WEL -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2025] WASCA 182 (5 December 2025)

1. The appellant was 40 years old at the time of the offending, and 42 years old at the time of sentencing. He had no prior convictions. The appellant had a stable upbringing with loving parents and an older brother. He continues to have a good relationship with his parents and brother, who remain supportive of him.
2. The appellant suffered a significant trauma when he was aged 13 years old, and the psychological effects on him have been ongoing.
3. The appellant completed school and gained TAFE qualifications in gym instruction and personal training, as well as a bachelor's degree in sports science from Notre Dame University. He also obtained a graduate diploma in exercise physiology. Since leaving school, he has, for the most part, been gainfully employed.
4. The appellant is currently in a relationship with a partner he met after he was arrested and charged with the offending. She remains supportive of him.
5. The appellant suffers from mental health issues. He has been diagnosed with attention‑deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and a major depressive disorder.
6. The appellant also has longstanding substance abuse issues. He commenced using illicit drugs and alcohol when he was aged about 17. In his early 20s, after the breakdown of a relationship, the appellant commenced using methylamphetamine.
7. Following his arrest and as at the time of sentencing, the appellant had engaged with a psychiatrist, Dr Chadwick, and a psychologist, Dr Coxon, in relation to his mental health. Dr Chadwick diagnosed the appellant with major depressive disorder, anxious/avoidant personality traits and ADHD (onset in childhood). Dr Chadwick considered that the appellant's personality traits and ADHD were not related to the commission of the offence, but it was not possible to say whether his major depressive disorder was related to his offending. The appellant had been prescribed and had commenced taking medications, including dexamphetamine, as well as having attended 19 counselling sessions.[2]
8. Following his arrest, the appellant ceased using illicit drugs. On four occasions from June 2023 to February 2024, he attended upon his general practitioner, Dr Torvaldsen, for voluntary urine drug screening (UDS).[3]
9. The appellant tendered numerous references attesting to his otherwise good character, and a letter of apology dated 13 November 2024.
10. The appellant also cooperated with the authorities in the following ways:[4]
    1. On 31 May 2024, he attended an interview with police for the purpose of providing a witness statement in respect of Mr A.
    2. On 18 September 2024, he signed a witness statement in respect of Mr A and provided police with camera footage from his premises.
    3. On 13 November 2024, he signed an undertaking to give evidence against Mr A and another co-offender pursuant to s 37A of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).
11. In this court the appellant's counsel submitted that the appellant had, in the 18 months following his arrest, substantially, if not completely, rehabilitated. Relevantly, it was also submitted that the appellant was at low risk of reoffending.[5]

1. In her remarks, the learned sentencing judge described the circumstances of the offending, and the appellant's personal circumstances, in similar terms as above. In relation to the seriousness of the offending, her Honour found:[6]
   1. The appellant was in possession of a very large quantity of cocaine, and the 1 kg portion was of a high purity, which meant it could have been 'cut' to produce an increased amount of illicit drugs, which could have done great harm to the community.
   2. The appellant was entrusted with this large quantity of cocaine by permitting it to be stored at his house by someone whom he knew was a drug dealer, which reduced the risk of detection.
   3. The appellant's role in the offending was an important one.
   4. The offending was not isolated or a 'one off', noting that the appellant could not be punished for the uncharged offending.
   5. The appellant received some reward for the offending in the form of small amounts of methylamphetamine.
2. The sentencing judge referred to the mitigating factors, including the appellant's remorse, previous good character, admissions to the police, early guilty plea, and cooperation with the authorities.
3. As to the appellant's mental health, the sentencing judge found there was no causal link with the offending. Given that fact, her Honour considered that the appellant's compromised mental health did not diminish his moral culpability, nor make him an unsuitable vehicle for general deterrence. However, her Honour stated that she had taken the appellant's mental health into account in 'a general way', and had accepted to some degree that prison would be more difficult for him than someone without his mental health conditions.[7]
4. In relation to the appellant's rehabilitation, the sentencing judge found:[8]
   1. The appellant had stopped using methylamphetamine and that was to his credit, and a positive step towards rehabilitation.
   2. Given the appellant's longstanding addiction to methylamphetamine, the appellant 'probably has some work to do in terms of rehabilitation to ensure that [he does not] go back to using methylamphetamine in the future'.
5. As to the appellant's risk of reoffending, the sentencing judge concluded that this was a matter which was difficult to assess on the materials, and she was unable to conclude that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending. Her Honour said:[9]

