Vesely & Lahti [2025] FedCFamC1F 682 (14 October 2025)

1. The children live with the wife.
2. The children spend time with the husband as follows:

(a) from the date of these orders for a period of six (6) months:

(i) in week 1 from Friday from the conclusion of school/childcare (or 3:30pm if a non-school day) until 6:00pm; and

(ii) in week 2 on Sunday for a period of four hours as agreed between the parents in writing, failing agreement from 2:00pm until 6:00pm.

(b) thereafter for a period of a further six (6) months:

(i) in week 1 from Friday at the conclusion of school/childcare (or 3:30pm if a non-school day) until 9:00am on Saturday morning;

(ii) in week 2 on Sunday for a period of six hours as agreed between the parents in writing and failing agreement from 12:00noon until 6:00pm.

(c) thereafter each alternate Thursday from the conclusion of school/childcare (or 3:30pm if a non-school day) until 12:00pm on Saturday; and

(d) such further or other times as agreed between the parties in writing.

1. Notwithstanding any of the provisions in these orders, the children shall spend time with the wife on Mother's Day from 10:00am until 5:00pm and with the husband on Father's Day from 10:00am until 5:00pm.

1. Changeover is to take place at the children's schools and/or daycare on a school day and on a non-school day changeover will be professionally supervised at B Contact Service, or such other professional supervised contact service as agreed between the parents, but to be unsupervised as from 5(c) and to take place at a venue of the wife's discretion.
2. The husband shall meet any costs associated with the supervised changeovers and for those purposes the parents each forthwith attend at B Contact Service to complete all applications and interviews for the use of the Service and that the parents have leave to provide a copy of these orders to the Contact Service.

1. During the time the children spend with the husband, the husband will ensure that the children attend their sport, social and other extracurricular activities.

Communication between the parents and access to information

1. Save as otherwise agreed between the parents in writing, the parents communicate about all matters relating to the children or either of them in writing by AppClose (free App).
2. All communication between the parents be limited in scope to matters concerning the children, and both parents be restrained from communicating about any other matters save via a legal representative, family dispute resolution practitioner, or mediator.
3. The parents keep each other informed in writing of:

(a) their respective email addresses and contact telephone numbers, including mobile phone numbers, at least seven (7) days prior to the change where practicable and otherwise, as soon as possible after the change; and

(b) all serious illnesses and/or injuries sustained by any of the children whilst in their respective care requiring hospitalisation or specialist medical attention and notify the other parent of the name and contact details of the medical practitioner(s) and allied health professionals treating the child as soon as practicable.

1. The husband be at liberty to seek and obtain from the children's school copies of reports, notices, correspondence, photographs and other like documents parents ordinarily receive at his own expense.

1. The parents and their agents are restrained by injunction from:

(a) using corporal punishment or physically disciplining the children or allowing any other person to do so;

(b) abusing, belittling, rebuking or denigrating the other parent, or making negative comments about the other parent, the other parent's partner or family members, to or in the presence or hearing of the children, or allowing any other person to do so;

(c) discussing these proceedings or any related documents with or in the presence or hearing of the children, or allowing any other person to do so; and

(d) communicating messages to each other through the children.

1. The parents be at liberty to provide a copy of these orders to each of:

(a) the children's school(s) and daycare;

(b) any medical, dental, and other allied health professionals treating the children; and

(c) the Child Support Agency and any other government department responsible for providing services for or relating to the children or either of them.

