THE REQUIREMENTS of SECTIONS 61, 62 and 251B OF THE NT ACT
18 Having regard to the date of commencement of the Ramindjeri application and the date of its amendment, and the date of the State's motion of 25 June 2012, and the dates upon which the Kaurna People through their applicant and the Ngarrindjeri through their applicant applied to be joined as parties, I consider there is sufficient reason also to apply the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Federal Court Rules) to the determination of the motion of the State. It was a step in the proceeding started after the commencement of the Federal Court Rules: see Rule 1.04(2), and there is no apparent reason why an order under Rule 1.04(3) should be made. The relevant Rule, namely Rule 26.01, reflects generally the statutory test prescribed in s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) in force since 2005.
19 Section 31A prescribes the test whether Mr Walker is shown to have no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the Ramindjeri claim as it is expressed. That test is a somewhat less onerous test to satisfy that was previously the case: see eg Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 241 CLR 118 at [53]-[56]. Section 84C of the NT Act provides for the entitlement of a party to an application under s 61 of the NT Act to apply to strike it out. It does not prescribe the test to be applied in deciding whether to accede to such an application.
20 In my view, it is appropriate in the present circumstances to apply the test prescribed by s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), although I do so with the caution appropriate having regard to the nature of the Ramindjeri application and to the consequences of making my order.
21 An application under s 61(1) for a determination of native title must be filed by:
A person or persons authorised by all the persons (the native title claim group) who, according to their traditional laws and customs, hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular native title claimed, provided the person or persons are also included in the native title claim group.
22 Section 61(4) of the NT Act requires the application to name the individual claim members or otherwise sufficiently clearly describe the persons constituting the claim group so that it can be ascertained if a particular person is, or is not, a member of the claim group. The purpose of s 61(4) is or includes "… to enable it to be known whether all the persons in the native title claim group have authorised the making of the application": Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of WA (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at [1186] per Lindgren J.
23 The proper definition of the native title claim group goes to "the heart of a native title determination application": Quall v Risk [2001] FCA 378 at [67] per O'Loughlin J and see also Landers v State of South Australia (2003) 128 FCR 495 at [35] per Mansfield J; Reid v State of South Australia [2007] FCA 1479 (Reid) at [27] per Finn J. The definition of "native title claim group" in s 253 is somewhat circular in that it simply refers to the group referred to in the relevant application, but s 223 provides more light on the concept. Section 223(1) provides:
(1) The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders in relation to land or waters, where:
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders; and
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters; and
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.
24 Section 251B provides for the manner of authorisation of an application under s 61. There are two alternative means of authorisation, depending on whether there is a process of decision making under traditional laws and customs which must be complied with. Section 251B provides:
For the purposes of this Act, all the persons in a native title claim group or compensation claim group authorise a person or persons to make a native title determination application or a compensation application, and to deal with matters arising in relation to it, if:
(a) where there is a process of decision-making that, under the traditional laws and customs of the persons in the native title claim group or compensation claim group, must be complied with in relation to authorising things of that kind - the persons in the native title claim group or compensation claim group authorise the person or persons to make the application and to deal with the matters in accordance with that process; or
(b) where there is no such process - the persons in the native title claim group or compensation claim group authorise the other person or persons to make the application and to deal with the matters in accordance with a process of decision-making agreed to and adopted, by the persons in the native title claim group or compensation claim group, in relation to authorising the making of the application and dealing with the matters, or in relation to doing things of that kind.
25 Section 62(1)(a)(v) requires proof by affidavit of the applicant, with the application, of the details of the process of decision-making complied with in authorising the applicant to make the application and to deal with matters arising in relation to it.
26 Where the requirement for authorisation is not complied with, generally it is fatal to success of the application: Harrington-Smith on behalf of the Wongatha People v State of WA (No 9) [2007] FCA 31 at [1172] per Lindgren J; Reid at [29] per Finn J, although s 84D now enables the Court in certain circumstances to proceed to hear and determine a claim even where the issue or extent of authorisation may not be clearcut. However, as explained in Roe v Kimberley Land Council Aboriginal Corporation [2010] FCA 809 per Gilmour J at [51]-[55], such circumstances would not arise where (as here) there is alleged to be a fundamental failure to secure authorisation under s 251B. See also Far West Coast Native Title Claim v South Australia (No 2) (2012) 204 FCR 542 per Mansfield J at [47]-[59]; KK v Western Australia (2013) 217 FCR 115 at [50]-[68] per Barker J.
27 Obviously, evidence about the process of authorisation that was adopted and how it complies with the NT Act requirements is necessary: Dieri People v State of South Australia [2003] FCA 187 (Dieri) at [57] per Mansfield J. That will commonly require evidence about the notice of the meeting and about the persons present and how they identified as members of the claim group: Brown v State of South Australia [2009] FCA 206 (Brown) at [24] per Besanko J; Bolton on behalf of the Southern Noongar Families v State of Western Australia [2004] FCA 760 at [45] per French J as he then was.
28 Where the means of authorisation are not traditional, compliance with s 251B of the NT Act will require the decision making process to give all members of the claim group a reasonable opportunity to participate: Lawson v Minister for Land and Water Conservation [2002] FCA 1517 at [25] per Stone J.
29 Where the described native title claim group is in fact more accurately a sub-group of a larger community of persons who hold the common or group rights and interests comprising the particular native title claim, that sub-group cannot, generally qualify as a claimant group under the NT Act: Kite v State of South Australia [2007] FCA 1662 at [22] per Finn J; Dieri at [56] per Mansfield J. O'Loughlin J stated in Risk v National Native Title Tribunal [2000] FCA 1589 at [60]:
… the acceptance of a small family group (when it is known that it forms part of a larger community) is inconsistent with the philosophy that is to be found in the table to s 61; that section talks of the persons who, as a group, hold "the common or group rights and interests".
In Reid at [28] Finn J adopted that reasoning and stated that:
… a subset or part of what truly constitutes a native title group cannot itself be a claimant group under s 61(1).
That general view must be qualified by recognising that there may be circumstances in which a sub-group may constitute a native title claim group where it alone exercises rights in relation to a defined area. Of course, that sub-group will itself need to have properly authorised the applicant to bring the claim on behalf of the sub-group in relation to that defined area. Hence, in Brown, Besanko J at [20]-[21] said:
The propositions [that a native title claim group is a group consisting of all the persons who, according to their traditional laws and customs, had the common or group rights or interests comprising the particular native title claim claimed] have been applied most commonly in circumstances where it is clear that the claimant group is a sub-group or sub-set or part of a native title claim group. Cases such as Tilmouth, Landers, Dieri People, McKenzie and Reid are all cases in which it was clear that the claim group was not a native title claim group. The cases also make it clear that caution needs to be exercised before concluding on a strike-out application that a claim group is a sub-group, sub-set or part of a native title claim group; Colbung v The State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 774 at [23]-[26] per Finn J; McKenzie at 223 [41] per Finn J; Hillig [as administrator of Worimi Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister for Lands for the State of New South Wales (No 2) [2006] FCA 1115] at [60] per Bennett J; Reid at [28] per Finn J; and Kite at [22] per Finn J. For example, it may be that a sub-group of a community sharing traditional laws and customs alone possesses rights and interests in a particular area and that sub-group may itself constitute a native title claim group: Hillig at [60] per Bennett J (see also the obiter observations of Wilcox J in Bodney v State of Western Australia [2003] FCA 890 at [41]; Perry M and Lloyd S, Australian Native Title Law (Lawbook Co, 2003) [3.130].