varying a reviewable decision in a manner favourable to the claimant; or

setting aside a reviewable decision and making a decision in substitution for the reviewable decision that is more favourable to the claimant than the reviewable decision;

Tribunal may, subject to this section, order that the costs of those proceedings incurred by the claimant, or a part of those costs, shall be paid by the responsible authority."

1. Because the Tribunal affirmed the decision of Telstra finding that Ms Keen's depression was not compensable (N2002/730), costs were not payable in regard to that matter. However, when the costs were taxed, the Registrar allowed costs.
2. An appeal against the Registrar's decision in both matters N2001/750 and N2002/730 came before me. The decision I published on 28 November 2005 was appealed to the Federal Court and remitted as follows:

"1. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 28 November 2005 be set aside.

2. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law, limited to the evidence and materials before it for the purpose of the decision referred to in order 1.

a. the order for costs made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 June 2003 only entitles the applicant to recover costs in respect of matter N2001/750.

b. nothing in paragraph (a) prevents the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from determining whether the applicant is entitled to recover the whole or any amount in respect of costs of any Item claimed which was relevant to matter N2001/750, notwithstanding that such Item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730.

4. The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings fixed pursuant to O 62 r 4(2)(c) in the total amount of $ 13,500.

One possible injustice in this scheme has been shown by the present case. That is where, as here, the party entitled to costs is an individual who does not have the benefit of his or her own input tax credits against which to offset the GST which he or she is liable to pay to their solicitors. A business conducting litigation which recovers costs, will have already had the benefit of being able to net off the payment of GST it was obliged to make to the suppliers of taxable supplies, including solicitors for legal services in connection with the business, against receipts of GST which the business will have obtained from its own supplies of goods or services. Individuals who are not conducting a business will not be able to effect that accounting and taxation consequence and will, to that extent, be worse off when receiving the benefit of an order for costs under the current provisions of the rules. However, that is a matter for the rules committee to address and is not one which the court can recognize in a case like the present.

Accordingly, there was no error in the decision of the Tribunal in this respect."

1. I have to take into account the decision of Rares J, and decide Ms Keen's appeal against the costs decision applying section 69A(3) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ("the Act").
2. In doing so, I note that Rares J decided, as part of the remittal, that the case be limited to the evidence and materials before me on the first occasion.

2. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to be heard and decided again according to law, limited to the evidence and materials before it for the purpose of the decision referred to in order 1.

1. The parties were satisfied to proceed by way of written submissions, a course to which I agreed. I have also convened Directions Hearings in this matter. The parties provided me with:
   • A joint statement in writing re N2001/750
   • A joint statement in writing re N2002/730
   • letter from Stacks to the GIO dated 6 May 2002
   • letter from Stacks to the AAT dated 24 May 2002
   • letter from Henry Davis York to Stacks dated 14 July 2004
   • letter from Henry Davis York to Stacks dated 23 September 2004
   • letters from Mr Jeffriess to Mr Polin dated 23 March 2007 and 27 April 2007.
2. I have used these as the basis for my decision. I am mindful however that some of the argument in the joint statements before me was somewhat different from that presented on the previous occasion, and that the number of costs items in dispute has escalated. I have proceeded to make a decision on the joint statements and correspondence as detailed above.
3. I have noted also that the task in this review is to apply section 69A of the Act which follows here:

"Section 69A Procedure for taxing costs

(a) the Tribunal has, under this Act or any other Act, ordered a party to a proceeding to pay to another party to the proceeding reasonable costs incurred by the other party; and

(b) the parties are unable to agree as to the amount of those costs;

the President may give such directions as he or she thinks appropriate for the costs:

(d) to be taxed by the Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy Registrar.

(2) If the Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy Registrar has taxed under paragraph (1)(d) the amount to be paid to a party to a proceeding by another party to the proceeding, either of those parties may apply to the Tribunal for review of the amount so taxed.

(3) If such an application is made, the Tribunal must review the amount taxed and may:

(b) set aside the amount and substitute another amount; or

(c) set aside the amount and remit the matter to the Registrar, District Registrar or Deputy Registrar, as the case may be, to be taxed in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal.

(4) An amount that a party to a proceeding is required under an order made by the Tribunal to pay to another party to the proceeding is recoverable by the other party as a debt due to the other party by the first-mentioned party."

1. I am mindful also of Item 3 of the decision of Rares J which is as follows:

a) the order for costs made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 June 2003 only entitles the application to recover costs in respect of matter N2001/750.

b) nothing in paragraph (a) prevents the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from determining whether the application is entitled to recover the whole or any amount in respect of costs of any item claimed which was relevant to matter N2001/750, notwithstanding that such item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730."

1. Accordingly, I also considered the submissions of the parties, O 62 r 19 of the Federal Court Rules, section 69A of the Act and the relevant case law in relation to Matter N2002/730.

1. The term costs describes the remuneration and expenses incurred in relation to legal work. Costs on a party/party basis are such costs as are necessary and proper for the attainment of justice, or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed, in this case Ms Keen. Costs on a party/party basis do not entitle the successful party to a complete indemnity for his or her costs. The costs are those that are necessary to enable the successful party to conduct the litigation, and no more. It is also said that the successful party should have his or her full costs, but not luxuries. (W. & A. Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Limited (1963) 81 WN (Pt.1) (NSW) 1 and Peel v London and North Western Railway Company (No. 2) (1907) 1 Ch D 607). I was mindful from Comcare v Labathas [1995] FCA 1702; (1995) 61 FCR 149 that the "overriding principle is that the expenses must have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of the claimant." Labathas also supports the proposition that reasonable costs can include costs incurred before the proceedings are commenced provided that they are costs for the purposes of the proceedings in which they are claimed to be payable. Costs apparently resulting from over-caution, negligence, mistake or merely at the desire of the party are not party/party costs.
2. Finn J held in Labathas that:

particular language of s67(8) - "costs of those proceedings" - considered in the context of the three tiers of decision making enshrined in the SRC Act make this a necessary matter to address. Costs incurred for the purposes of the original determination or of the reviewable decision are in my view costs of "proceedings" other than the Part VI proceedings for which s67(8) costs are payable. To this extent I am in agreement with Comcare's submissions.

_I did indicate that that agreement is subject to one qualification. It is this. It was submitted that no expense incurred before the reviewable decision was capable of being an allowable cost under s67(8). I am unable to agree with this temporal limitation. My reason is that the critical question is not: When were the costs incurred? but rather: What were the proceedings for which they were incurred?_may be evidence in which costs can be incurred well before a reviewable decision is given and can be incurred not for the reviewable decision or, for that matter, for the original determination, but for the purposes of a projected appeal to the Tribunal. I refrain from attempting to exemplify situations in which this may be so. It is only necessary to acknowledge the possibility of this. But having so concluded that preliminary expenses cannot be subjected to a temporal limitation, I must add that it would in my opinion require distinctive evidence indeed before it could properly be said that expenses incurred (a) before the original determination, or (b) before the reviewable decision were not incurred for those proceedings but were incurred despite them for a projected Part VI proceedings. What in my view is not sufficient to attract the characterisation of "costs of the proceedings" for s67(8) purposes is the mere proof that the prior incurred costs were useful in the Part VI proceedings."

REVIEW OF THE BILL OF COSTS IN MATTERS N2001/750 AND N2002/730 PURSUANT TO THE DECISION OF RARES J AND SECTION 69A(3) OF THE AAT ACT

1. Items 1 - 6 referred to work done between 3 December 1999 and 9 November 2000 to the value of $261.
2. Mr Polin noted in his submissions that Item 4, "Item 16: Copying the above documents for our files as requested by our client - see preceding entry - 48 pages - $29" had been conceded by the Applicant, submitting that the Respondent objected to all work claimed before the first determination dated 6 March 2001 as per general objection 6 in his written submissions.
3. Mr Jeffriess disagreed, submitting that Item 2 of the Bill of Costs referred to advice given to the Applicant not only in relation to making a claim but also about AAT procedure and hence was in respect of proceedings later brought in the Tribunal.
4. I noted that in the Conference Registrar's decision she allowed the Respondent's objection stating that "Costs incurred in November 2000 are not costs of these proceedings in accordance with the decision in Labathas v Comcare ..."
5. In coming to a decision I was mindful of the parties' arguments and the principles expressed in Comcare v Labathas where it was held that there may be situations in which costs can be incurred well before a reviewable decision is given, and can be incurred not for the reviewable decision or, for that matter, for the original determination, but for the purposes of a projected appeal to the Tribunal, cases where distinctive evidence exist, and where such costs can then be considered party/party costs. The overriding principle is that the expenses must have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of the claimant.
6. I am mindful that in this case the Items related generally to advising Ms Keen about lodging a claim with GIO (Items 1 & 2), scanning and copying documents regarding medical examinations and rehabilitation (Items 3 & 4), and correspondence with the GIO, (Item 5).
7. I was mindful of the Labathas test, noting that whilst costs incurred before the commencement of proceedings are not automatically disallowed, I was not satisfied that any of the Items 1 - 6 in the Bill of Costs came within the Labathas test.
8. Having taken into account the evidence and submissions, I decided that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 1 - 6 and to disallow the claim for $261.

1. Items 7 - 27 were billed for $217 and related to the period November 2000 to February 2001. They were for contact between the Applicant and her solicitors in relation to the claim to the GIO.
2. The Respondent referred to the arguments as set out in the section above in relation to Items 1 - 6, and objected to all work carried out before the first determination dated 6 March 2001. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant did not require the assistance of a solicitor in that period, and that no medical examinations were organised on her behalf.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, disagreed, and referred to paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Applicant's submissions where he had referred to the Labathas tests and costs incurred before the commencement of proceedings in the AAT, which I have discussed above.
4. I am mindful that in this case Items 7 - 27 related generally to assisting Ms Keen with lodging a claim with GIO (Items 7, 8, 9 etc), arranging medical examinations (Items 19 - 21), correspondence with the GIO, (Item 21- 26).
5. I was mindful of the Labathas test, noting that whilst costs incurred before the commencement of proceedings are not automatically disallowed, I was not satisfied that any of the Items 7 - 27 in the Bill of Costs came within the Labathas test.
6. After reviewing the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, in relation to Items 7 - 27, which was to disallow the claim for the $217 on the basis that the costs were not incurred in accordance with the decision in Labathas, and were not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant.

1. The claim for these Items was $246, and concerned correspondence with the GIO.
2. Mr Polin argued as above in relation to his written submissions at paragraph 6, and submitted that it was unnecessary for the Applicant to engage a solicitor to act as a "middle man" with the Respondent.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, referring to Items 7 - 27 above, argued that a prudent person seeking to attain justice would be well advised to ensure a solicitor handled matters for her with the insurer.
4. I noted that in regard to Items 28 - 37 in the Bill of Costs, the Registrar had allowed the Respondent's objections, holding that the costs incurred were not costs of the proceedings in accordance with the decision in Labathas.
5. I am mindful that in this case Items 28 - 37 related generally to assisting Ms Keen further with communications with the GIO, and consideration and discussion regarding the reconsideration.
6. I was mindful of the Labathas test, noting that whilst costs incurred before the commencement of proceedings are not automatically disallowed, I was not satisfied that any of the Items 28 - 37 in the Bill of Costs came within the Labathas test.
7. Having reviewed the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 28 - 37 which was to disallow the claim for the $246 on the basis that the costs were not incurred in accordance with the decision in Labathas, was the correct or preferable decision. I affirmed her decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the AAT Act.

1. The claim for Item 38 was for $84 in relation to 38 folios, for perusal of reports of Drs Fischer and Loefler.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the number of folios be reduced to 15, and objected to the amount of $54.
3. Mr Jeffriess noted that the Respondent did not object to this Item on the basis that it was incurred before proceedings commenced.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that after a review of the material at Item 38, it was allowed at the rate claimed for the number of folios claimed.
5. I do not have before me the actual number of folios, but am satisfied that the Conference Registrar reviewed the material at Item 38 and allowed them at the appropriate rate. From her statement, I am satisfied that she is likely to have counted the folios. I noted the dates of Drs Fischer and Loefler's examinations which preceded the reviewable decision. However I am satisfied it is likely that the reports may have been used in conjunction with the appeals to this Tribunal, and that the Labathas principles apply.
6. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I therefore decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 38 in the Bill of Costs, that is to allow the claim for $84.

1. The cost charged for Item 39 was $43, and was for correspondence which enclosed doctors' reports, and communication with the GIO regarding Ms Keen's health.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the letter was too lengthy for a covering letter, and that the number of folios should be reduced. He objected to $23 of the amount charged.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the letter included comments in support of various aspects of Ms Keen's claim rather than being a simple covering letter. He considered that notwithstanding the Respondent should have had the relevant medical certificates, a prudent applicant would have included these for the Respondent.
4. I considered the Conference Registrar's findings that the letter was a precursor to the Applicant's claim and "had the flavour of a special letter". She also considered that the provision of the medical certificates was not inappropriate.
5. I have not seen the letter in question but I am satisfied from the evidence and submissions, that the letter provided explanations for certain aspects of the claim. I consider given the situation, that the inclusion of the medical certificates was reasonable.
6. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 39 in the Bill of Costs, that is to allow the claim for $43.

