//
[2025] QSC 262
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2025-10-17
Treston J
Original judgment source is linked above.
BANKRUPTCY - ADMINISTRATION OF PROPERTY - REALISATION OF PROPERTY - PROTECTION OF TRUSTEE FROM PERSONAL LIABILITY - COSTS OF PROCEEDINGS - where the first respondent applies for a declaration to disentitle a receiver from claiming remuneration and disbursements in relation to unsuccessful proceedings brought by the receiver - where the receiver commenced proceedings in the District Court in 2017 - where during the trial of the claim in 2025 the receiver's claim was dismissed after it was conceded that the receiver did not have standing to commence the proceedings - where the receiver bears the onus of demonstrating that the costs of the unsuccessful proceedings were properly incurred - where the receiver did not apply for judicial advice prior to the commencement of the proceedings - where the receiver offers no evidence as to the factors which were taken into consideration before the commencement of the proceedings without bringing a Beddoe application - whether the expense associated with the unsuccessful proceedings was properly incurred such that there is a right under the general law to indemnity for that expense - whether the receiver ought to be denied remuneration and disbursements in respect of the unsuccessful proceedings
BANKRUPTCY - TRUSTEES - REMUNERATION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - where the first respondent applies for an order that the receiver's remuneration for acting as receiver other than in relation to the unsuccessful proceedings be fixed in an amount to be determined by the court - where the receiver did not place evidence before the court to discharge his onus - where the first respondent submits that consequently the court should make an order fixing the receiver's remuneration at nil for the whole of the receivership - whether such an order ought to be made
BANKRUPTCY - TRUSTEES - VACATION OF OFFICE - REMOVAL - GENERALLY - where the first respondent applies for an order that the receiver be removed - where there are practical difficulties in deciding the application and the hearing of the application ought to be adjourned
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), rr 269, 389
Adsett v Berlouis [1992] FCA 368; (1992) 37 FCR 201
Bank of Queensland Ltd & Anor v Ross Auto Auctions Pty Ltd (in liq) (Receivers & Managers appointed) & Anor [2016] QSC 19
Dixon v Dixon (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 944
Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese for Australia and New Zealand Property Trust v Dobrijevic (No 3) [2017] NSWCA 109
In re Beddoe [1892] UKLawRpCh 180; [1893] 1 Ch 547
Krystyna Allan Trust & Ors v White Horizon Pty Ltd; Krystyna Allan Trust and Ultimate Horizon Trust Partnership (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Kelly [2025] QDC 60
LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) & Ors v Whyte [2023] QSC 132
Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc v His Eminence Petar The Diocesan Bishop of The Macedonian Orthodox Diocese of Australia and New Zealand [2008] HCA 42; (2008) 237 CLR 66
Miller v Cameron [1936] HCA 13; (1936) 54 CLR 572
Olsen v James [2020] NSWSC 1015
Park & Muller (liquidators of LM Investment Management Ltd) v Whyte (No 3) [2017] QSC 230; [2018] 2 Qd R 475
Tyler v Custom Credit Co Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178
"(a) First, to the payment of any fees and expenses of the Receivers and Managers, their partners and/or their employees as are reasonably incurred in carrying out the terms of this order and their duties as Receivers and Managers;
(b) Second, to the payment of any debts and liabilities of the Partnership to persons who are not partners of the Partnership;
(c) Third, to the payment of any debts and liabilities of the partners of the Partnership;
(d) Fourth, distribute between the partners of the Partnership in equal half shares."
"That should there be insufficient funds available to the Receivers and Managers to pay in full, the debts and liabilities of the Partnership in accordance with this Order, the Receivers and Managers may determine the proportion of which each Partner must contribute further monies as may be necessary to enable them to satisfy such debts and liabilities, taking into account, the amount that each Partner has already contributed to the Partnership expenses."
"That the Receivers and Managers prepare and lodge final accounts of the Partnership."
"That the Receivers and Managers must submit accounts to the partners or their nominated entities at the end of each calendar month from the date of appointment by the Court."
(a) to the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, $37,507;
(b) to the partnership's former accountant, $27,335; and
(c) to a variety of secured creditors, $2,027,361.98.
