WATSON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 8 (15 January 2026)

Supplied identification material of JD with intent that the material would be used to commit an indictable offence. (Criminal Code (WA), s 490(1))

Possession of a prohibited drug (2.045 kg of methylamphetamine) with intent to sell or supply it to another.

(Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(a))

Sold a prohibited drug (14 g of methylamphetamine) to another

(Misuse of Drugs Act 1981 (WA), s 6(1)(c))

1. The sentences were backdated to 1 February 2024 to take account of time spent in custody on remand. The appellant was made eligible for parole.
2. The appellant now appeals against his sentences. The appellant is self‑represented, and his grounds of appeal are not expressed in an orthodox form. In substance they raise the following issues:
   1. Is the individual sentence of 10 years 8 months' imprisonment for possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply manifestly excessive?
   2. Does the total effective sentence of 12 years 2 months' imprisonment infringe the totality principle?
   3. Do the sentences imposed on the appellant infringe the parity principle having regard to the sentence imposed on a co‑offender (who it is convenient to refer to as LS)?
   4. Did the sentencing judge err by failing to take account of the conditions experienced by the appellant in custody as a mitigating factor?
3. For the following reasons, none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Leave to appeal must be refused on all grounds and the appeal must be dismissed.

1. The sentencing judge made the following findings as to the circumstances of the appellant's offending.

Supply of identification material with intent to commit indictable offence[1]

1. On 28 September 2021, the appellant submitted an online application to Bankwest for a bank account and debit Mastercard in the name of the complainant (who it is convenient to refer to as MT). The appellant provided MT's personal details, including her driver's licence and Medicare card numbers, and provided an email address in her name. The appellant provided his own phone number in the application. The application was successful, and a bank account was opened in MT's name (Bankwest account).
2. On 29 October 2021, the appellant submitted an online application to the Queensland Rural and Industry Development Authority (Development Authority) for a $10,000 grant for COVID‑19 related business assistance, knowing that eligibility for the grant depended upon the applicant being either a Queensland business or a not‑for‑profit organisation. At the time the appellant submitted the application, he was resident in Western Australia and not otherwise eligible for a grant. The appellant provided a false business name and gave the name of the relevant contact person who it is convenient to refer to as JD. The appellant also provided an image and a driver's licence in JD's name, together with details of his Medicare card. The appellant also provided an email address using JD's name.
3. The appellant also provided the Development Authority with the details of the Bankwest account but altered the account statement by providing the details of JD, using a Queensland address for the account holder, in place of MT's name.
4. When the Development Authority assessed the application, they viewed it as suspicious and declined the application for the grant.
5. During police inquiries it was later established that a truck belonging to JD was stolen in 2020. When the truck was later recovered, his driver's licence and other cards which had been in the truck were missing. The email address using JD's details was created without his knowledge.
6. The account statements for the Bankwest account revealed references to transactions conducted with LS and also another person who it is convenient to refer to as JM in November 2021. Police inquiries of JM established that he was not aware of transactions being conducted in his name.
7. On 6 November 2021, when the appellant was arrested on unrelated matters, police found a Bankwest debit card in MT's name in the appellant's possession. Police subsequently located text messages between the appellant and LS in which she confirmed payment had been made to her using MT's name.

Possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another[2]

1. From early October 2021, the appellant was regularly in telephone contact with LS, frequently using the Signal encrypted communications application, about various drug transactions or drug‑related activities in which they were both involved in sourcing and selling prohibited drugs, principally methylamphetamine.
2. Both the appellant and LS knew a person in New South Wales, from whom significant quantities of methylamphetamine could be sourced. The Signal messages included messages about the appellant travelling to New South Wales to collect methylamphetamine from the New South Wales supplier on various occasions including on 1 August 2022.
3. On 2 August 2022, the appellant flew back to Perth and was met by LS in the afternoon. He collected a suitcase from baggage retrieval and then the appellant and LS caught a taxi. Police intercepted the taxi and arrested the appellant and LS. Police located the suitcase in the boot of the taxi. Inside the suitcase were four bags containing methylamphetamine in the quantity of either 497 g or 498 g with a purity ranging from 76 ‑ 82%. A further quantity of 55.5 g of methylamphetamine at a purity of 82% was also found by police. The total amount of methylamphetamine was 2.045 kg, which the appellant had transported from Sydney in the suitcase.
4. When the appellant was arrested, he was holding a black Apple iPhone. When requested to provide the pin code to allow police to access the phone, the appellant refused. Police later executed a search warrant at a garage that the appellant was using from which they seized drug‑related paraphernalia, including a notebook or tick list with a concluding entry of $56,480.
5. The appellant was on bail for fraud offences including those referred to at [9] ‑ [13] above, when he committed the possession of methylamphetamine offence.
6. Police charged the appellant with the offending on 2 August 2022, and he was later released on bail.

