Vok v NSW Land and Housing Corporation

Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165

Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 1

Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734

Bush v Menzies [2024] NSWCATCD 43

Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17

Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5

Department of Housing v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal and Anor [2003] NSWSC 150

Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JS [2025] NSWSC 1172

Donohoe v Alburario [2025] NSWSC 9

El-Mohammed v Lin [2024] NSWCATAP 139

Harris v Commissioner for Social Housing; Towney-Kilbey v Commissioner for Social Housing; Sullivan v Commissioner for Social Housing [2013] ACTSC 186

Hawkesbury Nominees Pty Ltd v Battik Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 185

Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1

Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd t/as Home Owners Warranty (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32

Makowska v St Geoge Community Housing Ltd [2020] NSWCATAP 159

Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 198

Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2021] NSWSC 287

McC v Director of Housing (Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 2748

McNeill v Clarence Valley Council [2025] NSWCATAP 184

Meyers v Commissioner for Social Housing [2019] ACTCA 19

Mr S v Director of Housing (Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 2615

Orr v Cobar Management Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCCA 220

Parrott v NSW Land and Housing Corporation (Social Housing) [2010] NSWCTTT 254

Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57

Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33

Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39

Tanner v NSW Land and Housing Corp [2023] NSWCATCD 24

TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Baker [2023] NSWCATAP 178

Unique Commercial Property Group Limited v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204

1. This is an internal appeal under s 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) from a decision of the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal dated 29 August 2025 to dismiss a claim by a social housing tenant for compensation under the Residential Tenancies Act 2010 (NSW) (RT Act) for breach of quiet enjoyment.
2. The appellant is an 82-year-old longstanding social housing tenant. He resides in a block of units operated by the respondent (landlord). His neighbours are also tenants of the landlord.
3. Living directly below his unit is a person whom the tenant alleges makes loud noise, including playing music and singing.
4. In this decision, any reference to "the tenant" is a reference to the appellant; and any reference to "the landlord" is a reference to the respondent.
5. The tenant has complained to the landlord about the alleged behaviour of his neighbour in the past and has previously taken Tribunal proceedings.
6. In 2021, the Tribunal (Member Rose) made orders that the landlord take all reasonable steps to ensure the neighbour not interfere with the tenant's quiet enjoyment but otherwise dismissed the tenant's application.
7. On 2 October 2024, the tenant commenced fresh Tribunal proceedings seeking compensation due to the neighbour's alleged conduct which constituted a breach of quiet enjoyment. The tenant alleged the landlord had failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the neighbour from engaging in such conduct.
8. The Tribunal (Member Hunt) heard the tenant's application on 13 August 2025.
9. On 29 August 2025, the Tribunal published to the parties written reasons dismissing the tenant's application.

1. The Tribunal's reasons are summarised as follows:
2. The tenant had given evidence that the conduct of the neighbour making excessive noise which involved singing and playing loud music; interrupted his sleep during the day; caused him not to be able to watch television; and caused the table in his unit to vibrate. According to the tenant, police had been called on various occasions. The issue had been ongoing for over 5 years, and the landlord had not taken all reasonable steps to stop the neighbour from engaging in such conduct.
3. The tenant asserted he had sent "many emails" to the landlord, but they were not included in the documentary evidence submitted to the Tribunal. They were included in his previous Tribunal proceedings in 2021. He had not kept a diary or record of noise disturbances. The tenant had provided an email from another neighbour complaining to the landlord about the same conduct. According to the tenant, the only measures taken by the landlord involved sending the neighbour warning letters. The landlord had not compelled the neighbour to enter into an acceptable behaviour agreement or sought to terminate his tenancy.
4. The landlord's evidence was that there had been no complaints by the tenant to the landlord about the disturbances between 2021 and August 2024. The tenant sent an email on 12 August 2024 complaining of the noise made by the neighbour, but it was not specific. The landlord had not been informed of any police attendances.
5. According to the landlord, on 23 September 2024 the landlord issued the neighbour with an "Anti-Social Behaviour Warning Notice" stating that if there were any further incidents of anti-social behaviour the landlord may issue a "strike notice" against the neighbour.
6. In February 2025, the landlord had issued a further "Anti-Social Behaviour Warning Notice" on the neighbour based on the complaint of another person.
7. The landlord further investigated and determined to issue a "strike notice" against the neighbour on 5 July 2025.
8. The landlord's actions were consistent with its Anti-Social Behaviour Policy that applied to all of its tenants. The landlord had informed Mr Vok that to take further action it required details of specific incidents and more evidence of the alleged conduct.
9. The complaints received by the landlord about Mr Vok's neighbour involved conduct during the day, not at night.
10. The Tribunal found that the tenant had filed the application on 2 October 2024, and unless an extension of time was granted under s 41 of the NCAT Act, the relevant time period to commence Tribunal proceedings to seek compensation or damages under ss 187 and 190 of the RT Act was 3 months from the date of breach under Reg 39(9) of the Residential Tenancies Regulation 2019 (NSW).
11. The Tribunal was not satisfied that, even if loss of quiet enjoyment was established, the landlord had failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop the conduct of the neighbour under s 50(3) of the RT Act. The Tribunal referred to Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 198 that what needs to be considered is whether the landlord's response to a complaint was "timely and proportionate in all the circumstances", which is dependent upon the particular factual circumstances.
12. The Tribunal found at that although it accepted the tenant finds it difficult to live near the neighbour, the tenant had failed to provide sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to be satisfied that the landlord had intentionally or negligently failed to prevent the neighbour from interfering with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises.
13. The Tribunal found at [41]-[42] that, in any event, the tenant had failed to establish the landlord had failed to take all reasonable steps to restrain or prevent the conduct of the neighbour and the landlord's response was reasonable. The Tribunal accepted that the landlord had not followed its policy by not issuing a second "strike notice" to the neighbour in February 2025 rather than a "warning notice" but that was immaterial to the outcome.
14. The Tribunal rejected the argument of the tenant that the landlord should have made an application to the Tribunal for orders against the neighbour; or imposed an acceptable behaviour agreement, because the tenant had provided to the landlord "limited objective evidence" and "few specific complaints."

