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[2026] QCA 17
respondent. Appeal dismissed. Appeal No 5292 of 2025 was ordered to be marked Registry Only, unavailable for public search except by further order, and the parties’ names were not to appear on the Court...
The Court of Appeal dismissed the challenge to a short temporary restraint on treatment under a mental health treatment authority. The order had expired, and the broader declaration sought would not change how the authority operated. The Court also found that the appellant had not raised a serious challenge to the statutory treatment-authority criteria, and that the primary judge could take account of the Mental Health Court’s appeal and stay powers. The Court did not decide whether the Supreme Court has inherent power to grant an injunction in this setting.
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2,122 words · generated 08/10/2026
In VQ v The State of Queensland [2026] QCA 17, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered an appeal arising from an urgent application to restrain treatment being provided under a treatment authority made under the (Qld) (the Act).
1 cited instrument linked from this judgment.
The treatment authority was made on 22 September 2025 by two psychiatrists, the third and fourth respondents. The Mental Health Review Tribunal confirmed it on 17 October 2025 ([3]). On 21 October, VQ sought an urgent Supreme Court hearing for an injunction restraining treatment ([4]). The urgency included the fact that a second dose of medication was due on 28 October ([4]).
The primary judge heard the application on 27 and 28 October. The material included the treatment authority, material before the Tribunal, a clinical report, and medical opinions supporting the treatment-authority criteria. The fourth respondent gave evidence and was cross-examined ([5]). The primary judge assumed the Supreme Court had inherent jurisdiction to grant an injunction, but declined to grant the broader relief sought, having regard to remedies available under the Act ([6]–[8]).
The primary judge made a temporary order restraining treatment under the amended treatment authority until 12 noon on 29 October. Its stated purpose was to give VQ time to apply to the Mental Health Court and seek urgent relief there ([2], [8]). VQ appealed, arguing that the primary judge should have granted a broader injunction pending a challenge to the validity of the Act, particularly s 49, and to the practitioners’ actions ([9]).
Brown JA gave the reasons for the Court. Mullins P and Wilson J agreed ([1], [19]–[20]). The appeal was dismissed. The Court also continued orders restricting public access to the file and publication of the parties’ names on the Court website ([17]–[21]).
The Court gave several reasons, with the first being sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It said the declaration VQ sought was “inutile” because the challenged temporary order had already expired and a declaration would not affect administration of the treatment authority ([11]). The point was about the practical effect of the relief sought: the appeal could not usefully change the expired order or the ongoing operation of the authority.
The Court then addressed other grounds. It observed that VQ had not identified a serious question to be tried about the validity of s 49 ([13]). The reasons connect that conclusion to the statutory scheme and the case presented. Section 12 of the Act was described as including criteria that a person have a mental illness and lack capacity to consent to treatment for it. The Court said VQ did not challenge that the criteria were satisfied in his case, particularly the finding that he lacked capacity to consent. It also noted that medical evidence showed the authorised practitioners and Tribunal were satisfied that criterion was met ([13]).
The Court referred to ss 18 and 53. Section 18 provides, as described in the judgment, that a treatment authority is lawful authority to provide treatment and care to a person with a mental illness who lacks capacity to consent to treatment. Section 53 provides that the authorised doctor decides the nature and extent of the treatment and care under the authority ([14]). The Court used this statutory context to explain why a challenge to s 49, framed as authorising treatment without consent, did not disclose a serious question on the arguments advanced.
A further reason concerned the primary judge’s discretion. The Court said the primary judge had not ruled that the Supreme Court lacked inherent jurisdiction. Rather, she accepted the assumed power but decided not to continue the broader injunction because of the alternative processes under the Act ([15]). The Mental Health Court could hear an appeal by way of rehearing and had power to stay a Tribunal decision concerning a treatment authority. Those powers were relevant to the balance of convenience in deciding whether to grant an injunction ([15]).
Finally, the Court rejected the complaint that the short temporary order was ineffective. Its duration was explained by its purpose: giving VQ an opportunity to apply to the Mental Health Court for an urgent stay. The primary judge also considered the fourth respondent’s evidence about risks of delaying treatment and the manufacturer’s clinical recommendation ([16]). The Court concluded that the order was not “nugatory and of no legal effect” ([16]).
The judgment does not set out a comprehensive account of the law before this decision, and it does not cite earlier cases. Its legal discussion is centred on the provisions of the Act and the discretionary decision in this particular appeal. Accordingly, the reasons should not be read as establishing a general rule about all treatment authorities or all injunction applications.