1. On 17 January 2024, the appellant was a passenger in a vehicle which police stopped after observing it leave the appellant's bail residence. When police searched the vehicle, they found a clip‑seal bag on the floor behind the front passenger seat in which the appellant had been sitting, which contained 27.86 g of methylamphetamine. The appellant was arrested on suspicion of possession of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply and taken to a police station. The police then commenced a controlled operation and placed an undercover operative in a cell with the appellant.
2. The appellant told the undercover operative that the appellant did not owe money as he did not do 'tick' and got ounces of methylamphetamine for $5,500. The appellant said that he sold 'two to three' a day and had a couple of females who ran drugs for him. The appellant said that he sold 'halves and quarts', and that the drugs were good and sold quickly.
3. The appellant was released from the police station early in the next morning and met the undercover operative outside the police station. The undercover operative then drove the appellant to the appellant's residence, and they exchanged contact details. Arrangements were made for the appellant to sell drugs to the undercover operative. The appellant told the undercover operative that he would need a few days as he did not have anything at the time. The appellant told the undercover operative to ring him in a couple of days.
4. The appellant and the undercover operative communicated on 31 January 2024, 1 February 2024 and 5 February 2024. They arranged to meet at a tavern on the evening of 5 February 2024. The appellant told the undercover operative that he could source half an ounce of methylamphetamine for $2,700 and that he would sell it to the undercover operative for $3,000.
5. On 8 February 2024, there were ongoing communications between the appellant and the undercover operative about meeting. The appellant told the undercover operative that he was collecting drugs in Caversham. The appellant was observed to visit various addresses in the Caversham area before driving to a business premises where he met the undercover operative. The appellant got into the undercover operative's vehicle and threw a black sealed bag on the centre console, stating that it cost $3,000, which the undercover operative handed to the appellant. The black sealed bag contained approximately 14 g of methylamphetamine.
6. Police arrested and charged the appellant with this offending on 10 April 2024.

The appellant's role in the drug dealing enterprise[4]

1. The appellant was towards the mid‑level to the upper‑level of a significant drug distribution enterprise. He was selling drugs partly to fund his own drug use, but also for profit. The appellant was selling various quantities of methylamphetamine from at least 1.75 g to 14 g or half an ounce, and at times indicated he had an ability to source up to an ounce. He was selling methylamphetamine for thousands of dollars.
2. The appellant imported a large quantity of methylamphetamine of a little over 2 kg into Western Australia from New South Wales. There was a high level of planning and premeditation to the offending, reflecting a system which the appellant had been operating over an extended period of time to bring methylamphetamine into Western Australia. Prior to the offending in August 2022, the appellant had regularly been in contact with his supplier in New South Wales, and had made a number of trips to New South Wales to bring significant quantities of methylamphetamine to Western Australia travelling on commercial flights. The offending for which the appellant has been convicted was not one‑off or isolated.
3. The appellant acted as a courier of the drugs from Sydney to Perth. The appellant's involvement in transporting or couriering the drugs from New South Wales to Perth was at least partly for his own benefit, as he intended to share a significant proportion of the drugs with LS and with another person in Western Australia. The appellant volunteered to fly drugs from New South Wales to Perth to help expedite the transportation of drugs into Western Australia when the drugs were previously being posted to Western Australia.
4. While the appellant would have shared a significant quantity of the 2 kg of methylamphetamine, he would have retained a significant quantity of the methylamphetamine for his own purposes. However, the sentencing judge could not make any finding as to precisely how much the appellant would have kept for his own commercial purposes.
5. The appellant was receiving many thousands of dollars for his drug‑related activities. The extent of the appellant's commerciality was illustrated by the 'tick book' found in his garage which indicated the appellant was owed $56,480 by his drug‑dealing customers. The extent of the appellant's commerciality is also evidenced by him selling 14 g of methylamphetamine to the undercover operative for $3,000.
6. During the course of his drug‑related activities with LS, the appellant opened the Bankwest account in the name of another person by using that person's stolen identification details which helped him receive and make payments in relation to his drug‑related activities and hide his identity.
7. The offending of which the appellant was convicted must be seen against a background of and in the context of him being actively involved in significant drug‑dealing activities over an extended period of time, at least since early October 2021. By early October 2021, the appellant's drug‑dealing activities were well established. There was a determination and a persistence, as well as significant planning, in his offending. The fact that the appellant was on bail for other offending did not deter him from continuing to offend and engage in drug‑dealing activities.

