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File Number(s): 2026/92022

Publication restriction: Nil

Ex tempore JUDGMENT

Overview

1. Mr Wanninayake commenced these judicial review proceedings against twelve defendants by Summons on 5 March 2026.

2. The ninth defendant (the LS Commissioner) seeks by way of Notice of Motion dated 26 March 2026 that the proceedings be summarily dismissed under r 13.4 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR), or in the alternative, that the whole of the Summons be struck out under r 14.28 of the UCPR so far as it concerns the ninth defendant.

3. A directions hearing was held on 30 June 2026, at which Mr Wanninayake appeared self-represented. At that direction’s hearing, I set this motion down for hearing today (together with a timetable for submissions in relation to that motion).

Evidence

4. The plaintiff has filed an affidavit dated 3 March 2026, totalling 688 paragraphs, to which is attached some 500 pages of exhibits. The plaintiff has also filed affidavits dated 10, 13 and 16 April 2026.

5. The LS Commissioner served and read an affidavit of Ms Georgina Garling made 19 August 2026 to which correspondence with the plaintiff is attached. In that correspondence, it appears that the prospect of the plaintiff discontinuing these proceedings against the LS Commissioner was canvassed. The plaintiff has indicated today that it was his intention to discontinue against the ninth defendant, however, as a matter of practicality, that has not been achieved to date.

6. Nonetheless, the LS Commissioner has indicated by submissions that it no longer consents to the plaintiff discontinuing against it and instead seeks to move for summary dismissal in accordance with its notice of motion. I proceed on that basis.

7. As this is a summary dismissal application, I take the plaintiff’s case (including his pleading and supporting affidavits) at its highest and, as such, receive the LS Commissioner’s affidavit solely for the fact that it makes plain that she denies any allegations of improper purpose, bias or “cronyism and connivance”. In effect, that affidavit contains a broad denial of the allegations by the plaintiff that she exercised her power under s 277 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law 2014 (NSW) (LPUL) for an improper purpose or that she was motivated by bias.

Factual background

8. The plaintiff was a medical practitioner who trained in Sri Lanka.

9. He relocated to Australia in 2005 and first worked in the Northern Territory. Thereafter, he worked in various hospitals in Australia, including the Northern Territory, Queensland and New South Wales.

10. On 7 November 2023, the Medical Council of New South Wales (Medical Council) suspended the plaintiff’s registration as a medical practitioner under s 150 of the Health Practitioner National Law (NSW) (National Law) (s 150 decision).

11. On 22 May 2024, the plaintiff made an application under s 150A of the National Law seeking a review of the decision to suspend his registration. The Medical Council had delegated its power to make the s 150A decision to three delegates, one of which was Professor Isabel Karpin.

12. On 15 July 2024, the delegates issued interim reasons which stated that they were unable to decide the s 150A review application “without further assistance from an independent psychiatric report”. The s 150A review application was then adjourned pending receipt of the additional report.

13. The consideration of the s 150A application reconvened with a further hearing at Medical Council premises on 1 November 2024. The delegates (who included Professor Isabel Karpin) issued reasons on 20 November 2024 affirming the s 150 decision to suspend the plaintiff’s registration (the second s 150A decision). As I refer to below, Professor Isabel Karpin is a person against whom the plaintiff made complaints to the LS Commissioner in relation to her participation in the s 150A decision.

Legal framework in relation to a summary dismissal application

14. In terms of the legal principles applying to a summary dismissal application, I gratefully adopt what was recently said by Faulkner J in Westwood v Gulliver [2024] NSWSC 1323 at [70]-[74] as follows:

“[70] The power to dismiss proceedings under this rule will only be exercised where the claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed: General Steels Industries v Cmr of Railways NSW (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129; [1964] HCA 69 (Barwick CJ). In Agar v Hyde (2000) 201 CLR 552 at 576; [2000] HCA 41 at [57], Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ said the proceedings may be dismissed where there is a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceedings if they were allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way.