1. The appointment of the Independent Children's Lawyer be discharged.

1. Within ninety (90) days of the date of these orders ("the date"), the wife refinance the property/mortgage into her name.
2. Within ninety (90) days of the date of these orders the husband do all such acts and things and sign all documents as required to transfer to the wife at her sole expense (save for any fees associated with the husband engaging a PEXA agent to act in the transaction) all his right, title and interest in the property known as D Street, Suburb E VIC [...] and being the whole of the land in title reference Volume [...] Folio [...] ("[D Street] property") to the wife.
3. Until the transfer of the property in order 18 above, the husband shall continue to pay as they fall due all regular instalments in respect of the mortgage, council rates and water rates in respect of the property and pay immediately any arrears in respect of the said instalments.
4. In the event that the wife is unable to refinance pursuant to order 17 above, then the wife to immediately do all things and sign all necessary documents to engage an Estate Agent of her choice to place D Street, Suburb E VIC [...] on the market for sale ("the sale") and the husband to do all things and sign all necessary documents to effect the sale including contract of sale and discharge of mortgage.
5. The wife shall assume responsibility of paying the regular instalments in respect of the mortgage, council rates and water rates in respect of the property upon advising the husband that she is unable to refinance.
6. The wife otherwise retain, to the exclusion of the husband, for her sole use and benefit:

(a) Motor Vehicle 1 bearing registration [...] and the husband will do all such things necessary to transfer the registration to the wife within 7 days of these orders;

(b) F Street, City G, Country H;

(c) funds in her bank account; and

(d) the furniture and contents in her possession.

1. The husband otherwise retain, to the exclusion of the wife, for his sole use and benefit:

(a) the proceeds from the sale of J Street, City G, Country H;

(b) the proceeds from the sale of K Street, L Town, Country H; and

(c) funds in his bank account including funds withdrawn from the M Bank Offset Account.

1. Pursuant to s 90XT(1)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), whenever a splitable payment becomes payable in respect of the husband's, MR VESELY, interest in Superannuation Fund 1 as the Trustee of the fund, the trustee shall pay to the wife, MS LAHTI, the amount calculated in accordance with Part 7 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025, using a base amount of $150,341 or 50 per cent of the current value of the husband's superannuation account (whichever is the higher ) and there should be a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of the person to whom a splitable payment would have been made but for these orders.
2. Each party and the Trustee has liberty to apply on not less than three (3) business days, notice.
3. The wife do all acts and things to forthwith serve a copy of these orders upon the Trustee.
4. There be liberty to apply to each party and the Trustee in relation to the implementation of the orders affecting the superannuation interest.
5. Unless otherwise specified in this order and except for the purposes of enforcing the payment of any money due under this or any subsequent order:

(a) each party shall be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all property (including choses-in-action) in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders;

(b) monies standing to the credit of the parties in any bank accounts shall be the property of the party in whose name such bank account is held;

(c) each party hereby forgoes any claim they may have to any superannuation or insurance benefit belonging to or owned by the other and the party in whose name any such policy of superannuation or insurance stands shall be deemed to be the owner and beneficiary of such policy to the exclusion of the other;

(d) each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property or any financial resource to which that party is entitled pursuant to this order;

(e) each party shall be solely responsible for and indemnify the other against the payment of any liability (including income or other taxation assessments) standing in their sole name, or jointly with another person, whether past, present or future;

(f) any gift, inheritance, or windfall received by either party after the date of this order will be the property of the party to whom the gift is given, the inheritance bequeathed to or windfall paid to, as the case may be; and

(g) any property or financial resources acquired by either party after the date of this order, will be the property or financial resource of the party whom acquires the same.

1. All extant applications, save as to costs, be otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym of Vesely & Lahti has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Mr Vesely ("the husband") is the applicant in proceedings for both parenting and property orders. Ms Lahti ("the wife") is the respondent.
2. There are three children of the marriage namely X born 2018 (aged 7 years), Y born 2019 (aged 6 years) and Z born 2021 (aged 4 years) ("the children").
3. Where the children currently spend supervised time with the husband, he commenced the trial seeking orders on a structured basis towards an equal shared living and care arrangement to operate for three months after the date of final orders. Relevantly, he proposed orders whereby the wife's time with the children be subject to her successfully undertaking a psychological assessment for asserted mental illness.
4. The husband initially proposed an order for joint parental responsibility for important decision-making for the children. When confronted in his evidence as to the allegations he makes against the wife as to her capacity and mental health and his agreement with the wife as to poor communication and lack of co-operation between them as parents, he then proposed an order that he have sole parental responsibility for the children.
5. In his interviews for the Family Report the husband put his position for parenting orders in a number of alternatives. Nevertheless, despite prosecuting his case on the basis of:

(a) the wife suffering a mental illness that impacted on her parenting capacity;

(b) that it was the wife who instigated family violence against him, and

(c) that he had been the primary carer for the children,

by the time of his counsel's final submissions the husband incongruently with such arguments mounted throughout his evidence, sought orders effectively consistent with those proposed by the Independent Children's Lawyer ("ICL") and the wife, albeit with some fine differences in detail, which would see sole parental responsibility vesting in the wife and with the children to live primarily with the wife.

