relationship exists." [Emphasis added.]

1. In my view the associate judge, notwithstanding his expressed awareness of the need to consider all of the relevant indicia in the manner required by s 4(4) of the Relationships Act, did elevate the lack of a common residence and the lack of financial interdependence in life and in death to the status, if not of preconditions to a finding that a significant relationship existed, then at least to a status they did not deserve.
2. I accept the appellant's submission that the fact that there was no cohabitation between the appellant and the deceased, and the fact of their apparent "failure to take on responsibility for each other in life or in death", were accounted for and were of no great moment in the overall context of the couple's circumstances.
3. To my mind his Honour's conclusion suggests that he was allowing himself to be moved by traditional notions of a marriage or de facto relationship and failed to recognise the flexibility implied by s 4(4) of the Relationships Act and the legislative framing of personal relationships in a way that does not necessarily require an element of cohabitation or domestic partnership. In doing so he has proceeded on a wrong principle and his conclusion was not the correct conclusion. Regarded cumulatively, the evidence compels a determination that a significant relationship existed.

and as representative of the next of kin of the late

1. In March 2015, Roger Tapping died. He was 54. He had never been married and had no children. His nearest relatives were cousins. He had had little or no contact with them.
2. In January 2016 letters of administration of his estate issued to the Public Trustee.
3. Julie Wiggins claims she was in a significant relationship with Mr Tapping. Her claim is that this relationship was extant at the time of his death. She says it continued for a period of at least two years.
4. If Ms Wiggins was in a significant relationship with Mr Tapping, then upon his death she would be deemed to be his spouse pursuant to s 6(c) of the Intestacy Act 2010. That section provides that a person:

"(c) who, immediately before the intestate's death, was a party to a significant relationship, within the meaning of the Relationships Act 2003, with the intestate that -

(i) had been in existence for a continuous period of at least 2 years; or

1. If she was the spouse of the deceased she was entitled to the whole of his estate pursuant to s 12 of the Intestacy Act.
2. Holt AsJ declined to make the declaration sought by Ms Wiggins [Wiggins v Public Trustee [2020] TASSC 3]. This is an appeal from the decision.
3. A significant relationship is defined in s 4 of the Relationships Act 2003 (the Act). That definition is as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a significant relationship is a relationship between two adult persons -

(b) who are not married to one another or related by family.

(2) If a significant relationship is registered under Part 2, proof of registration is proof of the relationship.

(3) If a significant relationship is not registered under Part 2, in determining whether two persons are in a significant relationship, all the circumstances of the relationship are to be taken into account, including such of the following matters as may be relevant in a particular case:

(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for financial support, between the parties;

(e) the ownership, use and acquisition of property;

(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life;

(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.

(4) No finding in respect of any of the matters mentioned in subsection (3)(a) to (i), or in respect of any combination of them, is to be regarded as necessary for the existence of a significant relationship, and a court determining whether such a relationship exists is entitled to have regard to such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the court in the circumstances of the case."

1. Section 4(3) of the Act was engaged upon Ms Wiggins' application for a declaration pursuant to s 66 of the Act because the relationship was not registered.
2. The criteria identified in that section, though wide ranging, are not exhaustive. Any matter established by the evidence and relevant to "relationship" must be considered. It is the "composite picture that must be looked at and any attempt to isolate individual factors and attribute to them relative degrees of ... importance involves a denial of common experience and will almost inevitably be productive of error": Taisha v Peng [2012] FamCA 385, 296 FLR 350, per Cronin J at [13], citing the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Lynam v Director-General of Social Security (1983) 52 ALR 128.
3. The judgment appealed from sets out the matters relied upon by Ms Wiggins. They appear in the judgment of Estcourt J at [26].
4. Holt AsJ made the following findings of fact.

"21 Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping were in a relationship which was enduring, caring and, subject to one event in 2008, involved exclusivity in sexual relations, at least so far as Ms Wiggins knew. She said in her oral evidence that she assumed that any bondage activity engaged in by Mr Tapping, referred to in par 17(f) of her affidavit reproduced earlier in these reasons, did not involve sexual intimacy. There was a mutual commitment to companionship, family and support of a non-financial nature. The relationship existed for about ten years between 2005 and 2015, subject to a cooling off and substantial cessation of sexual intimacy between 2008 and 2010. Mr Tapping treated, and was treated by Ms Wiggins' daughter and her family, as part of the family. Ms Wiggins treated Mr Tapping's nearest relative, being his mother, as part of her family, accompanying her and Mr Tapping on fortnightly grocery shopping trips followed by lunch up until 2010 when Mr Tapping's mother's health and then her death intervened. Mr Tapping and Ms Wiggins were exclusively accompanied by each other at events involving partners. Mr Tapping performed handyman tasks for Ms Wiggins and the family of her daughter. Ms Wiggins provided domestic assistance to Mr Tapping. Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping assisted each other in times of ill health. Mr Tapping would nominate Ms Wiggins as his next of kin in documents requiring such nomination such as hospital admission documents and travel insurance documents. Ms Wiggins nominated Mr Tapping as her next of kin, along with her daughter, in such documents. The fact that the couple never had or contemplated having children is of no significance as Ms Wiggins was aged in her fifties at the time of the commencement of the relationship. The fact that there was no cohabitation is accounted for by Mr Tapping being an alcoholic, a hoarder and leaving his house dirty and in a mess involving washing up being left on benches for lengthy periods of time and clothes left on the floor. Ms Wiggins kept a clean and tidy house and would not live in the type of environment which Mr Tapping was content with. The fact that Ms Wiggins would never have married Mr Tapping is explained by her having been a party to four failed marriages in the past, the last to an alcoholic, and her desire not to commit to a fifth."

