1. While the applicant accepts that there is an application of the 2024 Act to disqualifying orders made before (and a disqualifying period started before) the commencement day, the applicant says that nothing in the 2024 Act has a retrospective effect of a type that would recast or change the content in terms of a disqualifying order made before the commencement day. Nor is there anything that would have the retrospective effect of cancelling or making a nullity of a disqualifying order made before the commencement day which is otherwise still in effect.[22]
2. The applicant does not dispute that the principles and objects of the 2024 Act are set out in s 4(1) and s 4(2). The applicant does, however, take issue with the respondent's reference to the objects as including 'to prevent access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour' if it be suggested the applicant poses a risk of these things. The applicant asserts that if there is evidence he poses a risk as described above, that should expressly have been put. Otherwise, there is nothing before the Tribunal which establishes a risk of these things relevant to the interpretative issues arising on the preliminary question or at all.[23]
3. The applicant draws attention to the distinction apparently drawn by the respondent between the category or type of an order on the one hand and the terms or content of an order on the other. The applicant argues that the respondent's submissions, while asserting a plain and natural meaning to the phrase 'disqualifying order', do not at any point engage in a meaningful way with the actual meaning of the word 'order' in the context of a definition plainly referring to orders of a court.[24]
4. The applicant contends that the respondent asserting a meaning of 'disqualifying order' which is strictly limited to the category of a court order fails to consider the serious problems that will arise in practice from such an approach including requiring the respondent to act in a way which overrides an order of the Magistrates Court, which presumably was not Parliament's intention.[25]
5. The applicant says that if the respondent was to be placed by Parliament in the very unusual situation where he was specifically being told by Parliament to ignore an order of the court, what might be expected is additional words in the definition of disqualifying order that reflect that intention. For example: disqualifying order means an order, that is, a VRO, a CAO, even if that order has a permissive element to it.[26]
6. The applicant argues that this situation is something that the drafters have plainly not thought of and only arises for a period of time because eventually CAOs that have a similar permissive clause to that in Mr White's CAO will become extinct.[27]
7. The applicant points to a Mareva Order as an example of how both the category and terms of a court order have consequences. Simply possessing information that an order of the category 'Mareva Order' exists, does not allow any person to know what that lawfully made order of a court permits or does not permit.[28]
8. In considering the meaning of the words rule, judgment and order in the context of the 'slip rule', the applicant refers to the following passages from Manousaridis J in Heywood v Sharpe:[29]
   1. There are a number of matters to notice about this rule. First, the rule applies to a 'judgment or order'. The word 'judgment' is defined in the Dictionary to the FC Rules to have the meaning given to that word in s.4 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). In that section, 'judgment' is defined to mean a 'judgment, decree or order, whether final or interlocutory', or a sentence, and includes a conviction. The word 'order' is defined in the Dictionary to the FC Rules to include 'a final order, an interlocutory order, a direction and a sentence of the Court'.
   2. The word 'judgment', in its historical sense, refers to the formal decision of a common law court by which it finally determined the issues that were tendered by the parties to the court for its determination. It has been defined as:

the determination or sentence of the law, pronounced by a competent judge or court, as the result of an action or proceeding instituted in such court, affirming that, upon the matters submitted for its decision, a legal duty or liability does or does not exist.

1. Section 4 of the FCA Act makes it clear, however, that 'judgment' is not limited to its technical common law meaning. It includes a 'decree' which, although rarely used in modern times, is an order made by courts of equity that finally determines the rights between the parties. It also includes an 'order' which denotes any form of words by which a court pronounces its decisions in response to applications made to it. And, finally, because 'judgment' is defined to include an 'order', and 'order' is defined to include 'directions', 'judgment' also includes 'directions'. This may be taken to mean any order the Court makes for the taking of a step in a proceeding.
2. In short, the words 'judgment' and 'order' denote the words by which courts pronounce decisions they make ...
3. The applicant also relies on Harris v De Robillard[30] which involved a claim that the form of judgment annexed to a bankruptcy notice did not accurately record the judgment that was entered in the local court's computer system. Manousaridis J held that the word 'order' is wide enough to include any form of words by which a court pronounces its decision in response to applications made to it. His Honour went on to observe that the expression 'judgment' and 'order' denote the words by which court's pronounce decisions they make that finally determine the controversy between the parties or otherwise determine finally the rights of the parties.[31]
4. Based on the authorities to which we have just referred, the applicant contends that the plain and ordinary meaning of the word 'order' in the context of a CAO and a 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act must mean the words by which a court pronounces decisions it makes.
5. In further support of this proposition the applicant also relies on s 32 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA):
   1. Effect of Court's summonses etc

