Visionmax Pty Ltd v Budget Specs

[2006] FCA 222

Federal Court of Australia|2006-03-16|Before: Collier J

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Court

Federal Court of Australia

Decision date

2006-03-16

Before

Collier J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (21 paragraphs)

[1]

THE COURT ORDERS THAT: 1. In relation to para 7 of the Statement of Claim: a. The Applicant must provide to the Respondent particulars of the timing of the event referred to in para 7 of the Statement of Claim clarifying when the Audit Team is alleged to have arrived at the Budget Ipswich premises; b. The Applicant must provide particulars of whom it alleges notice or warning should have been given of the Audit Team's arrival at the Budget Ipswich premises. 2. In relation to para 10 of the Statement of Claim the Respondent is not entitled to any further particulars. 3. In relation to para 11 of the Statement of Claim: a. The Applicant must provide to the Respondent particulars of the timing of the event referred to in para 11 of the Statement of Claim. b. The Applicant must particularize the records and information it alleges the Audit Team took and/or copied. 4. In relation to paras 12 and 13 of the Statement of Claim the Respondent is not entitled to particulars of the conversations between Mr Sarracino and one or more of the Audit Team. 5. In relation to para 14 of the Statement of Claim: a. The Applicant must provide to the Respondent particulars of any complaint or objection made in relation to the removal of the hard drive, who made the complaint or objection and to whom the complaint or objection was made. b. The Respondent is not entitled to particulars of the content of any complaint or objection made. 6. In relation to para 16 of the Statement of Claim: a. The Applicant must provide to the Respondent the same particulars to be provided in relation to para 11 of the Statement of Claim above; b. The Respondent is not entitled to further particulars of para 16(a) of the Statement of Claim; c. The Applicant must amend para 16(b) of the Statement of Claim or provide the particulars of when, how and by whom on behalf of the Respondent the information and materials referred to are alleged to have been obtained. 7. In relation to para 22 of the Statement of Claim: a. The Applicant must provide to the Respondent further particulars of para 22(b) of the Statement of Claim as requested. b. The Respondent is not entitled to any further particulars of para 22(c) of the Statement of Claim. 8. In relation to para 23 of the Statement of Claim the Applicant must provide to the Respondent particulars of the conduct constituting the alleged failure to act in accordance with the Franchise Agreement. 9. In relation to para 27 of the Statement of Claim the Respondent is not entitled to any further particulars. Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

[2]

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 1 On 8 February 2006, the Respondent filed a Notice of Motion seeking particulars of various paragraphs of the Applicant's Statement of Claim. The Notice of Motion was supported by an Affidavit filed 13 February 2006 sworn by Mr Richard Mark Hamwood, a solicitor employed by the solicitors for the Respondent ('Mr Hamwood's affidavit'). 2 Through its solicitors, the Respondent had previously requested particulars of the Statement of Claim by letter dated 14 November 2005. All references in this judgment to 'Request' followed by a number, are references to requests for further and better particulars contained in that letter, attached as Exhibit RMH 1 to Mr Hamwood's affidavit. 3 At the time of the hearing on 13 February 2006 the Applicant had not yet provided a response to the Respondent's request for further and better particulars. The Respondent submitted that they had assumed that the response would be on similar terms to that given in the related Luce Optical matter (QUD370/2005). The Applicant informed both the Court and the Respondent that that was not the case. On 24 February 2006 the Applicant delivered by way of email to my Associate a document entitled 'Applicant's further and better particulars of the Statement of Claim in response to the Respondent's request dated the 14 November 2005'. This document was not formally filed in the registry until 13 March 2006 and it is unknown at what time the Respondent was served with this document. 4 The Notice of Motion was heard by me on 13 February 2006. Outlines of Submissions on behalf of both the Applicant and Respondent were filed at that time. On 16 February 2006 I caused my Associate to telephone both parties to request that supplementary submissions be provided in relation to this matter as both the oral and written submissions tendered at the hearing on 13 February 2006 mistakenly referred to the paragraph numbering in the related Luce Optical matter (QUD370/2005). On 22 February the Respondent filed its supplementary submissions in the registry. The Applicant's supplementary submissions were delivered by email to my Associate on 24 February 2006 but were not formally filed in the registry. Clearly it is important that submissions by Counsel be regularised before this Court either by making or filing in Court or by filing with the registry. As this has not happened despite repeated contact by my Associate, the supplementary submissions of the Applicant in relation to this matter are not before me and cannot be considered in delivery of this judgment. 5 The Applicant submits generally that the Respondent's requests for particulars are in the nature of interrogatories; are vexatious and oppressive due to the number of requests made and the repetitive nature of many of the requests; and that the requests generally fail to make any distinction between a request for particulars of material facts and a request for the evidence which might be led to establish a pleaded material fact. The Applicant contends that proper and appropriate answers have been provided to the Respondent and no further order should be made. 6 The Respondent submits that the particulars sought from the Applicant fall into four categories: (1) particulars of the form and circumstances relating to agreements or terms of agreements relied on; (2) particulars of the form and circumstances relating to specific communications; (3) particulars of supporting facts relied on; and (4) particulars to clarify what is meant or intended in the Statement of Claim without which there is unresolved ambiguity or uncertainty. The Respondent submits that each request is a proper request for particulars and should be provided by the Applicant.