1. The tenant filed a Notice to Appeal on 8 September 2025. The appeal has been brought within the applicable time period under Reg 25(4)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW).
2. The grounds of appeal identify errors on a question of law by reason of:

(1) Identifying a wrong issue.

(2) Asking a wrong question.

(3) Ignoring relevant material;

(4) Making a decision without evidence.

1. The Notice of Appeal states that the tenant is not seeking leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act and Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 of the NCAT Act.
2. However, the Appeal Panel regards it as appropriate to refer to the principles for leave to appeal in this decision, as the appellant is an older person who is a social housing tenant. For such an appellant, distinguishing between an error on a question of law, and grounds that require leave to appeal, is not a straightforward task.
3. The tenant lodged and served a large number of documents and submissions with the Notice of Appeal.
4. The landlord lodged and served a Reply to Appeal on 24 September 2025. The landlord lodged and served its documents and submissions in the appeal on 24 October 2025.
5. The tenant lodged and served reply submissions on 6 November 2025.
6. Both parties were ready to proceed at the appeal hearing on 18 November 2025. The Appeal Panel heard submissions and argument from the parties.

1. Internal appeals may be made as of right on a question of law, and otherwise with leave (that is, the permission) of the Appeal Panel: s 80 (2) of the NCAT Act.
2. An appeal is not simply an opportunity for a dissatisfied or aggrieved party to re-argue the case they put at first instance: Ryan v BKB Motor Vehicle Repairs Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCATAP 39 at [10].
3. What is an error on a question of law was extensively discussed by the Appeal Panel in Unique Commercial Property Group Limited v Cusumano [2024] NSWCATAP 204 (Cusumano) at [25]-[40]. An error on a question of law is an appeal as of right (if established) and does not require leave. A mixed error of fact and law (if established) requires leave to appeal.
4. In Cusumano at [33], the Appeal Panel stated the categories of questions of law are "not closed"; and at [37] stated:

What constitutes a question of law is vexed and context dependent in the sense that the distinction between matters of fact and of law may turn on the circumstances in which the question arises: Targeted Property Investments Pty Ltd v Look Up Technologies Pty Ltd (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 416 at [33(4)], citing Thomas and Naaz [2023] NSWCA 40 at [52] and Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA 51; (1968) 118 CLR 186 at 194; [1968] HCA 51.

1. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision to set out all of the examples of an error on a question of law that were discussed in Cusumano.
2. A pure question of law can be decided without any reference to the facts or may proceed by reference to assumed facts. Pure questions of law must be questions whose character as a question of law can be recognised on the face of the question and not depend upon the answer given to the question. This does not include a question which may ultimately disclose an error of law depending on an analysis of the facts but where this cannot be known without scrutiny of the facts: Orr v Cobar Management Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCCA 220 at [48] and [109].
3. However, a question of law may arise in the circumstances including the following:

(1) Failure to provide procedural fairness at the hearing (Donohoe v Alburario [2025] NSWSC 9 at [36]- [39]; Kirk v Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531; [2010] HCA 1 at [60]; Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57 at [41] (Gleeson CJ), [142] (Kirby J) and [170] (Hayne J).).

