Brown v State of South Australia
[2009] FCA 206
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2009-03-12
Before
Besanko J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (13 paragraphs)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 On 27 March 2008, Ms Dawn Margaret Brown filed a Native Title Determination Application in this Court. The application was made by using the form referred to in the Native Title (Federal Court) Regulations 1998 (Cth) reg 5(1)(a) Form 1. I will refer to this application as the original application. 2 In the original application, the applicant claimed that she was entitled to make the application as "spokesperson" for what she described as the "Brown Family Group". In Schedule A, the applicant named 22 persons as the persons who constituted the native title claim group. The claim area was defined in the original application; it is a large area in central South Australia, including Coober Pedy. In Schedule E, the applicant described the native title rights and interests claimed as follows: The right to be able to access and travel through the land to ensure our traditional way of life can be protected by our families. The right to make decisions regarding the land and debate decisions made by government or any other non-indigenous groups in the claimed area. 3 In Schedule R, the applicant claimed that she was a member of the Brown Family Group and was authorised by her family to speak for it. In Schedule T, the applicant provided other relevant information, and in that section the following statement appeared: We were will [sic] participants of the Antakirinja Matu-YankunytjatjaraClaim but they have shifted away from the Western Desert criteria and might lose our determination. 4 On 11 April 2008, the first respondent to the Native Title Determination Application, the State of South Australia, filed a notice of motion seeking the following orders, relevantly: 1. That the application be struck out pursuant to s 84C(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ("NTA") on the basis that it does not comply with s 61, 61A and 62 NTA. 2. Alternatively, that the application be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) on the basis that it has no reasonable prospects of success. 5 The first respondent's notice of motion was supported by an affidavit of Mr Simon McCaul, a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's Office of South Australia. On 11 April 2008, the solicitors acting for the Antakirinja Matu-Yankunytjatjara Native Title Claim Group ("AM-Y claim group") filed an affidavit of one David Brown, who is a member of that group. 6 On 15 April 2008, the second respondent, the AM-Y claim group, filed an application in this proceeding seeking an order that it be made a party to the applicant's application. The second respondent is the applicant in a native title determination application made many years ago (SAD 6007 of 1998), and the area claimed by the applicant is the same area as the area claimed by the AM-Y claim group in its application. It may also be noted that the area claimed overlaps a portion of a native title claim made by the Arabunna Peoples (SAD 6025 of 1998). The first respondent's notice of motion came on for hearing before me on 1 December 2008, and on that occasion I was asked to, and did, make an order that the second respondent be joined as a respondent to the applicant's application. 7 On 30 June 2008, the applicant filed an Amended Native Title Determination Application. I will refer to this application as the amended application. She did not have leave to file an amended application, but that defect was cured when, on 15 September 2008, a judge of this Court made an order that the applicant have leave to file and serve an amended application and that the document entitled "Claimant Application" filed on 30 June 2008 stand as the amended application and leave be given "now as then" to file and serve that document. The relevant application for the purposes of the first respondent's notice of motion is the amended application, although it will be necessary to refer to the original application because of changes made in the claim group. Unless there is a need to indicate otherwise, I will refer to the claimant group as particularised in the amended application as the Brown Family Group. 8 Since the first respondent filed its notice of motion, further affidavits have been filed by the parties. The first respondent filed an affidavit of Ms Sandra Joan Jarvis, an anthropologist employed at South Australian Native Title Services Limited, and an affidavit of Mr Andrew Jantke, a solicitor employed in the Crown Solicitor's Office of South Australia. The second respondent filed an affidavit of Mr Bobby Brown and an affidavit of Mr Sandy Brian Buzzacott. Both Mr Bobby Brown and Mr Buzzacott are members of the AM-Y claim group. 9 The applicant filed four affidavits sworn by her, one filed on 8 October 2008, two filed on 10 November 2008, and one filed on 13 November 2008. That material was put forward by the applicant in addition to the material in, and accompanying, the original application and the amended application. Although an affidavit of the applicant accompanied the original application, it consisted of no more than the form in the Regulations and did not provide any information which was specific to the original application. An affidavit of the applicant accompanied the amended application and it does address (to an extent) the matters which an applicant's affidavit is required to address by virtue of s 62(1)(a) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) ("NTA"). 10 The first respondent's notice of motion seeks to engage s 84C(1) of the NTA. That subsection provides that this Court may strike out an application which does not comply with one or all of s 61, s 61A or s 62 of the NTA. In the alternative, the first respondent's notice of motion seeks to engage s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ("FCAA") which provides that this Court may dismiss an application on the basis that it has no reasonable prospect of success. 11 The test to be applied on an application under s 84C(1) of the NTA is clear. Finn J stated the relevant principles in McKenzie v South Australia (2005) 214 ALR 214 ("McKenzie") at 221 [26]: Beyond this provision [that is, s 84C(1)] this court retains its power of summary dismissal under O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules. It is now well accepted that applications under s 84C(1) should be approached in the same cautious way as applications under O 20 r 2: see Bodney v Bropho [2004] FCAFC 226…at [51]-[52]. The court's powers should be exercised only where the claim as expressed is untenable and upon the version of the evidence favourable to the respondents to the strike out: Landers v South Australia (2003) 128 FCR 495 at [7]. A clear case has to be made out: Williams v Grant [2004] FCAFC 178…at [48]-[49]. Nonetheless, it may require extensive argument and may be necessary to adduce evidence to establish the futility of a case: General Steel Industries Inc v Commission for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 130; Bodney v Bropho at [51]-[52]. 12 There is one qualification to these statements and that is that one now has regard to s 31A of the FCAA rather than O 20 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules. In this case, I have reached the conclusion, having regard to the principles applicable to s 84C(1) of the NTA, that the amended application should be struck out under that section. In the circumstances, it is unnecessary to consider the possible application of s 31A of the FCAA to the circumstances of the case. 13 The first respondent contends on its notice of motion that the NTA allows for an application to be made by a native title claim group, but not by a sub-group. It contends that the Brown Family Group, as defined in the amended application, is not a native title claim group but, rather, it is a sub-group and therefore the amended application is incompetent. The first respondent further contends, as an independent basis for the orders sought in its notice of motion, that a native title determination application is competent only if the applicant is authorised by all persons in a native title claim group and all the persons in the Brown Family Group have not authorised the applicant to make the application and to deal with matters arising in relation to it. The first respondent submits that it follows that the applicant's amended application is incompetent. The second respondent supports the first respondent's contentions. 14 It is convenient to begin by stating briefly the relevant legal principles.