Despite the views of the doctors, a matter that concerns me greatly that goes to your risk of reoffending is that it does seem to be that there was some link between your offending and your methylamphetamine use. You appear to have been able to stop your methylamphetamine use on your own accord with very little, if any, specialised professional assistance, which is to your credit. However, given it was a longstanding entrenched addiction, I am concerned that you remain at risk of relapse, particularly given that you claim you used methylamphetamine to self-medicate.

Now the expert material before me seems to gloss over your addiction, and that may be - it's not a criticism of your reports or of you in - I'm not suggesting that you were less than frank with them, but it may well be because of the questions they were asked. I, therefore, am unable to conclude that you're at low risk of reoffending. That doesn't make your offending worse. It simply means the absence of a mitigating factor.

1. The sentencing judge emphasised the importance of general deterrence noting the seriousness of the offence.
2. After having regard to both the aggravating and mitigating factors, the sentencing judge found that the only appropriate sentence was a term of immediate imprisonment.
3. The sentencing judge allowed a 25% reduction on account of the appellant's guilty plea, a further reduction of 8% for the appellant's past cooperation with the authorities, and a 20% discount for the appellant's promise of future cooperation.
4. As mentioned earlier, the sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 4 years 2 months' imprisonment, backdated to commence on 27 October 2024, and made an order that the appellant was eligible for parole.