(1) A summons or warrant or other order of the Court has effect according to its contents.

(2) A member of the Police Force must obey any warrant, order or direction that is duly issued by the Court and addressed to members of that Police Force.

(3) A member of the Police Force who contravenes subsection (2) is to be dealt with under the Police Act 1892 section 23.

1. The applicant relies in particular on the words:[32]

A summons or warrant or other order of the Court has effect according to its contents.

(Emphasis added)

1. The applicant also relies on the following observation from Corboy J in Blenkinsop v Wilson:[33] [34]
   1. ... Section 34(1) further provides that it is presumed in any case dealt with by the Court that the Court was constituted according to law and had jurisdiction to deal with the case. Section 34(7) states that those presumptions apply in the absence of proof to the contrary.
2. The applicant argues that the respondent's submissions do not provide any authority for the meaning of the word 'order' in terms of a court order. The applicant says further that according to the respondent the face of the order is as far as the respondent must enquire into the relevant order to satisfy himself that pursuant to s 192(1)(c) and s 9(1)(a) or (b) the person is a disqualified person.[35]
3. In response the applicant argues that given the established meaning of the word order as meaning 'the words by which courts pronounce decisions they make' - it is this interpretation that would actually require further words in the defining section or in s 192(1)(c) and s 9(1)(a) or (b) to make clear that what is being referred to as a disqualifying order is simply an order of a certain category.[36]
4. According to the applicant, the respondent's preferred interpretation has obvious problems in that if mere confirmation of the existence of an order in the category of a CAO were sufficient to constitute a disqualifying order and prompt a decision of the respondent under s 192 of the 2024 Act, this in practice would require the respondent to make a decision under s 192 which could be directly opposite to the terms of a lawfully made order of the Magistrates Court.[37]
5. The applicant submits that an administrative decision-maker cannot override the lawful order of a court absent an express and clear basis or authorisation, which is not the case here.[38]
6. Finally, the applicant takes issue with the respondent's submissions that the repeal of s 14(5) of the RO Act is indicative that Parliament must have intended that every CAO, no matter its terms, are disqualifying orders without exception.[39]
7. The applicant contends, on the other hand, that the fact of Parliament repealing s 14(5) of the RO Act means self-evidently that Parliament was aware that for some time there would be two possible types of CAOs in existence, (those that are permissive of firearm possession and those that are not).[40]
8. The applicant argues that given the contemplation by Parliament of some period of lawful CAOs constituting orders of a court permitting possession, it can be properly reasoned that Parliament cannot be taken to have intended administrative decision-makers override a court order without clear words in legislation expressly empowering them to do so.[41]

1. At the end of the hearing, we made orders permitting the parties to file further submissions. Both parties took advantage of that opportunity.
2. The applicant's supplementary submissions primarily focus on the application of the principle of legality which is a rule of statutory construction requiring that courts do not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail certain rights or privileges unless such an intention is clearly manifested by unambiguous language.[42]
3. The applicant argues that the principle of legality applies to the extent that the Tribunal considers uncertainty accompanies the meaning and use of the words 'CAO' and 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act.[43]
4. According to the applicant uncertainty is said to accompany the question of whether a CAO renders the person bound by the order subject to a disqualifying order under the 2024 Act in circumstances where the CAO permits the person bound to possess a firearm authority without further condition.[44]
5. The applicant concedes that firearm ownership is not an entrenched right but says it does not need to be for the principle of legality to have a role in the interpretative process in the event the relevant statutory provisions are unclear.[45]
6. The applicant argues that the courts have recognised a wide range of what are described as principles, rights and privileges that can only be abrogated by the clearest of indications by the legislature.[46]
7. The formulation of principles, right and privileges requiring a clear and unambiguous statutory intention to abrogate, are said by the applicant to be set out by Pearce in Statutory Interpretation in Australia.[47]
8. The applicant aligns his interest in maintaining his firearm authority[48] with an interference with vested property rights as described in Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council:[49]

