austlii:cth/FedCFamC1F/2025/372
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC1F
2025-06-23
Berman J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) Amended Initiating Application filed 18 February 2025;
(2) Trial affidavit of the applicant filed 18 February 2025;
(3) Affidavit of Ms F (the applicant's partner) filed 14 February 2025;
(4) Affidavit of Ms AA (the applicant's mother) filed 14 February 2025;
(5) Affidavit of Ms G (the applicant's sister) filed 21 March 2025;
(6) Family Assessment Report of Ms E dated 18 March 2025; and
(7) Outline of Case Document (Final Hearing) prepared by applicant's counsel filed 29 March 2025.
(1) Amended Response to Initiating Application filed 18 March 2025;
(2) Trial affidavit of the respondent filed 25 March 2025;
(3) Affidavit of Ms BB (the respondent's mother) filed 18 March 2025;
(4) Family Assessment Report of Ms E dated 18 March 2025;
(5) Affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025; and
(6) Outline of Case Document (Final Hearing) prepared by the respondent's counsel filed 27 March 2025.
(1) Affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025;
(2) Family Assessment Report of Ms E dated 18 March 2025;
(3) Child Protection Services Assessment Report filed 31 October 2023;
(4) Private Family Assessment Report of Ms L dated 24 March 2023; and
(5) Outline of Case Document (Final Hearing) filed 28 March 2025.
(a) Until 1 June 2025 from 10.00am until 4.00pm Sunday; > > (b) Until 1 August 2025: > > > (i) In week 1, from 10.00am Saturday until 4.00pm Sunday; > > > > (ii) In week 2, from 10.00am until 4.00pm each Sunday. > > (c) Until 1 October 2025: > > > (i) In week 1, from the conclusion of school on Tuesday until the commencement of school on Wednesday; and > > > > (ii) From 10.00am Saturday until 4.00pm Sunday; > > > > (iii) In week 2, from 10.00am until 4.00pm each Sunday. > > (d) Until 1 December 2025: > > > (i) In week 1, from the conclusion of school on Tuesday until the commencement of school on Wednesday and > > > > (ii) From the conclusion of school on Friday until 4.00pm Sunday; > > > > (iii) In week 2, from 10.00am until 4.00pm each Sunday. > > (e) Until 1 February 2026: > > > (i) In week 1, from the conclusion of school on Tuesday until commencement of school on Thursday; and > > > > (ii) From the conclusion of school on Friday until 4.00pm Sunday; > > > > (iii) In week 2, from 10.00am until 4.00pm each Sunday. > > (f) Until 1 April 2026: > > > (i) In week 1, from the conclusion of school on Tuesday until 4.0pm Sunday; > > > > (ii) In week 2, from 10.00am until 4.00pm each Sunday. > > (g) From 1 June 2026: > > > (i) In week 1, from the conclusion of school/kinder or school on Tuesday until 4.00pm Sunday; > > > > (ii) In week 2, from the conclusion of school/kinder or school on Thursday until the commencement of school on Friday. > > > > (iii) For half of each of the April, July and September/October school holidays at times to be agreed in writing between the parents and failing agreement from 5.00pm on the last Friday of the school term until 5.00pm on the middle Saturday in even years and from 5.00pm on the middle Saturday until the commencement of school in odd years of such school holiday period; > > (h) On Christmas Day: > > > (i) From 9.00am Christmas Eve to 2.30pm on Christmas Day in even number years; and > > > > (ii) From 2.30pm Christmas Day to 6.00pm Boxing Day in odd number years; > > (i) On [X]'s birthday as follows: > > > (i) If [X]'s birthday falls on a weekday when she is with the Mother from 3.30pm to 6.30pm; > > > > (ii) If [X]'s birthday falls on a weekend when she is with the Mother from 10.00am to 3.00pm. > > (j) From 5.00pm on the day before Applicant's Day to 5.00pm on Applicant's Day. > > (k) For Easter: > > > (i) From 5.00pm Maundy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday in odd number years; and > > > > (ii) From 5.00pm Easter Saturday to 5.00pm Easter Sunday in even number years; > > (l) At such other times as may be agreed in writing between the parents.