(2) No evidence at all to support a factual finding (Kostas v HIA Insurance Services Pty Ltd t/as Home Owners Warranty (2010) 241 CLR 390; [2010] HCA 32).

(3) Absence of the jurisdictional power to make an order (Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala (2000) 204 CLR 82; [2000] HCA 57; at [163] (Hayne J))

(4) A constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, in the sense of a failure to consider a "substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts" that was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine (see e.g. Alexandria Landfill Pty Ltd v Transport for NSW (2020) 103 NSWLR 479; [2020] NSWCA 165 at [8]- [12] and [413]; Resource Pacific Pty Ltd v Wilkinson [2013] NSWCA 33 at [1] and [9]).

(5) Applying the wrong legal principle (considered in isolation to the factual findings) which materially affected the outcome (Bimson, Roads & Maritime Services v Damorange Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 734 (Bimson) at [38]-[53]; Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) v JS [2025] NSWSC 1172 at [44]).

(6) However, the wrong application of the correct legal principles to the facts is an error of mixed fact and law for which leave to appeal is required under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act (TNT Building Trades Pty Ltd v Baker [2023] NSWCATAP 178 at [42]- [43] and the authorities cited therein).

1. The circumstances in which the Appeal Panel may grant leave to appeal from decisions made in the Consumer and Commercial Division are limited to those set out in Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 of the NCAT Act. In such cases, the Appeal Panel must be satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that:

(a) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(b) The decision of the Tribunal under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(c) Significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. In Collins v Urban [2014] NSWCATAP 17 (Collins v Urban), the Appeal Panel stated at [76] that a substantial miscarriage of justice for the purposes of Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 may have been suffered where:

... there was a "significant possibility" or a "chance which was fairly open" that a different and more favourable result would have been achieved for the appellant had the relevant circumstance in para (a) or (b) not occurred or if the fresh evidence under para (c) had been before the Tribunal at first instance.

1. Even if the appellant establishes that it may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice in the sense explained above, the Appeal Panel retains discretion whether to grant leave under s 80(2) of the NCAT Act. The appellant must demonstrate something more than the Tribunal was arguably wrong (Pholi v Wearne [2014] NSWCATAP 78 at [32]).
2. Ordinarily it is only appropriate to grant leave in matters involving issues of principle or questions of public importance which might have general application; an injustice which is reasonably clear, in the sense of going beyond merely what is arguable, or an error that is plain and readily apparent which is central to the Tribunal's decision; or the Tribunal has gone about the fact finding process in such an unorthodox manner, or in such a way that it was likely to produce an unfair result, it would be in the interests of justice for it to be reviewed (Collins v Urban at [84]).
3. In respect of a self-represented non-legally trained appellant, grounds of appeal may be considered generally (subject to procedural fairness considerations and the issues discussed in McNeill v Clarence Valley Council [ 2025] NSWCATAP 184 at [185]- [188]) to determine whether a question of law has been raised (Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13]).

50 Tenant's right to quiet enjoyment

(1) A tenant is entitled to quiet enjoyment of the residential premises without interruption by the landlord or any person claiming by, through or under the landlord or having superior title (such as a head landlord) to that of the landlord.

(2) A landlord or landlord's agent must not interfere with, or cause or permit any interference with, the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in using the residential premises.

Maximum penalty - 10 penalty units.

(3) A landlord or landlord's agent must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the landlord's other neighbouring tenants do not interfere with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in using the residential premises.

(4) This section is a term of every residential tenancy agreement.

1. The onus is upon the tenant to prove breach of s 50 of the RT Act. The issue of breach is assessed objectively.
2. The principles of quiet enjoyment were discussed by Hill J (with whom Gallop J agreed) in Hawkesbury Nominees Pty Ltd v Battik Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 185 (Battik) at [35]-[41]. At paragraph [37] it was stated:

The covenant for quiet enjoyment may be breached by the landlord (or those claiming under him) interfering with the physical occupation of the land by the tenant: Hill & Redman's Law of Landlord and Tenant (18th ed) para936, note 1. The principal, as the cases discussed below indicate, may be expressed in the following way: there will be a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment where the ordinary and lawful enjoyment of the demised premises is substantially interfered with by the acts of the lessor or those lawfully claiming under him, whether or not the title to the land or the possession of the land is otherwise affected. Whether what is complained of amounts to a substantial interference will be a question of fact. A breach may result either from acts of commission or omission by the landlord: see generally, Dennett v Atherton (1872) 7 QB 316, 326-7, Robinson v Kilvert [1889] UKLawRpCh 47; (1889) 41 Ch D 88 at 97.