As a practical matter it means that, where a statute is capable of more than one construction, that construction will be chosen which interferes least with private property rights.

1. The applicant says that the ownership of a thing is self-evidently a property right. Further, whilst the type of property in question being firearms is subject to regulation pertaining to its ownership the applicant's right was vested in the sense that he already had the required regulatory approval and licensing to own the type of property in question.[50]
2. The applicant's submissions also pick up the argument advanced by the respondent that a MRO is only prescribed to be a disqualifying order where that order imposes restraints on the person bound by the order possessing a firearms item or firearm authority.[51] It follows according to the respondent that this assists in the interpretative process in that the failure to make a similar concession with respect to CAOs is deliberate.
3. The applicant contends that there is something to be made of the fact that an MRO is only a disqualifying order if it includes a prohibition on holding a firearm authority that was achieved by regulations. The applicant argues that the exercise of a power by regulation could be used to resolve the uncertainty in relation to CAOs. It is the existence of this power, according to the applicant, that tends against an interpretation that Parliament intended the result for which the respondent advocates.[52]
4. The respondent's further submissions in reply deal firstly with the principle of legality. While not disputing the existence of such a principle, the respondent contends its application is limited and does not extend to a firearm authority.[53]
5. The respondent says further that in the absence of any ambiguity the principle of legality has no role to play.[54]
6. Next the respondent addresses the applicant's contention that the power to make regulations prescribing an order of a kind as a disqualifying order is evidence that Parliament did not intend that all CAOs by disqualifying orders.[55]
7. The respondent points to the fact that a CAO is expressly included in the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act. Thus, there is no room for the regulations to make any further prescription in relation to CAOs. This is said to be in contrast to other orders which are not expressly included in the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act, including MROs.[56]

1. As the Court of Appeal observed in Mohammadi v Bethune the primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions of the statute.
2. It is apparent that the 2024 Act gave rise to significant changes from what previously existed in the 1973 Act.
3. On its face neither the respondent nor the Tribunal have a discretion to grant a firearm authority to a person bound by a FVRO, VRO or CAO. By contrast under the 1973 Act the respondent retained a discretion to issue a firearm authority even if the applicant had been bound by a FVRO or VRO in the 5 years preceding the application for a firearm authority.
4. This change in approach to FVROs, VROs and by association CAOs is consistent with the purpose and objects of the 2024 Act which is concerned with public safety and preventing access to firearms by persons who pose a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour.
5. The applicant's primary argument is that an order including a CAO is to be considered according to its terms not merely by reference to it as a category of orders. The applicant says that Parliament has placed the respondent in the unusual position of having to ignore an order of the Magistrates Court permitting the applicant to possess a firearm authority. According to the applicant, had Parliament intended the respondent to ignore a court order, it is reasonable to expect that the words used to define a disqualifying order would have made that clear.
6. The applicant contends that the failure of the 2024 Act to deal with the subset of persons bound by a CAO that were permitted by a court to retain their firearm authority demonstrates that it was something the drafters had not considered.
7. The applicant rightly points out that it is not for an administrative decision-maker such as the respondent or the Tribunal to interfere with or overturn an order of a court. That, however, is not the case here. Neither the respondent nor the Tribunal is invested with any discretion as to whether a person bound by a FVRO, VRO or CAO can possess a firearm authority.
8. Section 140 of the 2024 Act simply says:

The Commissioner must not grant a firearm authority to a person who is a disqualified person or prohibited person.

1. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill supports this construction:

The designation of an offence or an order as a disqualifying offence or disqualifying order is not to be taken as a decision by the Commissioner, since this designation was achieved by legislative means. Therefore, a person cannot challenge a disqualification arising from a disqualifying order or disqualifying offence to the State Administrative Tribunal.

1. Section 9(1) of the 2024 Act defines a disqualified person as a person subject to a disqualifying order. FVROs, VROs and CAOs are all defined as disqualifying orders pursuant to s 5.
2. The 2024 Act in defining a disqualifying order does not on its face contemplate that the terms of a FVRO, VRO or CAO may permit the person bound to hold a firearm authority.
3. As we have already explained the applicant contends that had Parliament intended the respondent to ignore a court order that should have been made clear and was something the drafters' failed to consider. Whereas the respondent says had Parliament intended CAOs permitting possession of a firearm authority to be excluded from the scope of the term 'disqualifying order', it would have expressly said so.
4. The respondent points to the way the legislation deals with MROs, interim FVROs and through the exceptions in reg 6(2) of the Regulations regarding the disqualification period for orders of a temporary or interim nature.
5. The definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act includes in para (c) 'an order of a kind that is prescribed by the regulations as a disqualifying order'.
6. Regulation 6(1) of the Regulations says that for the purposes of para (c) of the definition of 'disqualifying order' in s 5 of the 2024 Act the following is a disqualifying order:

(d) a misconduct restraining order as defined in the Restraining Orders Act 1997 section 3(1) that imposes restraints on the person bound by the order under section 36(2)(f) or (fa) or (3)(c) or (d) of that Act[.]

1. Sections 36(2)(f) and s 36(3)(c) of the RO Act vest in the court a discretion whether to impose a restraint on the person bound by a MRO from possessing or applying for a firearm item or firearm authority. The Regulations acknowledge the court's discretion in relation to the terms of an MRO hence there are MROs that are disqualifying orders and those that are not.
2. As a general rule delegated legislation made under an Act is not to be taken into account for the purposes of interpretation of the Act itself.[57] However, it is permissible to look at the regulations not to construe an overall scheme or to throw light on ambiguity in a statutory provision, but to ascertain what the scheme is.[58]
3. The 2024 Act and Regulations appear to draw a distinction between the way different types of orders are dealt with. Interim and temporary orders render the person bound an interim disqualified person. Once the interim order expires or is dismissed, the person is no longer prohibited from holding a firearm authority because of the interim or temporary order.
4. MROs only become 'disqualifying orders' in the event a court imposes the restraints provided in s 36(2)(f) or (3)(c) of the RO Act. This flexibility may be explained by the fact that MROs involve conduct of lesser seriousness than that the subject of a FVRO, VRO or CAO and can only be made if the parties are not in a family relationship with one another.
5. Section 36(1) of the RO Act provides:

In making an MRO a court may impose such restraints on the lawful activities and behaviour of the respondent as the court considers appropriate to prevent the respondent -

(a) behaving in a manner that could reasonably be expected to be intimidating or offensive to the person seeking to be protected and that would, in fact, intimidate or offend the person seeking to be protected; or

(b) causing damage to property owned by, or in the possession of, the person seeking to be protected; or

(c) behaving in a manner that is, or is likely to lead to, a breach of the peace; or

(d) committing an offence under The Criminal Code section 70A(2A).

1. FVROs, VROs and CAOs are final orders. A CAO can only be made as a means of resolving an interim FVRO.
2. There are two other contextual matters that further support the conclusion that the legislature's decision to not moderate the definition of a disqualifying order by reference to the specific nature or content of a CAO in a particular case was deliberate.
3. First, as a consequence of the 2024 Act, s 14(5) of the RO Act was repealed thereby removing any prospect that a person bound by a FVRO or VRO could hold or apply for a firearm authority. This is the surest indication that Parliament did not want a person, who among other things, poses a risk of violence, family violence or intimidating behaviour to hold a firearm authority.
4. Second, s 427 of the 2024 Act provides that s 9 (disqualified persons and interim disqualified persons) extends to:

...