1. The cost charged for Item 40 of the Bill of Costs was $16 for copying 21 pages of enclosures .
2. Mr Polin submitted as for Item 39 that the letter was too lengthy, and the number of folios should be reduced to 10 pages. The Respondent objected to $6 of the costs.
3. Mr Jeffries' argument was as for Item 39, that the letter included comments in support of various aspects of Ms Keen's claim rather than being a simple covering letter. He considered that notwithstanding the Respondent should have had the relevant medical certificates, a prudent applicant would have included these.
4. The Conference Registrar referred to her reasoning in Item 39, and rejected the submissions of the Respondent.
5. As in Item 39, I was satisfied that a comprehensive letter and the inclusion of certain documents with the solicitor's letter was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 40 in the Bill of Costs, that is to allow the claim for $16.

1. I noted that Item 43, perusal of the reconsideration decision, Statement of Reasons, and a notice advising rights of review (21 folios), at a cost of $50 had been reduced by $8 in the decision of the Conference Registrar.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the cost should be reduced by $8 by way of reduction to $2 per folio as in Item 17 in the Second Schedule.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the Applicant's construction of the Second Schedule was correct. He submitted that if the Respondent's submission was followed, the cost would be $14 for three folios and only $10 for five folios. He submitted that the Second Schedule should not be read to produce such a result.
4. I have noted the costs in the scale at the time of the delivery of the service, and that the number of folios involved is 21. Applying the scale, and noting the discretion available, which I exercised in a way similar to the Conference Registrar resulted in my affirming her decision. This means the $50 amount for Item 43 was reduced by $8. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 43 in the Bill of Costs.

1. Item 45 in the Bill of Costs was described as a special letter to the AAT dated 29 May 2001 in which the Applicant applied for a review of the determination, provided details and set forth reasons for the application (five folios). The cost charged was $43.
2. Mr Polin submitted this work was included in Item 44 for which $178 had been charged, and submitted the Respondent objected to the full amount of $43.
3. Mr Jeffries explained that this Item entailed the preparation of a letter seeking a review. He further explained that Item 44 was for receiving instructions to apply, which was quite a separate matter.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that this was a different and separate letter.
5. I accepted the assurance of the Applicant that the letter in Item 45 dealt with quite a different matter from that in Item 44. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 45. I allowed the full cost of the Item which was $43.

1. Items 51 - 53 to the value of $22 were conceded by the Applicant, so no further evidence or submissions were necessary.
2. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties already given, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objection and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 51 - 53 of the Bill of Costs. I disallowed the full cost of the Item which was $22.

1. Items 54 - 58 dealt with correspondence with the Applicant about the solicitor, and the hearing, and the copying of enclosures. The amount of the bill was $62.
2. Mr Polin objected to the amount in full, arguing that the cost was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter, and the adjournment was not the fault of the Respondent. He also indicated the Item duplicated Items 48 - 51.
3. The Applicant argued that the cost was necessarily incurred for the attainment of justice, and that the adjournment was sought because the Applicant's solicitor could not attend due to being on holidays.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection to the value of $61, pointing out that the adjournment was at the request of the Applicant, and the costs of vacation and relisting should not be borne by the Respondent.
5. I agreed that the full cost of the adjournment should be disallowed as argued by the Respondent, as it was at the request of the Applicant, and there were no particular circumstances which might have mitigated the situation.
6. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objection, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 54 - 58 of the Bill of Costs. I noted that there was a discrepancy of $1, likely to have been an arithmetic error in calculation.

1. Items 61 - 68 included scanning the T-documents, and perusing medical reports to the value of $690. The major Item was Item 61 billed at $450 for scanning/perusal of the section 37 documents.
2. Mr Polin argued that the Conference Registrar had a discretion in this matter (Items 17 and 18). He submitted that one and a half hours to peruse and scan documents was a reasonable time, and scanning should be at the rate of $51 per 15 minutes. He objected to $144 for Item 61, $24 for Item 62, $46 for Item 63, $14 for Item 64, $34 for Item 65, $34 for Item 66, $70 for Item 67 and $14 for Item 68 of the Bill of Costs.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the costs were for scanning of certain documents, commenting that the Respondent did not give reasons for wanting the Tribunal to reduce the usual rate.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in part, and reduced the quantum for reviewing the T-documents by $282. She exercised the discretion available to her, and applied Item 31 for review of the documents at $51 per 15 minutes to the total of two hours.
5. I have noted the argument between the parties as to Items 61 - 68, noting that some of the Items were medical reports which formed part of the T-documents. I am satisfied that the costs for scanning should be considered pursuant to Item 31, and that two hours, as allowed by the Conference Registrar was adequate time. I am satisfied that further costs were not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant.
6. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objections, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 61 - 68.

1. Items 77 and 78 were charged at $119 and concerned correspondence from the Applicant's solicitors to her, enclosing the section 37 documents.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the correspondence accompanying the section 37 documents was unnecessary, because instructions had already been received by then to apply for review of the decision. He submitted that the Respondent objected to the full $119 charged for Items 77 - 78.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, submitted that the taking of instructions was not all that needed to be done. He submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar considered the provision of the section 37 documents was necessary. She however reduced the photocopying rate to $0.50 per page, and reduced the costs by $5.
5. I have noted the argument between the parties as to Items 77 - 78, and find that it was necessary for the attainment of justice and to maintain the Applicant's rights, for her legal advisors to supply her with the section 37 documents. Costs of photocopying are referable to Item 16 of the Second Schedule, and I am satisfied that the Conference Registrar's decision in that regard was the correct one. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 77 - 78 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the cost of Item 79 was $108 for copying the section 37 documents for counsel.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the costs should be reduced as per Item 16 of the Second Schedule with regard to copying over 10 pages. He submitted that a commercial copier would have charged no more than $0.20 per page. The Respondent submitted $40.60 was the appropriate charge and argued against the additional $67.40.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that at the relevant time, there was no convenient commercial copier in the legal advisor's area. He submitted that delivery and collection of the documents for copying elsewhere would have resulted in more expense.
4. The Conference Registrar exercised her discretion to reduce the photocopying rate to $0.50 per page, and reduced the cost by $5.
5. I have noted the argument between the parties as to Item 79, and find that it was necessary for the attainment of justice and to maintain the Applicant's rights for her counsel to have the section 37 documents. Costs of photocopying are dealt with in Item 16 of the Second Schedule, and I am satisfied that the Conference Registrar's decision to reduce the rate to $0.50 per page was the correct one. Unavailability of copying in the vicinity of the Applicant's legal advisors, and the resultant increase in costs of photocopying cannot be charged to the Respondent. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 79 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that Item 80 was charged at $68, and related to drawing a brief to Counsel to advise.
2. Mr Polin argued that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. He submitted that the Applicant was entitled to the benefit of such advice, and that was the appropriate time in the proceedings to obtain it.
2. I noted that the Respondent conceded before the Conference Registrar that the brief to appear was not included at a later stage, and that she accordingly disallowed the Respondent's objection.
3. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was to note the Respondent's concession, and pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 80 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the cost of Item 82 was $20, and the Item enclosed the brief for the Applicant's counsel, and requested advice before the conference listed some weeks ahead.
2. Mr Polin objected to the correspondence on behalf of the Respondent, submitting that the brief spoke for itself.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted however that the letter indicated a time limit applied.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection.
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was to disallow the amount claimed on the basis that the brief did not require a covering letter. Therefore pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, I affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 82 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the cost of Item 85 was $11, billed for correspondence with counsel, enclosing a copy of the Respondent's request for particulars, and the Applicant's response. The cost for Item 93 was also $11.
2. Mr Polin objected on a similar basis to his objection in Item 82 above.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that "No definition is given of a 'running brief' nor more particularly is any reason given for such a brief to be disallowed".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in both Items 85 and 93, and stated that: "The Respondent's objection in relation to this Item (and a number of subsequent Items) was an objection to material being provided to Counsel by way of a 'running brief'. In relation to this Item I agreed with the Respondent's more general objection."
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correspondence was not required, and the costs were accordingly not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. I therefore disallowed the amount claimed, and decided that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 85 and 93 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the cost of Item 95 was $10 for a telephone attendance to explain various matters to Ms Keen.
2. Mr Polin argued that it was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter further.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, stating that the telephone attendance was not necessary and proper for the attainment of justice in the proceedings.
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was to allow the amount claimed on the basis that the Applicant was entitled to have her solicitors explain to her what the purpose of attending appointments made for her by the Respondent was about. Therefore pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, I set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 95 of the Bill of Costs, and allowed the $10 for the telephone attendance. I consider that the costs were necessary for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant.

1. I noted that the costs of Item 96 were $10 incurred for telephone attendance on counsel to confirm the Statement of Issues.
2. Mr Polin referred to the argument made in relation to Item 80, and submitted that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted that if counsel was briefed prematurely, then all correspondence related to that premature period should not be charged. He submitted that the solicitor should be competent to work without the assistance of counsel until the hearing, and that the Respondent would only concede counsel's fee for hearing, necessary preparation and conference with the Applicant prior to hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess also referred to his argument in relation to Item 80, submitting in addition that the solicitor and his client needed to be ad idem on issues and evidence for the case, and that discussions were essential to the efficient running of litigation.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection and referred to her ruling in Item 85 where she had stated: "The Respondent's objection in relation to this Item (and a number of subsequent Items) was an objection to material being provided to Counsel by way of a 'running brief'. In relation to this Item I agreed with the Respondent's more general objection."
5. In considering the principles involved, I was mindful that counsel's fee, in order to qualify as necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant, was allowable for hearing, necessary preparation and conference with the Applicant prior to hearing. I noted the timing in this case, and found that counsel's involvement for the settling of the Statement of Issues was premature, and was work which could be handled for the Applicant with the solicitor's advice. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 96 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the costs associated with Item 103 were $51 which was for attendance on the Applicant "to discuss the nature of the (AAT) telephone conference and the issues which have arisen".
2. Mr Polin argued that the Respondent objected to the full amount charged as he submitted it was unnecessary and did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, referred again to his Contention 18, where he argued on behalf of the Applicant, that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the attendance to inform the client was reasonable.
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, and the purpose of the attendance which was to "discuss the nature of the telephone conference and the issues which have arisen", I found that in order for the Applicant to be fully informed, for the attainment of justice and for the Applicant to defend her rights, the attendance in Item 103 of the Bill of Costs was necessary and appropriate_._ I decided that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to disallow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 103 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the costs of Item 125 were $18 for perusal of five folios of a report of the Applicant's clinical psychologist.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the claim was excessive and submitted it should be reduced to $14 or in the alternative, to $10 (at $2 per folio).
3. Mr Jeffriess commented that the Respondent had not made any argument, rather just a simple statement that the cost was excessive.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection and reduced the cost to $2 per folio, a total of $10 for the five folios.
5. I noted the evidence and submissions of the parties, and that Item 17 of the Second Schedule allows for perusal of documents. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that the cost of $2 per folio was the correct or preferable charge, and accordingly found that pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, the correct or preferable decision was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. The charge for Item 126 as indicated on the original Bill of Costs was $20, and was for correspondence to the Applicant seeking instructions regarding service of the psychologist's report. I noted that in the Joint Statement of the parties, it was shown as $22. Given the conclusion I have reached, the difference is of little consequence.
2. Mr Polin argued that the letter was unnecessary and solicitor/client in nature; it did not progress the matter. He submitted that the solicitor, not the client has the expertise to know whether the report should be served.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the client has a right to be informed and be involved in the preparation and running of her case.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis it was not necessary to seek instructions regarding service of the report.
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the decision about whether the report was to be served depended upon the solicitor's legal knowledge, and that accordingly, the correct or preferable decision was to allow the Respondent's objection. This meant that pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, I affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 126 of the Bill of Costs.

1. I noted that the costs for Item 132 were $14 incurred for perusal of the tax invoice of the Applicant's specialist occupational physician.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent accepted the scan rate but objected to $11 and perusal of the document.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, argued that it was necessary for the solicitor to consider the appropriateness of the amount charged, and that the cost was therefore justified.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, stating that scanning of the tax invoice was more appropriate than perusal.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that scanning was all that was required, and was in fact more appropriate. The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 132 of the Bill of Costs.

1. The costs of Item 134 of the Bill of Costs were $80 for perusal of a report regarding the Applicant by the qualified specialist occupational physician.
2. Mr Polin argued that excessive folios were claimed, and that they should be reduced to 30. He submitted Item 17 of the Second Schedule which specifies the cost for folios in excess of 30, should be applied. He submitted that the Respondent conceded 15 minutes to peruse the document and objected to $29 of the amount.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the Second Schedule allowed for claims of over 30 folios, and submitted that the Respondent had given no reason for the reduction he thought appropriate.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed perusal of 36 folios at the rate of $2 each, and deducted $8 from the total of $80.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I found no basis for the Respondent's claim that the number of folios be reduced, and found the rate of $2 per folio as applied by the Conference Registrar appropriate. Accordingly I found that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to perusal of folios in Item 134, and deducted $8 from the total claimed.