1. The children's time with the husband would be staged towards ultimately spending time with him fortnightly between Thursday after school until Saturday at 12 noon. Unfortunately, counsel for the husband's final submissions did not enlighten the Court as to why he had made such a significant change of position and did not make any retractions of the serious assertions and allegations he had made against the wife.
2. The wife proposes that she have sole parental responsibility for decision-making for the children and that the children live with her. She initially argued that the children's time with the husband be supervised on approximately six occasions per year. However, she now adopts the position put by the ICL being that the children initially spend time with the husband for a period of six months on a fortnightly regime of week one from Friday at the conclusion of school until 6.00pm and in week two on Sunday for a period of four hours from 2.00pm until 6.00pm with the changeovers to be supervised. Thereafter for a period of six months with time on the Friday to continue but time on the Sunday in week two to be for a period of six hours. Thereafter for a period of six months and on a fortnightly regime in week one from Friday at the conclusion of school until 9.00am on Saturday and in week two for a period of six hours on the Sunday. The final step would have the children spend time with the husband fortnightly from Thursday at the conclusion of school until 12.00pm on Saturday. The cessation of the time on Saturday is to accommodate the wife and the children attending their church on Sundays. The ICL proposes that changeovers be supervised until the final stage above.
3. In respect of financial matters the husband argues for an 80 per cent distribution of the net property pool in his favour and 20 per cent to the wife.
4. Where it is clear that the aim of the wife's application is to retain the equity in the former matrimonial home (where the husband seeks to also retain the property) she asks for a 60 per cent adjustment of the parties' net tangible property and a 50/50 split from the husband's superannuation entitlements where the wife herself has no superannuation.

1. There are issues between the parties as to the content and value of items in the property pool and, in particular, the value of two properties in Country H owned by the husband where he says that he has passed such ownership to his brother.
2. There are issues as to the value of a property owned by the wife in Country H.
3. The wife argues that the husband has wasted assets since separation where within the context of the husband having a $156,000 per year income, he has dissipated savings of some $122,000; claims to have borrowed $107,000 from relatives and acquaintances and dissipated those monies; and failed to comply with an interlocutory/interim court order to maintain mortgage payments on the home whereby the mortgage has increased from $308,000 at separation to currently sitting at $334,000.
4. There are issues generally between the parties as to their contributions and the weight to be given to their contributions.
5. Each of the parties argues for adjustment in his or her favour pursuant to factors under s 79(5) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
6. There are serious issues of mutual allegations of family violence albeit that the husband's assertion that the wife was habitually violent to him during the marriage being difficult to maintain given the parenting orders he now seeks. The wife claims that the husband was physically, verbally, financially, and coercively controlling during the marriage and that he demeaned and humiliated her by his misogynist attitude.
7. Generally, there are significant issues of disputed fact and credit between the parties directly relevant to the Court's determinations in both financial and parenting matters.

