[65] First, that the principal rule is that judicial hearings should take place in open court: publicly and in open view, with no restriction on reporting. This is a fundamental precept underpinning the administration of justice.

[66] Second, that in certain circumstances the administration of justice requires a qualification of the general rule. There will be circumstances where modifications of the general rule are necessarily made to ensure that the administration of justice is not frustrated. These exceptions are many and varied and cannot be precriptively identified.

[67] Third, that the test to be applied by the court in making a pseudonym order is, to use the words of the statute, whether it is necessary to do so in order not to prejudice the administration of justice.

68] Fourth, that a court, in determining whether to make a pseudonym order, is entitled to take into account the individual considerations affecting the person seeking the order and balance those against the principal rule of open justice in determining whether the administration of justice warrants the making of the order. Relevant to these individual considerations is whether there is a real risk of the party or witness suffering psychological harm as a result of publication of his or her name or the names of other parties. Also relevant is the real risk of a party not proceeding with an action in the event that he or she or another person is identified.

The fifth consideration is not relevant to this proceeding.

[70] Sixth, that in determining whether to make such an order, a court is entitled to take into account the fact that there will still be a reporting of the proceeding and that the hearing itself will be conducted in open court, subject to the restrictions imposed by the pseudonym order.

[71] Seventh, in determining whether it is necessary to make such an order, usually the proofs must be cogent and will not be satisfied by mere belief on the part of a party that the order is necessary. However, in certain cases a court can, in a practical sense, act on its own experience and draw appropriate inferences.

1. In this matter there have been two medical reports. One from Professor Mark Cook makes reference to the family situation of the respondent and makes a request that these matters should be taken into consideration. I will not set out the matters in detail. There is also a report from Dr Nikolai Jeuniewic which, again, not making specific reference to medical details, expresses the opinion that any adverse publicity that may be received by the respondent as a result of the hearing at VCAT will have a severe impact on his illness.
2. It then becomes a question of the balance between the interests of justice and the personal interests by way of potential affect upon the individual, in terms of coming to the consideration of whether there should be an anonymization here. I note several observations, the first of all is that the opinion of Dr Jeuniewic is brief, three sentences in fact. It identifies him as having a professional relationship, it identifies a condition and it gives the opinion that any adverse publicity may result as a matter of this hearing will have a severe impact.
3. Firstly, I make the point that there is no guarantee that there will be any publicity at all, even with publication of these reasons and the publication of details on the register of practitioners or on disciplinary proceedings. There is a causal link which does not necessarily prove to be consistent here. It is not the making of the decision or indeed the publication but adverse publicity which may have a result.
4. I am also mindful of the very minor nature of these offences. There was a situation submitted to the Tribunal which indicates that the Commissioner had offered to reprimand the respondent, however, for whatever reason, I have no reason to doubt this, the respondent's former legal practitioner refused to accept the reprimand and I have been told through Counsel that this was not on instructions. It indicates that the Commissioner is of the view that these offences are of a minor nature as no offers of reprimand are made in relation to serious offences. Also, the very fact that there is a proposal by consent that the Tribunal reprimand the respondent, also indicates the Commissioner's view that these matters are at the very lowest end of the scale of offences.
5. Balancing between the principle that the proceedings of any Court and indeed this Tribunal should be open with no restriction on reporting, is the starting point. It becomes a balance of the requirements of the administration of justice as against what could be said to be harmful to the respondent, in particular to the respondent's health. Given the scant detail that has been provided in the report which proposes that there would be an impact on health, I am not satisfied that it outweighs the requirement that the administration of justice be carried out in an open manner.
6. I am not satisfied that there is sufficient ground for the making of an anonymization order and that application is refused.
7. Turning back to the question of the charges themselves, I do make the point, I think this is borne out by the very fact that if the disposition is agreed to by the Commissioner that the charges are at the very low end of the spectrum of disciplinary offences. I do take the view that a reprimand is appropriate disposition. I make the point, made many times in the past, that a reprimand is not to be seen as insignificant. It carries with it an indication of disapproval of the conduct and it remains on the record as such. I make the point too, that whilst the parties have both submitted that is appropriate, the Tribunal is not held to that, if I consider that the charges were any more serious I do have the ability to impose a more onerous disposition and I choose not to in this case. I believe that the reprimand is appropriate. There has been reference made to a previous caution which is now quite a long time ago and I do not think that that has any bearing on this matter. I also have a good reference from Dr Matt Collins QC who is the present Chairman of the Victorian Bar and I take that into consideration when agreeing to the proposed disposition of a reprimand.
8. The respondent to pay the applicant's costs of this proceeding on a standard basis at 80% of Supreme Court Scale to be assessed by the Costs Court in default of agreement.