1. The sentencing judge made the following findings as to the appellant's personal circumstances.[5]
2. The appellant was 43 years old at the time of sentencing. He was born and raised in Western Australia, the middle of six children. The appellant benefited from a supportive and positive family life and upbringing.
3. Between the ages of 19 and 35 years, the appellant was in a long‑term relationship with the mother of his two sons who were 20 and 16 years old at the time of sentencing. That relationship ended because of the appellant's drug use. The appellant maintained regular telephone contact with his sons while remanded in custody. The appellant's father has passed away. Because of his drug use and association with other drug users and people involved in criminal activity, the appellant no longer had any contact with his mother, brothers and sisters.
4. The appellant completed year 12 and performed well academically. He had been employed servicing vehicles and served 5 years in the Royal Australian Navy. The appellant lived a relatively law‑abiding lifestyle until his mid‑thirties.
5. The appellant had a prior criminal record, including a conviction for the possession of MDMA with intent to sell or supply to another in 2003, for which he received a suspended sentence of imprisonment, and various other less serious offences committed in Western Australia and New South Wales. He had not previously been sentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment.
6. The appellant started using amphetamines at the age of 17 years and continued using that drug over an extended period of time, except when serving in the Navy. For about the last decade or so the appellant has regularly used methylamphetamine. In the months leading up to the offending, the appellant was using over a gram of methylamphetamine daily. This led to the appellant incurring a significant drug debt extending to tens of thousands of dollars.
7. The appellant was in good physical health but had been diagnosed with depression and anxiety, for which he was taking prescribed medication.

1. The trial judge found that the appellant entered pleas of guilty in relation to the supply of identification material offences at the first reasonable opportunity. His Honour allowed a discount of 25% under s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 2005 (WA) in respect of that offending. The sentencing judge allowed a discount of 7.5% in respect of the possession of methylamphetamine offence, to which the appellant pleaded guilty on the eve of trial. His Honour allowed a discount of 17.5% in respect of the sale of methylamphetamine offence to which the appellant pleaded guilty earlier, but not at the first reasonable opportunity.[6]
2. The appellant had been in custody on remand since early 2024. His Honour observed:[7]

You are, I am informed, locked in your cell which you share with two others for at least 24 hours most days. I accept that such conditions have been difficult for you to cope with and have caused you some hardship in prison over and above that which would have been experienced had you not spent such a long time in lockdowns and, regrettably, it's a situation that is often brought before this court, and while it's not acceptable that people be in custody in such conditions, there's not much the courts can do about it, but I do acknowledge that it will have caused you hardship because of those conditions and I take that into account. (emphasis added)

1. The sentencing judge recognised the significance of personal and general deterrence as sentencing considerations for serious drug offences, and the lesser weight given to personal mitigating circumstances, in orthodox terms.[8]
2. The sentencing judge also referred to the parity principle which was to be applied in relation to the sentence imposed on LS. LS had been sentenced to a term of 9 years' imprisonment for the possession of methylamphetamine offence, as part of a total effective sentence of 10 years 6 months' imprisonment for that and other offending, before a further reduction was applied in respect of matters it is unnecessary to detail in these reasons. The sentencing judge noted a number of mitigating factors in respect of LS which were not present to the same extent in the appellant's case: she received a 25% discount for pleading guilty at the first reasonable opportunity to the possession of methylamphetamine offence; she had cooperated with police; and she had no past criminal record. Her offending, other than the common possession of methylamphetamine offence, was less serious than the appellant's other offending. The sentencing judge found that LS's antecedents were broadly similar to the appellant's but that, in the appellant's case, the need for personal deterrence and punishment was greater.[9]
3. In applying the parity principle, the sentencing judge concluded:[10]

I have formed the view that the circumstances of your offending are more serious than that of [LS] and the need for personal deterrence, general deterrence and punishment requires a greater sentence to be imposed upon you than was imposed upon [LS] in relation to the offending in August 2022 even though I find the culpability of each of you for that offending is similar.