The statutory position described in the judgment is that a treatment authority is made under a scheme with specified criteria, including mental illness and lack of capacity to consent to treatment ([13]). Section 18 is described as making the authority a lawful basis to provide treatment and care, and s 53 as assigning the authorised doctor responsibility for deciding the nature and extent of treatment and care ([14]). The Act also provides an avenue to the Mental Health Court, which can hear an appeal by way of rehearing and can stay a Tribunal decision concerning a treatment authority ([15]).
The Court’s decision applies those features in assessing the appeal. It holds that the statutory appeal and stay pathway was relevant to the primary judge’s consideration of the balance of convenience, and that no error was shown in declining to continue the injunction ([15], [17]). It also rejects the argument that the short order was legally ineffective in the circumstances ([16]).
Importantly, the Court expressly left open whether the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining treatment under a treatment authority. It noted “compelling arguments” that the extensive statutory provisions may mean that jurisdiction is unavailable, but said that question was not to be determined in the appeal ([12]). The Court proceeded on the assumption that the power remained available, then dismissed the appeal on other grounds ([12]). Thus, the judgment does not resolve the boundary between the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction and the statutory scheme.
Nor does the judgment determine the validity of s 49 generally. It says VQ did not identify a serious question to be tried on the challenge advanced, in light of the treatment-authority scheme and the absence of a challenge to the criteria being met in his case ([13]–[14]). That is a case-specific explanation of why the argument failed in this appeal, not a final ruling on every possible constitutional or statutory challenge to s 49.
At [11], Brown JA said the declaration was “inutile” because the temporary order had expired and the declaration would not affect the treatment authority. In plain English, the Court considered that the requested declaration would not produce a practical change in the situation before it. This was the basis on which the appeal could be dismissed without deciding every other argument.
At [12], the Court identified “compelling arguments” that the Supreme Court might lack inherent jurisdiction to grant this form of injunction, given the Act’s extensive provisions. It immediately qualified that observation: the jurisdiction question was not being decided. In plain English, the Court flagged a significant unresolved issue but did not make a binding determination of it in this appeal.
At [13], the Court said VQ had not challenged that the treatment-authority criteria were met, including the finding that he lacked capacity to consent. It noted that medical evidence supported the practitioners’ and Tribunal’s assessment. In plain English, the challenge to the statutory power was considered against the fact that the factual basis for the treatment authority had not itself been disputed in the way described by the Court.
At [15], the Court said the Mental Health Court appeal and rehearing pathway was “plainly relevant” to the balance of convenience. In plain English, the existence of another court with power to reconsider the Tribunal decision and stay it mattered when the primary judge decided whether a Supreme Court injunction should continue.
At [16], the Court said the temporary order was “not nugatory and of no legal effect.” It had a limited but practical purpose: allowing an urgent application to the Mental Health Court before treatment resumed. The Court also recorded that the primary judge considered evidence about the risks of delay.
The decision is most directly relevant to a fact pattern involving a person subject to a treatment authority under the Queensland Act, an urgent Supreme Court application to restrain treatment under that authority, and an available statutory appeal or stay process in the Mental Health Court. The judgment’s reasoning also bears on an appeal directed at a temporary order that has expired, where the appellant seeks a declaration that would not change the authority’s operation ([11], [15]–[16]).
The statutory-context reasoning is especially tied to a case where the treatment-authority criteria, including lack of capacity to consent, are not challenged, and medical evidence supports the relevant findings ([13]). The Court’s conclusion that no serious question had been identified was made in that context. It should not automatically be extended to a different case where the criteria, evidence, statutory provisions, or grounds of challenge differ.
The decision also provides an example of a court considering a short interim restraint for the limited purpose of allowing recourse to another statutory forum. The Court treated the order’s practical purpose and the evidence about treatment-delay risks as relevant to whether the order was effective and appropriate ([8], [16]).
It does not decide a case in which the Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction is squarely contested and must be determined. The Court explicitly reserved that question ([12]). It also does not determine the validity of s 49 in a proceeding that fully argues that issue; the Court’s observation was that VQ had not identified a serious question on the arguments and facts before it ([13]).
The supplied judgment contains no discussion of later decisions, and no later judicial treatment can be established from the text provided. It also contains no citations to earlier cases or authorities, so there are no precedent relationships to extract from the judgment itself.
The Court’s reasons may be relevant to later cases involving the statutory appeal route, the balance of convenience in injunction applications, or the practical utility of declaratory relief after an interim order expires. But the judgment alone does not establish how subsequent courts have applied, followed, distinguished, or limited its reasoning. Any account of later treatment would require later judgments or other legal sources, which are not included here.