1. The husband is 45 years of age. He was born in Country H. He works in a high-level role as a researcher.
2. The wife is 32 years of age. She was born in Country H. She is self-employed in the health industry.
3. The parties met in Country H in 2016 and married in late 2016.
4. In 2016 the wife relocated to Australia where the husband was already resident, but where the wife continued to travel to Country H intermittently to attend to family and business matters.
5. The children of the relationship were born in 2018, 2019, and 2021.
6. The parties separated in December 2022.
7. In January 2023 the husband vacated the former matrimonial home. The children have not spent unsupervised time with him since then.
8. There have been frequent State Court Intervention and Family Violence Orders between the parties. Matters have been referred to Child Protection who issued a Case Plan in early 2023.
9. The husband commenced these proceedings by an application filed 2 March 2023.
10. A s 69ZW Report of 12 April 2023 shows Child Protection having substantiated reported concerns for the children's exposure to family violence perpetrated by the husband.
11. On 20 April 2023 orders were made for the children to spend time with the husband for three hours a week supervised by family friends or such other person nominated by the ICL.
12. A Child Impact Report was released dated 23 June 2023.
13. On 28 June 2023 further orders were made for the children to spend additional time with the husband weekly but supervised by a Family Contact Service or T Family Service.
14. On 4 August 2023 a psychological evaluation of the husband was prepared by Dr N and the parties then engaged B Contact Service for supervised time which recommenced in October 2023.
15. On 14 July 2024 a Family Report prepared by Ms O was released.
16. On 16 October 2024 orders were made pursuant to s 102NA of the Act that each of the parties be legally represented.
17. On 12 June 2025 an updated Family Report was prepared by Ms O.

1. Part VII of the Act provides for the process towards determining parenting orders whereby at s 60CA the best interests of the children is to be the paramount consideration for the Court.
2. In determining children's best interests the Court is to reference the probative evidence and the parties' proposals to the factors set out at s 60CC(2) where the focus for the Court is on the safety of children and to prevent their exposure to family violence, abuse or neglect. Specifically, the Court is to consider the views of the children but according to their maturity and rationality. The Court is to consider the capacity of each of the parents to attend to the children's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs together with the benefit for the children in having a relationship with their parents but again with a reference to relative safety issues.
3. Section 60B of the Act defines parental responsibility as meeting all of the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to their children. Such responsibility is normally seen as manifesting in respect of important long-term decisions for children in matters such as religion, education, medical procedure and the like.
4. Section 61CA of the Act encourages consultation between parents towards major long-term decisions for their children but yet again referenced on safety. By reason of s 61D a Court can confer parental responsibility for a child on either parent or on the parents jointly which would be premised on the ability of the parents to consult with each other and to make a genuine effort towards a joint decision thereby showing a degree of child focus, objectivity and cooperation.
5. Where the Court is called upon to make determinations of disputed fact it does so to a standard of "on the balance of probabilities" pursuant to s 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) which states:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject - matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. Notably, in the process of a trial and the findings of fact, a party making an assertion of fact carries an onus to prove that fact to the requisite standard being on the balance of probabilities. It is not for a party facing an assertion or allegation to prove a negative.
2. In determining issues of credit, the Court has the considerable advantage of seeing and hearing the parties give evidence and be cross-examined. The Court views the demeanour of the witnesses and the nature and directness of their responses. The Court should, however, be careful to understand that parties and witnesses in trials are in uncomfortable and unfamiliar environments where they might be keen to avoid admission against interest and where educational, social, language and cultural traits must also be taken into account in determining credit.

1. The husband relied on his trial affidavit sworn 8 May 2025 and an affidavit in reply of 27 June 2025 together with a sworn financial statement filed 9 May 2025.
2. The husband's case for primary care of children, as it was put initially, was based on assertions as to the wife suffering a mental illness such that compromised her capacity to care for the children. He argued that he was the historical primary carer of the children and more lately that the wife had delegated that role to the maternal grandparents. He said he was the victim of the wife's family violence. He maintained these assertions and allegations throughout his cross-examination. Strangely his incongruent position taken at final addresses was not accompanied by any retreat from his assertions against the wife.
3. The husband was a poor witness. I do not find generally that he was a witness of the truth. The tenor of his evidence was to deflect and blame the wife and in particular with his blanket denials of family violence where such denials were often made in the face of persuasive evidence to the contrary.
4. The husband presented as empowered, entitled, misogynist and, at times, arrogant in his responses in cross-examination. I am comfortably satisfied that a number of his responses were untruthful and deliberately so as for example, where he denied knowledge or participation in emails adduced by him and asserting to be from a "[Ms P]" sent to VicRoads and Q Association enclosing copies or details of the wife's medical records which had been brought to this Court by subpoena. The only persons having proper access to the subpoenaed documents were the parties themselves and their legal representatives. The husband's bizarre suggestion that the wife herself had disseminated this material to these authorities in some attempt to "set up" the husband was unpersuasive in the extreme. The husband denied any knowledge of "[Ms P]" and gave no persuasive explanation as to how the emails came into his possession.
5. The husband was given numerous opportunities, including from the bench, to retreat from both his denials of violence perpetrated by him and his allegations of violence by the wife. He was taken to evidence contrary to his own assertions but remained steadfast in his denials.
6. I generally found the husband's evidence to be consistent with the wife's allegations against him that he presents with a misogynist attitude towards the wife and generally to this Court where he openly threatens appeals if orders are made contrary to those sought by him. I maintain a strong suspicion that the husband's strident prosecution of his applications in both parenting and property matters, and the overuse of the subpoena facility, where his case was generally and transparently unsupported by the facts, presents in itself as a form of systems abuse and of a further particular of his propensity for controlling and coercive behaviour.
7. I accept that the husband comes from a culture with views different to those of 21st-century Australia as to the relationships between male and female. The evidence is that the husband functions otherwise successfully within the community but not so within his personal relationships where he maintains a position of male superiority.

