Wang v Canberra Metro Operations Pty Ltd [2025] ACTSC 531

1. Mr Wang, an elderly Chinese man with virtually no English language skills claims that he received poor treatment at the hands of an employee of the defendant, Canberra Metro Operations Pty Ltd (Canberra Metro) on 27 and 28 January 2024, leading to a cascading series of events culminating in his arrest by the Australian Federal Police and subsequently to his loss of access to Canberra Metro services for a period. His primary contention is that the unfair treatment he received has caused him to suffer psychological injury.

2. With that background, and with the assistance of his daughter, who has good English language skills, he prepared a claim against Canberra Metro that was filed in this court.

3. Canberra Metro says that the claim is without merit. They contend that it is destined to fail, and there is no prospect of the substance of the allegations made resulting in a viable claim against them.

4. As a consequence, Canberra Metro seeks the orders set out in their application dated 12 September 2025 as follows: (a) The originating claim and statement of claim dated 5 August 2025 are struck out. (b) The plaintiff has no leave to replead. (c) The proceeding is dismissed. (d) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the application. (e) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the proceeding.

5. The application proceeded before me on 24 October 2025. Mr Wang was present but played no active part in the application hearing. I gave leave for his daughter, Ying Fang Wang, to appear on his behalf. Ms Wang advised me that her father has made extensive attempts to secure legal representation to pursue his claim. He has been denied legal aid. He has been unable to procure representation from any of the several personal injury law firms he has contacted. He has approached the Human Rights Commission and received advice from them to the effect that his claim is more appropriately pursued through the courts.

What is the substance of the claim?

6. I accept that the pleading of the claim in its present form is such that Canberra Metro will have great difficulty in providing any meaningful response to it in the form of a defence. The pleading indicates that the claim is based on defamation, negligence, tort and discrimination. It speaks of humiliation in front of the general public, false claims made by Canberra Metro staff, false arrest, physical mishandling by the Australian Federal Police, consequent injury to his shoulder and psychological injury in the form of stress and anxiety. It also identifies unfair restriction of his access to Canberra Metro services. However, those matters are not set out in a form that enables the responding party to clearly identify the material facts relied upon as the basis for each of the claims that is made. Nor do they identify with clarity, the substance of the cause or causes of action that are relied upon and the nature of the remedy that is sought.

7. Having said that, some further elucidation of the complaint was received from Ms Wang, albeit in the form of submissions from the bar table. In short form, and based on those submissions, the substance of the claim may be described in this way: (a) Mr Wang was at all material times a customer of Canberra Metro in the habit of using the light rail service. (b) On 27 January 2024, he boarded the light rail at Harrison with a view to travelling to the city. He tapped on using his light rail card as he entered the tram. (c) In the course of the journey he was approached by an employee of Canberra Metro who accused him of not “tapping on”. He denied this allegation. (d) On the following day he was again utilising the light rail service. He was again accused by a Canberra Metro employee, a woman who he believes also had Chinese language skills, of not tapping on with his card. (e) At the Alinga Street station, a confrontation ensued. As a result of that confrontation the Canberra Metro staff member accused Mr Wang of assaulting her- an allegation which he denies. (f) The police were then called, and Mr Wang was arrested, handcuffed and taken into custody. As a result of his English language difficulties, he had no understanding of the reason for his arrest. (g) He denies that there was any assault. (h) He asserts that the effect of the false allegations concerning his use of the card and the assault resulted in his wrongful arrest. (i) He asserts some physical, but principally psychological, suffering as a result of both the wrongful arrest and his loss of face in the context of the false allegation made concerning the assault. (j) He claims that he has suffered damage in the form of physical and psychological injury as a consequence of the events described above.

The defendant’s submissions

8. The defendant has provided detailed and helpful written submissions traversing the relevant principles, supplemented orally at the hearing.

9. They submit: (a) The pleadings are non-compliant with the pleading practice in Pt 2.6 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) (Rules). (b) The defendant is entitled to know the cause of action that it is required to meet and the facts and circumstances relied upon to support that claim. (c) No cause of action is discernible from the pleading. (d) The elements of any claim in negligence are not identified. In any event, such a claim is untenable and therefore leave to replead should not be given. (e) As no publication has been identified, the foundation for a defamation claim is not made out. (f) There is no common law cause of action for discrimination. In any event, there is nothing arising from the information that has been disclosed to demonstrate that the reason for the actions of the Canberra Metro employee had a foundation in discrimination. (g) To the extent that any claim is made for wrongful arrest it is a claim that lies against an entity other than Canberra Metro.

Should the claim be struck out in whole?

10. Rule 425 of the Rules confers power on the Court to order that a pleading or part of a pleading be struck out on the basis of one of four grounds.