1. I noted that the bill for Item 135 was $11 for a letter to the Applicant asking her to make an appointment to discuss the service of the letter of the specialist occupational physician. Item 136 was charged at $8, for photocopying eight pages of enclosures to accompany the letter.
2. Mr Polin argued that the correspondence was unnecessary and that the Applicant's input was not required as to service of the medical report.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, referred to the Applicant's Contention 18 and Item 126 where he argued that the client has a right to be informed, and to be involved in the preparation and running of her case. Mr Jeffriess' comments in Contention 18 have been referred to above. In Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar held in relation to Items 135 and 136 that the Respondent's objections should be disallowed as the seeking of instructions in relation to the report was appropriate.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the communication to the Applicant to make an appointment to attend and discuss service of the medical report (which depends on the expertise of the solicitor in conducting the case rather than the client's preferences), should have been by telephone. That would have involved less costs of photocopying and correspondence, and I allow $10 for the telephone call pursuant to Item 33 of the Second Schedule. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 135 and 136, and in substitution disallow the photocopying, and allow only $10 for the telephone call.

1. I noted that the bill in Items 139 and 142 was $14 for each for service by post via the DX.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist).
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that Item 137 related to the drawing of the letter and made no provision for service.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that Item 27 of the Schedule did not apply in the circumstances, and preferred the submissions of the Respondent. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 139 and 142 and disallow the two $14 charges claimed.

1. I noted that Item 143 was billed at $51 for a telephone attendance in regard to instructions about service of the qualified specialist occupational physician's report, discussion of a new claim for depression, anticipated receipt of the treating clinical psychologist's report, and arrangements for a conference.
2. Mr Polin submitted that this Item was not necessary as it did not progress the matter. As to the AAT conference, Mr Polin submitted this was a solicitor/client call. As to service of medical reports, he submitted that the Applicant's input was not required as to service of the medical report. The Respondent objected to the full amount of the bill.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to the Applicant's Contention 18, and Item 126, and argued that it was necessary to explain procedures regarding the filing of a new claim in regard to the Applicant's psychological condition to her. He argued that the client has a right to be informed and be involved in the preparation and running of her case. He submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objections in part, reducing the bill by $29. She held that the attendance as detailed did not require legal skills, and allowed the attendance at a clerk's rate.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that attendance at a clerk's rate was proper for the attainment of justice and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly I found that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Item 143 and to reduce the bill by $29.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 144 was $7 for receiving and filing an incoming letter. The Applicant conceded this Item, and the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and reduce the charge for the Item to nil.

1. I noted that the costs in Item 147 and 150 of the Bill of Costs were each $14 for service by DX.
2. Both parties referred to their submissions in relation to Item 139 which concerned the application of Item 27 of the Second Schedule.
3. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 147 and 150, and to disallow both $14 charges claimed.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 153 was $20 and for Item 154, $1 for sending the letter subject of Item 153 by facsimile.
2. I noted that the Applicant conceded both Items. The Conference Registrar allowed the objections of the Respondent, and I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 153 and 154, and disallow both charges.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 156 was $10 for a telephone conference with counsel.
2. I noted that the Applicant conceded the Item. The Conference Registrar allowed the objection of the Respondent, and I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Item 156 and disallow the charge.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 157 was for $56, and concerned the drawing of the Statement of Facts and Contentions which detailed the Applicant's employment history and the circumstances in which she left her employment. Item 158 was a charge of $14 for typing the Statement of Facts and Contentions of seven pages.
2. Mr Polin submitted that there were excessive folios claimed in Item 157, and argued they should be reduced to five folios with a reduction in cost by $16. He argued that Item 158 was five folios and should be reduced by $4.
3. Mr Jeffriess maintained that the document was seven pages long and should be charged accordingly.
4. The Conference Registrar reduced the number of folios in Item 157 to five, and the cost by $16. In Item 158 she allowed the Respondent's objection and reduced the charge by $4 for the five folios.
5. I have not seen the document referred to. I have no basis on which not to accept the Applicant's assertion that the document is seven pages long. Accordingly, I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 157 and 158, and allow the charges for Items 157 and 158 as claimed.

1. I noted that the bill in Items 160 and 162 were service by DX at a cost of $14 each.
2. Mr Polin and Mr Jeffriess both referred to their submissions at Item 139 which were as follows: Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist). Mr Jeffriess argued that Item 137 related to the drawing of the letter and made no provision for service.
3. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 160 and 162, and to disallow both $14 charges claimed.

1. I noted that the bills in Items 165 and 166 were for $20 and $10 respectively, and related to the provision of the clinical psychologist's report to the Applicant seeking her instructions regarding service.
2. Mr Polin submitted that both Items were unnecessary and referred to the Respondent's objections in regard to Item 135 where he argued that the correspondence was unnecessary, and that the Applicant's input was not required as to service of the medical report.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, referred to the Applicant's Contention 18 and Item 126 where he argued that the client has a right to be informed and be involved in the preparation and running of her case. In Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar held in relation to Items 165 and 166 that the Respondent's objections should be disallowed as the seeking of instructions in relation to the report was appropriate.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the Respondent's objections should be disallowed as the seeking of instructions in relation to the report was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 165 and 166.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 168 was $14, and related to perusal of a letter of the Respondent with regard to the claim for the Applicant's psychological condition.
2. I noted that the Applicant conceded the Item. The Conference Registrar allowed the objection of the Respondent, and noting the concession, I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 168, and disallow the charge.

1. I noted that the bills in Items 171 and 174 related to service by DX and were $14 each.
2. Both parties referred to their arguments in relation to Item 139.
3. There, Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist).
4. Mr Jeffriess argued that Item 137 related to the drawing of the letter and made no provision for service.
5. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances.
6. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I accepted the Respondent's argument that the Items were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137. I am satisfied that the Conference Registrar's decision was correct. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 171 and 174 of the Bill of Costs, and disallow the two $14 charges.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 177 related to the copying of 12 pages of the report of the qualified neurologist, and was charged at $11. Item 178 was $20 for the cost of writing to the Applicant, and enclosing the report with an explanation of its significance to her.
2. Mr Polin's argument was that this correspondence did not progress the matter. He referred to the Respondent's argument in relation to Item 135 where he had submitted that the correspondence was unnecessary, and that the Applicant's input was not required as to service of the medical report. The Respondent conceded $12 was a legitimate charge for copying the report for counsel, and objected to only $25.50 he said. As the total amount for Items 177 and 178 was $31, and the concession was $12, the Respondent's position was, likely due to an arithmetic error, not entirely clear.
3. Mr Jeffries referred to his argument as to Contention 18, and Item 126. He submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection to Item 177, noting that the objection was not pressed at taxation.
5. She allowed the Respondent's objection in relation to Item 178, deducting $20, and observing that the copying of the medical report had been allowed at Item 177. She explained that the letter was not necessary because the claim at Item 179 was for an attendance on the Applicant the following morning**.**
6. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the report would assist the Applicant with knowledge about her case, and it was appropriate for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the Applicant's rights. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision in relation to Item 177, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to disallow the Respondent's objection and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.
7. In relation to Item 178, I accepted the reasoning of the Conference Registrar in relation to the letter accompanying the medical report, and considered that the letter was not necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the Applicant's rights, in particular given the claim at Item 179 for an attendance on the Applicant the following morning. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision in relation to Item 178, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.
8. In concluding, I noted an arithmetic error in the Joint Statement. I disregard that and am satisfied that the $11 charged for Item 177 was a legitimate charge, and the $20 in Item 178 is disallowed.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 184 was for $52 and involved a letter to counsel enclosing the Applicant's Statement of Facts and Contentions and other documents, as well as making arrangements for conferences. Item 188 which was billed at $31, was for attendance on counsel to appoint a conference for 30 April 2002. Item 189 which was billed at $21, was to advise the Applicant of a date for an appointment with counsel.
2. In regard to Items 184, 188 and 189, Mr Polin referred to a similar objection the Respondent made to Item 80 where he had indicated that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury. He argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing. In relation to Item 84, he also submitted that it was unnecessary to send all copies of correspondence to counsel, neither was it necessary that counsel attend the Conciliation Conference.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the documents sent were relevant to the case, and further, that to deny the Applicant representation by counsel at a conference designed to attempt resolution of the matter would be to deny her proper protection and representation.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, commenting that the objection to these Items and other similar items by the Respondent arose out of premature delivery of a brief to counsel, and that it was unnecessary for counsel to be involved at that stage.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties in relation to Item 184, I decided that, if her solicitors considered representation by counsel of importance, then to deny the Applicant representation by counsel at a conference designed to attempt resolution of the matter would be to deny her proper protection and representation. The fact that the Respondent decided counsel was not to be briefed for the Conciliation Conference was a matter for the Respondent. The costs incurred were proper for the attainment of justice and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision in relation to Item 184, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar, and in substitution, allow the costs of Item 184.
6. As to Items 188 and 189, after considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that these were solicitor/client costs incurred in making arrangements for the Applicant to confer with counsel. Accordingly, the correct and preferable decision would be pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to disallow the Items and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in that regard.

1. I noted that Item 186 was billed at $10 for a telephone attendance upon the Applicant to explain travel arrangements.
2. Mr Polin argued that the expense was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that such arrangements were of a solicitor/client nature and did not progress the matter before the Tribunal.
5. In relation to Item 186, I accepted the reasoning of the Conference Registrar that the arrangements were of a solicitor/client nature and did not progress the matter before the Tribunal. The contact with the client was not necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) her rights. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision in relation to Item 186, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 192 was for $53, for attendance on counsel to advise him regarding the summons hearing discussed in Item 191.
2. Mr Polin referred to a similar objection the Respondent made to Items 80 and 184, where he had indicated that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury. He argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess also referred to his comments in Items 80 and 184. Mr Jeffriess argued that the documents sent were relevant to the case, and further, that to deny the Applicant representation by counsel would be to deny her proper protection and representation.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, stating that attendance on counsel was not necessary or proper, and was over cautious.
5. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 192. I agreed with the Respondent's submissions and the ruling of the Conference Registrar that attendance on counsel in relation to the summons hearing was not necessary for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 193 was $21 for contact with counsel in relation to having a reader or an agent attend a summons hearing, and the bill for Item 194 was $1 for photocopying.
2. Mr Polin objected on the basis of his argument in Item 80 which was that the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing. He also submitted that the letter in Item 193 duplicated Item 197.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the allegation of duplication was incorrect. He referred to his argument in Item 80, and referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey, where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. He submitted that the Applicant was entitled to the benefit of such advice, and that that was the appropriate time in the proceedings to obtain it.
2. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, stating that attendance on counsel was not necessary or proper, and was over cautious.
3. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Items 193 and 194. I compared Items 193 and 197, and formed the view that they dealt with the same arrangements. Further, I agreed with the Respondent's submissions and the ruling of the Conference Registrar that arrangements in regard to the summons hearing involving counsel were not necessary for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. I noted that the bill in Items 195 and 196 were $7 and $15 respectively, for filing an incoming letter, and for advice to the Applicant regarding her disability support pension.
2. Mr Polin submitted that these Items were unnecessary, and did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred me to Contention 18 where he submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. He referred to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Registrar disallowed the full amount of $22 on the basis that the material was not necessary to progress the matter before the Tribunal.
5. I am satisfied that advice to the Applicant regarding her disability support pension was not necessary to progress the matter before the Tribunal. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the Respondent's objections should be allowed. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 195 and 196.

1. I noted that the bill in Item 208 was for $588 to scan material arising out of a summons in relation to a treating doctor's records.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent's objection to $376 had been conceded by the Applicant.
3. Mr Jeffries disagreed, stating that Item 210, rather than Item 208, had been conceded.
4. The Conference Registrar held that the scanning rate was excessive, and that a one hour attendance to review the 98 pages produced on summons pursuant to Item 31 was appropriate. She allowed the Respondent's objection as claimed, i.e. $376.
5. I accepted that an hour was adequate to scan the documents and was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. I was satisfied that the Respondent's objection should therefore be allowed, reducing the costs for inspecting the documents by $376. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 210 of the Bill of Costs was for $848, and dealt with costs incurred in attendance by the solicitor (from Forster) upon counsel in Sydney.
2. Mr Polin objected to $576 and submitted that the costs be reduced according to Item 40 in the Second Schedule. Mr Jeffriess conceded.
3. I noted that the Conference Registrar accepted that the costs be reduced according to Item 40 in the Second Schedule, hence reducing the costs by $576.
4. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 210. I accepted the concurrence of the parties, and the ruling of the Conference Registrar that Item 40 in the Second Schedule applies. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to reduce the bill for Item 210 by $576, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. The cost for Item 211 was $318, and the cost for Item 213, $53. Item 211 was claimed for a 90 minute conference between the Applicant and counsel discussing medical reports and matters relating to the Conciliation Conference. Item 213 was for a further conference with counsel of 15 minutes duration.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent objected to the amounts in full. He referred to the overall costs of counsel in this matter, and referred to the Respondent's argument at Items 80 and 184.
3. I noted from Mr Polin's argument in relation to Items 80 and 184 that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing (Item 184).
4. Mr Jeffries submitted that the concession on counsel's hearing rate was nothing other than for the brief on hearing. He submitted it did not include other Items, and emphasised that to properly advise the Applicant, and instruct counsel, necessitated conferences between the parties involved.
5. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objections in both Items 211 and 213. She deducted $318, being the full amount charged for advice prior to a Conciliation Conference, and in Item 213, she disallowed the full amount of $53.
6. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Items 211 and 213. I accepted the argument of the Respondent and the decision of the Conference Registrar that counsel's attendances had been accounted for elsewhere as indicated. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow Items 211 and 213.