1. The wife was voluble and expansive in her evidence whilst at times unconvincing in her apparent spontaneous emotion. Nevertheless, when she settled into cross-examination, I found the wife to be generally a witness of the truth and one able to make admissions against interest. Her responses were informed and direct and, where necessary, highly particularised. I generally prefer the evidence of the wife over that of the husband where there is a factual or credit dispute.
2. The wife's case to be the primary carer of the children is based on her allegations that the husband has perpetrated serious family violence on her and that he continues to do so by way of systems abuse and coercive and controlling behaviour. She now concedes that a relationship between the children and the husband may be fostered if only by reason of her ability to have kept the children from exposure to the husband's violent demeanour. She says that she has been demeaned and humiliated by the husband and his misogynist attitudes and practices and that he lacks the insight necessary to be a primary or prominent parent to the children.
3. The wife presented, unlike the husband, as child focused in her evidence. Notably during cross-examination the wife was able to move from a position of limited supervised time for the children with the husband to one where she could be comfortable with the children spending unsupervised time with him, albeit while still maintaining her concerns as to the children's safety and as to the husband's attitude and lack of insight. If alternative positions were put by the wife during her cross-examination then they came with the conditions which were, after hearing the evidence of the husband, entirely reasonable.

1. Ms R is the wife's mother and is the maternal grandmother of the children. She provided an affidavit sworn 10 July 2025 and filed with the leave of the Court. She gave evidence and was cross-examined with the assistance of an interpreter.
2. The maternal grandmother's evidence corroborates that of the wife. She says that she witnessed family violence perpetrated by the husband.
3. The maternal grandmother denies the allegations made by the husband against the maternal grandfather of him sexually abusing his three daughters.
4. The maternal grandmother corroborates the wife's evidence that a loan rendered to the parties by the maternal grandparents to assist with the establishment of the wife's business was attempted to be repaid by the husband. However, this was not accepted by the maternal grandmother and her husband due to concerns that the money might be used to exert pressure or control over the wife.
5. The maternal grandmother denied that she was or had been the delegated major carer for the children.
6. Within the limitations of the evidence being interpreted, I observed the maternal grandmother to be an honest and informed witness. I generally accept her evidence as against that of the husband.

1. Ms O is a Family Consultant and provided two Family Reports in this matter dated 16 July 2024[1] and 12 June 2025.[2] Ms O gave evidence and was cross-examined. I was significantly assisted by the evidence of Ms O who I found to be an informed, balanced and considered expert.
2. The Family Consultant gave evidence and was extensively cross-examined.
3. In her first report at [104] the Family Consultant identifies the three children as having been exposed to family violence and adapting to parental separation but nevertheless presenting with positive and close attachment to both parents.
4. Whilst identifying the primary issue of family violence and credit in this respect between the parties, the Family Consultant then recommended as follows:

115. The Court to grant an Order for shared parental responsibility.

1. The children live with [the wife] and spend time with [the husband] after school and on a Saturday. This may be increased for one overnight when time spent has been positive.

