Victoro 88 [2025] QBCCMCmr 374 (29 October 2025)

Sulejman Ciketic and Semira Ciketic (applicants)

The application for interim orders is hereby dismissed.

[1] The dispute in question is about the reasonableness of a body corporate resolution at a general meeting to replace the existing tile roof of the scheme building with a metal Colourbond roof.
[2] This decision pertains to interim relief sought by the owners of a lot, to prevent the impending replacement of the roof until the question of the validity and reasonableness of the resolution can finally be determined at department adjudication.

[3] The scheme comprises eight lots and common property, and is regulated under the Standard Module.
[4] The applicants are co-owners of Lot 2. The respondent is the body corporate.
[5] At extraordinary general meeting ('EGM') dated 16 July 2025, the respondent body corporate considered as a group of same issue motions for decision by ordinary resolution, six different roof replacement options (quotations) as follows:
1. Metal roof replacement for a sum of $78,106.55;
2. Metal roof replacement for a sum of $159,775.00;
3. Metal roof replacement for a sum of $89,015.30;
4. Tile roof replacement for a sum of $75,625.00;
5. Tile roof replacement for a sum of $150,535.00;
6. Metal roof replacement for a sum of $91,168.00.
[6] The motion for the third option above (motion 2.3) was carried with four votes in favour and one against. I also note that there were nil votes in favour of either of the tile roof options.
[7] The applicants in some length express concerns they initially entertained over any need at all to replace the roof. I will not restate those concerns herein given they conclude finally that they now accept that the roof requires replacement (pursuant to a recommendation to that effect made by the respondent body corporate's insurance provider).[1]
[8] However, the applicants oppose the replacement of the tile roof with a metal one on the grounds that:
1. The former has a longer life span and better warranty;
2. The use of the former would preserve the value of the property (and as such any investment made in the same);
3. The unknown impact of the use of the latter on insurance coverage and insurance premiums.
[9] More importantly, the applicants allege that the resolution breaches the 'like-for-like rule' that adjudicators have previously upheld when considering questions of maintenance and improvements. They claim that the respondent body corporate has contravened its obligation to act reasonably under sections 94(2) and 100(5) of the Act, and contravened its maintenance obligation under section 180 of the Standard Module (read together with section 152 of the Act)[2].

[10] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[3] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[4] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[5] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [6]
[11] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of sections 276(1)(a) and (b) of the Act (read together with section 227(1)(b) of the Act).

[12] This dispute was the subject of an application for department conciliation. Despite successful conciliation on 10 September 2025, the dispute has persisted.
[13] On 21 October 2025, the applicants lodged this application for interim orders.
[14] On 23 and 24 October 2025, the Commissioner through her delegate sought further information under section 240 of the Act.
[15] Subsequently, the applicants provided the information sought and amended their application.
[16] On 27 October 2025, the dispute was referred to department adjudication for consideration of interim orders.
[17] The applicants claim that the roof replacement works were scheduled to commence on 29 October 2025. However, upon my instructions, my delegate contacted the respondent body corporate who confirmed that such works were rescheduled to commence on 5 November 2025.

[18] An adjudicator may make an interim order only if satisfied it is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[7] Accordingly, an applicant must satisfy the adjudicator that serious or irreparable damage would be caused without the interim order.
[19] An interim order has effect for a period stated in the order, not to be longer than one year, and may be extended, varied, renewed or cancelled by the adjudicator until a final order is made, and otherwise lapses when an application is finally determined or withdrawn.[8]
[20] An interim order is usually made in the form of a temporary injunction - an order not to do something, pending a final determination of an application.
[21] In deciding whether an interim order is warranted, adjudicators often adopt the approach taken by courts to considering interlocutory injunction applications.[9] The first issue is whether the applicant has made out a 'prima facie case' or raised a 'serious legal question', in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is some probability that the applicant will succeed at the final determination stage. The second issue is whether any inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an interim order were refused outweighs or is outweighed by any inconvenience or injury which the respondent would suffer if an interim order were granted. Those two issues of serious legal question and balance of convenience are parts of one ultimate question - whether an interim order is warranted - and therefore should not be addressed mechanically or in isolation from one another.
[22] The questions of law and fact raised by the application do not need to be finally decided at the interim order determination stage, and doing so is not appropriate where the evidence is potentially incomplete, or questions of law require opposing arguments and unhurried consideration. That said, if the answer to a question of fact or law is clear on the evidence and issues as presented in the interim application, it may be appropriate and beneficial to decide such questions at the interlocutory stage.[10]
[23] Even if the considerations of urgency or balance of convenience favour the applicant, it is not inappropriate for an interim order application to be dismissed if there is little or no prospect of success on the legal arguments and the uncontroversial facts, at the final determination stage.
[24] Ordinarily, an interim injunction should do no more than maintain the status quo for a limited time or until the determination of the main application, usually in the form of a restraining injunction. An interim order in the form of a mandatory injunction, i.e., an order requiring a respondent to do something (as opposed to a restraint) which is not needed to preserve an existing interest of the applicant and which imposes a non-compensable burden or loss on the respondent is a special case. It is rarely made by courts and calls for particularly careful consideration, with the effect that the balance of convenience is shifted in the respondent's favour (all other things being equal).[11]

[25] The question before me for determination at this stage is whether an interim order is warranted.