(a) On Christmas Day: > > > (i) From 9.00am Christmas Eve to 2.30pm on Christmas Day in odd years; and > > > > (ii) From 2.30pm Christmas Day to 6.00pm Boxing Day in even years; > > (b) On [X]'s birthday as follows: > > > (i) If [X]'s birthday falls on a weekday when she is with the Applicant from 3.30pm to 6.30pm; > > > > (ii) If [X]'s birthday falls on a weekend when she is with the Applicant from 10.00am to 3.00pm. > > (c) From 5.00pm on the day before Mother's Day to 5.00pm on Mother's Day. > > (d) For Easter: > > > (i) From 5.00pm Maundy Thursday to 5.00pm on Easter Saturday in even number years; and > > > > (ii) From 5.00pm Easter Saturday to 5.00pm Easter Sunday in odd number years;
(a) A detailed itinerary of such travel including flight details, accommodation details, details of all countries to be visited, confirmation of travel insurance and full contact details; > > (b) Written confirmation that the children's vaccinations are up to date ' and their medical records reflect such vaccinations.
(a) Abusing, belittling, rebuking, insulting or denigrating the other or the other's partner in the presence of or within the hearing of [X] or allowing any other person to do so; > > (b) Discussing these proceedings or any allegations made in these proceedings in the presence of or within the hearing of [X] or allowing any other person to do so; > > (c) Permitting [X] to read any document filed in or produced for use in these proceedings or any part thereof or allowing any other person to do so; > > (d) Posting any information on any social media platform regarding the other parent, the other parent's partner, the other parent's family, these proceedings or any allegations made in these proceedings or allowing any other person to do so.
(a) Abusing, denigrating, insulting, or rebuking the other, the other's partner or family members in the presence of or within the hearing of [X] or allowing any other person to do so; > > (b) Discussing these proceedings or any allegations in these proceedings in the presence of or within the hearing of [X] or allowing any other person to do so; > > (c) Posting any info1mation on any social media platform regarding these proceedings, any allegations made in these proceedings, the other party, the other party's partner or allowing any other person to do so.
(a) attending any school [X] may attend from time to time or > > (b) Attending events/functions including but not limited to assemblies, concerts, sports days and parent/teacher interviews; > > (c) obtaining such information from any school [X] may attend from time to time including but not limited to newsletters, reports or photographs; > > (d) posting, publishing, or sharing any photographs, videos, or images of [X] on any social media platforms or websites; and, > > (e) obtaining such information from any medical specialist, general practitioner, dental practitioner, allied health professional, psychologist, counsellor and/or therapist [X] may consult from time to time.
(1) All previous parenting orders be discharged;
(2) The applicant have sole responsibility for decision-making in respect to the long-term care, education, health welfare and development of the child;
(3) The child live with the applicant;
(4) The child spend no time with the respondent for a period of three months from the date upon which the orders are made and the child is placed in the applicant's care;
(5) At the conclusion of the three month period, the child spend supervised time with the respondent for four periods each year at a children's contact centre, on a date in April to celebrate the child's birthday, a date in May to celebrate Mother's Day, a date in the Term 3 school holidays and a date in or around Christmas with visits to be limited to no more than two hours; and
(6) The respondent communicate with the child by way of letters, cards and gifts to coincide with the child's birthday, Christmas, Easter and other special occasions providing that the frequency of cards, letters and gifts does not exceed more than one occasion in each calendar month and the applicant is to ensure that the child receives any letters, cards and gifts forwarded by the respondent.
...In proceedings under Pt VII of the Act in relation to a child, the Court is enjoined to 'regard the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration' (sec 60D). The paramountcy of this consideration in proceedings for custody or access is preserved by sec 64(1). The consequence is that the ultimate and paramount issue to be decided in proceedings for custody of, or access to, a child is whether the making of the order sought is in the interests of the welfare of the child. The fact that the proceedings involve an allegation that the child has been sexually abused by the parent who seeks custody or access does not alter the paramount and ultimate issue which the Court has to determine, though the Court's findings on the disputed allegation of sexual abuse will naturally have an important, perhaps a decisive, impact on the resolution of that issue.
But it is a mistake to think that the Family Court is under the same duty to resolve in a definitive way the disputed allegation of sexual abuse as a court exercising criminal jurisdiction would be if it were trying the party for a criminal offence. Proceedings for custody or access are not disputes inter partes in the ordinary sense of that expression: Reynolds v Reynolds (1973) 47 ALJR 499; McKee v. McKee (1951) AC 352, at pp 364-365. In proceedings of that kind the Court is not enforcing a parental right of custody or right to access. The Court is concerned to make such an order for custody or access which will in the opinion of the Court best promote and protect the interests of the child. In deciding what order it should make the Court will give very great weight to the importance of maintaining parental ties, not so much because parents have a right to custody or access, but because it is prima facie in a child's interests to maintain the filial relationship with both parents: cf. J v Lieschke (1987) 162 CLR 447, at pp 450, 458, 462, 463; 69 ALR 647.