2. [The wife] to be able to take the children for holidays to [Country H] safely and without [the husband] seeking involvement from the [Country H] Court.

118. Communication to occur through a Court recommended parenting app.

1. In her more recent report of 12 June 2025, the Family Consultant in her considerations bases her recommendations on the husband's potential for family violence and his attitude where at [102] she says:
   1. The above recommendations are solely based upon [the husband's] behaviour following finalisation of this matter. If there are any further attempts to discredit, denigrate, or the use of systems abuse against [the wife], or to interfere with her daily life, it is recommended that time be suspended and a further assessment of [the husband's] risk be considered.
2. Subject to those conditions the Family Consultant recommended that the children spend time with the husband for four hours on Saturday in week one and Sunday after church in week two with changeovers to occur at a professional centre, increasing to six hours after six months.
3. Then at [101] the Family Consultant recommended the children's time further increase to Friday night after school to Saturday lunchtime every alternative weekend and on Sunday after church to Monday at school every alternate weekend with changeovers to continue in a professional changeover facility but with such increase not to occur for one year.
4. It is clear that the Family Consultant's recommendations were guided by the serious allegations of family violence of physical, emotional, financial, and coercive/control, and systems abuse as deposed by the wife in her affidavit material and to this Court.
5. The Family Consultant substantially dismissed each of the husband's three alternative arguments for his primary care of the children as being without basis or fundamentally contrary to the children's best interests.
6. The Family Consultant in her evidence was critical of the husband for his systems abuse in issuing copious subpoena in respect of the wife's medical and other records. It is clear that the Family Consultant was of the view that it was the husband who was either the author or instigator of the emails from "[Ms P]" to VicRoads and to the wife's professional body.
7. Having interviewed the children, the Family Consultant was of the view that the wife had substantially protected and quarantined the children against the nature of these proceedings and the volatile relationship between the parents albeit that both X and Y had an understanding of the negative relationship between their parents.
8. Having seen and heard the Family Consultant give her evidence in Court, I conclude that she was cautious in the extreme as to the veracity of the husband's statements to her in his allegations against the wife. Whilst she recognised a good and attached relationship between the children and the husband, the Family Consultant's recommendations for time between the children and the husband were conditional upon a change in the husband's attitude towards the wife.

1. Ms S affirmed an affidavit on 30 June 2025. She is a professional Contact Supervisor and the Manager and Director of T Family Service. Her affidavit annexes a Supervision Report dated 13 June 2025 detailing six supervised contact sessions between the children and their father. She was not required for cross-examination.
2. The reports of supervised time are comprehensive and generally positive in respect of the husband's attitude and behaviour at supervised visits and that the children showed a loving and attached a relationship with him.

1. Dr N is a Clinical Psychologist and prepared a psychological assessment dated 4 August 2023 in respect of the husband such annexed to her affidavit affirmed 7 September 2023.
2. Dr N was not required for cross-examination.
3. Dr N did not interview the wife but had the benefit of affidavit material and objective materials from the Court file.
4. Cognitively the husband was estimated to function in the high average range of intellectual abilities.
5. On the Paulhus Deception Scale (PDS) the husband was found to have a "very high likelihood of invalid responses on psychometric measures due to overly positive self-presentation".
6. On the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) the husband was found to not have "answered in a completely forthright manner" and tending to "portray himself in a consistently favourable light as being relatively free of common shortcomings". He was reluctant to acknowledge limitations. It was found that he may minimise or be unaware of problems at times.
7. Based on a Family Strengths and Needs Assessment (FSNA) testing the husband presented as a low to moderate parenting risk noting issues of co-parenting problems and allegations of family violence including the exposure of children to that violence.
8. In her conclusions, Dr N found the husband to exhibit Cluster B traits including inflated sense of self, tendency to externalise, possible pattern of interpersonal problems but not constituting a formal disorder.
9. Again at [75] the husband's profile suggested a very high likelihood of invalid responses on psychometric tools due to overly positive self-presentation.
10. At [78] Dr N assessed the risk where the risk was deemed to be low to moderate in respect of the husband.
11. At [79] Dr N opines in respect of the husband:

While the allegations against [the husband] could not be corroborated, there are some components of the picture that are troubling. [The husband] was listed as the perpetrator by Victoria Police in five family violence incidents with [the wife]. The records show two other alleged victims from 2015 and 2016 reporting sexual and physical assault. Although there is no evidence confirming the abusive behaviours, if confirmed, the allegations would point to a pattern of abuse and control in intimate relationships.