(b) a disqualifying order made before commencement day; and

...

(d) a disqualifying period that started before commencement day.

1. A distinction is to be drawn between legislation having a prior effect on past events and legislation basing future action on past events.[59] The former is retrospective the latter is not.
2. We note that the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill says:[60]

Disqualifying offences and disqualifying orders are both retroactive, which means that a person who has committed a disqualifying offence or received a disqualifying order before commencement day will either lose their firearm authority or not be able to apply for one until the expiry of the disqualifying period, which will be dated backwards to match the date of conviction or the day the disqualifying order was received.

1. The distinction as to whether legislation is retrospective or bases future action on past events is not always easy to resolve.
2. While there is nothing to prevent Parliament from making laws having retrospective operation, the starting point is that statutes are presumed not to have retrospective operation.
3. The presumption against retrospectivity can be excluded by either a direct statement to the contrary in the statute or by 'necessary intendment' that the statute is to operate retrospectively.
4. In Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd, the High Court held:[61]

... Necessary intendment only means that the force of the language in its surroundings carries such strength of impression in one direction, that to entertain the opposite view appears wholly unreasonable.

1. In our view, even if the 2024 Act is characterised as retrospective it is clear that the legislature intended that it apply to a disqualifying order made before commencement day.
2. The fact that the 2024 Act:

(a) does not distinguish between FVROs, VROs and CAOs that permit the person bound to hold a firearm authority and those that do not;

(c) applies to disqualifying orders made prior to commencement day,

is a clear indication that the legislature must have intended that FVROs, VROs and CAOs that permitted the person bound to hold a firearm authority were to be considered disqualifying orders.

1. As we have discussed earlier, had Parliament wanted to draw a distinction between those who had permission to hold a firearm authority in accordance with s 14(5) of the RO Act, it could have done so.
2. We turn now to consider the applicant's submissions in relation to the principle of legality.
3. The principle of legality is a rule of statutory construction that an intention to abrogate or curtail certain rights or freedoms is not implied to the legislature unless such an intention is clearly manifest by unambiguous language.[62]
4. No authority was produced by either party that confirmed the principle of legality applies to a firearm authority. We also note that principles of the 2024 Act include:

(b) the possession and use of firearms is a privilege that is always conditional on the overriding need to ensure public safety.

1. A further difficulty for the applicant lies in the fact that there does not appear to be any ambiguity as to whether a CAO is a disqualifying order for the purposes of the 2024 Act.
2. The applicant argues that the power to make regulations prescribing an order of a kind as a disqualifying order is evidence that Parliament did not intend all CAOs to be disqualifying orders.
3. Unlike a MRO, a CAO is expressly referred to in the definition of a 'disqualifying order' without reference to a CAO that is permissive. Had there been an intention to treat CAOs in the same ways as MROs, they could have been included in para (c) of the definition of 'disqualifying order'.
4. As Bell P observed in Kassam v Hazzard:[63]

The principle of legality's role may be thought of as an occasionally useful, context-dependent adjunct to the ultimate and central judicial task and responsibility of giving effect to legislative intention. As Basten JA (with whom Beazley P and Payne JA agreed) observed in Elliott v Minister administering Fisheries Management Act 1994 (2018) 97 NSWLR 1082; [2018] NSWCA 123 at [35] (Elliott):

"the general requirement that effect must be given to the text of the statute, read in context and having regard to its apparent purpose, remains the principal focus of statutory construction".

The usual process of statutory construction expressed above is not 'overridden' by the principle of legality: Elliott at [40].

1. In Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd[64] McHugh J discussed the relevance of the strength of the right in question:

The presumption of non-interference is strong when the right is a fundamental right of our legal system; it is weak when the right is merely one to take or not take a particular course of action. Courts should not cut down the natural and ordinary meaning of legislation evincing an intention to interfere with these lesser rights by relying on a presumption that the legislature did not intend to interfere with them. Given the frequency with which legislatures now abolish or amend 'ordinary' common law rights, the 'presumption' of non-interference with those rights is inconsistent with modern experience and borders on fiction. If the presumption still exists in such cases, its effect must be so negligible that it can only have weight when all other factors are evenly balanced.