1. Item 214 was for $848, and dealt with costs incurred in attendance by the solicitor (from Forster) upon counsel in Sydney.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Applicant had agreed that the amount be reduced by $576. Mr Jeffriess did not make a comment, and I accepted that he accordingly concurred.
3. The Conference Registrar reduced the amount claimed by $576 pursuant to the application of Item 40 of the Second Schedule.
4. I considered the submission of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 214. I was mindful of the discretion available pursuant to Item 40 of the Second Schedule, and accepted the concessions made, and the decision of the Conference Registrar. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to allow the Respondent's objection, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to reduce Item 214 by $576.

1. Item 222 was claimed at $43, and was for perusal of 10 folios of correspondence from the Applicant.
2. Mr Polin submitted that this was unnecessary as it duplicated other instructions, or duplicated the matters dealt with in Item 223, and did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the Respondent had no basis for his claims regarding duplicate instructions, and emphasised that the content of Item 223 was entirely different.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objections partially, reducing the claim by $28. Due to the fact the relevant letter was unable to be produced, the Conference Registrar was prepared to concede, based also on the Respondent's concession that the letter would be relevant, and that three folios should be allowed.
5. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 222. I did not have the relevant letter before me, but accepted the concessions made by the Respondent before the Conference Registrar regarding the relevance of the letter in the litigation ahead. I did not accept the Respondent's submission that Items 222 and 223 dealt with the same subject matter even though the topics appeared to be related. Accordingly, I affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar. The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to reduce Item 222 by $28.

1. Item 224 dealt with documentation regarding the Applicant's redundancy and was billed at $150.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Item did not progress the matter. He submitted in the alternative that the time spent was on research which is not a party/party cost, and in the alternative a scan of 15 minutes might be conceded.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, where the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. The Conference Registrar had disallowed $150, being the full amount claimed for scanning an agreement relating to the Applicant's redundancy from Telstra on the basis it was not relevant to the matter before the Tribunal.
5. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 224. I find that the costs incurred for dealing with documentation regarding the Applicant's redundancy were not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, I found that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow the $150 charged for this Item.

1. I noted that Item 226 was claimed at $21, and was for correspondence to counsel regarding the redundancy agreement.
2. Mr Polin referred to his argument at Item 80 above where he argued that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. He submitted that the Applicant was entitled to the benefit of advice regarding the redundancy agreement, and that the timing in relation to the proceedings was right.
2. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in relation to Item 226, and referred to her decision at Item 80 where she had disallowed the Respondent's objection on the basis "the Respondent conceded the Brief to Appear was not included at a later stage**"**.
3. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 226. At Item 224 above, I found that the costs incurred for dealing with documentation regarding the Applicant's redundancy were not necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Similarly so at Item 226. Accordingly, I found that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow the $21charge for this Item.

1. Item 229 of the Bill of Costs was claimed at $102, and was in relation to scanning Centrelink correspondence on an FOI request which included a medical report in relation to Ms Keen's disability rating.
2. Mr Polin submitted it was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter except for a medical report of one page which was served. He submitted the cost be reduced to $15 and objected to $87.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to the Applicant's Contention 18, submitting the Respondent was speaking with the benefit of hindsight. He submitted that Ms Keen had not only a right, but an obligation to be fully informed, and needed to give specific instructions about the material contained in the documents. Referring to Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, he said that the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. Mr Jeffriess also referred to Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection because she held that the FOI issue was irrelevant to the litigation. She reduced the bill by $87 and allowed for the cost of scanning the medical report which was $15.
2. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Item 229. I was satisfied that the scanning of the medical report ($15), was a cost which was proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant, but that the other material was not. The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and disallow $87 of the total charge.

1. Items 230 - 232 were charged at $7, $15 and $126 respectively, and concerned the Applicant's income tax returns.
2. Mr Polin submitted these charges were unnecessary as they did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 18, and submitted further that the Respondent was confusing Items referred to in Item 225. He submitted that it was important for the preparation of the case that Ms Keen's legal advisors had copies of the tax returns and information regarding earning capacity.
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection, holding that the material was necessary to progress the matter before the Tribunal.
5. I considered the submissions of the parties and the evidence before me in relation to Items 230 - 232. I was satisfied that the provision of tax returns and information regarding earning capacity to the Applicant's legal advisors was proper for the attainment of justice and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and to disallow the Respondent's objection.

1. Items 235 and 238 were DX costs charged at $14 each.
2. Both parties referred in their submissions to Item 139.
3. Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist).
4. Mr Jeffriess argued that Item 137 related to the drawing of the letter, and made no provision for service.
5. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that it had been conceded by the Applicant. She referred to Item 139.
6. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I noted that notwithstanding the Applicant appeared to have conceded the Items before the Conference Registrar, she was not so conceding in the Joint Statement before me. Item 27 of the Second Schedule applies in relation to service of documents, but in the circumstances, I find that the service had already been effected in relation to Item 137 so that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 235 and 238, and to disallow the two $14 charges.

1. Items 241 and 242 were charged at $7 and $15 respectively for correspondence with counsel and advice regarding service of Dr Arad's letter.
2. Mr Polin referred to his objection at Item 80, submitting that it was unnecessary for the solicitor to seek counsel's advice regarding service of the medical report.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his argument in Items 80 and 96 above. He also referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. He submitted that the Applicant was entitled to the benefit of such advice, and that that was the appropriate time in the proceedings to obtain it.
2. Mr Jeffriess also referred to his argument in relation to Items 80 and 96, submitting that the solicitor and his client needed to be ad idem on issues and evidence for the case, and that discussions were essential to the efficient running of litigation.
3. The Conference Registrar held that the attendance on counsel as charged, was not necessary and proper, and deducted the full amount of $22 for Items 241 and 242 of the Bill of Costs.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the Respondent's objections should be allowed as the seeking of instructions from counsel in relation to the report was unnecessary. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 241 and 242.

1. Items 245 and 248 were both for service by DX and billed at $14 each.
2. Both parties referred to their submissions at Item 139 above.
3. Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist).
4. Mr Jeffriess argued that Item 137 related to the drawing of the letter and made no provision for service.
5. The Conference Registrar referred to Item 139, and allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the Applicant had conceded the cost.
6. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I noted that notwithstanding the Applicant appeared to have conceded the Items before the Conference Registrar, she was not so conceding in the Joint Statement before me. Item 27 of the Second Schedule applies in relation to service of documents, but in the circumstances, I find that the service had already been effected in relation to Item 137, so that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 245 and 248, and to disallow the two $14 charges claimed.
7. For the sake of completeness, I note that these items were not argued in the previous hearing before me.

1. Item 249 was billed at $21, and was for a letter to counsel informing him that the report of Dr Arad had been obtained via an FOI request to Centrelink, and was served in the proceedings.
2. Both parties referred to their objections made in relation to Item 80.
3. Mr Polin argued in Item 80 that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
4. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. He submitted that the Applicant was entitled to the benefit of such advice, and that that was the appropriate time in the proceedings to obtain it.
2. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection and referred to her decision in Item 80 above.
3. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar on the basis that I did not consider the costs incurred in informing counsel about the result of the FOI request were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant.

1. Item 250 was billed at $53, and was for attendance with counsel for 12 minutes discussing dates and callover appearance.
2. Mr Polin submitted this was unnecessary as K Thompson appeared at the callover, and objected to $43 of the cost. Mr Polin submitted that the Applicant conceded telephone attendance pursuant to Item 33 of the Second Schedule.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that Ms Thompson's appearance arose out of the discussions at Item 251 regarding Mr Vincent's advice that in the interests of cost saving more junior counsel could attend the callover.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in part and deducted $43. She allowed a cost pursuant to Item 33 of the Second Schedule for attendance to ascertain counsel's availability.
5. In order to maintain the Applicant's rights and considering what was proper for the attainment of justice, a $10 cost pursuant to Item 33 of the Second Schedule was more appropriate as this permitted a cost for attendance to ascertain counsel's availability. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, affirm the Conference Registrar's decision.

1. Item 252 was billed at $10, a telephone attendance on Ms Thompson regarding AAT dates.
2. Mr Polin submitted this cost was unnecessary as it duplicated the advice in the letter at Item 261.
3. Mr Jeffriess considered the communication of counsel to report on the callover of importance, and submitted the objection of the Respondent was without merit.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection to Item 252 on the basis that hearing dates were advised by Ms Thompson at Items 252 and 261, whereas only one notification was necessary, and Item 261 had been allowed.
5. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that one notification of hearing dates was sufficient, and that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 255 was charged at $11, and was for a letter to the Respondent's solicitor enclosing a hearing notice. Item 256 was the charge of $1 for photocopying enclosures for the letter.
2. Mr Polin submitted that this correspondence was unnecessary as the solicitor for the Respondent was aware of the hearing dates.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to the Applicant's Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. Mr Jeffriess submitted that a prudent solicitor would ensure that all the parties were informed and ready for hearing.
2. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, noting that both parties attended the callover, and each knew the hearing dates independently.
3. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I agreed that both parties were independently aware of the hearing dates, and that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to allow the Respondent's objection, and to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 263 was billed at $21, and was for correspondence from the Respondent passed on to the Applicant's counsel regarding the Applicant's financial situation, and details regarding the separation from her employer.
2. Both parties referred to Item 80 where Mr Polin argued that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. I noted that the Conference Registrar referred to the argument and decision in Item 80, and allowed the Respondent's objection.
2. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 263 of the Bill of Costs, and in substitution to allow the charge. The Applicant's solicitors needed to keep their counsel informed, and the costs incurred were proper for the attainment of justice and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant.

1. Item 265 was billed at $21, and consisted of correspondence with the Respondent's solicitor by the Applicant requesting a report of a medical examination she had undergone, and discussing compensation figures mentioned at the Conciliation Conference.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the letter was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter, and was simply a "prompt".
3. Mr Jeffriess emphasised that the report of the medical practitioner attended by the Applicant a year previously had not been served. He submitted that the letter was a necessary part of the litigation, and without it, the hearing could not proceed.
4. The Conference Registrar found that the letter to prompt the Respondent was not necessary or proper at that time, and deducted the full amount of $21.
5. I accepted Mr Jeffriess' submission that the report of the medical practitioner attended by the Applicant a year previously had not been served, and that the letter was a necessary part of the litigation. Taking into account all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I decided that the correct or preferable decision was, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar and in substitution to allow the cost.

1. Items 270 and 273 were both for service by DX at a cost of $14 each.
2. Both parties referred to their submissions in Item 139 above.
3. Mr Polin submitted that the Items were superfluous in that they were covered in the sending of the letter at Item 137 (enclosing the report of the treating psychologist).
4. Mr Jeffriess argued at Item 137 that this related to the drawing of the letter, and made no provision for service.
5. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that Item 27 of the Second Schedule did not apply in the circumstances.
6. I noted that these two Items in the Bill of Costs were simply for DX delivery without specifying the correspondence or documents sent. Item 27 of the Second Schedule deals with service of documents, but I was not satisfied these items had not already been sent and accordingly charged for. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Items 270 and 273, and to disallow the two $14 charges claimed.

1. Item 276 was billed at $10 for a telephone attendance on the Applicant, discussing various medical reports.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the report of Dr Fisher referred to in Item 276 had already been received and perused by the Applicant's solicitor. He submitted the call was solicitor/client in nature, and did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted the minimum telephone charge had been claimed and that it was necessary for the Applicant to instruct her solicitor regarding the medical matters involved in her case.
4. The Conference Registrar accepted the submission of the Respondent and disallowed Item 276 in full, being $10 on the basis that the attendance on the Applicant did not progress the matter before the Tribunal.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the attendance on the Applicant as billed in Item 276 did not progress the matter before the Tribunal, and preferred the Respondent's submissions. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 278 was billed at $10 and involved counsel's advice regarding the timing of oral evidence.
2. Mr Polin considered it unnecessary to have counsel's advice on an administrative matter, and submitted it did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted counsel was running the hearing, and such arrangements were necessary for the efficient running of the hearing.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis counsel's advice on this matter was not required.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the attendance on the Applicant as billed in Item 278 did not progress the matter before the Tribunal, and preferred the Respondent's submissions. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 279 was billed at $10, charged for making the arrangement with the clinical psychologist to attend the hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted that this duplicated Item 275, while Mr Jeffriess submitted Item 275 related to another arrangement with the psychologist.
3. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that two telephone calls to discuss arrangements with the psychologist on the same day were unnecessary.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that two telephone attendances with the psychologist on the same day were unnecessary, and preferred the Respondent's submissions. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar

1. The cost of Item 286 were billed at $53, a discussion with counsel about the impending hearing.
2. The Respondent objected to this Item. The Applicant conceded this Item.
3. The Conference Registrar had allowed the Respondent's objection.
4. I noted the agreement of the parties, and accordingly, I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Items 287 and 288 charged at $11 and $3 for photocopying a letter enclosing Centrelink calculations.
2. Mr Polin referred to the Respondent's objections at Item 80, and added that this information, being Centrelink payback figures, was only relevant after finalisation of the application.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the communication with counsel regarding payback details was necessary, particularly in relation to settlement negotiations.
4. The Conference Registrar held that it was unnecessary for counsel to be informed about Centrelink matters at that stage of the proceedings, and disallowed the full amount of $14.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that it was unnecessary for counsel to be briefed about Centrelink matters at that time, and preferred the Respondent's submissions. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 290 was billed at $10, a telephone call to the AAT to ascertain whether the letter making a request regarding telephone evidence had been received.
2. Mr Polin noted that this duplicated Item 280, and was unnecessary.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that arranging and ensuring the most efficient use of the Tribunal's time was essential and cost saving.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the matter had been dealt with at Item 280.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the arrangements had already been dealt with at Item 280, and preferred the Respondent's submissions. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Items 291 - 293 dealt with the Applicant's receipt of the Respondent's Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions, $7 for receiving it, $83 for perusal of 20 folios, and $6 for the facsimile.
2. Mr Polin submitted that action relating to the Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions was not a legitimate cost in N2001/750, as it dealt with issues arising in N2002/730.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the issues in N2001/750 involved issues of the effect of any psychological sequelae of the physical injuries, including the ability to earn. He referred to the decision of Rares J in relation to costs charged in N2002/730 which may be allowable.
4. The Registrar allowed certain Items, reducing the Bill of Costs by $23. She indicated that the costs incurred by the Applicant in N2002/730 were allowable. She allowed $3 per folio for Item 292.
5. I am satisfied that the Applicant is only entitled to recover costs in relation to Matter 2001/750, and other costs only pursuant to the ruling of Rares J which appears as follows in his Honour's decision.

a. the order for costs made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 June 2003 only entitles the applicant to recover costs in respect of matter N2001/750.

b. nothing in paragraph (a) prevents the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from determining whether the applicant is entitled to recover the whole or any amount in respect of costs of any Item claimed which was relevant to matter N2001/750, notwithstanding that such Item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730.