[71] In O’Brien v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2013] NSWCA 71 at [3], Macfarlan JA, with whom Beazley P agreed, identified the following relevant principles:

(1) the real issue is whether there is an underlying cause of action, not simply whether one is pleaded;

(2) demonstration of the outcome of the litigation is required, not an assessment of the prospects of its success; and

(3) the power summarily to terminate proceedings must be exercised with exceptional caution.

[72] In considering whether the General Steels test is met, the Court is to have regard to the fact that the plaintiff is self-represented and must satisfy itself that there is no viable course of action of which the plaintiff will be deprived if the case is dismissed: Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 at 536 (Kirby P, with whom Hope and Samuels JJA agreed).

[73] The Court may find that a pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action merely by reference to the pleading itself and without regard to any evidence. If so, the Court must assume the truth of all the allegations made in the pleading: Agius v New South Wales [2001] NSWCA 371 at [24] (Priestley, Powell and Giles JJA).

[74] The Court may alternatively, determine the application having regard to evidence adduced by the parties: r 13.4(2). However, if the Court receives evidence on an application like this it must not make findings of fact based on that evidence unless there is no other evidence which might emerge during the further conduct of the proceedings which could add to or qualify those ‘facts’: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; 198 CLR 334 at [50] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ).”

15. In Simmons v Henwood [2013] NSWCA 184 at [95], Emmett JA observed as follows in relation to the stringency of the test to be applied:

“Ordinarily a party should not be denied the opportunity to put his case before the court in the ordinary way, after taking advantage of available interlocutory processes. Before a party will be deprived of that opportunity, the court must have a high degree of certainty about the ultimate outcome of the proceeding, if it were to be allowed to go to trial in the ordinary way (see Agar v Hyde [2000] HCA 41; 201 CLR 552 at 575-576, [57]). The power to order summary dismissal should only be exercised with great care and should never be exercised unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried (see Fancourt v Mercantile Credits Ltd [1983] HCA 25; 154 CLR 87 at 99).”

Consideration

Facts relevant to the Notice of Motion

16. The facts relevant to the LS Commissioner’s Notice of Motion seeking summary dismissal are as follows.

17. On 11 November 2024, the plaintiff lodged a complaint with the Office of the New South Wales Legal Services Commissioner (OLSC) about Professor Isabel Karpin. As I have referred to, Professor Isabel Karpin was one of the delegates who made the s 150A decision on behalf of the Medical Council.

18. On 22 November 2024, under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL, the LS Commissioner determined to close the complaint following a preliminary assessment on the basis that the complaint was misconceived (the Nov****ember 2024 LSC decision).

19. On 24 April 2025 and 8 May 2025, the plaintiff made further complaints against Professor Karpin to the OLSC. On 15 May 2025, under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL, the LS Commissioner determined to close both complaints following a preliminary assessment on the basis that the complaints were lacking in substance and misconceived (the May 2025 LSC decision).

20. Originally, in his Summons the plaintiff sought 49 orders against 12 defendants, as well as declaratory relief. Only three orders were sought expressly in respect of the LS Commissioner:

21. Order 38 which seeks a “Declaration that the NSW Legal Services Commissioner has exonerated Prof Isabel Karpin on misconstrued grounds owing to cronyism”.

22. Order 39: “Order to the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner to conduct an internal review of the matter in relation to exonerating Isabel Karpin by Ms Samantha Gulliver, NSW Legal Services Commissioner”.

23. Order 40: “Order Attorney General of NSW to take disciplinary action against Legal Services Commissioner of NSW”.

24. In support of the orders sought, the plaintiff sets out 51 grounds. Only Ground 40 squarely relates to the LS Commissioner. It is in the following terms: “Misconduct by the Legal Services Commissioner”. No further detail in the Summons is provided.

25. As set out above, the decisions in respect of which the plaintiff seeks judicial review are the s 150 decision and the s 150A decision, each of which was made by the Medical Council. As such, the LS Commissioner is not a decision-maker under either of the two decisions that are the subject of the proceedings.

26. However, given this is a summary dismissal application, I do not look only to the form the plaintiff’s pleaded claim. As set out above at [14], the real issue to be determined is whether a reasonable cause of action exists, not simply whether one is pleaded. To this end, I have considered all of the evidence the plaintiff has served in these proceedings.