Viewed in this setting, the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the Court's determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court's consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse. The Family Court's wide-ranging discretion to decide what is in the child's best interests cannot be qualified by requiring the Court to try the case as if it were no more than a contest between the parents to be decided solely by reference to the acceptance or rejection of the allegation of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.
In considering an allegation of sexual abuse, the Court should not make a positive finding that the allegation is true unless the Court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, at 362. There Dixon J said:
"The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences."
His Honour's remarks have a direct application to an allegation that a parent has sexually abused a child, an allegation which is often easy to make, but difficult to refute. It does not follow that if an allegation of sexual abuse has not been made out, according to the civil onus as stated in Briginshaw, that conclusion determines the wider issue which confronts the Court when it is called upon to decide what is in the best interests of the child.
(i) The importance of the evidence in proceedings; and
(ii) The nature of the subject matter of the proceedings; and
(iii) The probative value of the evidence; and
(iv) The powers of the Court (if any) to adjourn the hearing, to make another order or to give a direction in relation to the evidence.[4]
...
It is a matter of significance within section 69ZT(3)(a)(i) that the evidence in relation to domestic or family violence will impact very significantly upon the Court's determination of these proceedings. It may even be, as the High Court discussed in M v M (supra), that the findings will be decisive or almost decisive, but whatever their ultimate significance the findings will have a major impact on the determination of the parenting proceedings.
...
- Perhaps for present purposes the short and simple answer is that particularly in the context of determining disputed issues of fact or belief with respect to domestic or family violence or apprehension thereof it would appear unsafe to afford inadmissible evidence any significant weight in the exercise of the Court's fact-finding functions.
a) Separation anxiety and distress before and after contact; > > b) Sleep disturbances, toileting regression, and sexualised behaviour; and > > c) School refusal and disengagement from daily routines.
I was turning right into the playground, waiting for all the traffic to go passed, [the applicant] was standing at the picnic bench near entrance on his phone.
[Ms G] and 3 kids were down other end on the swings.
As I turned in and started driving down he looked an (sic) noticed me, quickly got [the child] drink bottle and bag threw them into his sister car and ran down to swings.
I parked just in front of the swings where they were.
[The applicant] was trying to push [the child] she was telling him no go away. As I was walking closer to them, he pushed her that high the swing nearly flipped and she shit herself started crying Asked me to get her down. I grabbed the swing and stopped it.
She got down and said that was so scary mummy, don't push me [Mr Waibel]. Ran to the car.
[Ms G] came over to my car with [the child's] stuff.
[T] came over and said bye
[Ms G] said bye
[The applicant] walked over to my car and asked [the child] for a cuddle, she said no you don't listen and scare me. He just laughed and smirked and then grabbed [U] and said say bye [U] he was screaming and kicking telling [the applicant] to put him down.
I closed [the child's] door, [the applicant] walked off and I stood there talking to [Ms G] for few minutes. Then left.
She wet her pants when we got home.