1. I am satisfied that Items 291 - 293 refer to N2002/730. No costs other than as noted above pursuant to his Honour's decision may be awarded in relation to Matter N2002/730.
2. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the argument of the Respondent, noting that the Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions referred to matters raised directly in N2002/730, and not relevant to N2001/730. Accordingly, I disallowed the costs in Items 291 - 293 in full. I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, is to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar and in substitution find that the costs in Items 291- 293 are disallowed.

1. Items 294 - 295 were billed at $11 and $6 respectively, for a letter to counsel enclosing a letter from the Respondent's solicitor, with $6 charged for the facsimile.
2. Mr Polin referred to his objection at Item 80, and to his objections in the Items 291 - 293 above. Mr Polin submitted that the Amended Statement of Facts and Contentions was not a legitimate cost in N2001/750, as it dealt with issues arising in N2002/730.
3. At Item 80, Mr Polin argued that the Respondent would concede this Item if the brief to appear was not later duplicated. He submitted the matter was not complex as it related only to incapacity arising from the Applicant's neck injury, and argued that counsel was only required in the immediate preparation for the actual hearing.
4. At Item 80, Mr Jeffriess referred to his Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the issues in N2001/750 involved issues of the effect of any psychological sequelae of the physical injuries, including the ability to earn. He referred to the decision of Rares J in regard to recovering costs.
2. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objections on the basis that the material was necessary for counsel to properly advise. I noted however that she had erred in allowing costs relating to N2002/730.
3. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the matters in Items 294 - 295 of the Bill of Costs referred to N2002/730, and having considered the decision of Rares J, found, that I preferred the Respondent's submissions in that regard. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar, and disallow the costs claimed.

1. Item 297 was billed at $10, a telephone call to arrange travel for the Applicant's solicitor from the country.
2. I noted that the Applicant conceded this Item as also noted by the Conference Registrar.
3. I accepted that the Item was conceded by the Applicant. It would not be a cost necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. The correct or preferable decision is, therefore, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and disallow costs claimed for Item 297.

1. Items 302 and 303 were billed at $6 for photocopying a report of the qualified orthopaedic surgeon and $21 for a letter to the Applicant from her solicitors commenting on it.
2. Mr Polin referred to the objection the Respondent made in relation to Item 135. In it he argued, as here, that the correspondence was unnecessary.
3. Mr Jeffriess on the other hand, referred to the Applicant's Contention 18 and Item 126 where he argued that the client has a right to be informed and be involved in the preparation and running of her case. Mr Jeffriess' comments in Contention 18 have been referred to above. In Contention 18 in the Joint Statement produced by the parties, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent's frequently made point in relation to certain matters that they did not progress the proceedings, was not the test. Rather, he submitted, it was "whether the Item was necessary for the attainment of justice or to defend (or maintain) the applicant's rights".
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar held in relation to Items 302 and 303, that the Respondent's objections should be disallowed as it was necessary for the Applicant to be provided with the relevant material.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the communication to the Applicant about the medical report, was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 302 and 303.

1. Item 304 was billed at $21, for a letter to counsel enclosing the copy of the qualified orthopaedic surgeon's report.
2. Mr Polin referred to his objections at Item 80.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to the Applicant's Contention 5 in the Joint Statement in which he referred to Asprey J in Gilbey where his Honour held:

"The taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial, and to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson 'in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially known as 'hindsight'.' The question of the necessity for or propriety of any Item of costs should be judged by the state of things known or which ought reasonably to have been known to a diligent solicitor at the time when the expenditure was made or the liability therefore was incurred."

1. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objections, noting that it was necessary for counsel to have the report of the qualified orthopaedic surgeon at that stage of proceedings.
2. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the communication to counsel with the medical report was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 304.

1. Item 308 was billed at $53 for attendance with the Applicant in regard to her superannuation and arrangements for a conference.
2. Mr Polin argued that the meeting was unnecessary as it did not progress the matter, and the Applicant had previously been advised as to arrangements.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the objection made no sense and that the attendance involved more than simply making arrangements.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis of duplication of information.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the communication to the Applicant was not necessary and proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining her rights, as it was a duplication. I preferred the submissions of the Respondent. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 308.

1. Item 309 of the bill was billed at $848 for travel to Sydney by Ms Keen's solicitor.
2. A reduction of $576 was conceded by the Applicant (Item 40 of the Second Schedule was allowed), and was the amount objected to by the Respondent.
3. The Registrar accordingly deducted $576 for this Item which had been conceded by the Applicant, and accepted by the Respondent.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the agreement of the parties to adhere to Item 40 of the Second Schedule for Item 309 in the Bill of Costs was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 309.

1. Item 310 was billed at $212 for a one hour conference with counsel and the Applicant in preparation for the hearing.
2. A reduction of $93 was conceded by the Applicant (Item 35 of the Second Schedule was allowed), and was the amount objected to by the Respondent.
3. The Registrar accordingly deducted $93 for this Item which had been conceded by the Applicant, and accepted by the Respondent.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the agreement of the parties to adhere to Item 35 of the Second Schedule for Item 310 in the Bill of Costs was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 310.

1. Item 311 was billed at $1,060 for five hours attendance at the hearing.
2. The Applicant conceded to a reduction of $176, and the parties agreed on the figure. The Conference Registrar accepted that the Item should be claimed under Item 37 of the Second Schedule, and allowed the Respondent's objections.
3. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the agreement of the parties to adhere to Item 37 of the Second Schedule for Item 311 in the Bill of Costs was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 311 which will be paid at $884.

1. Item 312 was billed at $106 for attendance on counsel after the hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted that Item 35 only provides for "necessary" conferences with counsel, and suggested the attendance as billed did not qualify as such. He submitted it did not progress the matter, but in the alternative proposed reducing the rate to 30 minutes pursuant to Item 35 of the Second Schedule.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that a conference between solicitor and counsel was essential, because during the course of hearing matters arise which are both fluid and unpredictable, and require discussion.
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed this Item in full, ($106), finding that there had been numerous previous attendances on counsel.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that a conference between solicitor and counsel at the end of the first day of hearing was necessary and desirable for the proper conduct of the hearing, and proper for the attainment of justice, and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act in relation to Item 312 is to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar, and in substitution allow the costs of the conference as charged, $106.

1. Item 313 was billed at $477 for the final day of hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted that Item 36 of the Second Schedule applied and the time should be reduced to two hours, and the cost reduced by $87.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the times recorded for the hearing were wrong due to a typographical error, and there was no reason to reduce the actual time spent.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection, reducing the cost by $87 on the basis that the AAT recorded the hearing lasted one hour and 50 minutes, and the Applicant's claim of two hours, 36 minutes was inaccurate.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that based on the AAT's records, the hearing lasted one hour and 50 minutes. Accordingly, I preferred the submissions of the Respondent to deduct $87 from the amount claimed. I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Item 313.

1. Item 314 was billed at $106 for attendance on the client after the hearing, and $848 for Item 315 for the solicitor to travel to the hearing from Forster.
2. I noted that the Applicant conceded $106 as objected to by the Respondent in Item 314, and that the Applicant conceded $576 as objected to by the Respondent in Item 315.
3. The Conference Registrar allowed the objection of the Respondent in Item 314, and reduced the amount claimed for attendance with the Applicant after the hearing by $106. She disallowed the full amount of $848 in regard to Item 315.
4. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the agreement of the parties to reduce Item 314 in the Bill of Costs by $106, was appropriate.
5. I noted from the Joint Statement that the Applicant conceded $576 in Item 315, and am satisfied that the agreement of the parties to reduce Item 315 in the Bill of Costs by $576, was appropriate.
6. Accordingly I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 314, and to vary the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 315 to reduce Item 315 by $576.

1. Item 316 was billed at $21, a letter to the Applicant from her solicitors reporting about the hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted the letter was unnecessary and did not progress the matter as the Applicant was present at the hearing.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the Applicant, as a lay person, is entitled to have the matters of law and procedure explained to her in writing.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the objection of the Respondent, agreeing that the letter did not progress the matter.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the submission of the Respondent, and am satisfied that the letter did not progress the matter. The Applicant was present at the hearing, and should have had any queries she had answered there. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Item 316.

1. Item 317 was billed at $15 to peruse one folio, the tax invoice of the treating clinical psychologist.
2. Mr Polin submitted the bill be reduced by $9, to the cost of a scan.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his argument at Item 132 submitting that accounts needed to be checked for appropriateness.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the document was more properly scanned than perused.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the submissions of the Respondent, and am satisfied that it was more appropriate to scan rather than peruse the tax invoice. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation Item 317 to reduce it by $9.

1. Item 319 was billed at $22 for correspondence with the Tribunal regarding the date of publication of the decision.
2. I have noted the concession of the Applicant in relation to this Item. The Conference Registrar allowed the objection of the Respondent on this basis.
3. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the concession of the Applicant in Item 319 is appropriate. I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and disallow the $22 cost.

1. Item 320 was billed at $683 for perusal of a letter from the AAT enclosing the decision and informing of appeal rights.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent conceded only a perusal of the decision to the extent of advising the Applicant of it, i.e. two pages. Perusal of the whole decision, he submitted, was not relevant as it did not progress the matter, and was a cost for the future, perhaps of an appeal.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the reasons were an integral part of the parties' understanding of the outcome, and not useful only as to appeals. He submitted that this was particularly so in a case such as this where there were two different findings on two different claims.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed only for scanning the reasons for decision of the Tribunal and deducted $668 from Item 320 of the Bill of Costs. She held that the reasons for decision were not costs of these proceedings.
5. I preferred the submissions of the Respondent that the Reasons for Decision do not progress the matter between the parties, and are properly costs of an appeal. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct, and I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 321 was billed at $10 for receiving a call from the AAT regarding the date of publication of the decision.
2. I noted that this Item was conceded by the Applicant, and accepted by the Respondent, and that the Conference Registrar reflected that agreement of the parties in her decision.
3. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I am satisfied that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct, and I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and disallow the cost of $10 in Item 321.

1. Item 322 was billed at $55 for attendance with counsel regarding the publication of the decision in this matter.
2. Mr Polin submitted that it was unnecessary for counsel to obtain a copy of the decision of the AAT as it was forwarded by DX. He submitted the action by the Applicant did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that a litigant was entitled to have details of a decision more swiftly than would be possible by DX.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in that she held it was not necessary for counsel to attend to obtain the decision.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I prefer the submissions of the Respondent and find that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct. The decisions of the AAT are available at the reception area on the day of publication which has been announced, and can be mailed, emailed or DX'd. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar and disallow the $55 cost.

1. Item 325 was billed at $55, an attendance with the Applicant to advise her of the outcome of the AAT's decision.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the attendance was unnecessary, and a duplication, in that a letter was sent (Item 326).
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the Applicant was entitled to know the result of her application as quickly as possible, and more quickly than mail would permit.
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the Applicant's representative was entitled to advise her of the decision at the earliest opportunity.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the submissions of the Applicant, and find that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct. The Applicant was entitled to have her advisor inform her of the decision at the earliest opportunity. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Item 326 for a letter to the client enclosing the AAT's decision was billed at $22, and Item 327, copying the decision (36 pages), was billed at $23.
2. Mr Polin agreed that the letter be sent, but objected to the copying of the decision on the basis that it did not progress the matter, and that there was no evidence instructions for appeals were sought. He submitted that if so, then these costs would not be costs of the matter at first instance.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to Item 320, submitting that rejecting such an Item would mean litigants would not be informed of the Reasons for Decision. That would not be in the public interest he said.
4. The Conference Registrar accepted the submissions of the Respondent, holding that it was unnecessary to inform the Applicant of the decision both by telephone and in writing. She disallowed the full $45.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the submissions of the Respondent, and find that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct. The Applicant did not need to be informed both in writing and by telephone. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow the full amount of $45.