1. The principles in Battik have been applied in the Tribunal on a number of occasions: see, for example Tanner v NSW Land and Housing Corp [2023] NSWCATCD 24 at [25] and Bush v Menzies [2024] NSWCATCD 43 at [122]. Battik was referred to without any criticism by Basten JA in Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2021] NSWSC 287 at [40].
2. The duty of a landlord not to "permit" any substantial interference with the quiet enjoyment of the tenant may extend to actions of neighbours of the tenant who are also tenants of the landlord: Aussie Traveller Pty Ltd v Marklea Pty Ltd [1997] 1 Qd R 1; Meyers v Commissioner for Social Housing [2019] ACTCA 19 at [209].
3. The landlord's obligation under s 50(2) of the RT Act includes circumstances where a neighbouring tenant, who is also a tenant of the landlord, commits breaches of a residential tenancy agreement of which the landlord is aware, or should reasonably be aware, that substantially interferes with the quite enjoyment of a tenant in using the residential premises, and the landlord fails to take reasonable steps against that neighbouring tenant to prevent or stop the interference: Department of Housing v Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal and Anor [2003] NSWSC 150; Harris v Commissioner for Social Housing; Towney-Kilbey v Commissioner for Social Housing; Sullivan v Commissioner for Social Housing [2013] ACTSC 186; Parrott v NSW Land and Housing Corporation (Social Housing) [2010] NSWCTTT 254; McC v Director of Housing (Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 2748; Mr S v Director of Housing (Residential Tenancies) [2009] VCAT 2615.
4. A landlord is not liable for every act or omission by it that causes substantial interference with the reasonable peace, comfort, or privacy of the tenant in using the residential premises. Acts or omissions need to be either deliberate or their consequences are reasonably foreseeable. In Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers [1999] NSWSC 264 (Bondi Diggers) Austin J stated at [111]:

"A breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment occurs whenever the landlord causes substantial interference with the enjoyment of the demised premises through an act or omission that is either deliberate or negligent in the sense that its consequences were reasonably foreseeable: Martin's Camera Corner Pty Ltd v Hotel Mayfair Ltd [1976] 2 NSWLR 15; Kohua Pty Ltd v Tai Ping Trading Pty Ltd (1985) 3 BPR [97,240]; P Butt , Land Law (3rd ed 1996), p305-308."

1. In Makowska v St Geoge Community Housing Ltd [2020] NSWCATAP 159, the Appeal Panel stated at [27]:

"In our view the Tribunal clearly applied the correct test for determining whether the respondent had breached its obligation to provide the appellant with quiet enjoyment. That test, as set out in the Judgment of Austin J in Advance Fitness v Bondi Diggers, is whether there had been substantial interference with the enjoyment of the premises through an act or omission that was either deliberate or negligent in the sense that the consequences were reasonably foreseeable."

1. In El-Mohammed v Lin [2024] NSWCATAP 139, the Appeal Panel after referring to Bondi Diggers at [58] stated at [60]:

"The test is not whether conduct was "deliberate or wrongful" but whether it was "deliberate or negligent." The Tribunal found there was no breach because the landlords' conduct was "inadvertent." However, conduct which is inadvertent may nonetheless involve a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment if it is negligent in the sense that its consequences were reasonably foreseeable."

1. In respect of s 50(3) of the RT Act, the Appeal Panel stated in Makowska v St George Community Housing Ltd [2021] NSWCATAP 198 at [41]:

The appellant argued, in effect, that this passage means that a landlord must literally do everything possible which is not unreasonable. We reject this interpretation in relation to s 50(3) of the Act. We consider that 'all reasonable steps' is intended to encompass all of the steps that it is reasonable for a landlord to take in all of the circumstances, viewed objectively. This may involve the landlord choosing between different, reasonable steps from time to time. It is not to be expected that a landlord will all at once impose a barrage of measures, at great expense and effort, to address a mild complaint of minor anti-social behaviour. The requirement inserted into the residential tenancy agreement by s 50(3) of the Act for the landlord to take 'all reasonable steps' will be met if the landlord's response to a complaint is timely and proportional in all of the circumstances. The precise steps which will fulfil the requirement will obviously vary from case to case.