That night [the child] had a sore fanny, was crying said [the applicant] hurt her at [Ms AA]'s house. Wouldn't let her go to toilet by herself. Her fanny was red raw inside and outside and she was shaking in pain when I was trying put cream on her. She said she hates going there. Doesn't like [Ms F] they're mean hate you mummy. [The applicant] wants to kill you.[8]
[The child] was initially referred to the CPS, on 20.06.2023 by DCP and SAPOL for a forensic medical assessment following concerns that she may have experienced sexual abuse. Specifically, it was alleged that [the child] had stated her applicant [the applicant] had "touched [the child] in her "fanny". Following a forensic medical that occurred on 22.06.23, SAPOL further requested a forensic interview of [the child].[10]
Moving forward, it was recommended that all contact with [the applicant] should be managed with [the child's] emotional and psychological interest in mind, where her safety and well-being were prioritised. If the concerns about sexual abuse remain unfounded, the CPS would recommend dyadic based therapeutic intervention between [the child] and [the applicant] prior to contact recommencing on the proviso that [the child] could tolerate such intervention and this did not cause her any stress or undue harm.[11]
DCP have finalised the assessment into the child protection concerns. Whilst [the child] disclosures are highly worrying, DCP have assessed that it cannot be substantiated that [the applicant] sexually abused [the child]. It is DCP's assessment that [the child] has been experiencing a high level of emotional dysregulation and behavioural difficulties and DCP have substantiated that [the child] has experienced emotional harm. Prior to DCP's involvement, [the child] was reportedly experiencing difficulties with her sleep, toileting, sexualised behaviours, separation anxiety, withdrawal from play with peers, loss of interest in extra-curricular activities, a dependence on adults, discussions about fears and worries, and an extreme aversion to attending any places that were associated with you. These presentations have reportedly subsided since contact with [the applicant] has ceased, which is commensurate with third party observations. Whilst DCP have substantiated that [the child] has been emotionally harmed, it is unknown what has caused her this harm and whether it is due to sexual abuse, the relationship with [the applicant], or the acrimony in your relationship with [the applicant].[12]
The Director approached me to talk with [the child] following a comment she said to [educator X] and to check for "redness".[14]
...observed nil redness or spotting on underwear; nil apparent bruising from observation at a short distance.[15]
In-person intake session with the child and the respondent present.
In-person therapy session with the child and the applicant.
In-person discussion with the respondent and the child, prior to the therapy session with the child and the applicant.
In-person therapy session with the child and the applicant.
In-person discussion with the respondent and the child, prior to the therapy session with the child and the applicant.
In-person therapy session with the child and the applicant.
No, I don't like you anymore because you always touched my fanny.[21]
It is possible that [the child's] engagement with [the applicant] during the session on 10 May 2024 triggered memories of the alleged abuse he perpetrated, which she consistently disclosed throughout the therapeutic intervention. Therefore, [the child's] reluctance to engage in further therapy sessions with [the applicant] may have been a reflection of her emotional unsafety and the distress she experienced due to contact with him, triggering memories of the alleged trauma.[23]
[The child's] consistent disclosures of sexual abuse during the therapeutic intervention indicated that [the child's] alleged experience of sexual abuse, perpetrated by [the applicant], was a critical experience(s) that caused her distress and trauma. While other potential causes of [the child's] emotional harm, such as exposure to parental conflict, should not be discounted, the findings from the therapeutic intervention indicated that her alleged sexual abuse by [the applicant] is at the forefront of her mind. As such, [the child] considers this abuse to be the primary source of her emotional distress. In the report writer's opinion, this would be the starting point in therapy when undertaking trauma processing, from which [the child] may identify other experiences that may have caused her emotional harm and distress that require processing. It is difficult to differentiate the impact of the possible causes of [the child's] emotional harm or distress without trauma processing.[24]
(1) Competing proposals of the parties as to care and time spending;
(2) Allegations of stalking directed to toward the applicant;
(3) Allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by the applicant; and
(4) The allegation that the respondent had consistently not encouraged the child's relationship with the applicant.
So, if we're looking at children's emotional development at that stage, in an intact relationship, where they have two carers, their first, probably - and their main job, in terms of their emotional development at that time, is exploration away from their primary carer. In an intact relationship, that tends to happen when the child goes and - goes with dad, for example, to the shops, to the beach, to the - and, an intact relationship, the other parent is completely supportive and helpful and encouraging and, you know, it might be tricky to - "Oh, your mum's just going to go to the shops, you know, we'll see you later. You hop off with that. [25]
...
... The difficulty becomes, in a separated family and when there is a mistrust or a high conflict or a poor co-parenting relationship, is the nature of that child's exploration with the other parent is something that the primary carer doesn't feel positive about, and that might be nonverbal - by - via nonverbal or verbal behaviour shown to the child, and so the child gets the sense of "Hang on. My most trusted person" - whether they say or whether they show or - "is - is not okay. What does this mean? This is very confusing for me. This is very frightening for me. And, if I go and spend good time with this person and I have this negative sense of both the separation and the reunion" - no child would welcome that...[26]
[Counsel] Would you think that orders of that nature are in [the child's] best interest, moving forward?
[Ms E] Not if the court doesn't find that [the child] experienced sexual abuse from the applicant.
[Counsel] Why would that be?
