SECTION 87 OF THE ACT
52 In their joint submission, the Applicant and State raised whether, in light of conflicting authority on this issue, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that the requirements in s 87 of the Act are met in order to approve a variation application pursuant to s 13(1)(b).
53 In Tarlka Matuwa Piarku (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2017] FCA 40, Barker J held at [16] that, if the grounds for variation are met pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Act, it is unnecessary to review the grounds for the making of a determination pursuant to s 87 of the Act:
As the Court is satisfied that the grounds for variation are met pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Native Title Act, it is unnecessary to review the grounds for the making of the determination on 29 July 2013 pursuant to s 87 and 87A of the Native Title Act, as the result of the variation will not remake the determination. Rather the result of the variation is that the varied determination will replace the determination as the approved determination of native title with the only change to the determination being the inclusion of areas of pastoral improvements as areas where native title exists. Nothing further will be varied in the determination nor the agreement reached between the parties for the determination on 29 July 2013.
54 As observed by Rangiah J in Robe River at [52], following Tarlka Matuwa Piarku, a number of decisions have made orders varying determinations of native title without reference to s 87 of the Act and only addressed whether the orders in the terms sought by the parties are within the power of the Court pursuant to s 13(5) of the Act: see, for example, the cases cited by Rangiah J at [52].
55 In contrast, in other determinations of variation applications, the Court has considered the grounds for the making of the variation pursuant to s 87 or s 87A in addition to the grounds for variation pursuant to s 13(5) of the Act. For example, in Karlka Nyiyaparli Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2021] FCA 9, Colvin J at [11] considered the reasoning of Barker J in Tarlka Matuwa Piarku, but said at [12]-[15]:
However, in my view, an application to vary a determination must be a proceeding in relation to an application filed in the Federal Court that relates to native title. Therefore, with due respect to his Honour, the requirements of s 87 (or the equivalent provision in s 87A) must be met in respect of the present application. I note that this was the course followed by Rares J in Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 1416 (and see also the approach of Rangiah J in Finlay on behalf of the Kuruma Marthudunera Peoples v State of Western Australia [2018] FCA 548).
Nevertheless, the fact that the Court has already determined that native title exists when it made the Determination by consent and did so on the basis of an agreement which contemplated the possibility of future variation of the determination if the High Court appeal was successful are matters that are relevant in deciding whether it is appropriate for the proposed orders to be made on the present application. The Court has already determined that it is appropriate to declare native title and has thereby been satisfied as to the matters specified in s 87 as to the making of a determination of native title by consent. Necessarily implicit in that decision was an acceptance that but for the decision BHP Billiton Nickel West Pty Ltd (since overturned), it would have been appropriate to make a determination of native title in the terms now sought. The orders made at that time contemplated the present application. The present application does not seek to depart from the basis upon which the Determination was made or to point to some matter that was not in contemplation at that time.
Therefore, this is not an instance where the application seeks to justify the variation of a previous determination of native title in terms that were not demonstrated to the Court when making the previous determination. Were that not to be the case then, in my view, it would be necessary for the Court to be provided with material of a kind that would support the making of a determination by consent in the exercise of the power conferred by s 87. The fact that the determination is to be made by way of variation does not take it outside the terms of that requirement.
Section 87 is an important requirement. Recently, in Hobbs on behalf of the Ngurrara D2 Claim Group v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 624 at [24]-[28], I summarised the authorities as to the nature of the matters that must be established on such an application. The communal nature of native title and its perpetual proprietary character mean that the Court must have an eye for the public interests and the future interests of those who may be affected by the terms of a determination of native title which, though made with the requisite consent, will have consequences for those who are not themselves before the Court on the application. However, in the circumstances of the present application, the Court can look to the earlier Determination as having addressed those matters and proceed on the basis that no party raises any issue as to the earlier consent or the appropriateness of the order. Rather, the Court is asked to take a step that was contemplated at that time.