[3]

Further and Better Particulars, compared with Interrogatories 7 The essential function of particulars is to 'carry into operation the overriding principle that the litigation between the parties, and particularly the trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises and incidentally to save costs'. (Atkin's Encyclopaedia of Court Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings, Butterworths, vol 8, p 31). Particulars complete the picture of the applicant's cause of action with information sufficiently detailed to put the respondent on guard as to the case it has to meet and to enable it to prepare for trial (Spedding v Fitzpatrick (1888) 38 Ch D 410; R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 741; Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at 371; King v AG Australia Holdings Ltd (formerly GIO Australia Holdings Ltd) [2003] FCA 543 at pars 16-18). A request for further and better particulars should be made initially by letter, however the Court may order further and better particulars to be provided pursuant to O 12 Federal Court Rules. 8 Particulars and interrogatories have complementary functions in preparing for trial. Unlike further particulars, interrogatories may be only be filed and served by leave of the Court (O 16 r 1 Federal Court Rules). Historically, '…the object of interrogatories is to enable a party to obtain from his opponent information as to facts material to the questions in dispute between them, and to obtain admissions on oath of any facts which he has to prove on any issue which is raised between them….The essential function of particulars… is to limit the generality of the pleadings, and to define the issues which have to be tried and as to which discovery has to be given. And thus, while to a certain extent the giving of particulars may render interrogatories unnecessary by informing the opponent of the case he has to meet, they do not perform a function which is co-extensive with that of interrogatories. There are indeed occasions when it is proper to interrogate as to the truth of the particulars, and on the other hand there are cases in which it would not be proper to order particulars, but where interrogatories could be allowed.' (Atkin's Encyclopaedia of Court Forms and Precedents in Civil Proceedings, Butterworths, vol 8, p 31)

[7]

Particulars and evidence 13 Order 11 r 2 of the Federal Court Rules states that a pleading of a party shall only contain in a statement in a summary form of the material facts on which the party relies, but not the evidence by which those facts are to be proved (Blake v Albion Life Assurance Society (1876) 45 LJQB 663 at 667 per Brett J and North Western Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1913] 3 KB 422 at 425.) Further, a request for particulars should not include a request to disclose evidence by which the applicant intends to prove its case at trial (Temperton v Russell (1893) 9 TLR 319 at 322). The application of this principle to individual facts can be difficult. A useful illustration of the principle however was in Re Dependable Upholstery Ltd (1936) 3 All ER 741, where the liquidator of a company sought a declaration against two directors that dividends had been paid wholly out of the capital of the company and not out of profits, and that there had been no profits of the company out of which dividends could be paid. The defendant directors sought further and better particulars of the facts relied upon in support of these allegations. Crossman J held that the liquidators were not required to give particulars of those facts. As the learned judge observed: 'In the present case the material fact on which the applicant, the official receiver, relies, is the alleged fact that each of the two dividends was in fact paid wholly out of the capital of the company. But it is suggested by Mr Morton on behalf of the respondents, the directors, that you have to go behind that allegation and find out the allegations or facts upon which that statement is based. It seems to me if one begins there, I do not know where one would end in the particulars which would have to ordered; because the fact that each of the dividends was paid wholly out of the capital of the company is the fact on which each party relies in the claim or defence. The facts which lead up to that are, in my view, really the evidence of the fact that the dividends were in fact paid wholly out of the capital of the company.' (at 745)

[10]

Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim 16 Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim states that 'The arrival of the Audit Team at the premises of Budget Ipswich as referred to in para 6 above was without notice or warning'. Paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim states 'At approximately 9.30 am on Monday the 25th October 2004, McKechnie, Mercer, Potter, Parry and Tame ("the Audit Team") entered the Budget Ipswich premises'. 17 The Respondent seeks particulars clarifying the difference (if any) in the acts asserted in para 6 (that at approximately 9:30 am on Monday 25 October 2004, the Audit Team 'entered' the Budget Ipswich premises) and para 7 in which the 'arrival' of the Audit Team is referred to. In addition the Respondent contends that it is entitled to know who the Applicant alleges notice or warning was to be given and why such notice or warning was required. 18 The Applicant objects to answering such request on the grounds that it is not a proper request for particulars. 19 In my view the Respondent is entitled to further but limited particularisation in relation to this paragraph. Insofar as Request 3(a) is concerned, the Respondent is entitled to clarification as to whether the 'arrival' of the Audit Team is intended to refer to the same event as referred to in para 6 of the Statement of Claim where it is alleged that the Audit Team 'entered' the Applicant's premises. The Applicant should provide the Respondent with sufficient particulars of the time of the event referred to in para 7. 20 In relation to Requests 3(b) and 3(c), although compelling arguments have been submitted from both parties, I am of the view that the Respondent is entitled to further and better particulars as sought. I accept the submission of counsel for the Respondent that para 7 contains an incomplete assertion, namely that notice or warning should have been provided to someone. The information sought here is limited, and is limited to the issue of to whom notice of the visit of the auditors should have been given. It is not akin to providing evidence of facts on which the parties pleading rely for claim or defence. In my view, this is part of the case the Respondent is required to meet, as distinct from evidence which the Applicant will lead to substantiate its claim. Further, in my view the request is not vexatious nor oppressive, nor in the nature of an interrogatory.

[16]

Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim 36 Paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim alleges that after the Audit Team collected records at the request of the Respondent on 25 and 26 October 2004, a report (dated 21 April 2005) was prepared by Ferrier Hodgson at the Respondent's request in relation to the Applicant's business activities. 37 The Respondent argues that it is entitled to know what records the Applicant alleges it collected along with any information relating to the substance of the request by the Respondent for the collection of records from the Applicant. The Respondent also seeks clarification of para 16(b) of the Statement of Claim which it submits is ambiguous (Request 20). 38 The Applicant has provided some particulars to the requests relating to para 16 of the Statement of Claim but objects to providing further particulars on the basis that the Respondent's requests are not proper requests for particulars but are more in the nature of interrogatories. 39 Earlier in this judgment I ordered limited particularisation of para 11 of the Statement of Claim. To the extent that the Applicant claims a report, produced by Ferrier Hodgson, is based on information and materials obtained by the Respondent, it should describe what that information and materials are. It may be appropriate for the Applicant to cross-reference para 16 to the particulars to be included in para 11. 40 In relation to Request 19, contrary to the submission of the Respondent I do not accept the analogy between the pleadings in the case before me, and those in Gold Coast City Council v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 135. In my view, in para 16(a) of the Statement of Claim the Applicant has supplied sufficient particulars to the Respondent. The remainder of the Respondent's request is a request for evidence and not a proper request for particulars. 41 In relation to Request 20, in my view para 16(b) of the Statement of Claim is ambiguous, for the reason that, on the face of the document, paras 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13 do not contain references to information obtained by the Respondent. The Applicant is required to either amend para 16(b) or provide particulars as sought by the Respondent.

[17]

Paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim 42 Paragraph 22 of the Statement of Claim alleges that the Respondent failed to act in good faith and fairly in the manner of the exercise of the power conferred by the Franchise Agreement and that the power was exercised oppressively, capriciously, in an arbitrary way and for an improper purpose, being to effect the policy decision of the Respondent, OPSM and Luxotica to acquire independently owned Budget franchises. 43 The Respondent seeks particulars of what conduct the Applicant relies upon to assert the allegation and specific details of the policy decision or facts from which the policy decision may be inferred. 44 The Applicant objects to the request for particulars of the conduct establishing that the Respondent failed to 'act in good faith and fairly' on the grounds that it is not a proper request for particulars and says that it is not able to give further and better particulars in relation to the 'policy decision' until after disclosure. 45 Paragraph 22(b) of the Statement of Claim is currently drafted in broad terms, and makes serious allegations against the Respondent. In my view in order to be in a position to meet the case against it, the Respondent is entitled to particularisation of this paragraph as requested by Request 22, but only as to the facts upon which the Applicant is relying on to assert the allegation in subpara (b). In doing so I note the somewhat similar situation in The Briton Medical and General Life Association Limited v The Britannia Fire Association and Whinney (1889) 59 LT 888 where the plaintiff association claimed, inter alia, 'The defendants…knew or ought to have known, and must be taken to have known, the improper motives which actuated the said directors of the plaintiff association'. Kay J, in noting that he was required to draw a line between requiring the plaintiff association to make a statement which would prevent the defendant association being taken by surprise at the trial, and requiring the plaintiff association to make a statement of the evidence on which it intended to rely, nonetheless ordered the plaintiffs to give particulars of the improper motives alleged in that para (at 890). 46 Request 23(c) however, which relates to the alleged policy decision of the Respondent referred to in para 22(c) of the Statement of Claim, in my view is more in the nature of an interrogatory, and not a proper request for particulars.