1. The appellant complains that the learned sentencing judge erred in failing to find that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending. This appeal ground has two limbs. First, that her Honour erred in finding that the appellant 'probably had some work to do in terms of rehabilitation'. Secondly, that she failed to take into account the relevant considerations of the appellant's remorse, prior good character, and other protective factors.
2. During sentencing submissions, the appellant relied on the following materials in support of the submission that he was at low risk of reoffending:
   1. A report from Dr Leonie Coxon, a clinical and forensic psychologist, dated 23 May 2024, and an addendum report dated 1 October 2024.
   2. A report from Dr Simon Torvaldsen, a general practitioner, dated 19 February 2024, and the UDS test results.
   3. A report from Dr Leighton Chadwick, a consultant psychiatrist, dated 4 March 2024, and an addendum report dated 7 October 2024.
   4. A letter of apology from the appellant.
   5. Letters from the appellant's family as to his rehabilitative efforts.
   6. Numerous character references.
3. More specifically, Dr Coxon and Dr Chadwick each expressed the opinion that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending.
4. Dr Coxon conducted a risk assessment of the appellant using the 'Inventory of Offender Risk, Needs and Strengths'. The appellant's overall risk was 'around the average range', which suggested that he was of average risk of reoffending. Nevertheless, Dr Coxon opined that the appellant was unlikely to commit such an offence again as she considered he 'would not like to inflict the consequences of his offending behaviour on his family again as he feel[s] they do not deserve this trauma'.
5. Dr Chadwick was unable to comment on any 'specific predictive likelihood' as to whether the appellant would reoffend in a similar manner in the future, noting the limitations of such a predictive assessment. However, Dr Chadwick referred to the appellant's lack of criminal history, that he had no impairment of impulse control, as well as his remorse, and considered that those factors, combined with his personality style, 'probably suggest a low risk of future similar offending'.
6. Dr Torvaldsen considered that the appellant 'is now well aware of the consequences not just for himself but to others and [is] highly unlikely to re-offend ... He recognises that he did the wrong thing, and now understands the seriousness of the offence he committed, which I don't think he properly appreciated at the time of the offending'.
7. In support of his contention that he was substantially, if not completely, rehabilitated, the appellant relied upon his reported abstinence from using methylamphetamine. The appellant submitted that this was of some significance as his drug use was a motivating factor for his offending. The appellant was, on occasions, rewarded with a small amount of methylamphetamine for his role in the offending. It follows that, should he relapse, he would be at greater risk of reoffending in a similar manner.
8. The appellant also relied on the written material from his girlfriend and parents which spoke to the appellant's commitment to working on his mental health and to no longer using illicit drugs, as well as the fact he voluntarily submitted to drug testing.
9. In summary, the appellant submits that the material before the learned sentencing judge, considered individually and in combination, established that the appellant had successfully ceased using methylamphetamine and had largely rehabilitated. The appellant submits that there were no submissions or material put forward to contradict this position. Moreover, the State prosecutor did not specifically contest that the appellant was at low risk of reoffending. The appellant submits that the learned sentencing judge, in rejecting the submission that he was at a low risk of reoffending, failed to properly take into account the extent of the medical assistance the appellant had in fact received, and the relevance of that treatment to the likelihood of his risk of reoffending. The appellant contends there was not a proper basis for the learned sentencing judge to find beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant 'probably had some work to do' in terms of rehabilitation. Rather, the materials clearly established, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending.