[Ms E] Well, if the court makes a finding that sexual abuse did not occur yet it remains the mother's view that sexual abuse did occur, and [the child] doesn't have the opportunity or is supported or facilitated or - to have reparative experiences of relationship with the applicant, she will be solely and wholly exposed to the dominant narrative that dad abused her. Now, children think that they're made up of both - both parents. Will [the child] - in terms of her emotional development, will she have - develop a more ingrained sense of self-blame that she was somehow to - to fault for - for what supposedly happened to her? Her sexual development may be compromised in her relationships with her peers as an adolescent, when you start to explore intimate relationships and into adulthood. Will her self-esteem, will her sexual development be regressed or repressed? And she will have, in terms of her sense of identity, no connection to the other side of herself. Whether that involves, you know, traditions, cultural elements, simply knowing cousins, uncles, aunts ---
[Counsel] Yes?
[Ms E] --- grandparents, having that fuller sense of identity will be lost. So that - I - I don't think that - that would be in [the child's] best interest.[27]
...Not unless the mother has a meaningful desire to support that. As I said before, in reconnecting children with their parents who they haven't had a relationship or seen for a long time, that generally happens in a gradual way, your Honour. And so, as - as that gradual progression occurs, a child still is spending predominant amounts of time with their primary carer. If the mother does not and have a meaningful or - or - or perhaps is responsive to the court's direction to amend her behaviour and find ways to manage her anxiety via her own treatment, and openly and sincerely, via verbal/non-verbal, convey to the child that this is something she supports, then no, it - it - it's - it's not going to work.[28]
[His Honour] Perhaps to just speak generally, [Ms E], it's not uncommon that, when parties separate, one party changes their name back to a maiden name, for instance. So it's very common that we will have separated parties who will have different surnames but with a child or children bearing the name of one or other of the parties. How do children, in the ordinary course of events, navigate that situation? They will only have a surname of one of the parties. How do they navigate? What happens? Is there an impact? Is it something that the children just go with? Is it - are there some indicators as to when it's problematic?
[Ms E] I think it depends - it does depend on their age. You know, older children - becomes part - names become - you know, it's part of their identity and it's something ---
[His Honour] Yes
[Ms E] --- that they've had for a longer period of time, and so then dealing with a name change, unless they have particularly strong feelings about that ---
[His Honour] Yes
[Ms E] --- other parent and associations with that name ---
[His Honour] Right
[Ms E] --- then it's a positive thing for them. For example, I'm thinking in a - in - in circumstances where there's family violence and they might want to not be aligned, not even have the - the - the - the - the nomenclature of - of that person because that associates them with that experience.[29]
[His Honour] So the question then is that might be what the child does - and I still have to assess that evidence, but let's take it at its highest for the exercise - that then comes back to the weight that I place on the wish of the child, does it not?
[Ms E] Yes.
[His Honour] That's what that's about. So you're in the position to be able to tell me with what level of caution, if any, I should exercise when considering the wishes of this child, if any are to be expressed. Should I place significant weight? Should I say there's not much weight? What should I - what weight should I give the wishes of this child?
[Ms E] Well, purely based on her age, I would caution the court about putting weight on the wishes of the child.[30]
A parenting order confers parental responsibility for a child on a person, but only to the extent to which the order confers on the person duties, powers, responsibilities or authority in relation to the child.
44. ... the High Court said in the following passage in M v M noting that what was there said about allegations of child sexual abuse have been held by this Court to apply equally to allegations of violence (Amador; A v A). The resolution of the mother's allegation of family violence were:
... subservient and ancillary to the court's determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Court's consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegations of sexual abuse. The Family Court's wide-ranging discretion to decide what is in the child's best interests cannot be qualified by requiring the court to try the case as if it were no more than a contest between the parents to be decided solely by reference to the acceptance or rejection of the allegation of sexual abuse on the balance of probabilities.
(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.
(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:
(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and
(b) the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and
(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.
The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no third standard of persuasion was definitely developed. Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or the facts to be proven. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by in exact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.
... In February 2010 in the final court orders to which they consented, the parties (unwittingly, involuntarily or otherwise) acknowledged that two out of the three children were struggling and resistant to any relationship with their father. The therapeutic model was the road they began and it failed. The two children in that model became more entrenched as their youngest sibling continued to go down the contact centre handover route. [The child] could not have been unaware of the resistance and dislike for his father as expressed by his siblings. The two older children could not have been oblivious to the fact that, having resisted the therapy, there was little else to do but decline any involvement in their father's life. Thus, the credibility of the parties would have made little difference because the children had come to such an entrenched position that the options for the Court were very limited.