1. After concluding that the seriousness of the appellant's offending was such that a sentence of immediate imprisonment was the only appropriate sentencing disposition, the sentencing judge indicated the individual sentences which were appropriate before applying the totality principal. The appropriate individual sentences are identified in the table at [2] above.
2. The sentencing judge then applied the totality principle, observing:[11]

There is nothing before me to suggest that your state of health will rapidly worsen while you are in prison, nor is there anything to suggest that if you are given a sentence of a length appropriate to your overall criminality, you will be released in such a state that you would have no reasonable expectation of a useful life or rehabilitation after released from prison.

It follows that in the circumstances of your case, your prospects of rehabilitation, whilst something I will take into account as part of the general mix of factors bearing upon the exercise at my sentencing discretion, is not something that justifies the imposition of a sentence less than might otherwise be imposed on the basis that such a lesser sentence is required in order to avoid the sentence being crushing.

In my view, taking into account all the matters that I have mentioned, and in order to achieve a just sentence, a total sentence of 12 years, two months' imprisonment, appropriately reflects your overall criminality in committing the offences, having regard to all of the relevant circumstances, including the need for protection of the public, the need for punishment and the need for personal and general deterrence.

1. The sentencing judge then imposed the sentences identified in the table at [2] above to give effect to that conclusion.

1. The general principles governing appeals contending that error should be inferred on the basis that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, or that the total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle, are well established. Those principles were summarised in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia:[12]

(1) Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. Express error involves acting on a wrong principle, for example by mistaking the law or facts or taking into account an irrelevant matter. Implied error arises where the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently.

(2) In order to determine whether a sentence for an individual offence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of crimes of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances.

(3) The first limb of the totality principle requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences (including those, if any, in respect of which the offender is still serving or is yet to serve a term of imprisonment), viewed in their entirety, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances including those referable to the offender personally (and including, for example, the desirability of accommodating any wish to rehabilitate), all relevant sentencing factors and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases.

(4) The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors, and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect.

(5) When this court dismisses an appeal against sentence and when it resentences on a successful appeal, its decision does not fix the upper or lower limit of the range.

(6) Where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count generally falls to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence. A heavy individual sentence (which is not manifestly excessive) may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. A relatively light sentence (which is not manifestly inadequate) may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust.

Was the individual sentence for the possession of methylamphetamine offence manifestly excessive?

1. The maximum penalty for the offence of possession of a trafficable quantity (28 g or more) of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another is life imprisonment.
2. The general sentencing considerations for serious drug offences are well established, and were summarised in Gaskell v The State of Western Australia in the following terms:[13]

The major sentencing considerations for offences of dealing or trafficking in dangerous drugs of addiction are general and personal deterrence. The weight of the drugs in question is not generally the chief factor to be taken into account in fixing a sentence, but it is a matter of importance. That is because it can be presumed that the greater the quantity and the purity, the greater the harm which may be done to the community. Other matters to be taken into account include the nature and level of the offender's participation in drug dealing or trafficking within a particular organisation or generally, and whether the offending was committed for commercial gain. The degree of purity is often regarded as significant. Matters personal to an offender will almost always be subsidiary considerations, but they are not completely irrelevant.