1. Item 329 was billed at $46 for a special letter to Ms Keen's solicitor setting out details of costs claimed.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent queried the existence of the letter, and in the alternative queried the reason why the rate for a special letter had been claimed.
3. Mr Jeffriess conceded the Item.
4. The Conference Registrar noted that the Item had been allowed at Item 328 and upheld the Respondent's objection.
5. After considering all the evidence, submissions and concessions of the Applicant, I preferred the submissions of the Respondent, and agree that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct as the cost had previously been allowed. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow the full amount of $46.

1. Item 332 was billed at $39 for nine folios, a letter regarding the costs incurred, and making a mention of the Federal Court proceedings.
2. Mr Polin remarked that the Applicant had conceded the Item in a letter dated 23 March 2007, and added that the Respondent conceded three folios but that the rest related to the Federal Court proceedings. The Respondent objected to $24 of the costs claimed.
3. Mr Jeffriess conceded.
4. The Conference Registrar noted the Applicant's concession and allowed the Respondent's objection to the value of $24.
5. I noted from the Joint Statement that the Applicant had previously conceded the Item, and am satisfied that the agreement of the parties to reduce Item 332 in the Bill of Costs by $24, was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 332.

1. Items 333 and 334 were billed as follows: Item 333 for $1,280 for drawing the Bill of Costs (160 folios), and Item 334, $540 for typing the Bill of Costs.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Bill of Costs was drawn by a legal costs consultant, and that these Items should be claimed as one disbursement Item at the rate of 9% plus GST or taxed profit costs excluding GST. He submitted that the Respondent had conceded as much in the summary page at the end of the Joint Statement.
3. Mr Jeffriess commented that no such summary was provided, and that the work was a joint effort involving the Applicant's solicitor's time in checking, collating conferring etc. He submitted that if the Tribunal was of the view that the Item should be treated as proposed by the Respondent, then an appropriate Item would need to be added in disbursements which meant the Respondent would be liable to pay GST on it.
4. The Conference Registrar reduced the claims for Items 333 and 334 by $960 on the basis that certain costs in drawing and engrossing the bill were necessary and proper, and given 50% of the claimed Items were allowed, 50% of the costs claimed for the preparation of the bill were allowable.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct as certain costs in drawing and engrossing the bill were necessary and proper, and if approximately 50% of the claimed Items are allowed, 50% of the costs claimed for the preparation of the bill are allowable.
6. I find that the correct and preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to provisionally affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow $960 in Items 333 and 334. If after the calculations for which I have remitted these Reasons for Decision have been made, and if the above estimate is found to be incorrect, then the parties should inform the Tribunal.

1. Item 335 was billed at $15, Item 337 was for $31, Item 338 was for $15 and Item 339, $15.
2. The Conference Registrar had allowed certain Items.
3. I noted from the Joint Statement that the Applicant conceded all four Items, and I am satisfied that the agreement of the parties to reduce the costs of them was appropriate. Accordingly I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to all four Items.

1. Item 340 was billed at $11 for correspondence with the Respondent requesting payment of costs.
2. Mr Polin submitted this was unnecessary as costs would be paid by the Respondent in accordance with the certificate of taxation.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the letter was sent in an attempt to avoid lengthy argument about costs. He referred to the Applicant's Contention 5 which has been reproduced in the paragraphs above.
4. The Conference Registrar agreed with the Respondent, and allowed objection, reducing the bill by $11.
5. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I preferred the objections of the Respondent, and was satisfied that the Conference Registrar's findings were correct. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow $11 in Item 340.

1. Item 341 was billed at $68 for Drawing Notice being Certificate of Taxation, including copies, filing and service.
2. I noted that at the time of the Taxation, the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the Certificate of Taxation is issued by the AAT. The Applicant conceded this Item in the Joint Statement.
3. After considering all the evidence and submissions of the parties, I was satisfied that the Conference Registrar's findings, and the concession were correct. I find that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar to disallow $68 in Item 341.

1. Item 344 was billed at $2,496.15 for work done in connection with the billing, for "general care and conduct".
2. Mr Polin objected to $1,446.22. He submitted that the Item should be reduced to 15% of the taxed profit costs.
3. Mr Jeffriess agreed with the proposition that the Applicant is entitled to 15% of profit costs as determined by the Tribunal.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection which at the time of her taxing was $1,402.65.
5. I noted that this was not argued before me at the previous hearing. There was no disagreement about the 15%, and I am satisfied that the Applicant is entitled to 15% of profit costs as determined by the Tribunal. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in principle, but not as to actual dollar value.

1. Item 350 was billed at $160 for the psychologist as a stand-by fee in order to give evidence at the hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the clinical psychologist was not required to give evidence, and so no standby fee was payable. He submitted that if required, the psychologist, who was in his rooms working, could have been called by telephone.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that it was not known until the day of the hearing whether it was going to be necessary to call the psychologist. He submitted that the AAT would have expected the Applicant to be in a position to call any necessary evidence. He referred to page 10 of Gilbey (supra), submitting that the judge in that case had cautioned about being affected by what was colloquially termed hindsight. I noted his Honour stated:

"In determining whether an Items of costs is "necessary" or "proper" the taxing officer would have regard to the facts in issue between the parties to the litigation as disclosed by the pleadings and to all facts which render probable the existence or non-existence of the facts in issue, .... But in making his decisions upon such matters the taxing officer should place himself in the position of the solicitor sitting in his office chair engaged in the task of preparing the case for trial and, to use the words of Sachs J in Francis v Francis and Dickerson (380, "in particular care must be taken not to be affected by what is colloquially termed 'hindsight' ..."

1. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full ($160) on the basis the psychologist was not called, and a standby fee was not necessary or proper.
2. I accepted the submissions of the Respondent that the psychologist was not called, and could indeed have, if necessary, been called from his rooms by telephone during an agreed time at the hearing. I am mindful that the treating psychologist is likely to have been relevant to evidence given in Matter N2002/730 in which Ms Keen was not successful, and where costs could in any case not be awarded (except in taking into account the decision of Rares J). The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 350 of the Bill of Costs, notwithstanding on different grounds.

1. Item 354 was billed at $431.98 for the solicitor to attend a conference with counsel, and to attend the Conciliation Conference at the AAT. Item 355 was billed at $431.98 for Ms Keen's travel from Taree to Sydney return.
2. Mr Polin objected to $431.98 on the basis that the airfare had been claimed twice, and that cheaper flights may have been available.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that two costs were charged because flights for the Applicant and her solicitor were involved, adding that the Respondent had not assisted with any other fare structure.
4. The Conference Registrar allowed both costs because she held that both the Applicant and her solicitor were required for activities in Sydney. She noted that before her, the Respondent had conceded the costs.
5. Mr Polin did not concede either Item 354 or 355 before me. I accepted the argument of the Applicant that the attendance of both the Applicant and the solicitor were required for the Conciliation Conference at the AAT. The costs incurred were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the of the Applicant. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 354 and 355 of the Bill of Costs.

1. Item 358 was claimed at $200 for two nights accommodation for the solicitor, and Item 359, $352 for the costs of the Applicant driving to and from Sydney for the hearing, including meals, but with no claim for accommodation.
2. Mr Polin did not mention a figure, but queried whether the accommodation for the solicitor had not previously been claimed, and whether the CBD rather than Balmain may have been preferable. He also sought receipts for the Item 359 claim.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the objection was without merit as receipts for the moderate costs claimed had been presented to the Conference Registrar.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objections.
5. I was satisfied that receipts and appropriate justification for costs incurred had been produced before the Conference Registrar, and that the costs incurred were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Both the Applicant and her solicitor were required to be present at the Conciliation Conference and the hearing. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 358 and 359 of the Bill of Costs.

1. Item 360 was billed at $268.80, and was for the solicitor's travel from Forster to Sydney, that is 640 kms at $0.42 per km.
2. Mr Polin argued that the return travel had been claimed at Item 359 above, and that Forster is 308 kms from Sydney's CBD.
3. Mr Jeffriess emphasised that Item 359 was referable to the Applicant, and Item 360 to the solicitor's travel. As to the Respondent's assertion that Forster is 308 kms from Sydney, Mr Jeffriess argued that the solicitor needed to charge for a door-to-door passage to his hotel and back to the Tribunal.
4. The Conference Registrar did not rule on Item 360. As such I do not have jurisdiction to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However if I am wrong, I am satisfied that the solicitor's travel was necessary or proper for the attainment of justice, or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. He was required to be present at the hearing. The rate and distance charged was reasonable. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision would be to allow the claim.

1. Item 361 was billed at $142.10 incurred for parking, fares and meals for the solicitor during the hearing.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the full amount be disallowed on the basis that the costs had already been claimed in Items 358 and 359.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that Items 358 and 359 were for the Applicant, and not in regard to the solicitor.
4. I noted that Item 361 was not disputed before the Conference Registrar, and hence there is no decision about it by her.
5. As the Conference Registrar did not rule on Item 360, I do not have jurisdiction to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However if I am wrong, I am satisfied that the solicitor's travel was necessary, and having considered the costs claimed, decided they were necessary expenses incurred in the solicitor attending the hearing. The costs were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly I would disallow the objection of the Respondent.

1. Items 364 - 382 of the Bill of Costs related to counsel, Mr Vincent's costs to a total of $6,062. The work was billed for conferences, perusal and preparation of documents, brief on hearing etc.
2. Mr Polin referred to the Respondent's objections at Item 80. He submitted that the Respondent objected to $3,065.75.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his argument at Item 80. He submitted that the matter was complex and involved careful preparation and presentation by counsel. He submitted that the costs were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Mr Jeffriess did not concede any of the items.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar had allowed the Respondent's objections in part. She held that the Tribunal was assisted by counsel's involvement, particularly given the remote location of the solicitor.

• Item 364 was billed for $62.50 The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection - amount reduced by $62.50. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for counsel to participate in the telephone conference. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 364 of the Bill of Costs.
• Item 365 was billed for $250. The Respondent's objection was allowed in part, and the amount reduced by $130 by the Conference Registrar. I accepted that Ms Thompson, junior counsel attended the summons hearing. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to allow the costs for junior counsel ($120), and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 365 of the Bill of Costs.
• Item 366 was billed for $62.50. The Respondent's objection was allowed in full by the Conference Registrar. I accepted that counsel did not need to participate in the telephone conference at the AAT in order to protect the Applicant's rights. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to disallow the attendance of counsel on this occasion, and affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 366 of the Bill of Costs.
  • Item 367 was billed for $375. The Respondent's objection was allowed in full by the Conference Registrar. I decided that, if her solicitors considered representation by counsel of importance, then to deny the Applicant representation by counsel at a conference designed to attempt resolution of the matter would be to deny her proper protection and representation. The fact that the Respondent decided counsel was not to be briefed for the Conciliation Conference was a matter for the Respondent. The costs incurred were proper for the attainment of justice and for maintaining the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly, the correct or preferable decision in relation to Item 367 pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, was to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar, and in substitution, allow the costs of $375.
• Item 368 was billed for $562. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full. I disagreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for both the solicitor and counsel to attend a conference before the Conciliation Conference. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 368 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, $562.
• Item 369 was billed for $62.50. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for the Applicant, the solicitor and counsel to attend a conference after the Conciliation Conference. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 369 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, $62.50.
• Item 370 was billed at $62.50. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for counsel to peruse tax returns and reports at this time. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 370 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, $62.50.
• Item 371 was billed at $125. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection in full. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was necessary for counsel to give advice at this time. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 371 of the Bill of Costs and allow the costs, $125.
• Item 372 was billed at $62.50 for counsel - a telephone conference. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full. The supporting notes were however contradictory in that she wrote "Advice from Counsel during these proceedings was necessary." I noted from my previous decision that I then held the costs of the service in Items 372 (and 369, 370, 372 and 374) were superfluous to the effective carriage of the matter. I accepted that the Conference Registrar had disallowed the item, and agreed that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 372 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, $62.50.
• Item 373 was billed at $125. The Respondent conceded the Item, and in earlier proceedings the Conference Registrar noted that no objection was taken. I accepted the concession and held that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 373 of the Bill of Costs and allow the costs, ($125).
• Item 374 was billed at $62.50. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for counsel to give advice at this time. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 374 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, ($62.50).
• Item 375 was billed at $62.50. The Conference Registrar disallowed the Respondent's objection in full on the basis that counsel's advice was required as the matter was proceeding to hearing within five days. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was necessary for counsel to give advice at this time. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 375 of the Bill of Costs and allow the costs, ($62.50).
• Item 376 was billed at $62.50. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full on the basis that perusal of documents by counsel had previously been billed. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it was unnecessary for counsel to peruse documents at this time. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 376 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, ($62.50).
• Items 377- 379 were billed at $750, $2,000 and $1,000 respectively. The Respondent did not take objection, and the Conference Registrar allowed the Items as claimed. I agreed with the Conference Registrar and found that the Items were necessary in order to protect the rights of the Applicant. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 377 - 379 of the Bill of Costs and allow the costs, being $750, $2,000 and $1,000.
• Items 380 - 382 were billed at $62.50, $187.50 and $125 respectively. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in full on the basis that at the conclusion of the matter, counsel's costs cannot be considered part of the proceedings. I agreed with the Conference Registrar that it could not be considered part of the costs of the proceedings for counsel to peruse documents and give advice after the hearing, rather that it might more realistically be related to any appeal which might flow from the outcome of the matter. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Items 380 - 382 of the Bill of Costs and disallow the costs, $375.