[the family report writer] conceded it was inevitable that over time, [the child] would be infected with his siblings' views and in turn, he too would take the stance of resistance.
... it is not and never has been the case that a judge in his Honour's position is obliged to make orders consistent with a child's stated views (Harrison and Woollard [1995] FamCA 30; (1995) FLC 92-598; Maldera & Orbel [2014] FamCAFC 135; (2014) FLC 93-602). It is well settled that a trial judge is obliged to consider the weight which should be given to any stated views. And that a range of factors may affect the weight given, beyond simply the age and level of maturity of the child. In other words, context is critical and thus, for example, a child who might be too afraid of a parent to express a view contrary to that held by the parent, is protected by the court's obligation to understand the rationale for a child's view and consider how giving effect to that view fits with the child's best interests.
• The child's age and level of maturity. (Joannou & Joannou [1985] FamCA 46; (1985) FLC 91-642)
- The strength of the views, and the length of the time such views have been held by the child. (Wotherspoon & Cooper [1980] FamCA 51; (1981) FLC 91-029)
- The extent to which the child's views appear to be based on a choice that is well thought through and based on appropriate as distinct from irrelevant or peripheral matters. (Mitchell & Mitchell [1984] FamCA 11; (1984) FLC 91-531)
- The extent to which the child's views are the result of pressure on the child, or emotional attachment of the child, and thus how far they reflect the child's own choice. (R v R (Children's wishes) [2002] FamCA 383; (2002) FLC 93-108
- The likely consequences of an order contrary to the child's views. (Radford & Alpe (No. 2) (1985) FLC 91-622
The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child
The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child
The general principle appears to be that the Court will not intervene to prevent a parent from changing the surname of a child in the custody or care and control of that parent (or to direct that a name be restored where a change has occurred), unless the Court is satisfied that the change was made without the consent of the other parent and that it does not promote the welfare of the child. The same principle applies when the Court is asked to direct that a surname be restored where a change has already occurred. In deciding the issue in each case there is no onus of proof. It is for the Court to balance in its discretion the factors for and against change. The guiding principle is that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. It must stand above the wishes or proprietary interests of the parents.
...the factors to which the Courts should have regard in determining whether there should be any change in the surname of a child include the following:
(a) The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration;
(b) The short and long term effects of any change in the child's surname;
(c) Any embarrassment likely to be experienced by the child if its name is different from that of the parent with custody or care and control;
(d) Any confusion of identity which may arise for the child if his or her name is changed or is not changed;
(e) The effect which any change in surname may have on the relationship between the child and the parent whose name the child bore during the marriage;
(f) The effect of frequent or random changes of name.
I certify that the preceding three hundred and seventy-six (376) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Berman.
[4] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZT(3)(b).
[5] See the Outline of Case Document (Final Hearing) of Ms Trevis filed 27 March 2025 at page 6.
[6] See the Outline of Case Document (Final Hearing) of Ms Trevis filed 27 March 2025 at page 7.
[9] See the affidavit of Ms BB filed 18 March 2025 at paragraph 18.
[10] See Exhibit "4" at the page marked 206.
[11] See Exhibit "4" at the page marked 220.
[12] See the DCP Report dated 21 November 2023 as annexed to Exhibit "4".
[13] An extract of the notes is tendered as Exhibit "7".
[14] See Exhibit "7" at the page marked 1,817.
[15] See Exhibit "7" at the page marked 1,817.
[16] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH-3".
[17] See Exhibit "4" at the page marked 220.
[18] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH-3", page 19.
[19] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH-3", page 22.
[20] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH-3", page 25.
[21] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH -3", page 29.
[22] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH -5".
[23] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH -5", page 58.
[24] See the affidavit of Ms H filed 24 March 2025 at Annexure "MSH -5", page 59.
[25] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 29 line 17.
[26] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 29 line 31.
[27] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 34 line 25.
[28] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 36 line 6.
[29] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 51 line 4.
[30] Transcript 3 April 2025, p. 51 line 41.
Briginshaw & Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34
M v M [1988] HCA 68
(2019) 60 Fam LR 212
(1973) 47 ALJR 499
(1987) 162 CLR 447
(1938) 60 CLR 336