As this court has recently observed, while categorisation of the role of an offender may promote consistency, the utility of such an exercise is often limited by the extent of the available information. Such a characterisation is not an essential task to be undertaken in every case, regardless of whether it is possible or appropriate. The characterisation of an offender's role, even when possible, must not obscure an assessment of what the offender did. (citations omitted)

1. Significant sentences of imprisonment are commonly imposed for the offence of possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine measuring in the kilograms. In Zanon v The State of Western Australia,[14] prior to the increase in the relevant maximum penalty to life imprisonment, McLure P referred to a series of cases in which sentences of 12 years or more imprisonment were imposed for offences involving multiple kilograms of methylamphetamine. Her Honour also referred to a cluster of cases in which a total quantity of drugs of around 1 kg attracted sentences of between 9 and 12 years' imprisonment. As was noted in Wood v The State of Western Australia,[15] the increase in the maximum penalty for possession of a trafficable quantity of methylamphetamine to life imprisonment is an indication that sentences for the offence in question should be increased. The cases reviewed in Wood illustrate the types of sentence customarily imposed for this type of offending.[16]
2. In his written submissions, the appellant refers to two other cases in support of his submission that he did not receive a sentence that was comparative to other offenders, convicted in similar circumstances to the appellant. He refers to these cases as involving Amit Sharma and Jason Wedley. However, these cases do not appear to be decisions of this court, and no reference other than the name of the offender is provided. In his oral submissions, the appellant indicated that both cases concerned sentences imposed in the District Court of Western Australia. These cases do not assist the appellant. It is established that the customary sentencing standards for an offence are to be found from the decisions of this court rather than the sentencing decisions of single judges.[17]
3. The appellant also referred to the decision of this court in Tran v The State of Western Australia [No 2],[18] in which a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment for possession of about 2.9 kg of methylamphetamine with intent to sell or supply it to another was reduced to 9 years 6 months' imprisonment on appeal. However, Tran is of limited assistance in the present context as the sole ground of appeal against sentence in that case concerned the parity principle. Further, while Mr Tran was convicted after trial and was in possession of a greater quantity of methylamphetamine than the appellant, the overall degree of criminality involved in Mr Tran's offending was less than the appellant's and Mr Tran was sentenced as a person of prior good character. The decision in Tran does not suggest that the sentence imposed on the appellant for the possession of methylamphetamine offence in the present case was manifestly excessive.
4. The appellant's involvement in the possession of methylamphetamine was not fleeting, impulsive or transient. The appellant transported about 2 kg of methylamphetamine into Western Australia as part of a regular activity undertaken to source methylamphetamine for the substantial drug trafficking operations of himself and other persons. It was undertaken for the commercial benefit of the appellant, as well as those other persons. The appellant would have retained a significant quantity of the methylamphetamine for his own purposes. The appellant had not demonstrated remorse for this offence committed while on bail for earlier offending, and was entitled to only a very small discount for a very late plea of guilty on the eve of trial.
5. Having regard to the maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the circumstances of the offending and customary sentencing standards, it is not reasonably arguable that the sentence of 10 years 8 months' imprisonment imposed for the possession of methylamphetamine offence was unreasonable or plainly unjust. Nor is it reasonably arguable that the sentence of 11 years 8 months' imprisonment which the sentencing judge would have imposed before a reduction for totality was unreasonable or plainly unjust. The appellant's grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospect of succeeding so far as they contend that the individual sentence imposed for the possession of methylamphetamine offence is manifestly excessive.

Did the total effective sentence infringe the totality principle?

1. Nor is it reasonably arguable that the total effective sentence of 12 years 2 months' imprisonment infringed the totality principle. Given the appellant's age, the sentence cannot be properly described as crushing in the relevant sense.
2. Further, the offences of which the appellant was convicted, other than the possession of methylamphetamine offence, were separate from the latter offending. The offence involving the sale of methylamphetamine to the undercover operative was committed after the appellant had been bailed for the possession offence. Some degree of accumulation of the sentences for the other offences upon the sentence imposed for the possession of methylamphetamine offence was required to reflect the overall criminality involved in all of the offending.
3. The degree of accumulation adopted by the sentencing judge was modest. The total effective sentence of 12 years 2 months' imprisonment was only 6 months longer than the individual sentence of 11 years 8 months' imprisonment which the sentencing judge would have imposed for the possession of methylamphetamine offence before applying the totality principle.
4. In all of the circumstances, it is not reasonably arguable that the total effective sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust or that the sentencing judge failed to properly give effect to the totality principle. The appellant's grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospect of succeeding so far as they contend that the total effective sentence of 12 years 2 months' imprisonment infringed the totality principle.