1. Those findings are not challenged. By way of conclusion his Honour said:

"22 The ultimate question for me is whether I am persuaded that the relationship was a significant relationship within the meaning of the Relationships Act 2003. Although the absence of any single feature or combination of features specified in the Relationships Act, s 4(3) is not necessarily determinative against a finding that a significant relationship existed, there is a powerful feature standing in the way of the declaration sought in the circumstances of the present case. Although neither partner was wealthy, property and financial resources were never shared or mixed. Ms Wiggins wanted to keep her property and finances totally within her own control. She made only a small non-financial provision for Mr Tapping in her will. Mr Tapping, although having expressed orally a desire to make provision for Ms Wiggins or her family in his will and having no close relative to receive his bounty, did not leave a will. Mr Tapping suffered from diabetes and did not modify his eating habits or lifestyle to accommodate the condition. He must have known that premature death was a possibility. Despite this there is no evidence of any attempt by him to put his testamentary wishes into writing. Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping did not accept for themselves the financial aspects which, in the ordinary course of a shared life and by virtue of statute, go with the existence of a significant relationship. Another feature, which counts against the making of the declaration sought by Ms Wiggins, but to a lesser extent, is that, although explained, there was not cohabitation and there was never any mutual intention of cohabitation occurring sometime in the future".

1. Two matters are identified by Holt AsJ as militating against a conclusion that there was a special relationship: the absence of cohabitation and the fact that the financial arrangements were not intertwined.
2. Cohabitation is not a statutory requirement for the purposes of finding a significant relationship existed: Brownell v Robinson [2017] TASSC 5 at [20]. In any event the fact that Ms Wiggins did not cohabit with Mr Tapping was explained on the evidence. Holt AsJ said as much. That explanation served to neutralise its significance in terms of understanding the nature of the relationship.
3. The fact that the financial and property arrangements of Ms Wiggins and Mr Tapping were not intertwined, was also explained, and to the point where its significance was at best marginal.
4. Affording it such weight that it supplanted the other factual matters identified by his Honour was unjustified. It evidences an approach which led to error. It was erroneous to treat it discretely rather than as part of the "composite picture": Taisha (above).
5. An evaluation of the "composite picture" paints a different result from that arrived at below.
6. The question in this appeal is whether the conclusion reached by Holt AsJ was correct. This case does not engage the approach to appellate review identified by cases such as House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. Section 4 of the Act commands one or other result: a finding of a significant relationship or not. Whilst an evaluative approach was required, the need for such approach does not imply an appeal which relates to the exercise of judicial discretion; one in which the question is whether a conclusion was open, as opposed to correct: Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 53.
7. This is explained by Gageler J in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30, 264 CLR 541 at [48]- [49]:

"[48] The course of High Court authority since Warren v Coombes has accordingly proceeded on a consistent understanding of how the line of demarcation is to be drawn between those of a primary judge's conclusions which attract the correctness standard of appellate review reaffirmed in that case and those which attract the deferential standard applicable to appellate review of an exercise of judicial discretion ...

[49] The line is not drawn by reference to whether the primary judge's process of reasoning to reach a conclusion can be characterised as evaluative or is on a topic on which judicial minds might reasonably differ. The line is drawn by reference to whether the legal criterion applied or purportedly applied by the primary judge to reach the conclusion demands a unique outcome, in which case the correctness standard applies, or tolerates a range of outcomes, in which case the House v The King standard applies. The resultant line is not bright; but it is tolerably clear and workable."

1. I approach this appeal according to the "correctness standard". The facts as found demanded a "unique outcome", and did not give of a "range of outcomes". They compelled a conclusion that the appellant was in a significant relationship.
2. The declaration sought by the appellant should be made. I agree with the orders proposed by Estcourt J.

[1] Hansard, House of Assembly, 25 June 2003 at 29-33.