"1. Order 10 of the order of this Honourable Court dated 3 June 2011 be varied, so far as may be necessary, such that the preparation and lodgement, by Peter Dinoris and Nick Combis as Receivers and Managers (Receivers and Managers) of the Krystyna Allan Trust and Ultimate Horizon Trust partnership (Partnership), of accounts of the Partnership on and from 1 July 2006 shall constitute compliance with that order.
White Horizon proceedings in the District Court
"[43] By the third day of the trial, both parties made written concessions that the claim and the counterclaim must be dismissed because no cause of action in debt arose between the parties to the White Horizons proceeding. Both parties submitted that claims by partners inter se arise, rather, in equity on the taking of an account on dissolution.
[44] That proposition is confirmed by the High Court decision of Commissioner of State Taxation of the State of South Australia v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd [2010] HCA 43; (2010) 242 CLR 508. In that case, four partners had for many years carried on a well-known wine making business under the name CA Henschke & Co. One partner retired. Pursuant to the deed of retirement, the retiring partner received a substantial payment and the remaining three partners continued in partnership on the terms of the existing partnership.
[45] The Commissioner levied stamp duty on the deed of retirement as a conveyance, contending, in effect, that the effect of the deed was to vest personal property of the retiring partner in the continuing partners. The case turned upon whether the effect of the deed was merely to extinguish the interest of the retiring partner (as the Full Court had found) or to convey the interest of that partner to the continuing partners (as the trial Judge had found). The High Court agreed with the trial Judge. In so doing, the joint Judgment articulated the nature of the interest of partners in partnership property as follows:
22 The significance of the interplay between the law of contract and the doctrines and remedies of equity was further explained by Lord Millett in Hurst v Bryk. His Lordship observed that disputes between partners and the dissolution and winding up of partnerships have always fallen within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, and continued:
'This is because, while partnership is a consensual arrangement based on agreement, it is more than a simple contract (to use the expression of Dixon J in McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd); it is a continuing personal as well as commercial relationship. Neither during the continuance of the relationship nor after its determination has any partner any cause of action at law to recover moneys due to him from his fellow partners. The amount owing to a partner by his fellow partners is recoverable only the taking of an account in equity after the partnership has been dissolved. Only the Court of Chancery was equipped with the machinery necessary to enable such an account to be taken, and the basis upon which the account was taken reflected equitable principles. These could be modified by agreement, but they did not find their source in contract.'
23 This foundation for the engagement of equitable doctrines and concomitant remedies has given rise to judicial consideration of the nature of the interest conferred by equity upon each partner with respect to partnership assets as they exist from time to time and in advance of a 'general' dissolution under the control of a court of equity. Neuberger LJ recently described as 'conceptually somewhat opaque' the concept of a partner's share in the partnership assets as understood in the earlier English authorities. However, the matter has received attention in a series of decisions in this Court.
[46] The underlined passage supports the concession made by both counsel.
[47] The position is also articulated in a leading English text as follows (footnotes omitted):
'What is meant by the share of a partner in his proportion of the partnership assets after they have been all realised and converted into money, and all the debts and liabilities have been paid and discharged. This it is, and this only, which on the death of a partner passes to his representatives, or to a legatee of his share; which under the old law was considered as bona notabilia; which his bankruptcy passes to his trustee ...'.
Although it would be more accurate to speak of a partner's entitlement to a proportion of the net proceeds of sale of the assets, the correctness of the statement of principle embodied in the above passage cannot seriously be questioned, reflecting as it does the proper application of sections 39 and 44 of the Partnership Act 1890. This approach underlay the decision in Commissioner of State Taxation v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd and was clearly endorsed by Norris J in Bieber v Teathers Ltd and the Irish court in Re Bloxham.
It also coincides with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal of Victoria in Commissioner of State Revenue v Danvest Pty Ltd, where various Australian authorities, including Commissioner of State Taxation v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd, were reviewed, even though Lord Lindley's definition was not, as such, cited by the court. The definition was, however, directly in play in Commission of State Revenue v Rojoda Pty Ltd. The decision in Deacon v Yaseen, must, in the above context, be regarded as something of an anomaly.
Accordingly, a partner's entitlement will reflect not only his capital and current account balances and the size of his capital profit (or asset surplus) share, but also any amounts which he may owe to the firm, e.g. in respect of overdrawings. It is submitted that any attempt to demonstrate that a particular element of a partner's share, e.g. his entitlement to capital, has an existence independent of the remainder must, in the absence of an express agreement, fail.