Did the sentence imposed on the appellant infringe the parity principle?

1. The legal principles concerning the parity principle are well established. As this court observed in Peagram v The State of Western Australia:[19]

The parity principle is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like offenders should be treated alike but, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for them. The critical question is whether disparity or lack of disparity in the sentencing outcome is capable of giving rise to a legitimate or justifiable sense of grievance, or to give the appearance in the mind of an objective observer that justice has not been done.

The parity principle requires that the sentences imposed upon co‑offenders be proportionate to the co‑offenders' respective degrees of culpability, to the aggravating and mitigating factors that apply to each of them and to their personal circumstances and antecedents. The sentences imposed upon co‑offenders must reflect any differences between them in relation to those matters.

The imposition of identical sentences upon co‑offenders whose respective conduct and antecedents warrant different sentences is unjust. Similarly, the imposition of different sentences upon co‑offenders whose conduct and antecedents are comparable is unjust. A justified sense of unfair treatment is produced in either case. (citations omitted)

1. In the present case the only offence common to both the appellant and LS was the possession of methylamphetamine offence. Before reduction for other matters, the sentence which the sentence judge would have imposed on the appellant for that offence was 11 years 8 months' imprisonment and the sentence imposed on LS was 9 years' imprisonment. In a context where the sentencing judge found the culpability of the offending of the appellant and LS to be similar, the lesser sentence for LS is explained by her greater reduction for pleas of guilty (25% as opposed to 7.5%) and mitigating factors (cooperation with police and an absence of a prior criminal record) that were not present in the appellant's case. The difference is also explained by the greater significance of personal deterrence as a sentencing consideration for the appellant. On the sentencing judge's factual findings, no objectively justifiable sense of grievance can arise on the appellant's part given the differences in those factors.
2. The appellant's written submission in relation to parity indicate that he seeks to challenge the sentencing judge's finding that the culpability of the appellant and LS was similar. The appellant contends that the sentencing judge should have found that his criminality was considerably less than that of LS.
3. The difficulty facing the appellant's submission is that his counsel at the sentencing hearing did not dispute the State's contention that the appellant and LS were equally culpable in relation to the possession of methylamphetamine offence.[20] There was no arguable error in the sentencing judge accepting a fact which was advanced by the State and not contested by the defence. In any event the material relied on by the appellant in the appeal to show that his offending involved lower criminal culpability that than of LS does not support that proposition. That material indicates that, while LS may have had a longer association with the supplier in New South Wales, it was the appellant who transported the methylamphetamine into Western Australia. While the appellant may not have established the supply chain, he was an active participant in its operation. The material also indicates that the appellant and LS both possessed the drugs for the purpose of obtaining supply for each of their own drug‑dealing businesses and that the appellant's role was not subordinate to that of LS.
4. The appellant's grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospect of succeeding so far as they allege an infringement of the parity principle.

Did the sentencing judge fail to take account of conditions in custody?

1. In the emphasised part of the passage of the sentencing judge's remarks quoted at [41] above, his Honour indicated that he did take the hardship caused to the appellant by the conditions he experienced in custody into account. It is implicit that the trial judge took that hardship into account as a factor tending to mitigate the appropriate sentence. The appellant's grounds of appeal have no reasonable prospect of succeeding to the extent they contend the sentencing judge failed to do so. It is unnecessary in this appeal to determine whether the conditions experienced by the appellant while on remand ought to have been taken into account as a mitigating factor.

1. For the above reasons, none of the appellant's grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. We therefore made the following orders at the hearing of the appellant's application for leave to appeal:
   1. Leave to appeal is refused on all grounds of appeal.
   2. The appeal is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[12] Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21].

[13] Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8 [128] ‑ [129].

[14] Zanon v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 91; (2016) 50 WAR 1 [173] - [174] (McLure P, Buss JA & Mitchell J agreeing).

[15] Wood v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 143 [49] - [51].

[17] See, for example, Houlahan v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 85; (2022) 100 MVR 455 [38].

[18] Tran v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2025] WASCA 102.

[19] Peagram v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 144 [54] - [56].

[20] Sentencing ts 99 - 100, 103 - 104.