56 Most recently, Jagot J in Top End agreed with the reasoning of Barker J in Tarlka Matuwa Piarku and explained at [9]-[12]:
I agree with the reasoning in Tarika Matuwa Piarku (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2017] FCA 40 (see also Robe River Kuruma Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2021] FCA 20 at [51]-[55] citing Yindjibarndi Aboriginal Corporation RNTBC v State of Western Australia [2020] FCA 1416) that if the Court is satisfied that the grounds for variation are met pursuant to s 13(5)(b) of the Act, it is unnecessary to review the grounds for the making of the determination under ss 87 or 87A of the Act (relating to the requirements to be satisfied for the Court to make an order in accordance with an agreement of the parties).
However, it should be noted that ss 87(1)(c) and 87A(4)(a) both require that any order made as a result of an agreement between parties must be on terms "within the power of the Court".
In other words, for a variation (or revocation) of an approved determination of native title, the Court must be satisfied that one or more of the grounds in s 13(5) of the Act exist. Further, an order giving effect to an agreement between the parties under ss 87(2) or 87A(4), where the agreement is for a variation or revocation of an approved determination of native title, will be an order varying or revoking that approved determination under s 68(c), having the effect of replacing the original determination as provided for in s 13(4)(c) of the Act.
This approach to the statutory scheme ensures the harmonious operation of all of its provisions. The requirement that an order giving effect to an agreement be within the power of the Court is fundamental. While the statutory scheme embodies the important object of facilitating resolution of dispute about native title by agreement between the parties (see, for example, Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474 at [36]-[38] and Western Bundjalung People v Attorney General of New South Wales [2017] FCA 992 at [3]-[22]), the requirement that the order reflecting the terms of the agreement be within the power of the Court is mandatory. To this end, regard should also be had to the facultative provisions of ss 87(4)-(5) and 87A(5), which enable the order of the Court to give effect to terms of an agreement that involve matters other than native title, provided such an order itself is within power.
57 I respectfully agree with the approach taken by Jagot J in Top End.
58 However, in any event and in case that view is mistaken, I consider that the requirements of s 87 of the Act are satisfied with respect to the variation application.
59 The following requirements are necessary preconditions to the exercise of power under s 87 of the Act:
(a) The notification period specified in the notice given under s 66 of the Act has ended (s 87(1));
(b) The parties have reached agreement on the terms of orders relating to the proceedings (s 87(1)(a) and (aa));
(c) The parties have reduced their agreement to writing, the agreement has been signed by or on behalf of the parties, and it has been filed with the Court (s 87(1)(b));
(d) The Court is satisfied that an order in, or consistent with, those terms is "within the power of the Court" (s 87(1)(c)); and
(e) It appears appropriate to the Court to make an order consistent with the terms of the order sought (s 87(1A) and s 87(2)).
60 I am satisfied that all of these requirements are met in the present application. As described at [4] above, the period specified in the notice given under s 66 of the Act has ended and the parties have reached an agreement which has been reduced to writing and signed. Further, the orders proposed by the parties are "within the power of the Court" pursuant to s 87(1)(c) of the Act because:
(a) the application is valid and was made in accordance with s 13(1) and s 61 of the Act: see [14]-[20] above;
(b) section 13(5)(b) of the Act is satisfied: see [26]-[51] above; and
(c) the orders agreed to by the parties comply with s 94A and s 225 of the Act.
61 I turn now to consider whether the order is appropriate pursuant to s 87(1A) and s 87(2) of the Act.
62 In Davey on behalf of the Mayala #2 Native Title Claim Group v State of Western Australia [2019] FCA 1137 at [14]-[18], I made the following observations as to whether the Court should be satisfied that it is "appropriate" pursuant to s 87 of the Act for the Court to make the orders sought by the parties:
[14] As I said in Jones on behalf of the Yinhawangka People v State of Western Australia [2017] FCA 801 at [45], the focus of the Court is upon determining whether there is an agreement between the parties and whether that agreement was freely entered into on an informed basis: Hughes (on behalf of the Eastern Guruma People) v State of Western Australia [2007] FCA 365 at [9] (Bennett J). As observed by North J in Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848 at [8]:
The Act makes mediation the primary means of resolution of native title cases. It is designed to encourage parties to take responsibility for resolution of proceedings without the need for litigation. Section 87 must be construed in this context. The section provides a power which is exercisable only when an agreement has been made. The power must be exercised flexibly and with regard to the purpose for which the section is designed. The section should not be construed to require parties in agreement to produce evidence as if in a trial.