27. In this respect, in his Affidavit made 3 March 2026 at [604]-[621], the plaintiff sets out allegations against the LS Commissioner in relation to her closure of the complaints he made against Professor Karpin under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL. The plaintiff has also filed affidavits dated 10, 13 and 16 April 2026 which refer to Professor Karpin.

28. Although the affidavits are difficult to understand in many respects, I have analysed the allegations made in the affidavits in order to determine whether a reasonable cause of action exists against the LS Commissioner.

29. As referred to above, the plaintiff’s complaints about Professor Karpin were closed by the LS Commissioner without further consideration of the merits under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL as the Commissioner was satisfied that they were: (i) misconceived (in respect of the Nov 2024 LSC decision) and (ii) misconceived and/or lacking in substance (in respect of the May 2025 LSC decision).

30. In Bowers v NSW Legal Services Commissioner [2022] NSWCA 34 at [20]-[21], Basten and Brereton JJA described the complaints function of the LS Commissioner in the following terms:

“[20] The Commissioner has statutory duties (i) to deal with all complaints properly made and to deal with them in accordance with the LPUL and the Legal Profession Uniform Rules (s 315); (ii) in exercising or considering whether or how to exercise any applicable discretions (including the conduct of any investigation), to act in a fair manner, having regard to the respective interests of the complainant and the respondent and to the public interest (s 316); (iii) to deal with complaints (including the conduct of any investigations) as efficiently and expeditiously as is practicable (s 317); and, (iv) relevantly, to give the complainant and the respondent written notice of a decision to close the complaint, including a statement of reasons for the decision (s 318).

[21] The Commissioner is required to conduct a preliminary assessment of all complaints: s 276(1). Having done so, he or she at any stage ‘may close the complaint without further consideration of its merits’, if satisfied that ‘the complaint requires no further investigation’, except to the extent it involves a consumer matter: s 277(1)(h).”

28. Here, the plaintiff’s complaints were closed by the LS Commissioner without further consideration of the merits under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL, not s 277(1)(h).

29. As referred to above, Ground 40 is in the following terms: “Misconduct by the Legal Services Commissioner”, and Order 38 seeks a declaration that the LS Commissioner closed the complaints against Professor Isabel Karpin “on misconstrued grounds owing to cronyism.” However, no other detail is set out in the Summons as to what “misconduct” or “misconstru[ing]” of grounds due to “cronyism” the LS Commissioner is alleged to have engaged in when closing the complaints under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL.

30. The plaintiff makes a number of references to Professor Karpin and his complaint about her to the LS Commissioner in his larger affidavit (dated 3 March 2026). Relevantly:

“63. Professor Isabel Karpin was reported to NSWLSC for her misconduct in evidence admission (Exhibit 45). However, Ms Samantha Gulliver, NSW LSC, had misconstrued the law and exonerated her (Exhibit 45). Later, I filed legal action against NSWLSC. Case was dismissed, as NCAT did not have jurisdiction over the matter (Exhibit 45).

…

603. Cameron Stewart had handed over copies of an email I had sent to him and his colleagues to the National Law s150A (NSW) MCNSW proceedings in October, 2023, during a gap between the second and third proceedings.

604. These were likely handled by Professor Isabel Karpin, who was a lawyer cum Community Member of the MCNSW.

605. She had admitted the evidence, ultra vires, on the basis they can-ied unethical content.

606. They, however, resulted in sabotage of the proceedings, on 01/11/2024.

607. However, National Law s41O (NSW), does not delegate the power to the MCNSW to adduce new, unsolicited, extraneous evidence, against practitioners under investigation.

608. Law should take precedence over ethics and therefore, the evidence should have been refused. Therefore, the act seems to be a subterfuge.

609. The unorthodox admission of evidence was unlawful. She seems to have cheated on me.

610. Therefore, I reported Professor Isabel Karpin to the NSW Legal Services Commissioner, Ms Samantha Gulliver.

611. NSWLSC exonerated Professor Karpin, claiming that I am misconceived. This was in the Context of 2 so-called professors of law had been misconceived about the law, themselves.

612. In the correspondence, she wrote further, that Professor Karpin was the Associate Dean of Sydney University of Technology. Therefore, this was an act of connivance, as well as abuse of power, to exonerate another lawyer, i.e., cronyism.