1. At [80] Dr N noted that there are no allegations of the husband directly inflicting harm upon the children (contrary to the wife's affidavit in these proceedings) and that he expressed care and affection for the children, but also noting that risk would lay in the children's exposure to his alleged abusive behaviours towards others.
2. Dr N recommended that the husband engage in individual therapy on a weekly basis with a clinical psychologist and recommended a Dr U. It is clear from the second report Dr U was engaged by the husband but for reasons not explained, the husband did not adduce evidence from Dr U.

1. Within the context of the now limited ambit of dispute where effectively the husband agrees with the orders sought by the ICL and the wife, but with a more rapid progression to the ultimate stage, it remains necessary to make some findings in respect of the evidence with reference to the matters at s 60CC of the Act.
2. I am comfortably satisfied that the wife has been the primary carer of the children both during the relationship and since separation. I reject the husband's assertions that the wife delegated this role to him during the relationship and has similarly done so to her parents since separation.
3. The Family Report indicates a close and attached relationship for the children with the wife. I find that the husband's various allegations against the wife are made generally without evidentiary basis and expect they have been made in an attempt simply to aggravate the wife within those proceedings and hence constitutive themselves a form of systems abuse.
4. Nevertheless, I also find that the children have a developed and continuing loving and attached relationship with their father despite limited recent contact and where time has taken place within the constraints of supervision.
5. I reject the various challenges made by the husband as to the wife's capacity to care for the children. His claims that the wife suffers a mental illness are unsupported by any evidence and unsubstantiated. I consider these allegations to be a form of systems abuse. Notably the husband did not seek orders for a psychiatric or psychological assessment of the wife despite his consistent assertions as to her mental health. The Family Consultant's enquiries of the wife's psychologist discloses no concern for the wife's mental health but rather concern for the reported impact on her of violence perpetrated by the husband. I adopt and accept the opinion of the Family Consultant in this regard and as set out [96] or her second report thus:

[The husband's] request for a mental health assessment for [the wife], and for the children to live with him while she has treatment, is also of substantial concern. There is no evidence that [the wife] has any current diagnosed mental health condition and any distress exhibited would be substantially caused by the Court proceedings. [The wife] has previously been treated for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, however, [the wife] is not currently experiencing any of the usual criteria expected for this diagnosis. [The husband] has not provided any credible reason for this view and it presents as another form of control through disingenuous means.

1. I find on the balance of possibilities that the husband has perpetrated systems abuse as against the wife and as follows:

(i) I find the husband to be either the instigator or author of the "[Ms P]" emails directed to VicRoads and the wife's professional body. In making this finding I also find that he has illegally used documents brought to Court under subpoena and to disseminate information from such subpoena within the community for the purposes of interfering with the wife's enjoyment of life and/or to harm her career;

(ii) For reasons of self-interest I find that the husband has obtained orders from a Country H Court preventing travel for the wife and the children back to Australia and has done so without any proper evidentiary basis;

(iii) I find that the husband had placed an Airport Watchlist Order preventing the wife from attending her sister's wedding in Country H in July 2024 where the husband himself attended the location of that function, taking photographs, so as to aggravate the wife;

(iv) I find that without foundation the husband has alleged the wife to have been a victim of sexual assault by her own father;

(v) I find that taking out an intervention order preventing the wife from attending the church of her choice constitutes systems abuse;

(vi) I find that the husband instituting defamation proceedings against the wife's mother and uncle in Country H was done without proper evidentiary basis or certainly with no evidence given or adduced to this Court to justify such proceeding;

(vii) I find that the husband causing some 57 subpoena to issue in these proceedings and where material from such subpoena were substantially not relied upon his case constitutes systems abuse; and

(viii) I find that the husband, without proper evidentiary basis, alleged the wife to be in an extramarital affair with her lawyer.