[48] There was no evidence of any specific agreement to the contrary.
[49] Both counsel also agreed that the express power conferred on the receivers to sue in order 8 of Justice Mullins' orders dated 3 June 2011 (see paragraph [14](d) above) did not alter that position. That is plainly correct as a matter of principle and on the proper construction of the order.
[50] As to the former, in Re Pinata Pty Ltd (in Liq) [2012] NSWSC 162, it was submitted that a receiver appointed by deed to the assets of a partnership for the purpose of dissolution and winding up of the partnership did not have power to sue partners for money due to the partnership. Hammerschlag J agreed:
48 First, it was put on behalf of Hamilton that the deed did not confer upon him the power or authority to sue one or more of the partners on behalf of another or others of them, as the plaintiffs contend he should have done. This submission was put on the basis that cl 3.1.3 of the deed does not comprehend a power in the receivers to commence proceedings by one partner against another or others. Clause 3.1.3 provides that the receivers shall have the powers granted to a liquidator under s 477 of the Corporations Law. Section 477(2)(a) of that enactment provides that a liquidator may bring or defend any legal proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company. It was put that this was not a power to commence proceedings for one partner against others.
50 For over 150 years it has been settled that neither during the partnership nor after its termination has any partner a cause of action at law to recover monies due to that partner from his fellow partners. The amount owing to one partner by his or her fellow partners is recoverable only by the taking of an account in equity after the partnership has been dissolved; see Richardson v Bank of England [1838] EngR 897; 41 ER 65. This principle has been affirmed by the High Court as recently 2010; see Commissioner of State Taxation v Cyril Henschke Pty Ltd (above) at 445 [22]; see also Hurst v Bryk [2002] 1 AC 185.
51 Under cl 3.1 of the deed the partners appointed the receivers their agent to wind up the affairs of the partnership. The powers they gave the receivers were given in aid of winding up the affairs of the partnership by gathering in its assets, paying its liabilities and dividing the surplus according to the partners' respective interests in the partnership. Clearly, this does not comprehend power in the receivers to bring proceedings to determine the extent of those interests, including by proceedings to determine monies due to one partner by his or her fellow partners, and on its plain meaning cl 3.1 does not confer such a power. To construe the provision otherwise would place the receivers in an impossible position of conflict and would assume an intention on the part of the partners to have an instrument which envisaged a course directly in conflict with long established principle.
52 In any event, the partners could not validly authorise their agents to bring proceedings which they themselves could not bring; see Peter Watts and FMB Reynolds, Bowstead and Reynolds on Agency (19 th ed, 2011).
53 The only proper course of resolution of the loan, interest, agistment and piping claims was for Pinata to bring proceedings for an accounting, a course which it ultimately took in 2001 and which, for reasons already discussed, failed.
[51] As to the latter, Justice Mullins' orders would in my view be taken to have been made on the assumption of consistency with the above principles. So much is more than an assumption, however. The terms of the order 5(f) deal specifically with claims inter se and provide a correct method for their resolution, consistent with the above principles.
[52] Finally, it remains only to note that the Partnership Act 1891 (Qld) does not appear to modify the general law in this respect. Indeed, ss 46 and 47 appear to be consistent with the above principles.
[53] Accordingly, neither party to the White Horizons proceedings has a cause of action in debt against the other and any sums due inter se must await the determination of balances due on the taking an account."
"[54] The first issue is what costs order to make in the White Horizons proceedings. In my view, I should make no order as to costs and leave the parties to bear their own costs. A different outcome might have followed if the counterclaim could be characterised as entirely defensive. But it was not. The defendant's position was that the plaintiff's claim was statute barred, but its claim was not. It pressed for judgment on its counterclaim and dismissal of the claim. While it is difficult to see how that could have succeeded in the face of a set-off defence, that was the defendant's position.
[55] Accordingly, I make no order as to costs of the White Horizons proceedings.