1. As McHugh J cautioned in Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton:[65]

[I]n Australia today, few principles or rights can claim to be so fundamental that it is unlikely that the legislature would want to change them.

1. Having regard to the text of the 2024 Act, read in context and having regards to its purpose, principles and objects, we are not satisfied there is a sufficient basis to invoke the principle of legality even were we satisfied it has application with respect to firearms.

1. The preliminary question is answered in the affirmative. A conduct agreement order that includes in its terms 'the Person Bound is permitted to possess a firearms item or firearms authorisation and the necessary licenses without further condition' is a disqualifying order for the purposes of the Firearms Act 2024 (WA).

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] The RO Act uses the term 'firearms authorisation' whereas the 2024 Act uses the term 'firearm authority'. For the purposes of consistency, we have used the term 'firearm authority'.

[2] Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] - [36].

[3] In fact, it was an interim FVRO that was made ex parte.

[4] Respondent's letter dated 23 August 2024, page 2.

[5] See s 29, State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA).

[6] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 113.

[7] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 114. See also Low v Performance Finance Ltd [2004] WASC 80.

[8] Magistrates Court transcript; 7 June 2023.

[9] Respondent's submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 2 - 4 and Applicant's submissions, 16 June 2025, page 2.

[10] Second Reading, 14 September 2016, (Hon Michael Mischin, Attorney General).

[11] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.

[12] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.

[13] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 2.

[14] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 5 - 6.

[15] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 8.

[16] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, page 12.

[17] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 9 - 10.

[18] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, pages 11 - 12.

[19] Respondent's Submissions, 14 March 2025, para 63.

[20] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 2.

[21] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.

[22] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.

[23] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 4.

[24] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 3.

[25] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.

[28] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 7.

[29] Heywood v Sharpe [2014] FCCA 2999 at [13] - [16].

[30] Harris v De Robillard [2017] FCCA 2451 at [24].

[31] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, pages 9 - 10.

[32] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 11.

[33] Blenkinsop v Wilson [2019] WASC 77 at [57].

[34] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 11.

[35] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, pages 11 - 12.

[36] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.

[37] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 12.

[38] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.

[39] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.

[40] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.

[41] Applicant's Submissions, 16 June 2025, page 13.

[42] Saeed v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 241 CLR 252; [2010] HCA 23 at [56] - [59] per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ.

[43] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 2.

[44] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, pages 6 - 7.

[45] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 2.

[46] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, pages 3 - 5.

[47] D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9th edition, LexisNexis Australia, 2019) at page 255.

[48] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 3.

[49] Fazzolari Pty Ltd v Parramatta City Council [2009] HCA 12; 2009 254 ALR 1 at [43] - [44].

[50] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 4.

[51] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 6.

[52] Applicant's Supplementary Submissions, 15 July 2025, page 6.

[53] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, page 2.

[54] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, page 2.

[55] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, pages 2 - 4.

[56] Respondent's Further Submissions in Reply, 28 July 2025, pages 3 - 4.

[57] Mine Subsidence Board v Wambo Coal Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 137 at [41].

[58] Brayson Motors Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Taxation [1985] HCA 20; (1985) 156 CLR 651 at 652.

[59] See generally, D Pearce, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (9th edition, Lexis Nexis Australia, 2019) at page 360.

[60] Explanatory Memorandum, presented in the Legislative Assembly, page 5.

[61] Worrall v Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd [1917] HCA 67; (1917) 24 CLR 28 at 32 per Barton, Isaacs and Rich JJ.

[62] Al-Kateb v Godwin [2004] HCA 37; (2004) 219 CLR 562 at [19] - [20].

[63] Kassam v Hazzard [2021] NSWCA 299 (Kassam v Hazzard) at [86].

[64] Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33 at [36]. See also Kassam v Hazzard at [90].

[65] Malika Holdings Pty Ltd v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 at [28].