1. No error on a question of law is established regarding the findings of the Tribunal on whether the landlord took "all reasonable steps" under s 50(3) of the NCAT Act.
2. The Tribunal identified the correct legal principle. The Tribunal did misunderstand and misapply a legal principle to the facts, in the sense identified in Bimson, nor is any other error on a question of law established.
3. Further, if leave to appeal had been sought, it would not have been granted by reference to Cl. 12(1) of Sch. 4 of the NCAT Act, and the principles discussed in Collins v Urban. The fact-finding process was orthodox and not clearly unreasonable, irrational, or illogical. The Tribunal considered the evidence of both parties. The decision is fair and equitable, notwithstanding the tenant's disagreement with the outcome.
4. The decision was not against the weight of evidence. The evidence relied upon by the tenant does not, in its totality, preponderates so strongly against the conclusion found by the Tribunal at first instance that it can be said that the conclusion was not one that a reasonable Tribunal member could reach (Collins v Urban at [77] and the authorities cited therein).
5. There is also no significant new evidence that was not reasonably available to the tenant at the hearing that is now available.
6. Accordingly, if leave to appeal had been sought, it would have been refused.
7. There is a further aspect of the Tribunal's decision that requires comment.
8. At paragraph [28], the Tribunal referred to Bondi Diggers and set out the correct legal test. At paragraph [34] it stated the tenant "must establish that there has been a substantial interference through an act or omission that was either deliberate or negligent". At paragraph [40] it found the landlord had not "intentionally or negligently" failed to prevent the neighbour from interfering with Mr Vok's quiet enjoyment.
9. The reference to "negligence" in Bondi Diggers is not that the landlord committed the tort of negligence, but that the landlord caused or permitted a substantial interference with the quiet enjoyment of the tenant in using the premises because the consequences of the acts or omissions of the landlord are reasonably foreseeable.
10. Under s 50(2) of the RT Act, the salient enquiry is whether the landlord interfered with, or caused, or permitted the loss of quiet enjoyment (which involves substantial interference) by reason of acts or omissions of the landlord (or landlord's agent) which are intentional, or negligent in the sense that the "consequences are reasonably foreseeable".
11. That extends to omissions that are reasonably foreseeable where the actions of a neighbouring tenant of the landlord are substantially interfering with the quiet enjoyment of a tenant, such that the landlord has "permitted" the substantial interference. Under s 51(1)(c) of the RT Act, it is a term of all residential tenancy agreements that a tenant not interfere, or cause or permit any interference, with the reasonable peace, comfort or privacy of any neighbour. The issue under s 50(2) and (3) of the RT Act is whether the landlord "permitted" that breach by its neighbouring tenant and failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent or stop the breach, such that the tenant is entitled to compensation under the RT Act.
12. Section 50(3) requires the landlord to take "all reasonable steps" to ensure the landlord's other neighbouring tenants do not substantially interfere with the quiet enjoyment of the tenant in using the premises. As discussed previously, whether "all reasonable steps" have been taken involves assessment of whether the landlord's response was "timely and proportionate" in all the circumstances. That depends on the evidence in the particular case, including the nature and duration of complaints by the tenant to the landlord and the landlord's response, or lack of adequate response. It is also dependent on what powers the landlord has to investigate and take action against the neighbouring tenant. The landlord may be faced with assessing diametrically opposed versions of events between the tenant and the neighbouring tenant.
13. The reference in paragraphs [34] and [40] to "negligently" may simply be an abbreviation of "negligently, in the sense that the consequences were reasonably foreseeable" at [111] of Bondi Diggers. There is ambiguity, and a potential contradiction, in the reasons at [34] and [40] when compared with what is stated at [28].
14. The Appeal Panel is not satisfied the finding at paragraphs [34] and [40] are an error on a question of law in the sense identified in Bimson. If there was an error, it is a type of error that requires leave to appeal. As discussed previously, leave to appeal was not sought, but if it had been, it would not have been granted.
15. The findings made by the Tribunal in respect of the reasonableness of the steps taken by the landlord means the tenant's application would have been dismissed in any event, irrespective of potential error in the findings at [34] and [40]. As discussed previously, no error on a question of law is established in respect of the manner in which the Tribunal dealt with s 50(3) of the NCAT Act.
16. Finally, in dismissing the appeal, the Appeal Panel notes there is an ongoing residential tenancy agreement between the parties, and the Appeal Panel makes no comment about the rights and obligations of the parties in the period after 29 August 2025.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.