10. Contrary to the appellant's submissions, we are satisfied that the learned sentencing judge was not in error when rejecting, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant's submission that he was at a low risk of reoffending, for the following reasons.
11. First, while the medical professionals all expressed the opinion that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending, there were limitations to each of their opinions. Dr Torvaldsen's opinion was based solely on the appellant's expression of remorse and his understanding of the seriousness of his conduct. It is difficult to see that the opinion as expressed is founded substantially on any requisite specialised knowledge or experience so as to provide it with probative value. Dr Coxon's ultimate opinion was inconsistent with the results obtained by the risk assessment tools, which determined that the appellant was at average risk of reoffending. Dr Chadwick, noting his lack of training or background in this area, qualified his opinion by observing that the appellant's lack of prior convictions, remorse, and the absence of a link between any mental impairment and a tendency to offend probably suggested a low risk of reoffending. That opinion cannot be given weight given Dr Chadwick's self-acknowledged lack of training or background in forensic psychiatry or in the application of predictive assessments of criminality using multiple demographic and epidemiological variables.
12. Secondly, while the appellant reported that he self‑medicated with methylamphetamine to treat his depression, the medical evidence did not extend to providing a causal link between the appellant's misuse of methylamphetamine and his major depressive disorder. Indeed, the evidence of Dr Chadwick was to the contrary. Accordingly, the fact the appellant had engaged successfully with a psychiatrist and psychologist, while to his credit, did not specifically address his drug addiction nor his risk of a relapse.
13. Moreover, the appellant ceased using illicit drugs without any specialist drug rehabilitation intervention. There was no evidence of any specific treatment being provided for the appellant's methylamphetamine addiction. In the context of the appellant's longstanding and entrenched addiction to methylamphetamine, there was a legitimate basis for the learned sentencing judge to adopt a cautious approach to his current abstinence.
14. Thirdly, there was also an evidentiary basis for the learned sentencing judge to find that the appellant's offending appeared to be linked to his methylamphetamine use. Indeed, the appellant became friendly with Mr A through their mutual illicit drug use, and he was rewarded for his offending with small amounts of methylamphetamine for his own personal use.
15. As to the appellant's submission that the learned sentencing judge failed to take into account the appellant's remorse, protective factors and lack of prior convictions, none of those considerations directly affected, or materially detracted from, her Honour's expressed concern that, given the longstanding and entrenched nature of the appellant's drug addiction, his abstinence may be vulnerable without specific intervention. Moreover, her Honour referred to those considerations, and, upon a reading of her sentencing remarks as a whole, we do not consider that she overlooked taking those matters into account when considering whether the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending.
16. Finally, even if it had been established that her Honour erred in failing to find that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending, we would not conclude that a different (in this case, lesser) sentence should have been imposed as required by s 31(4)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA). As explained below, in the context of dealing with ground 2, the appellant's offending involved a high degree of criminality. The appellant willingly hid in his home, as a bailee for Mr A, a large quantity of cocaine. He possessed the cocaine knowing that Mr A was engaged in the business of dealing in that prohibited drug. The offence was not committed on the spur of the moment. The appellant's involvement was not transitory. The appellant allowed Mr A to use his house as a storage space for a period of months.
17. Even if there had been a finding that the appellant was at a low risk of reoffending, combined with all of the other mitigating factors, the objective criminality and the need for general deterrence required the imposition of a sentence no shorter than that imposed by the learned sentencing judge.
18. For these reasons, the ground has not been made out. Leave to appeal should be refused.