For precedent analysis, it is particularly important not to treat the Court’s observation about possible limits on inherent jurisdiction as a decided rule. The Court expressly said that issue was not for determination ([12]). Later courts considering it would need to address the question directly on the arguments and statutory materials before them.
The central open question expressly identified by the Court is whether the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining a medical practitioner from providing treatment under a treatment authority. The Court noted arguments against such jurisdiction because of the Act’s extensive provisions, but did not decide them ([12]).
A second question concerns how the statutory appeal and stay powers of the Mental Health Court interact with applications for urgent relief in the Supreme Court. This judgment says the available statutory process was relevant to the balance of convenience and supported the primary judge’s discretionary decision on the facts before her ([15]). It does not provide a complete test for how that relevance should be assessed in different circumstances.
A third question is how a challenge to the validity of s 49 might be assessed where the applicant does identify a serious question, or where the treatment-authority criteria are disputed. The Court’s reasoning at [13]–[14] relied on the absence of a challenge to the criteria being met in VQ’s case. It did not resolve other possible grounds or a differently framed challenge.
Finally, the judgment does not establish a general rule about when a short-lived interim order is adequate or when a declaration remains useful after an order expires. Its conclusion depended on the stated purpose of the restraint and the fact that the declaration sought would not affect the treatment authority ([11], [16]).
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on or relying on this analysis, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: Queensland Judgments (Supreme Court Library Queensland) (www.queenslandjudgments.com.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
[2026] QCA 17
COURT OF APPEAL
MULLINS P / BROWN JA / WILSON J
Appeal No 5292 of 2025 / SC No 4790 of 2025
VQ Appellant
v
THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND First Respondent
MENTAL HEALTH REVIEW TRIBUNAL Second Respondent
YING MIN TEOH Third Respondent
SUJEE HEWAMADDUMA Fourth Respondent
BRISBANE
FRIDAY, 13 FEBRUARY 2026
JUDGMENT
BROWN JA: On 27 October 2025, the Supreme Court heard an application brought by the appellant for an urgent injunction to restrain medical practitioners from giving treatment to him under a treatment authority. The appellant seeks to appeal orders made following that application.
The orders the subject of the appeal were made on 28 October 2025 by a trial judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The order which is the particular subject of complaint by the appellant is the order that “The treating medical practitioners of [the appellant] be restrained from proceeding with the treatment under Amended Treatment Authority dated 27 October 2025 until 12 noon on Wednesday 29 October 2025.” The appellant complains that the order was too short to be of any legal effect.
The appellant was made subject to a treatment authority under the Mental Health Act on 22 September 2025 by the third and fourth respondents, who are psychiatrists. That treatment authority was confirmed by the Mental Health Review Tribunal on 17 October 2025 following a review hearing.
On 21 October 2025 the appellant sought an urgent hearing in the Supreme Court for an injunction to restrain his treatment. That application was heard by the primary judge on 27 and 28 October 2025. A second dose of the medication that the medical team had determined he should be given as part of his treatment for the medical illness was due to be administered on 28 October 2025.
The material placed before the primary judge included the relevant treatment authority and material provided to the Mental Health Review Tribunal. That included a clinical report as to the appellant’s condition and medical opinions supporting the criteria of the treatment authority. The primary judge heard evidence from the fourth respondent, a psychiatrist, who was also cross-examined by the appellant.
The decision of the primary judge assumed that the Supreme Court had the inherent jurisdiction to grant an injunction.
However, the primary judge determined in the exercise of her discretion not to grant the injunction sought by the appellant, particularly having regard to the fact that there is an adequate and an appropriate remedy under the Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld) for the appellant to appeal the decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in respect of the treatment authority. The powers of the Mental Health Court included the power to stay the treatment authority pending the review. The primary judge gave a temporary restraining order to enable the appellant to make an application to the Mental Health Court before receiving his next dose of medication.
The primary judge noted that the appellant had indicated he would make a prompt application to the Mental Health Court in light of the vacation of the order made on 27 October 2025. The appellant applied for an order restraining the medical practitioners providing treatment under the treatment authority pending the lodging of that appeal to the Mental Health Court. Her Honour determined to stay the treatment under the amended treatment authority until 12 noon the following day to permit the appellant to make an appeal to the Mental Health Court and make any urgent application to them if he considered it appropriate.
The appellant contends that her Honour should have exercised the original jurisdiction of the court to grant an injunction pending the determination of his challenge to the validity of the Mental Health Act and actions of the medical practitioners. He further contends that the consideration of the primary judge that the proper jurisdiction to resolve the issue by appeal of the decision of the Mental Health Tribunal was the Mental Health Court was not relevant to the granting of injunctive relief in the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. He seeks to have this Court make a declaration that the primary judge should have granted an urgent injunction restraining all persons from administering any medical treatment to the appellant until the validity of the Mental Health Act, particularly s 49, was decided.
