Voysey v Chief Superintendent Glen Horton [2025] QCAT 424 | Case summary

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal|2025-10-28

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld)

[1] On 12 July 2021 the applicant filed an application to review the respondent's decision that he had engaged in misconduct, as defined in the Police Service Administration Act 1990 ("PSA Act), in the manner in which he had investigated and finalised information received from a female child's school about a sexual incident. As a consequence of the finding of misconduct by the respondent, a sanction was imposed that he be demoted from Senior Constable 2.10 to Constable 1.6 for three months, suspended after six weeks, subject to no further grounds for discipline being committed for a period of 12 months from the date of the sanction.

(a) The investigation was in relation to a possible serious offence involving a child;

(b) The breach of the QPS policy and the Child Protection Act 1999 when the applicant failed to interview the child at school;

(c) Discussing the matter with the child's mother before discussing it with the child, and in the absence of another officer;

(d) Finalising the investigation without OIC approval, which could have potentially compromised the integrity of any further investigation;

(e) Failing to comply with QPS policy which requires all officers to ensure investigations are finalised only with OIC approval;

(f) The applicants failure to comply with legislation and policy may have created harm to the child, presumably if further evidence came to hand, and also the reputation of the QPS.

[7] Although s 7.4 of the PSA Act identifies various grounds for taking disciplinary action, the respondent submits that when read with the explanatory notes to the Police Service Administration (Discipline Reform) and other Legislation Amendment Bill 2019, it is the conduct rather than its categorisation that has to be considered. The explanatory note sets out the purpose of s 7.4 as follows:

The Bill removes the artificial distinctions of misconduct and breach of discipline and replaces these categories with the term a ground for disciplinary action. A ground for disciplinary action will encompass the behaviours that are currently listed in s. 9 - Grounds for Disciplinary Action of the Discipline Regulation and incorporates the definition of breach of discipline. The removal of the separate and distinct discipline categories of breach of discipline and misconduct will assist in simplifying the police discipline system, as the ability to review a decision for the sanction imposed for improper conduct will not be dependent upon the categorisation of behaviour. If an officer is found to have committed the alleged behaviour, a sanction will be imposed that is commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation, regardless of whether it would have been previously classified as a breach of discipline or misconduct

[8] On this basis the respondent submits that the sanction imposed reflects the applicant's improper conduct irrespective of its categorisation, be it "misconduct" or "careless, incompetent and inefficient" conduct. That is because all of the circumstances of the conduct were considered in coming to the sanction imposed, and it was appropriate in the circumstances.
[9] If it was just the conduct that determined the sanction, the question is then raised as to why the need to categorise the various grounds of conduct. Obviously, by its very description, any conduct that would constitute "misconduct" would be more serious than the lesser ground of being careless, incompetent or inefficient. By way of example misconduct, if seriousness enough, may warrant dismissal. Whereas no matter how serious the lesser ground, it would not warrant dismissal. There are probably other examples where the conduct is borderline in terms of categorisation, and the sanction imposed could easily be appropriate for both misconduct and the lesser conduct in the circumstances.
[10] Here the respondent sanctioned the applicant on the basis that he engaged in misconduct. That is reflected in what is particularised in [6] above. Whereas the Tribunal found that the same conduct fell within the lesser category. The conduct did not change and therefore, the sanction imposed must be appropriate for the lesser conduct. However, it is not for this Tribunal to simply impose its own views about sanction. It remains for the applicant to demonstrate error in the imposition the sanction imposed, now for the lesser category. In the words of Judicial Member McGill in Heuston v Horton[2] it is "necessary for the applicant to show some legal, factual or discretionary error before the reviewing Tribunal could interfere."
[11] The sanction imposed for the conduct was demotion from Senior Constable 2.10 to Constable 1.6 for short period then three months and then suspended after six (6) weeks. Such a sanction could fall within the "borderline" cases referred to above.
[12] Having regard to the range of sanctions that might be imposed under s 7.34 of the PSA Act, going from reprimand to demotion and dismissal, the applicant has not provided any cogent reason, by way of evidence or submission, why this sanction is inappropriate or manifestly excessive. I have not been provided with any comparative cases. The purpose of the sanction is to deter, both the applicant and other officers from engaging in similar conduct. Or, generally disregarding protocols and procedures in place under the Operation Procedure Manual.
[13] Unless there is some basis to challenge the sanction imposed, other than just the categorisation of ground of sanction, it remains relevant to have regard to what was said in Alridge v Ross, that it is appropriate that the Tribunal give "considerable weight to the view of the original decision-maker who might be thought to have particular expertise in the managerial requirements of the police force"[3].
[14] The sanction imposed, although for misconduct, is not so severe to fall within the manifestly excessive category. The reasons given by the Chief Superintendent considered all necessary matters, including the applicant's submissions in coming to his decision. The effect of the sanction is, in essence, that the applicant has lost the differential in income in rank for a period of six weeks. Therefore, I cannot see any basis upon which the Tribunal can interfere with the sanction.
[15] The order of the Tribunal will be that the decision of the respondent, insofar as it relates to sanction, is confirmed.

[1] Respondent's submissions 16 June 2025 [11]

Heuston v Horton [2024] QCAT 432

Voysey v Chief Superintendent Glen Horton

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Source

Judgment (9 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (1)

Cases Cited (1)