1. I held at paragraph 153 of the previous decision, (Re Keen and Deputy Registrar of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2005] AATA 1171; (2005) 89 ALD 595) which I made in this matter, that:

"As the decision under review in matter N2002/730 was affirmed, and as the Tribunal could not award costs in that matter, there is no bill of costs for me to review. Pursuant to section 67(8) of the Act Ms Keen is not entitled to costs in matter N2002/730. I have no discretion which I can exercise in this matter."

1. When the matter was appealed to the Federal Court, Rares J did not disagree with my decision as to costs incurred in relation to N2002/730, but he held that:

a. the order for costs made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 23 June 2003 only entitles the applicant to recover costs in respect of matter N2001/750.

b. nothing in paragraph (a) prevents the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from determining whether the applicant is entitled to recover the whole or any amount in respect of costs of any Item claimed which was relevant to matter N2001/750, notwithstanding that such Item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730."

1. I have noted from the correspondence between the parties referred to in the Bill of Costs relating to Matter N2002/730, that certain items are not in dispute. Accordingly I have only dealt with the items as disputed in the Joint Statement of the parties in relation to the Bill of Costs to N2002/730.
2. At the Directions Hearing held with the parties on 31 August 2007, Mr Jeffriess argued that Rares J had somehow by his decision in regard to items of costs incurred in N2002/730 which might also be relevant to N2001/750, conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal in N2002/730. Mr Polin disagreed.
3. I am mindful that my power to review items with which the Conference Registrar dealt arises pursuant to section 69A of the AAT Act, and only in relation to items of costs in N2001/750. Where I have held that an item billed in N2002/730 is relevant to N2001/750 in the terms Rares J has set out, and can therefore be allowed, I have deemed it to have been billed as part of the Bill of Costs in N2001/750.
4. I am mindful that where an item has not been previously reviewed by the Conference Registrar, I actually have no power pursuant to section 69A of the AAT Act to review it. However, for practical purposes, I have dealt with such items on the basis that if I had the power, my findings would follow as noted in relation to each of those items.

1. Item 1 was billed at $51 for attendance with Ms Keen to discuss the report of the qualified neurologist and procedures to lodge a new claim for depression.
2. The Respondent objected to the full $51, and submitted that Item 1 duplicated the work claimed at Item 179 of the Bill of Costs in N2001/750. In the alternative, Mr Polin argued the Respondent's Objection 6, that is in relation to costs incurred prior to the reviewable decision, and the principles involved.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that the Item was not a duplication, that the discussion related to both Matters N2001/750 and N2002/730, and referred to paragraphs 10, 11, and 13 - 15 of the Applicant's contentions. I noted that paragraphs 10 and 11 concerned the principles involved regarding costs incurred before the reviewable decision, and that paragraphs 13 - 15 related to separation of costs between the two Matters.
4. The Conference Registrar did not review Item 1, so that I have no power to review Item 1 and make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 1, I would find that both Item 1 of the Bill of Costs in N2002/730 and Item 179 of the Bill of Costs in N2001/750 were said to have been incurred on 1 November 2001. The words used were not identical in both, but both dealt with the upcoming claim for psychiatric injury, subject of N2002/750. The claim at Item 179 of the Bill of Costs in N2001/750 was not argued before me, and I assume it was agreed between the parties. I disallow the bill for $51 in Item 1 in N2002/730 as I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is a duplication of Item 179 of the Bill of Costs in N2001/750.

1. Items 2 & 3 were billed at $27 and $20 respectively for scanning documents related to depression said to have "resumed from her original neck injury" (Item 2), and in relation to the new claim, that is for psychological sequelae of the neck and shoulder injury (Item 3).
2. The Respondent submitted that if the depression was solely consequential upon the physical injury, no separate claim need have been made, and the matter could have been dealt with in N2001/750. He referred to the findings of Rares J in relation to N2002/730.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the original claim lodged in 1991 predated the onset of psychological symptoms and hence required that a new claim be made. He also referred to correspondence which demonstrated, he submitted, that the Respondent refused to consent to the issue of psychological sequelae being dealt with in N2001/750.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection in relation to Item 2 ($27),and did not deal with Item 3. She did so on the basis that the documents predated the determination and reviewable decision in relation to the psychological claim.
5. My decision is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in Item 2 and allow the Respondent's objection. My reasons are that the work predated the determination and reviewable decision, but also that Item 2 was in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was unsuccessful, and was accordingly not able to claim costs. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 2 of the Bill of Costs.
6. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Item 3, so that I have no power to review Item 3 and make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 3, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and not relevant to matter N2001/750, and I would accordingly disallow the claim for costs of $20.

1. Item 19 was billed at $31, and was for perusal of seven folios of correspondence from the Applicant with regard to her examination by a psychiatrist.
2. The Respondent objected to the full amount on the basis that the costs incurred were not necessary or proper, and did not progress the matter.
3. The Applicant argued that the conduct of the doctor during the examination was relevant, and that the Applicant's instructions to her solicitor regarding that conduct was essential to the prosecution of her case.
4. The Conference Registrar dealt with both Items 18 and 19, allowing the Respondent's objection on the basis that perusal of the letter did not progress the matter.
5. My decision is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar, and allow the Respondent's objection, because I find that Item 19 was in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was unsuccessful, and was accordingly not able to claim costs. I find that the cost was not relevant to matter N2001/750. Accordingly the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 19 of the Bill of Costs, albeit for different reasons.

1. The bill for Item 25 was for $15 incurred for perusal of a letter from the solicitor for the Respondent which sought particulars of any prior psychiatric treatment received by Ms Keen.
2. The Respondent objected to the full amount on the basis that the inquiry related solely to N2002/730, the claim for psychiatric injury.
3. The Applicant argued that the separate claim for psychiatric injury, (rather than adding it to N2001/750 as sequelae), was due to the Respondent's insistence on that course being taken, adding that the Respondent could not now, complain about such costs.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Item 25, so that I have no power to review Item 25, and make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 25, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $15.

1. Item 28 was billed at $21 for correspondence with Ms Keen about the letter referred to in Item 25.
2. The Respondent referred to his argument at Item 25, and submitted that this Item also duplicated Item 76 in the Bill of Costs for N2001/750.
3. On checking Item 76 in the Bill of Costs for N2001/750, I found no reference to the subject matter of the correspondence referred to in that Item, and hence did not accept the Respondent's argument on that point.
4. I noted however that Item 28 was not argued before the Conference Registrar, so that I have no power to review Item 28, and make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 28, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $21.

1. Item 30 was billed at $179, being the charge for perusal of the psychiatrist's report, and his examination of the Applicant.
2. The Respondent argued that the charge was excessive, objected to $73 of Item 30, and submitted that 30 minutes to peruse the report as per Item 31 of the Second Schedule was the correct charge.
3. The Applicant argued that the report was 44 folios, and served by the Respondent, and that no adequate reason for arguing the cost was given.
4. The Conference Registrar accepted the Respondent's objections, disallowing $73 on the basis of a half hour attendance pursuant to Item 31 of the Second Schedule.
5. I set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar and refused the whole amount on the basis that the report was solely concerned with N2002/730 where no costs are able to be claimed, and that the report was not relevant to matter N2001/750. The correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act is to set aside the decision of the Conference Registrar in relation to Item 30 of the Bill of Costs, and substitute a decision that no costs are payable for this Item.

1. Items 31 and 32 were billed at $21 for correspondence with Ms Keen, enclosing the report of the psychiatrist, and $10 for photocopying 10 pages of enclosures to the letter.
2. The Respondent argued that it was unnecessary to consult the Applicant regarding service of the letter, and that the sending of the letter did not progress the matter.
3. Mr Jeffriess argued that Ms Keen's views were crucial to the preparation of the case.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Items 31 and 32. Accordingly, I have no power to review Items 31 and 32, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Items 31 and 32, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and were not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $31.

1. Item 36 was billed at $15 for perusal of a letter which provided a response from Ms Keen in regard to particulars of prior psychiatric treatment.
2. The Respondent argued that the objection was as for Item 25 and that the claim duplicated work at Item 84 in N2001/750.
3. The Applicant replied that Items 25 and 28 were separate letters on separate subjects.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Item 36. Accordingly, I have no power to review Item 36, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 36, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and were not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $15.

1. Item 38 was billed at $21 for correspondence with the Respondent's solicitor about the prior psychiatric treatment.
2. The Respondent argued that this cost duplicated Item 87 in N2001/750, and referred to his objection in relation to Item 25.
3. Mr Jeffriess also referred me to Item 25. He argued that the letter was written some eight months after that claimed at Item 87, and was not a duplicate of that letter. He submitted that the letter was relevant to both matters.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Item 38. Accordingly, I have no power to review Item 38, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 38, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and were not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $21.

1. Item 50 was billed at $52, and was for a special letter to the reconsiderations officer requesting reconsideration of the decision, and raising issues in regard to the redundancy.
2. Mr Polin referred to the decision of Rares J in regard to N2002/730, his view that the psychological injury claimed could have been dealt with in N2001/750 rather than in a separate claim, and that in any case if reconsideration was to be requested, Ms Keen could have handled that without assistance of a solicitor.
3. The Applicant referred to Items 2 and 25 and submitted that the new claim was to enable the Tribunal to consider Ms Keen's "psychological sequelae of the physical injuries claimed in N2001/750."
4. The Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objection on the basis that the costs incurred were not costs of the application in N2002/730.
5. I affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar, pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act, albeit for different reasons, and allowed the Respondent's objections, agreeing with him that if reconsideration was to be requested, Ms Keen could have handled that without assistance of a solicitor.

1. Items 51 and 52 were billed at $7 and $15 respectively, and dealt with correspondence from GIO acknowledging receipt of a request for reconsideration of the decision in Matter N2002/730.
2. The Respondent argued as for Item 50, that the psychological injury claimed could have been dealt with in N2001/750 as sequelae.
3. The Applicant referred to Items 2, 25 and 50, submitting that at the relevant time the Respondent denied that it had the power to consider the sequelae as part of the original claim, and that it was for that reason, a separate claim was lodged.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Items 51 & 52. Accordingly, I have no power to review those Items, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Items 51 & 52, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and were not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $22.

1. Item 57 was billed at $52 for a special letter to the AAT informing of the acceptance by the employer of "lump sum compensation arising from the same incident", and requesting review of the determination in T0062051.
2. The Respondent argued the same objection as for Item 50, that is, that the psychological injury claimed could have been dealt with in N2001/750 rather than in a separate claim, and that in any case if reconsideration was to be requested, Ms Keen could have handled that without assistance of a solicitor.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his argument in relation to Items 2, 25 and 50, submitting that at the relevant time the Respondent denied that it had the power to consider the sequelae as part of the original claim, and that it was for that reason, a separate claim was lodged.
4. The Conference Registrar disallowed $31 of the costs on the basis that a special letter was not necessary to file an application at the AAT.
5. I was satisfied that the decision of the Conference Registrar was right, and that a special letter was not required. I disallowed $31, and found that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar.

1. Items 68 and 69 were billed at $15 and $21 respectively, for perusal of the account of the treating psychologist, and a request to the Applicant to pay his account.
2. The Respondent submitted that the costs incurred were unnecessary as the fee had already been paid by the solicitor at Item 53, and further that the matter could have been dealt with at Item 259 in the N2001/750 Bill of Costs.
3. The Applicant rejected the notion of combining matters to put to the Applicant, and argued that it was desirable she be notified as matters arose which concerned her.
4. The Conference Registrar did not deal with Items 68 and 69. Accordingly, I have no power to review those Items, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Items 68 and 69, I am satisfied that the costs were incurred entirely in relation to the psychological claim in which Ms Keen was not successful, and were not relevant to matter N2001/750, and accordingly I would disallow the claim for costs of $36.

1. Items 73 and 74 were billed at $19 and $318 respectively, for perusing section 37 documents.
2. Mr Polin submitted that the Respondent objected to $125, and noted that the section 37 documents were only served because there had been a new claim lodged, i.e. for the N2002/730 matter. He also submitted that sufficient costs had been conceded by the Respondent in N2002/730 for perusal of documents in relation to the depression aspect of the Applicant's claim.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that the issues relating to the expenditure for these Items was squarely within the material found by Rares J to be relevant. He submitted that the documents related to the psychological sequelae of the Applicant's physical injuries and were therefore important to the Tribunal's assessment of Ms Keen's disabilities and fitness for work.
4. The Conference Registrar dealt only with Item 74, allowing the Respondent's objection to $212, and allowing only a 30 minute attendance for scanning section 37 documents. I accepted the decision of the Conference Registrar with regard to Item 74, (taking into account the decision of Rares J) and finding that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to affirm the decision of the Conference Registrar, and allow a 30 minute attendance for scanning the documents.
5. As to Item 73; this was not argued before the Conference Registrar. Accordingly, I have no power to review that Item, and to make a decision pursuant to section 69A of the Act. However, I have considered the costs claimed, and if I am wrong, and I can consider Item 73, I am satisfied that the cost of $19 to peruse the statement was justifiably incurred, and to allow it would be the correct or preferable decision.