11. The rule states: 425 Pleadings—striking out (1) The court may, at any stage of a proceeding, order that a pleading or part of a pleading be struck out if the pleading— (a) discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or (b) may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the proceeding; or (c) is frivolous, scandalous, unnecessary or vexatious; or (d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. Note 1 The registrar may also reject a document that is filed if it does not comply with these rules (see r 6140 (Rejecting documents—noncompliance with rules etc) or if it is an abuse of the court’s process or is frivolous or vexatious (see r 6142 (Rejecting documents—abuse of process etc)). Note 2 Pt 6.2 (Applications in proceedings) applies to an application for an order under this rule. Note 3 Rule 6901 (Orders may be made on conditions) provides that the court may make an order under these rules on any conditions it considers appropriate. (2) The court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under this rule. (3) If the court makes an order under this rule, it may also make any other order it considers appropriate, including, for example— (a) if the court makes an order under subrule (1) (a)—an order staying or dismissing the proceeding or entering judgment; and (b) an order about the future conduct of the proceeding. (Emphasis added.)

12. The relevant principles are summarised in M Plus Advisors Pty Limited v Frino [2025] ACTSC 517 at [34] to [36].

13. Even approaching the claim as pleaded on the basis that every fact pleaded within it is true, it is simply not possible to discern a cause of action on the face of the document. Although, as Canberra Metro properly concedes, it is appropriate to allow some flexibility in the case of a claimant who is self-represented, there are limits necessarily placed on that flexibility to ensure that the interests of all litigants in the case are accommodated. In that regard, Canberra Metro relied upon the comments of Bell P, with whom Emmett AJA agreed in Mohareb v Saratoga Marine Pty Limited [2020] NSWCA 235 at [39] to [42], which are reproduced below: Whilst it may be accepted that some latitude may, in an appropriate case, be afforded to a litigant in person, and that the Court is empowered to waive any requirements of the UCPR in an appropriate case, it is important to keep in mind the remarks of Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath agreed) in Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] 1 WLR 1119; [2018] UKSC 12 at [18]: “In current circumstances, any court will appreciate that litigating in person is not always a matter of choice. … Some litigants may have little option but to represent themselves. Their lack of representation will often justify making allowances in making case management decisions and in conducting hearings. But it will not usually justify applying to litigants in person a lower standard of compliance with rules or orders of court. … The rules provide a framework within which to balance the interest of both sides. That balance is inevitably disturbed if an unrepresented litigant is entitled to greater indulgence in complying with them than his represented opponent. Any advantage enjoyed by a litigant in person imposes a corresponding disadvantage on the other side, which may be significant if it affects the latter’s legal rights … Unless the rules and practice directions are particularly inaccessible or obscure, it is reasonable to expect a litigant in person to familiarise himself with the rules which may apply to any step which he is about to take.” The above passage was cited with approval by Garling J in Ryan v The Council of the City of Sydney [2018] NSWSC 265. At [45], his Honour noted that: “…while the Court has a duty to treat litigants in person fairly and to hear their arguments fully, the Court may not indulge the litigant with special treatment in a way that disfavours their opponent.” Similarly, in Malouf v Malouf (2006) 65 NSWLR 449; [2006] NSWCA 83 at [183], Bryson JA remarked that: “Courts should not go so far in accommodating the positions of unrepresented litigants as to make it an advantageous procedural step to dismiss one's lawyers, or to retain none. ... Without procedure, procedural directions and compliance, justice will not be done at all. …The compliant also have an entitlement to consideration, and their compliance should not be disregarded, or mocked, by treating their opponent's obligation to comply with the court's directions as less than important, or as superfluous.” Nor, as McCallum JA (with whom Basten and Leeming JJA agreed) recently observed, is the Court required to undertake a partisan analysis of lengthy, unstructured assertions and misconceptions with a view to ensuring that a self-represented litigant has not missed some arguable point: see Mendonca v Legal Services Commissioner [2020] NSWCA 84 at [21].

14. I am satisfied that the statement of claim should be struck out on the basis that it discloses no discernible cause of action. I do not accept, as the defendant contends, that leave to replead should be denied. That would be an extraordinary step in circumstances where the dialogue with Ms Wang, that provides the basis for the summary of the claim I have set out above, supports a conclusion that there may be cause of action for the plaintiff arising out of the events that she described, assuming those events are proven. I will therefore allow the plaintiff leave to re-plead his claim.

15. I accept, as the defendant contends, that there is nothing in the material before me to demonstrate a factual basis for a claim founded in defamation or discrimination. I shall limit the right to replead accordingly.

Orders

16. The orders of the Court are: (1) The statement of claim dated 5 August 2025 is struck out with leave to replead limited as follows: (a) any claim for defamation is excluded; and (b) any statutory claim based on discrimination is excluded. (2) The plaintiff is to pay the defendant’s costs of the application, with such costs not recoverable until the conclusion of the proceeding.

I certify that the preceding sixteen [16] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Muller.

Associate: Date: 4 December 2025