The four respondents to the appellant’s application have provided detailed submissions in response.
There are numerous problems with the appellant’s argument, including that the declaration sought by the appellant is inutile given that the primary judge’s order ceased to have effect after 29 October 2025 and that the making of the declaration sought would be inutile, as it would not affect the administering of the treatment authority relating to the appellant. The appeal should be dismissed on this basis alone.
There are compelling arguments suggesting the Supreme Court lacks the inherent jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief restraining a medical practitioner from providing treatment under a treatment authority given the extensive provisions of the Mental Health Act governing treatment authorities. That is not a matter to be determined in this appeal. Even if one accepts for the purpose of this appeal that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court remains to grant such an injunction, the appellant’s appeal must fail for a number of reasons.
First, the appellant did not identify any serious question to be tried as to the validity of s 49 of the Mental Health Act authorising a health practitioner to make a treatment authority absent consent. Such a notion is contrary to the nature of the treatment authority provided for under the Mental Health Act. One of the criteria for a treatment authority contained in s 12 of the Mental Health Act includes that a person has a mental illness and does not have the capacity to consent to be treated for a mental illness. The appellant did not challenge that the criteria for the making of the treatment authority in his case was satisfied. In particular, he did not challenge the determination that he lacked the capacity to consent to be treated. There was medical evidence before the Court demonstrating that the authorised practitioners and the Mental Health Review Tribunal were satisfied that criterion had been met.
Section 18 of the Mental Health Act provides that a treatment authority is a lawful authority to provide treatment and care to a person who has a mental illness who does not have capacity to consent to be treated. Section 53 of the Act provides that the authorised doctor must decide the nature and extent of the treatment and care to be provided to the person under the treatment authority.
Secondly, the primary judge did not find that the Supreme Court had no inherent jurisdiction to grant an interim injunction, notwithstanding the jurisdiction of the Mental Health Court under the Mental Health Act. Her Honour accepted that the court had such an inherent power but was not satisfied that it should be exercised. She however determined in the exercise of her discretion, that on balance, that given the alternative remedies that were available to the appellant by using the procedures and processes provided for in the Mental Health Act, it was not appropriate to continue the injunction which she had put place on 27 October 2025. Her Honour observed that in fact the appellant was principally seeking to challenge the treatment authority and the treatment being given and that the Mental Health Court was the appropriate jurisdiction to address that complaint. It could review the decision on appeal and was empowered to stay a decision of the Mental Health Review Tribunal in respect of a treatment authority. The fact that the appellant had an avenue of appeal to the Mental Health Court who could hear the matter by way of a rehearing was plainly relevant, given the powers the court possesses to deal with treatment authorities, in considering the balance of convenience for the granting of an injunction. That decision was clearly open and no error in the exercise of discretion has been demonstrated.
Thirdly, the appellant’s complaint that the primary judge erred in providing for an injunction for a short period is again misconceived. The primary judge was not persuaded to grant the injunction sought by the appellant. The short period of time of the restraining order made on 28 October was explained by her Honour to be in the context of the appellant representing that he would make an application to the Mental Health Court and then to allow the appellant to seek an urgent stay of the treatment authority pending a lodgement of that appeal. In making that determination the primary judge also had regard to the fourth respondent’s evidence as to the risks of delaying treatment and the clinical recommendation of the manufacturer. The order was not nugatory and of no legal effect.
No error has been shown in the exercise of the primary judge’s discretion in making the orders of 28 October 2025. The appeal should be dismissed. Given the subject matter the orders maintaining confidentiality of the file should be continued.
The orders of the Court should be:
1.Appeal dismissed;
2.Appeal No. 5292 of 2025 be marked ‘Registry Only’ and not available for public search except by further order of the Court and the parties’ names not appear on the Court website.
MULLINS P: I agree.
WILSON J: I agree with the reasons of Brown JA and the orders proposed.
MULLINS P: The orders of the Court are:
1.Appeal dismissed;
2.Appeal No 5292 of 2025 be marked ‘Registry only’ and not available for public search except by further order of the Court and the parties’ names not appear on the Court website.
VQ
The State of Queensland [2026] QCA 17
Appeal dismissed. Appeal No 5292 of 2025 was ordered to be marked Registry Only, unavailable for public search except by further order, and the parties’ names were not to appear on the Court website ([18], [21]).