613. Thereafter, I filed legal action against the NSW LSC, before NCAT.

614. Hon Lea Armstrong J conducted a directions hearing, where I was told that NCAT has no jurisdiction to hear that case, against NSW LSC.

615. Therefore, I withdrew the case.

616. This is an example of solidarity/ favoritism/ cronyism, whichever you call it.

617. The harm this caused me was, delay in reinstatement, by about 18 months, now, during which time I could not work, because of the suspension.

618. Anecdotes A: Born blind in Sheffield, England, David Blunkett, pursued education with Braille System. His father, a foreman, died after failing into a hot water watt. Widowed, David’s mother did not get any compensation, because David’s father had been working past age of retirement. Mother took David to local parish priest, who told, that David could become a foreman, at his best. David studied at university and got a BA for political theory. He contested for Labor Party and won the constituency of Shefield Brightside (Blair 1) And became the Education Secretary portfolio and later during (Blair 2) Home Secretary. He had to resign after writing the minute, ‘No favourations; slightly faster”, on the visa application of his Filipino nanny’s visa applications!

Anecdote B: One of the Commissioners of Examinations of Sri Lanka (Mr. Nanayakkara) in 1970-80 (Head of The Department of Examinations, which conducts about 256 examinations per years, of the calibre of London O/L, British Computer Society, etc.), was found guilty and had to spend a prolonged jail term, for giving 2 marks gratis, to the daughter of one of his friends, who lacked that many marks for her aggregate to enter university. Such is the gravity of the offense of LSC, being a lawyer.

619. On weighing pros and cons, whether to plead about NSW LSCI in this application, I considered the fact that there was more than one offense/ misdemeanour in this matter, namely:

A. misinterpretation of National Law s41O (NSW), that legal error was misconceived, i.e., breach of law,

B. suggesting that more powe1ful members of the community can get away, offending, i.e., connivance,

C. exonerating someone based on sharing the same profession, i.e., cronyism,

D. Breach of trust as an occupational regulator.

620. The word ‘misconceived’ seem to be bastardized, because it is often used in the wrong context, as above.

Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary 9th edition; Oxford University Press; 2006:

Misconceive verb: to understand in a wrong way, i.e., misunderstand.

Misconceived adjective: badly planned or judged; not carefully thought about.

What courts and tribunals use is the bottom version of the word, however, what should used is the top one with a few more qualifying words. The problem I am raising is not the subtle grammatical mistake between English and Australian, but how much the litigants are inconvenienced, by the abuse of the word to dismiss the allegation in question. In the above instance the NSW LSC is asserting that I do not have the capacity realize the legislation, when that is not the case, as I did not misunderstand the law, LSC thereby misconstruing that to me.

621. I was registered with MCNSW, as a doctor, so they had a duty of care. The harm occurred because I was discriminated against a Delegate, a lawyer, whom I referred to LSC, with a complaint. The LSC exercised conscious bias, to exonerate this lawyer, wrongly alleging that I had been misconceived about National Law s41O (NSW). The event that led to the complaint, cost me the National Law s150A (NSW) proceeding, as the Delegates affirmed the original suspension.”

31. The plaintiff also makes similar allegations in his affidavits of 10, 13, and 16 April 2026 (although these affidavits are difficult to understand).

32. Thus, doing the best I can from the material relied on by the plaintiff, it appears from the substance of what is raised that he wishes to advance three broad types of grounds in respect of the LS Commissioner’s decisions to close his complaints under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL:

33. a misinterpretation of s 41O of the National Law;

34. bias of the LS Commissioner;

35. that the LS Commissioner exercised the power to close a complaint under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL for an improper purpose.

36. I now address each in turn.

(1) Misinterpretation of s 41O of the National Law

34. It is apparent from the materials that the plaintiff’s contention is that Professor Karpin misconstrued s 41O of the National Law (as part of the conduct of the hearing in relation to s 150A by the delegates, of which she was one), not the LS Commissioner.

35. That conclusion – that the LS Commissioner did not misconstrue s 41O of the National Law when making her decisions – is reinforced by the following.