1. The general principles applicable to a complaint that error should be inferred on the basis that a sentence is manifestly excessive are well established.[10]
2. In the present case, the appellant contends that the head sentence imposed fell outside the standards of sentences customarily imposed for comparable cases, and that, having regard to the circumstances of the offending and the appellant's personal circumstances, the sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust.
3. As mentioned earlier, the learned sentencing judge imposed a head sentence of 4 years and 2 months' imprisonment. After a reduction of 25% on account of his guilty plea, and reductions of 8% for past cooperation and 20% for future cooperation, the appellant submits that the learned sentencing judge must have adopted a starting point approaching 9 years' imprisonment. It is difficult to ascertain with any precision the starting point adopted. However, it may be accepted that it was at or about the 9-year term of imprisonment suggested on behalf of the appellant.
4. Whatever the starting point, it must be borne in mind that an appeal against sentence is not an appeal against any notional starting point. It is an appeal against the sentence that was actually imposed.[11] This court does not determine sentencing appeals by reference to an actual or notional starting point.[12]
5. In any event, the appellant relies on several authorities in support of his contention that the sentence imposed fell outside the standard of sentences customarily imposed for comparable cases involving drug offences.
6. In Tricoli v The State of Western Australia,[13] the offender pleaded guilty to possession of 436.59 g of cocaine (with a purity of about 68%) with intent to sell or supply it to another. He was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment and made eligible for parole. The appellant was storing the cocaine at his home, and selling it from his home, but he was not the owner of it. He committed the offence to support his own drug addiction. The offender was aged 32 years at the time of the offending, had no prior convictions, and pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity.
7. This court, after reviewing other cases, observed that offending involving large quantities of cocaine (such as in the offender's case) often attracted sentences of up to 10 years' imprisonment.[14]
8. It is difficult to see how this authority supports the appellant's contention. In the present case, the quantity of cocaine is more than twice the amount in Tricoli, while the appellant's role in the offending in the present case is comparable to the offender's role in Tricoli to the extent that both offenders stored the drug and participated in distributing it. The starting point for the sentence imposed in Tricoli would also be considerably higher than 6 years' imprisonment, given the offender pleaded guilty at the first opportunity.
9. In Jiang v The State of Western Australia,[15] the offender pleaded guilty to possession of 1.97 kg of cocaine with intent to sell or supply it to another. He was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment and made eligible for parole. The offender was not the owner of the cocaine but assisted to distribute the drug by driving other persons over the course of one day. The offender entered a late guilty plea and had no prior convictions. An appeal alleging that the sentence was manifestly excessive was dismissed.
10. In the present case, the appellant's offending involved a smaller quantity of cocaine, but his involvement in storing and distributing the cocaine was more serious, and was not isolated nor confined to one day. While accepting that the starting point for the sentence imposed in the present case would have been higher (which was appropriate given the more serious nature of the appellant's offending), the appellant's lesser head sentence reflected his favourable personal circumstances, early guilty plea and cooperation with the authorities.
11. In The State of Western Australia v YCL,[16] the offender pleaded guilty to two offences; possession of 558 g of cocaine with intent to sell or supply it to another, and possession of 134 g of methylamphetamine with the intent to sell or supply it to another. He had allowed his house to be used as a delivery address for drugs in exchange for cash. The offender entered early guilty pleas and cooperated with the authorities. The sentencing judge imposed sentences of 18 months' imprisonment and 3 years 6 months' imprisonment respectively, to be served concurrently. After a State appeal, this court held the sentences to be manifestly inadequate. The offender was resentenced to a total effective sentence of 5 years 3 months' imprisonment and made eligible for parole.
12. While it is to be accepted that the offender in YCL was in possession of two discrete types of illicit drugs, which rendered his offending more serious, the quantity and purity of each of the drugs were less significant than in the present case. In YCL, like the appellant, the offender had entered an early guilty plea and cooperated with the authorities. However, the offender in YCL received a lengthier head sentence than the appellant's sentence of 4 years 2 months. As such, this case does not support the appellant's contention that the sentence was outside the normal range for comparable drug offences.
13. It is to be acknowledged that the sentences imposed in comparable cases can provide guidance to sentencing judges and act as a yardstick against which appeal courts may examine a sentence. However, while accepting the importance of consistency in sentencing, the range of sentences imposed in the past for comparable drug offence cases does not fix the boundaries within which a judge must sentence. In any event, in our view the authorities relied upon by the appellant do not support his contention that the sentence imposed in the present case was outside the range of sentences customarily imposed for similar types of drug offences.
14. Moreover, the offending in the present case was serious. As the sentencing judge noted, the appellant's role was important. He stored the drugs in two safes, purchased and installed only for that purpose, which reduced his co-offenders' risk of detection by authorities. The quantity and purity of the cocaine was significant and was of considerable value on the illicit drug market. The appellant also participated in distributing some of the drugs. While the appellant was not paid a monetary amount for his role, he was rewarded with various small amounts of methylamphetamine for his own personal use. Furthermore, the offending was not isolated and so there was less scope for leniency in the sentence.
15. While it is true that there were several mitigatory factors in the appellant's favour, including his past and future cooperation with the authorities, early guilty plea, considerable rehabilitative efforts and progress (including his abstinence from drug use) since his arrest, and remorse, such matters have limited weight in cases of serious drug‑related offending where principles of general deterrence and the protection of the community must be emphasised.[17]
16. Ultimately, after balancing the relevant considerations, we are satisfied that the sentence imposed on the appellant was not manifestly excessive.
17. For those reasons, the ground has not been made out. Leave to appeal should be refused.
18. Accordingly, the following orders should be made:

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] Amended Statement of Material Facts (White AB 98 - 99).

[2] Offender's sentencing submissions, pars 52, 54, 68 (White AB 126, 128).

[3] Offender's sentencing submissions, par 69 (White AB 128).

[4] Offender's sentencing submissions, pars 98 - 99 (White AB 133).

[5] Appellant's submissions, pars 13 - 14 (White AB 15).

[6] Sentencing ts 14/11/2024, 43 - 44 (White AB 90 - 91).

[7] Sentencing ts 14/11/2024, 42 (White AB 89).

[8] Sentencing ts 14/11/2024, 41 (White AB 88).

[9] Sentencing ts 14/11/2024, 43 (White AB 90).

[10] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21].

[11] KJL v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 65 [59].

[12] KAT v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 11; (2017) 264 A Crim R 367 [40].

[13] Tricoli v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 74.

[15] Jiang v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 7.

[16] The State of Western Australia v YCL [2024] WASCA 124.

[17] Carlucci v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 37 [37].