1. Items 80 - 85 were billed at $97.50 which concerned activities related to the Bill of Costs in N2002/730. That is the total amount claimed by the Applicant.
2. Mr Polin argued that there was no need for a separate Bill of Costs for N2002/730. In his written Joint Statement, the Respondent objected to $88.50, (now accepted as being incorrect). The actual figure to which the Respondent objects is $75.50 of the total, i.e. Items 80, 81, 83 - 85 in full, and part of Item 82. The Applicant claimed $31 for Item 82, being for attendance to file the Bill of Costs. The Respondent concedes the Applicant is entitled to $22 being the sum allowed in respect of an ordinary letter, and that there should be a reduction of $9 for Item 82.
3. Mr Jeffriess referred to his argument in Items 2, 25 and 50.
4. I noted that the Conference Registrar allowed the Respondent's objections in relation to Items 80 - 85 to the value of $65.50. The Respondent wrote to the Tribunal after the Directions Hearing in this matter dated 31 August 2007 in the following terms: "It appears that there may be a typographical error in the Registrar's decision in regard to items 80-81. The sum of $20.50 has been disallowed. However in view of the respondent's submissions at the taxation which were accepted by the Registrar it would seem that the sum of $25.50 should have in fact been disallowed (being the combined total of $15 plus $10.50).
5. I found that the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act was to vary the decision of the Conference Registrar as follows:

• the Respondent's objections to Items 80 and 81 which amount to $25.50 are upheld on the basis that it was unnecessary to copy the Bill of Costs and DX it. I accept that it is likely the Conference Registrar made a clerical error in putting down $20.50, and I vary her decision.
• In Item 82, I have affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar to allow the Respondent's objection to $9. I accepted that $22 is the appropriate amount for an ordinary letter in connection with the attendance to file the Bill of Costs, certain items of which relate to the issues in N2001/750 as well as N2002/730 (Rares J).
• I agreed with the Conference Registrar's decision in Items 83 and 84 that the Respondent's objection should be allowed, and, allowing $15 for perusing in one, reduced the claim by $15. This is on the basis that certain items relate to the issues in N2001/750 as well as N2002/730, (Rares J).
• Item 85 was billed at $11 for a letter to the Respondent requesting payment of costs. I held that the Conference Registrar's decision to uphold the Respondent's objection to the $11 on the basis that the Respondent pays costs in accordance with the certificate issued by the Tribunal was correct.

1. Item 89 was billed at $395.70 for general care and conduct, with a 25% reduction because the matter was a Comcare matter, and general care and conduct at the rate of 15%.
2. Mr Polin argued that the amount should be reduced to 15% of taxed profit costs excluding GST.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted the amount should be 15% of profit costs.
4. The Conference Registrar found that general care and conduct should be allowed at 15% of the taxed profit costs.
5. I find that the decision of the Conference Registrar is the correct or preferable decision pursuant to section 69A(3) of the Act and affirm her decision, noting that certain Items in the bill of costs in Matter N2002/730 relate to Matter N2001/750.

1. Items 96 and 97 were billed at $312.50 and $312.50 respectively for counsel's perusal of the brief on two consecutive days.
2. Mr Polin conceded one hour should be allowed, that is $280 pursuant to the Second Schedule less GST and 25%. The Respondent objected to $415 in total.
3. Mr Jeffriess submitted that counsel had provided his Memorandum of Costs, and that the Respondent had not suggested a basis on which this should be found to be unreasonable.
4. The Conference Registrar dealt with Items 90 - 96 allowing the Respondent's objection, and disallowing $437.50, stating that sufficient allowance had already been made for attendances on counsel earlier in the Bill of Costs. As to Item 97, the Conference Registrar allowed for perusal of the brief.
5. I agreed that allowance had already been made for attendances on counsel earlier in the Bill of Costs. However, on the basis that Counsel needed to peruse the brief, in as far as it related to N2001/750, I allowed one attendance at $312.50. In that regard I affirmed the decision of the Conference Registrar at Item 97. I also varied the decision of the Conference Registrar, noting that I did not deal with items 90 - 95 because they were not argued before me. They dealt with counsel's activities in regard to advice, telephone calls and perusal of documents.

1. The costs allowed are as stated in the paragraphs above. Any costs which have been allowed from matter N2002/730 are on the basis that Rares J held, and were items claimed which were relevant to matter N2001/750 notwithstanding that such item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730.

"b. nothing in paragraph (a) prevents the Administrative Appeals Tribunal from determining whether the applicant is entitled to recover the whole or any amount in respect of costs of any Item claimed which was relevant to matter N2001/750, notwithstanding that such Item may also have been relevant to matter N2002/730."

1. The issue of GST was dealt with in my earlier decision. I noted the Respondent's submission that in accordance with the judgment of the Federal Court at paragraph 48 the Applicant is not entitled to recover from the Respondent the GST paid in respect of professional costs and counsel's fees.
2. Rares J's stated in relation to GST as follows:

"One possible injustice in this scheme has been shown by the present case. That is where, as here, the party entitled to costs is an individual who does not have the benefit of his or her own input tax credits against which to offset the GST which he or she is liable to pay to their solicitors. A business conducting litigation which recovers costs, will have already had the benefit of being able to net off the payment of GST it was obliged to make to the suppliers of taxable supplies, including solicitors for legal services in connection with the business, against receipts of GST which the business will have obtained from its own supplies of goods or services. Individuals who are not conducting a business will not be able to effect that accounting and taxation consequence and will, to that extent, be worse off when receiving the benefit of an order for costs under the current provisions of the rules. However, that is a matter for the rules committee to address and is not one which the court can recognize in a case like the present.

Accordingly, there was no error in the decision of the Tribunal in this respect."

1. I noted that both parties made submissions about the Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 issue in the Joint Statements, and that there was disagreement there as to the date of the relevant letter. The Applicant submitted that the letter dated 14 July 2004 was not in the correct form to be a Calderbank letter, while the Respondent's view was that the proper Calderbank letter was dated 23 September 2004.
2. I heard oral submissions from both parties with regard to the Calderbank issue on 31 August 2007, and note that the Applicant accepts that the letter of 23 September 2004 satisfies the requirements for Calderbank. I agree with that.
3. I have made decisions on each of the items of costs in dispute between the parties as raised in the Joint Statements, and Annexures to those, and as I told the parties when they appeared before me on 31 August 2007, I refer the matter back to them in order for them to make the calculations, and conclude their discussions. If further submissions need to be made about the Calderbank issue, I am prepared to hear the parties at a time to be arranged.

1. When Mr Jeffriess for the Applicant and Mr Polin for the Respondent appeared before me at a Directions Hearing in this matter on 31 August 2007, they raised the issue of costs of the remittal. Within a few days, both parties made written submissions which follow:

"1. The power to award costs in these proceedings comes not from the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act ('the AAT Act'), but from s. 67 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act ('the SRC Act'), which enlivened the Tribunal's power to award costs in the original 2001 proceedings.

2. Section 69A of the AAT Act covers the taxation of costs, not just cases of this type, but in all cases before the Tribunal.

3. At the taxation of this matter before the Registrar, part of the costs allowed were in relation to the preparation and taxation of the bill of costs. These costs were allowed and indeed the respondent does not seem to suggest that such costs should not be allowed. The costs were allowed as being a reasonable and necessary cost in the original (2001) proceedings, pursuant to s. 67 of the SRC Act.

4. The appeal from the Registrar's decision is as much a part of the costs of the original proceedings as was the taxation before the Registrar. That is, they are a necessary part of the 2001 proceedings and are payable as part of those proceedings.

5. This analysis is further strengthened by looking at s 69A(1) of the AAT Act. This allows the Tribunal itself to tax costs (s 69A(1)(c)). Clearly, the applicant would be entitled to costs if this procedure were undertaken by the Tribunal. That the Tribunal, procedurally, chose to have the original taxation undertaken by a Registrar is irrelevant. If the applicant would be entitled to costs of the taxation before the Tribunal at first instance, there is no reason why she should not be entitled to those costs on an appeal pursuant to the same section.

6. The fact that the appeal from the Registrar's decision was given a new proceedings number by the Registry of the Tribunal is a matter of the Tribunal's procedure only and does not change the character of the proceedings. Thus this fact does not disturb the applicant's entitlement to costs of the appeal as part of the original proceedings.

"1. The proceedings currently before the Tribunal (N2005/293) are separate and different to the previous proceedings between the parties which were before the Tribunal.

2. The proceedings currently before the Tribunal are not a review of a decision by the respondent under the provisions of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988.

3. The current proceedings by the applicant seek a review of a decision of a Taxing Registrar of the Tribunal.

4. The Tribunal's power in these proceedings to review the decision comes from section 69A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (AAT Act).

5. Section 69(2) (sic) of the AAT Act provides:

the Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy Registrar has taxed under paragraph (1)(d) the amount to be paid to a party to a proceeding by another party to the proceeding, either of those parties may apply to the Tribunal for review of the amount so taxed.

6. There is simply no provision in the AAT Act to award costs of those proceedings brought pursuant to the AAT Act.

7. This of course is a submission that should not take the applicant by surprise. At the initial telephone conference between the parties and Registrar Shepherd of the Tribunal on 12 May 2005, the Registrar raised the fact that the proceedings were brought pursuant to s69A of the AAT Act and indicated his opinion that the applicant would not be entitled to costs of the application even if successful.

1. The term costs describes the remuneration and expenses incurred in relation to legal work. Costs on a party/party basis are such costs as are necessary and proper for the attainment of justice, or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed, in this case Ms Keen. Costs on a party/party basis do not entitle the successful party to a complete indemnity for his or her costs. The costs are those that are necessary to enable the successful party to conduct the litigation, and no more. It is also said that the successful party should have his or her full costs, but not luxuries. (W. & A. Gilbey Ltd v Continental Liqueurs Pty Limited (1963) 81 WN (Pt.1) (NSW) 1 and Peel v London and North Western Railway Company (No. 2) (1907) 1 Ch D 607). I am mindful also from Comcare v Labathas [1995] FCA 1702; (1995) 61 FCR 149 that the "overriding principle is that the expenses must have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for maintaining or defending the rights of the claimant."
2. I note that there was a discretion to award costs to Ms Keen pursuant to section 67(8) of the Safety Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 because she was successful in one of the appeals (N2001/750), she made to the Tribunal against the decisions of Comcare, and that the Tribunal exercised that discretion. When the parties could not agree on costs, Ms Keen produced three bills for costs before a Conference Registrar. The third, characterised by the Conference Registrar as the "Third Bill claiming costs incurred on day of taxation 29.10.04" was not argued before me either on the previous occasion, or on this occasion.
3. In coming to a decision whether costs of this remittal can be awarded, I have taken into account the submissions of the parties, the legislation and case law. I am mindful there was a Calderbank offer made on 23 September 2004.
4. I am mindful also that the appeal against the costs decision of the Conference Registrar must be considered pursuant to section 69A of the Act which follows:

(a) the Tribunal has, under this Act or any other Act, ordered a party to a proceeding to pay to another party to the proceeding reasonable costs incurred by the other party; and

(b) the parties are unable to agree as to the amount of those costs;

the President may give such directions as he or she thinks appropriate for the costs:

(d) to be taxed by the Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy Registrar.

(2) If the Registrar, a District Registrar or a Deputy Registrar has taxed under paragraph (1)(d) the amount to be paid to a party to a proceeding by another party to the proceeding, either of those parties may apply to the Tribunal for review of the amount so taxed.

(3) If such an application is made, the Tribunal must review the amount taxed and may:

(b) set aside the amount and substitute another amount; or

(c) set aside the amount and remit the matter to the Registrar, District Registrar or Deputy Registrar, as the case may be, to be taxed in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal.

(4) An amount that a party to a proceeding is required under an order made by the Tribunal to pay to another party to the proceeding is recoverable by the other party as a debt due to the other party by the first-mentioned party."

1. I have noted that there is nothing in section 69A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, or any other section of that Act, or the Regulations referable to costs, and particularly in this case, costs on costs. In the absence of specific legislative provision or regulation relating to costs, the Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to award costs of this remittal, and I would dismiss the application for costs to be awarded.
2. However, if I am wrong, in that determination, it is apparent from the hearings and the submissions made by counsel, and the material tendered that many of the items comprised in the costs assessment were the subject of dispute. Findings have been made in favour of the Applicant in some, and in favour of the Respondent in others. Costs are always a discretionary remedy. I noted Senior Member Allen stated in Hronopoulos v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2002] AATA 625 [13] after having referred to Calderbank offers, and a number of cases:

"... therefore the Tribunal should approach the question of costs without any presumption as to beneficial legislation or that an Applicant by the mere fact of having a reviewable decision varied or set aside is entitled to full or indeed any costs. There is nothing new in the concept that for good and sufficient reasons a successful litigant can be deprived of his or her costs."

1. In light of the above, I would not exercise the discretion to make an order in favour of one party or the other referable to costs of this appeal. I dismiss the application for costs of this remittal to be awarded.

1. I direct that the costs payable to the Applicant are those as discussed in the paragraphs above. I refer the matter back to the parties in order for them to make the arithmetic calculations, and conclude their discussions.
2. If further submissions need to be made about the Calderbank issue, I am prepared to hear the parties at a time to be arranged.

I certify that the 607 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Ms G Ettinger, Senior Member

Signed: .....................................................................................

Date of Hearing Submissions in Writing, May 2007; Directions Hearing 31 August 2007