[26] The evidence indicates that the roof replacement works are to commence on 5 November 2025. Accordingly, I am satisfied of the urgency of the circumstances.

(b) Serious prima facie case or serious legal question

[27] Section 94(2) of the Act requires bodies corporate to act reasonably including when making decisions. Similarly, section 100(5) of the Act requires committees to act reasonably in making decisions. (Further, section 100(1) of the Act states that a decision of the committee is a decision of the body corporate.) In the event this does not occur, an adjudicator may intervene to make an order that is just and equitable to resolve a dispute.
[28] A party aggrieved by a body corporate's decision or action often cites this concept of reasonableness in their argument that the decision or action was unfair to them. Whilst, unsurprisingly the Act does not provide any guidance as to what is considered reasonable or unreasonable, it has been the subject of considerable discussion over the past decade or so.
[29] The question of whether a body corporate has acted unreasonably is not a straightforward one. What is reasonable is a question of fact, based on a consideration of all relevant matters in the circumstances of the particular case.
[30] There is no onus on a body corporate to satisfy an adjudicator that it acted reasonably.[12] Rather, it is for the person(s) alleging that the conduct or decision was unreasonable to prove the same. I must note that this is a rather heavy onus.
[31] The test of reasonableness was considered by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT') in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall[13] ('Beaches') which held as follows:

(a) 'Reasonable action is evidence-based and rational';[14]

(b) 'A finding that a decision or action in issue is "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" does not necessarily mean it is a reasonable one'.[15]

[32] QCAT also held in Beaches that legal unreasonableness encompasses decision-making errors such as irrelevance, adding that decision-making in practice requires that 'all relevant matters [be] taken into consideration and irrelevant ones left out'.[16]
[33] A legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong'.[17] Accordingly, it is not sufficient to find that the body corporate could have made a better or more reasonable decision, or that a different body corporate could reasonably have come to a different decision.[18] Further, it is not the adjudicator's role to substitute his/her own view as to what would be the preferable decision by the body corporate.[19]
[34] A legally unreasonable decision made by a body corporate can be overridden by an adjudicator under section 276 of the Act (often read together with a relevant item under Schedule 5 of the Act), which states in part that an adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about the exercise of rights or powers, or the performance of duties under the Act or CMS. This has been contemplated under the BCCM Act, specifically items 17, 24 and 25 of Schedule 5.

(ii) Maintenance, improvements & body corporate autonomy

[35] The legislation imposes an obligation on the body corporate to 'maintain' common property and certain other elements.
[36] Section 152(1)(b) of the Act states that a body corporate must comply with the obligations with regard to common property and body corporate assets imposed under a regulation module. Section 180(1) of the Standard Module states that a body corporate must maintain common property in good condition, including, to the extent that common property is structural in nature, in a structurally sound condition. To the extent that lots in a scheme are created under a building format plan of subdivision, section 180(2) of the Standard Module requires the body corporate to maintain in good condition (and structurally sound condition) roofing membranes and structures that are not common property but that provide protection.
[37] Further, the legislation allows a body corporate to make 'improvements' to its common property.
[38] Section 186 of the Standard Module (read together with section 159 of the Act) provides for the level of authorisation required for improvements based on the cost of the improvement. For example, for the scheme in question, any work by the respondent body corporate that can be classed as an 'improvement' would need to be authorised via ordinary resolution if the cost of the improvement exceeds $2,400.00[20] but does not exceed $16,000.00[21]. If the cost of the improvement exceeds $16,000.00, the body corporate would require authorisation by special resolution.
[39] There is a wealth of case law that provides guidance on when a work must be categorised as 'maintenance' or as an 'improvement'. There has been some discussion of a 'like for like rule' considering arguments that maintenance includes repair or replacement; that replacement must generally be 'like for like' or replacement with a modern equivalent; that there may be circumstances where replacement works that are not like for like can constitute an 'improvement' as opposed to 'maintenance' work.
[40] In this case, the applicants' central argument is that the respondent body corporate must replace the tile roof with a like for like roof (i.e., in their view another tile roof) or a better one. They are of the view that the legislation mandatorily requires the respondent body corporate to do so, although they admit that they as non-lawyers cannot cite a specific provision that says so.[22]
[41] I appreciate that Queensland's body corporate legislation is incredibly complex, and can on occasion perplex even a legal mind. This is one of the reasons why the Commissioner's Office is dedicated to providing a free information service to the public.[23]
[42] I must note that contrary to the applicants' assertion, neither the legislation nor case law precludes the respondent body corporate from replacing its tile roof with a metal one provided it is not unreasonable to do so.
[43] Relevantly, the following was held in Coronation Towers[24]:

You will notice that these different options propose quite different solutions or methods of repair. All though might be categorised as "maintenance" in my view if the principal intention of the proposal is to return the pool to a useable condition or state of repair. This is why the "like for like" rule can be somewhat misleading. In my view, a body corporate should not be compelled to use a product simply because this product was used originally. For example timber with timber. This might lead to a body corporate having only limited, and potentially expensive, options for maintenance, which might not be in the best interests of the body corporate. This is particularly so in light of changing and improving technologies.

In my view, provided that the principal or foremost intent of the proposal is the repair or maintenance of the item, object or aspect of common property, then the body corporate should be allowed a reasonably wide discretion in the means by which this is achieved, including, potentially the use of products or materials different from the original, and potentially, even a somewhat different or updated design. This is particularly applicable in the case of an architectural feature: both the materials and the design might be different, provided that the intent is to "maintain" by replacement the previous architectural feature.

If however the cost of "like with like" varies considerably from the cost of a somewhat different proposal, then it might be that the first proposal is properly regarded as maintenance, whereas, the latter is better categorised as improvement. It is somewhat subjective and a matter for determination on the specific facts of each situation.

[44] I note that it would not be unreasonable for the body corporate to replace its tile roof with another tile roof. However, there is also nothing inherently unreasonable in replacing it with a metal one. Even if tile rooves generally have a better life span and warranties, and helps preserve the value of the property in question, and does not impact the body corporate's insurance, a decision to opt for a metal roof on the basis of a range of other benefits and determinants, is not unreasonable.
[45] Even if the applicants could demonstrate that a tile roof option would be the better decision (on the strength of various determinants) for the body corporate in the circumstances, that of itself does not make a decision to opt for a metal roof unreasonable.
[46] Similarly, even if I agreed with the applicants that a tile roof option is better and more reasonable, I as an adjudicator cannot impose my subjective view on the respondent body corporate.
[47] The respondent body corporate (by a majority of its lot owners) decided to opt for a metal roof. I see no reason at this stage to override its autonomy.
[48] Regardless, even if the replacement works were to constitute an 'improvement' as opposed to 'maintenance' under the legislation, I note that with four out of five votes in favour of the works, it has met the requisite threshold for authorisation by special resolution.
[49] In conclusion, I am not satisfied that the applicants have made out a prima facie case or raised a serious legal question.

[50] I note that if an interim order is not granted and the roof replacement works proceed, the respondent body corporate would be liable to make payment for the same using funds sourced by lot owners' contributions/special levies.
[51] However, given at this stage I am not satisfied that the applicants have made out a prima facie case or raised a serious legal question (based on the evidence currently provided with the application), I do not find that the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the status quo.

[52] I am not satisfied that the applicants have made out a prima facie case. Accordingly, an interim order is not warranted in the circumstances of this dispute.

[1] See pg 4 of the grounds statement in the application

[2] Incorrectly cited in the application as section 180 of the Act

[3] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws

[4] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act

[6] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]

[9] For general principles see for e.g., Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46 and SDW2 Pty Ltd v JLF Corporation Pty Ltd & Ors [2017] QSC 1

[10] Cohen v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 70 at [6]

[11] Meagher, Gummow and Lehane's Equity: Doctrines & Remedies (J.D. Heydon, M.J. Leeming, P.G. Turner) (Fourth Edition) (Sydney: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2002) at [21-395]; Bingham & Anor v 7-Eleven Stores P/L [2003] QCA 402 at [106]-[108]

[12] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[14] SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 [15] - [16] as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [23]

[15] McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [60] (Hayne J) as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [24]

[16] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [36] and [42]

[17] Woden Valley Glass v Psaila (1993) 122 ALR 378, 391 as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47]

[18] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[20] Basic improvements limit - $300.00 multipled by eight lots - See section 186 of the Standard Module

[21] Ordinary resolution improvement range - more than the basic improvements limit for the scheme and not more than $16.000.00 (i.e., $2,000.00 multiplied by eight lots) - See section 186 of the Standard Module

[22] See pg 1 of the grounds statement in the application

[24] See Coronation Towers [2006] QBCCMCmr 44

Corporate and Community Management Act 1997

Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020

Victoro 88 [2025] QBCCMCmr 374 (29 October 2025)

At a glance

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Judgment (44 paragraphs)

Victoro 88 [2025] QBCCMCmr 374 (29 October 2025)

Legislation Cited (2)

Cases Cited (2)