36. First, the Nov 2024 LSC decision does not refer to s 41O of the National Law.

37. Second, in relation to the May 2025 LSC decision, while the LS Commissioner referred to the plaintiff’s allegation that Professor Karpin facilitated the admission of unlawful evidence under s 41O of the National Law, she did not place any reliance on the terms of s 41O when deciding to close the complaint under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL. In summary, the way the LS Commissioner dealt with that allegation was as follows.

38. The LS Commissioner stated that she did not consider Professor Karpin’s conduct to be in connection with the practice of law. In doing so, she observed that for a lawyer’s conduct to have professional disciplinary consequences, it must be characterised as unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.

39. She then observed that the statutory concept of “unsatisfactory professional conduct” is conduct that occurs in connection with the practice of law and expressed her view that Ms Karpin’s role as a panel member in the s 150A proceedings convened by the Medical Council does not have “a sufficient connection with the practice of law”.

40. Consequently, she observed, if conduct is not unsatisfactory professional conduct, it must be categorised as “professional misconduct” before a disciplinary consequence could arise for Professor Karpin. She went on to observe that, in short, professional misconduct usually involves acts of dishonesty or conduct that is considered so egregious as to fundamentally compromise the integrity of the lawyer.

41. She then went on to conclude that she did not consider that the plaintiff’s allegations against Professor Karpin, in terms of her decision-making as part of the s 150A proceedings, could amount to professional misconduct.

42. In undertaking the analysis set about above, the LS Commissioner made no reference to how s 41O of the National Law was to be construed or whether unlawful evidence had been admitted by the s 150A delegates under s 41O or otherwise. As such, the LS Commissioner did not decide to close the plaintiff’s complaints under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL based on a particular construction, or misconstruction, of the terms of s 41O of the National Law. There is no basis for an inference that this was the case.

43. As is apparent from what I have referred to above, the basis on which the LS Commissioner closed the plaintiff’s complaints under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL in the May 2025 LSC decision was, in short, that Professor Karpin’s role as a panel member in the s 150A proceedings convened by the Medical Council did not have “a sufficient connection with the practice of law”.

44. Thus, taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest, there is no basis in the matters alleged in the pleadings or in the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence that could support an allegation that the LS Commissioner misinterpreted s 41O of the National Law when making her decisions under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL.

(2) Bias

41. The plaintiff’s allegations of “conscious bias” and cronyism against the LS Commissioner appear to, in substance, be an allegation of actual bias.

42. In Stolzenberg v Workers Compensation Nominal Insurer [2025] NSWCA 40 Stern JA (Griffiths and Price AJJA agreeing) observed as following in relation to a claim of actual bias:

“[62] To the extent that the plaintiff’s complaint is one of actual bias, more particularly that Professor Glozier fabricated and misrepresented material because he sought to favour the interests of icare, that allegation is wholly unsubstantiated and should be rejected. Such complaints should not be made lightly and cogent evidence is required: South Western Sydney Area Health Services v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16 at [97] (McColl JA, Giles and Tobias JJA agreeing) and the authorities there cited. Even recognising that actual bias is not confined to an intentional state of mind but includes subconscious (or unconscious) bias provided it is real: Bilgin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 149 ALR 281 at 289 -290 (Finkelstein J); Sun v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1997) 81 FCR 71 at 127 (Burchett J) and 135 (North J), here, the matters relied upon fall well short of showing any actual bias.

[63] A fanciful or speculative possibility must be put to one side and the reasonable fear of the observer must be ‘firmly established’: Re JRL; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 at 364 (Wilson J); [1986] HCA 39. Moreover, ‘[i]t is insufficient if a reasonable bystander merely had a vague sense of unease or disquiet’: AB v Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] NSWCA 73 at [21] (Emmett AJA, McColl and Leeming JJA agreeing); see also Kostov v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW)(No 2) [2020] NSWCA 94 at [30] (Bell P).”