[15] I also said in Jones at [44] that in determining where it is appropriate to make the determination sought by the parties, the Court exercises a discretion that must be exercised judicially and within the broad boundaries ascertained by reference to the subject matter, scope and purpose of the NTA: Brown (on behalf of the Ngarla people) v State of Western Australia [2007] FCA 1025 at [22] (Bennett J).
[16] Like Mortimer J in Freddie v Northern Territory [2017] FCA 867 at [20], I accept that it is also important to see the exercise of the judicial power in ss 87 and 87A of the NTA in the context of the Court's jurisdiction as a whole, and its foundational legislation, the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), and in particular s 37M and s 37N of that Act.
[17] Further, in Brown v Northern Territory of Australia [2015] FCA 1268 at [23], in describing the task to be undertaken by the Court, Mansfield J said this:
The Court is not required to embark upon an inquiry as to the merits of the claim to be itself satisfied that the orders are supported and in accordance with law: Cox on behalf of the Yungngora People v State of Western Australia [2007] FCA 588 at [3] per French J. However, the Court will consider evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether the State has made a rational decision and is acting in good faith: Munn for and on behalf of the Gunggari People v State of Queensland (2001) 115 FCR 109 at [29]-[30] per Emmett J.
[18] The State has a public responsibility to ensure that its agreement to the order proposed is in the interests of the community it represents. That responsibility involves, but it is not limited to, satisfaction by the State that there is a sufficient basis for concluding that the proposed determination is capable of satisfying the requirements of s 225 of the Native Title Act. As Mortimer J said in Freddie:
23. [a] s 87 agreement may be reached on behalf of the State (or Territory), and other parties, without the level of proof required in a contested application. Inherent in parties' agreement to resolve claims by settlement rather than litigation, as in other areas of the law, is a willingness to abide by an outcome without the exhaustive and detailed investigation that accompanies a trial of contested issues of fact and law. The public interest in an outcome of this kind is considerable: see Prior on behalf of the Juru (Cape Upstart) People v State of Queensland (No 2) [2011] FCA 819 at [26], Rares J.
24. The Court is entitled to rely on the processes established by a State (or Territory) for the assessment of claims to native title and, without abdicating its task of determining that the matters set out in s 225 are present in a particular application, is entitled to proceed on the basis the State (or Territory) has made a reasonable and rational assessment of the material to which it has access in deciding to enter into a s 87 agreement: see, in relation to a similar point with respect to s 223 of the Act, King on behalf of the Eringa Native Title Claim Group and the Eringa No 2 Native Title Claim Group v State of South Australia [2011] FCA 1387 at [21] (Keane CJ).
63 The requirements of s 87(2) of the Act will likely be met where the Court is satisfied that a relevant government respondent - such as the State of Western Australia - has, "through competent legal representation, satisfied itself as to the cogency of the evidence upon which an applicant relies": Jones on behalf of the Yinhawangka People v State of Western Australia [2017] FCA 801 at [46] (Bromberg J). See also Eagles on behalf of the Combined Thiin-Mah, Warriyangka, Tharrkari and Jiwarli People v Western Australia [2019] FCA 508 at [22] (Murphy J).
64 In their joint submissions, the Applicant and the State submitted that it was appropriate that the Court make the orders in the terms of the parties' agreement because:
(a) the parties are legally represented and have been throughout the Application process;
(b) the State has played an active role in the negotiation of the variation to the Determinations and, in doing so, the State acting on behalf of the community generally is satisfied that the Application is justified in all the circumstances having regard to the requirements of the Act and through a rigorous and detailed assessment process;
(c) the Nyikina Mangala people, including those people recognised in the Determinations as Native Title Holders and those people who would be recognised as a result of the making of the variation sought in the Application, have been thoroughly consulted and have consented to the making of the Application: see Schedule A; and
(d) there are no proceedings before the Court relating to native title determination applications to cover any part of the area the subject of the Application which would otherwise require orders to be made under s 67(1) of the Act.
65 Having regard to the above matters, I am satisfied that the orders proposed are appropriate.
66 For all those reasons, I am satisfied that the requirements of s 87 of the Act are satisfied.