[56] A second issue is whether I should make an order which denied indemnity of the receiver from the Partnership assets. Ultimately, both parties submitted I should not do so because that question was properly one for the Court which appointed the receiver. I am not persuaded that this Court does not have jurisdiction to make an order denying indemnity to the receiver in the circumstances presently before the Court. In my view, such power could come within the scope of s. 69 District Court of Queensland Act 1967 in a case of this kind. Further, it might be argued that in this case, the receiver was suing as trustee and therefore the express power in Rule 704 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 might be engaged. However, it is unnecessary to decide the point. Both parties submit that the matter should be left to the Supreme Court. And there is much to be said for declining to make orders affecting an officer of the Court appointed by another Court, even if power to do so exists. I will therefore not deal with the question of the receiver's indemnity."
Commencement of the District Court proceedings without judicial advice
"[A] trustee who, without the sanction of the Court, commences an action or defends an action unsuccessfully, does so at his own risk as regards the costs, even if he acts on counsel's opinion; and when the trustee seeks to obtain such costs out of his trust estate, he ought not to be allowed to charge them against his cestui que trust unless under very exceptional circumstances. If, indeed, the Judge comes to the conclusion that he would have authorized the action or defence had he been applied to, he might, in the exercise of his discretion, allow the costs incurred by the trustee out of the estate; but I cannot imagine any other circumstances under which the costs of an unauthorized and unsuccessful action brought or defended by a trustee could be properly thrown on the estate ... I entirely agree that a trustee is entitled as of right to full indemnity out of his trust estate against all his costs, charges, and expenses properly incurred ... The words 'properly incurred' ... are equivalent to 'not properly incurred' ... But, considering the case and comparatively small expense with which trustees can obtain the opinion of a Judge ... on the question whether an action should be brought ... at the expense of the trust estate, I am of the opinion that if a trustee brings or defends an action unsuccessfully and without leave, it is for him to shew that the costs so incurred were properly incurred."[5]
"In my view, it is important to recognise that Lindley LJ's statement in Beddoe is not a distinct species of the trustee's right to indemnity for expenses properly incurred. Rather, it articulates what considerations will or may be expected to establish that the legal costs incurred by a trustee in prosecuting or defending a particular proceeding are expenses properly incurred. The underlying informing principle is that a trustee is expected not to engage lightly in litigation that will or may incur costs that will diminish the trust property. The trustee is only to do so if the circumstances justify it. Lindley LJ's statement of the relevant considerations informs what may be a liability or expense properly incurred in those circumstances."
"In short, provision is made for a trustee to obtain judicial advice about the prosecution or defence of litigation in recognition of both the fact that the office of trustee is ordinarily a gratuitous office and the fact that a trustee is entitled to an indemnity for all costs and expenses properly incurred in performance of the trustee's duties. Obtaining judicial advice resolves doubt about whether it is proper for a trustee to incur the costs and expenses of prosecuting or defending litigation. No less importantly, however, resolving those doubts means that the interests of the trust will be protected; the interest of the trust will not be subordinated to the trustee's fear of personal liability for costs."
"While I agree that trustees ought not to be visited with personal loss on account of mere errors in judgment which fall short of negligence or unreasonableness, it is on the other hand essential to recollect that mere bona fides is not the test, and that it is no answer in the mouth of a trustee who has embarked in idle litigation to say that he honestly believed what his solicitor told him, if his solicitor has been wrong-headed and perverse. Costs, charges, and expenses which have been unreasonably incurred, do not assume in the eye of the law the character of reasonableness simply because the solicitor is the person who was in fault. No more disastrous or delusive doctrine could be invented in a Court of Equity than the dangerous idea that a trustee himself might recover over from his own cestuis que trust costs which his own solicitor had unreasonably and perversely incurred merely because he had acted as his solicitor told him.
If there be one consideration again more than another which ought to be present in the mind of a trustee, especially the trustee of a small and easily dissipated fund, it is that all litigation should be avoided, unless there is such a chance of success as to render it desirable in the interests of the estate that the necessary risk should be incurred."[11]
"... [the receiver] was an officer of the court and was entitled to resort to the court for necessary guidance. This court has a clear general jurisdiction to give its opinion, advice or direction to a receiver it has appointed."