43. It is apparent that an allegation of actual bias against the LS Commissioner is not based on prejudgment (of which there is no evidence), but rather is based on assertions that, in short, the LS Commissioner “exonerated” (that is, closed the complaints against) Professor Karpin “based on sharing the same profession”. This is variously described by the plaintiff as the LS Commissioner closing the complaints because of “conniving” or showing solidarity, favouritism or cronyism to Professor Karpin by reason of being in the same (legal) profession. I refer also to the plaintiff’s allegation in his Affidavit of 16 April 2026 that the LS Commissioner “released Isabel Karpin because she was a highly-placed” Associate Dean at the Faculty of Law at the University of Technology Sydney and that the Commission “did not want a trivial issue life (sic) to jeopardize the position of the latter”.

44. In my view, taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest, there is no basis in either the pleadings or affidavit evidence that could support the plaintiff’s allegations of bias. Rather, it is apparent that the allegations are based on the fact that Professor Karpin and LS Commissioner are each a member of the legal profession. For the same reasons, even if the plaintiff’s claims are to be interpreted as an allegation of apprehended bias, they must also fail.

(3) Improper purpose

45. Another way the plaintiff’s allegation of bias and cronyism could be framed is to assert that the LS Commissioner exercised her power under s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL for an improper purpose; namely, to close the complaints under that power for the purpose of conniving or showing solidarity, favouritism or cronyism to Professor Karpin as a fellow lawyer.

46. Taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest, I assume for the sake of my decision that a such purpose is not permitted by s 277(1)(a) of the LPUL, being the provision conferring the power.

47. In Golden v V*’*landys [2016] NSWCA 300; (2016) 339 ALR 610, Payne JA (McColl, Leeming JJA) observed as follows in relation to the “improper purpose” ground of judicial review:

“[134] The appellant accepted that an inference of improper purpose should only be drawn if the evidence could not be reconciled with the proper exercise of power: Industrial Equity Ltd v DCT at 672.

[135] Whether an exercise of power is vitiated by an improper purpose on the part of the decision maker is determined by reference to his or her subjective state of mind: Mandurah Enterprises Pty Ltd v Western Australia Planning Commission(2008) 38 WAR 276; [2008] WASCA 211 at 289-290; Austral Monsoon Industries Pty Ltd v Pittwater Council (2009) 75 NSWLR 169 ; [2009] NSWCA 154 at [98].

[136] Decisions are impeachable for improper purpose only where the relevant power is purposive or, at least where some purposes are forbidden: M Aronson and M Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (5th ed, 2013, Lawbook Co) at [5.510].”

48. Whether an exercise of power is vitiated by an improper purpose on the part of the decision maker is determined by reference to her subjective intention. Given the LS Commissioner has filed an affidavit denying the alleged improper purpose, the plaintiff must rely on inferences drawn from primary facts to establish any such alleged improper purpose.

49. There is nothing in the material filed and served by the plaintiff that would allow the drawing of such an inference, let alone material that would enable the court to conclude that the evidence cannot be reconciled with the proper exercise of the power.

50. It follows in my view, again taking the plaintiff’s case at its highest, that there is no basis in the matters alleged in the pleadings or in his affidavit evidence that could support these allegations. Rather, it is apparent that the allegations of bias and cronyism (which I have framed as an allegation of “improper purpose”) are based simply on the fact that Professor Karpin and LS Commissioner are each a member of the legal profession.

Mandamus

51. Separately, by Order 39 the plaintiff seeks an order in the nature of mandamus from this Court directing the LS Commissioner to conduct an internal review of the matter in relation to exonerating Professor Isabel Karpin by the LS Commissioner. It is apparent that the relief the plaintiff seeks is an order compelling the LS Commissioner to conduct an internal review to under s 313 of the LPUL; being a review of her decision under s 277(1)(a) to dismiss the complaints. The power under s 313 is expressed to be at the “absolute discretion” of the LS Commissioner. As such, there is no power for this Court to grant mandamus.

Conclusions

52. For all of the above reasons, I conclude that the Summons filed 5 March 2026, does not disclose a reasonable cause of action against the LS Commissioner. Accordingly, I grant the relief sought in the LS Commissioner’s Notice of Motion dated 26 March 2026, summarily dismissing the proceedings against it under r 13.4 of the UPCR. The LS Commissioner does not seek an order for costs, and thus I do not make such an order.