(a) first, while the receiver ultimately conceded that the White Horizon proceedings were misconceived, it does not follow that it was obviously so;[16]
(b) second, there is no allegation that the receiver acted other than bona fide in the interests of the partnership;
(c) third, the receiver had some advice from counsel, which advice did not identify the principles which led to the receiver conceding the claim; and
(d) fourth, whilst it was open to the receiver to make a Beddoe application for directions, that is merely one factor to be taken into consideration.
"The decision in Beddoe was referred to with apparent approval by the High Court in Macedonian Orthodox Community Church. ... In this context, there is every reason to treat the failure to obtain advice as a factor which potentially goes to unreasonableness. ... In Olsen ... I discussed the general equitable principles which apply to the onus in a trustee's claim for indemnity. I concluded ... that the legal onus lies on the trustee to show that the expense in question has been reasonably and honestly incurred, but usually this is an undemanding test, but the onus of demonstrating reasonableness is not demanding; in usual circumstances, it only requires that the incurring of the expense was not unreasonable. ... Even if the trustee does not bear any onus, the court may take a failure to obtain judicial advice into account, and if that failure is unexplained it is open to the Court to conclude that the trustee's behaviour was unreasonable."[22]
"The critical question, in our view, is whether or not the conduct which gave rise to the burden of costs - whether costs ordered to be paid or costs incurred by the trustee in prosecution of the litigation - was proper in the sense explained in Beddoe; that is, whether the expenditure was reasonably, as well as honestly, incurred. Where, for example, the litigation was obviously misconceived or, even if it was otherwise reasonable to be undertaken, extravagant in the resources applied to it, we would not regard the expense incurred as proper; notwithstanding that the trustee may have acted honestly throughout. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to identify all of the situations in which costs expenditure would not be regarded as proper. Nor is it profitable to attempt a detailed rule covering all circumstances. But we issue the caution that the language in some authorities, many of which relate to gratuitous trustees, may mislead. Sometimes that language appears to require a degree of personal misconduct or wilful recklessness, as opposed to mere negligence, mistake or breach of the trustee's duty as set out above. We do not think that such a limitation can stand with cases such as Beddoe, which in our opinion correctly express the law. If the expense is one prudently and reasonably incurred in the discharge of the trustee's proper duties, there is a right under the general law to be indemnified out of the trust estate. If the expense is not so incurred or is unreasonable or unnecessary, there is no right under the general law to indemnity because the expense is not 'properly incurred'. The position is no different with a trustee in bankruptcy. Where the line is drawn, between an expense properly incurred and one not properly incurred, is to be determined on the facts of the particular case and in the exercise of judgment."[25]
Denial of all, or some, remuneration and disbursements?
"4. That pursuant to r 269 of the UCPR, Mr Combis' remuneration for acting as receiver of the property of the Partnership is fixed in the sum of $0.00 in relation to District Court proceeding 383/17.
4A. That pursuant to r 269 of the UCPR, Mr Combis' remuneration for acting as receiver of the property of the Partnership other than in relation to District Court proceeding 383/17 is fixed in an amount to be determined by the Court."
(a) the proceeding was commenced in February 2017;
(b) White Horizon filed its first defence on 3 April 2017;
(c) the receiver applied for summary judgment in the White Horizon proceedings on 28 September 2017, which proceeded over the course of a number of applications;
(d) on 26 October 2017, an order was made for White Horizon to file an amended defence and pay the receiver's costs of the first adjourned summary judgment application;
(e) on the second return of the summary judgment application White Horizon's amended defence was struck out and a second costs order was made;
(f) on the third return of the summary judgment application in December 2017 the application was adjourned sine die and costs were reserved;
(g) on 20 April 2018, the Kelly proceedings were transferred to the District Court and reconstituted as proceeding 2015/18;
(h) on 29 August 2018, the first and second costs orders were assessed and entered at $24,790.42;
(i) a statutory demand for payment issued to White Horizon which was not satisfied, and in March 2019, White Horizon was wound up in insolvency;
(j) in April 2019, Mr Kelly commenced a Supreme Court proceeding seeking orders for the termination of White Horizon winding up, and upon the hearing of that application the receiver appeared and consented to the order;
(k) in May 2020, disclosure was undertaken;
(l) in October 2020, the partnership filed an application to dispense with White Horizon's signature on a request for trial date at which point directions were made for disclosure, particulars and an amended defence. At the same time an order was made that the White Horizon proceedings and the Kelly proceedings be heard together;
(m) in February 2021, following the receipt of particulars, White Horizon filed a further amended defence and counterclaim;
(n) between April and June 2022, the receiver issued notices of non-party disclosure to various financial institutions when disclosure was not made in the White Horizon proceedings and the Kelly proceedings;
(o) in July 2024, the District Court placed the matter on the commercial list and gave leave for the filing of a further defence;
Costs other than in relation to the White Horizon proceedings
"In deciding to remove a trustee the Court forms a judgment based upon considerations, possibly large in number and varied in character, which combine to show that the welfare of the beneficiaries is opposed to his continued occupation of the office. Such a judgment must be largely discretionary. A trustee is not to be removed unless circumstances exist which afford ground upon which the jurisdiction may be exercised. But in a case where enough appears to authorize the Court to act, the delicate question whether it should act and proceed to remove the trustee is one upon which the decision of a primary Judge is entitled to especial weight."[29]
"389 Continuation of proceeding after delay
(1) If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 1 year from the time the last step was taken, a party who wants to proceed must, before taking any step in the proceeding, give a month's notice to every other party of the party's intention to proceed.
(2) If no step has been taken in a proceeding for 2 years from the time the last step was taken, a new step may not be taken without the order of the court, which may be made either with or without notice.
(3) For this rule, an application in which no order has been made is not taken to be a step."
[1] Krystyna Allan Trust & Ors v White Horizon Pty Ltd; Krystyna Allan Trust and Ultimate Horizon Trust Partnership (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Kelly [2025] QDC 60 at [9] - [18].
[2] See Krystyna Allan Trust & Ors v White Horizon Pty Ltd; Krystyna Allan Trust and Ultimate Horizon Trust Partnership (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Kelly [2025] QDC 60.
[8] See Re Moore (deceased) [2025] QSC 213 at [23]; LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) v Whyte [2023] QSC 132 at [44]; Campbell v T. L. Clacher No. 2 Pty Ltd & Ors [2020] QSC 35 at [72]; Ban v the Public Trustee [2015] QCA 18 at [54] - [65]; Coore v Coore [2013] QSC 196 at [9] - [11].
[9] See QB4 Capital Pty Ltd v Guardian Securities Ltd [2023] FACFC 72 at [71]; Burke v Public Trustee for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 64; The Application of Richard Neal in his capacity as administrator of the Estate Late Paula Claire Hewitt [2021] NSWSC 1489 at [18]; Plan B Trustees Ltd v Attorney-General (WA) [2012] WASC 392.
[10] In re Beddoe [1892] UKLawRpCh 180; [1893] 1 Ch 547 at 558.
[12] [1992] FCA 368; (1992) 37 FCR 201 at 210 - 211.
[15] Bank of Queensland Ltd & Anor v Ross Auto Auctions Pty Ltd (in liq) (Receivers & Managers appointed) & Anor [2016] QSC 19 at [4] citing SingTel Optus Pty Ltd & Ors v Weston [2012] NSWSC 1002 at [14].
[16] Adsett v Berlouis (1992) FCR 201 at 211 - 212.
[19] Olsen v James [2020] NSWSC 1015 at [103].
[20] [2023] QSC 132 at [45].
[22] Ibid at [75] - [78] followed by Kelly J in in LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) & Ors v Whyte [2023] QSC 132 at [46].
[23] Free Serbian Orthodox Church Diocese for Australia and New Zealand Property Trust v Dobrijevic (No 3) [2017] NSWCA 109 at [42] followed by Kelly J in LM Investment Management Ltd (in liquidation) & Ors v Whyte [2023] QSC 132 at [47].
[27] Dixon v Dixon (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 944 at [75] - [78].
[30] Tyler v Custom Credit Co Ltd & Ors [2000] QCA 178 at [2].
White Rook Pty Ltd
White Horizon Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 262
(1992) 37 FCR 201
(2008) 237 CLR 66
(1936) 54 CLR 572
(2010) 242 CLR 508
(p) in December 2024, an order was made setting the matter down for a three day trial beginning in April 2025; and
(q) in March 2025, White Horizon was given leave to file a further amended defence and counterclaim which was its sixth such defence. Close to the trial, White Horizon filed a seventh amended defence.