1. I generally reject the husband's allegations of family violence perpetrated by the wife. I found the wife to be a credible, consistent and informed witness. She was able to make admissions against interest such as for example perpetrating some violent acts but under provocation or in retaliation. The family violence in this case should be seen within the context of the empowerment and dominance within the relationship exerted by the husband and where his violence towards the wife was at times demeaning and humiliating as well as physical, verbal, emotional and controlling.
2. Despite my findings as to the wife being a victim of family violence, it is to her credit that she has managed to keep the children from greater exposure to the husband's violence in the household prior to separation. This demonstrates her ability to prioritise the children's needs over her own.
3. I find generally that the husband has perpetrated physical, emotional, psychological, financial and coercive/controlling violence against the wife. The wife's allegations are particularised in some detail in her affidavit and expanded upon in her evidence in Court including under cross-examination. I accept the wife's evidence over the denials of the husband. The wife's assertions as to family violence are corroborated by both video and audio evidence tendered to the Court during the trial. Those recordings of the husband show demeaning and humiliating language towards the wife such that cannot be adequately explained by cultural background or by translation. The attempts by the husband at explanation or justification were not persuasive. I find that there are parts of the audio proceedings which unambiguously constitute threats to harm the wife physically. The language used in the recordings demonstrates the husband's misogyny, empowerment, and sense of gender superiority.
4. Video evidence shows the husband being abusive, threatening, and perpetrating physical abuse to the wife. An instance of the husband taking possession of the wife's telephone to view its contents without her permission and against her protest again demonstrates his misogyny and sense of gender superiority.
5. A prominent example of the husband's sense of entitlement comes from the second family report at [62] as follows:

[62] [The husband] advised that he is currently attending a psychologist and has stable mental health. [The husband] reported that his treatment involves discussing the Court matters and he is supported by [Dr U] in education regarding language and relationships. [The husband] explained that he would say to [Dr U] that he may have been aggressive at times within the relationship and that [Dr U] would correct him, advising that he had not been violent, and that the word he should use would be "assertive".

1. The husband did not adduce evidence from Dr U.
2. The children are still young and not of an age where they would be able to rationalise their best interests insofar as their living and parenting arrangements are concerned. That the Family Consultant observes a close and attached relationship between the husband and the children is, in my view, very much to the credit of the wife in quarantining the children from the husband's violent disposition.
3. Generally, I find on the evidence of both parents that, by reason of the husband's misogyny and sense of superiority, there is not an open and equal communicative relationship between the parents. I find that the wife continues to fear the husband and does so with good reason. I find that the husband was and continues to see himself as dominant in his relationship with his wife and in matters concerning the children and despite the wife being historically the primary carer of the children. I find little optimism for any co-operative and positive co-parenting given the continuing attitude of the husband and his failure to acknowledge and accept his failings. It follows, therefore, that any consideration for joint parenting responsibility for decision-making for the children would not be in the children's best interests. I note, however, that only at the time of his counsel's final submissions, that the husband conceded sole parental responsibility to the wife. There will be an order that the wife have sole parental responsibility for decision-making for the children.
4. I am easily satisfied that the children should live primarily with the wife and continue her role as the primary parent and is now, again only at the end of the evidence, conceded by the husband.
5. The issue of time with for the children with the husband is perplexing and problematic. On the one hand, I find no insight achieved by the husband into his behaviour and the likely impact on the children of being exposed to such behaviour. There are no indications of admission, regret, or remorse. He continues in his denials of family violence. The risk to the children of the continuation of the husband's attitude is evidenced by the initial position put by the ICL that time for the children should be limited to a few occasions each year for "identity contact". That position has changed since the informed evidence of the Family Consultant and the wife herself. It is therefore with some reservation that I determine that the children spend time with the husband. That time should be implemented with stages and ultimately be in the terms suggested by the ICL albeit I see no rationale or benefit in the inclusion of the second step proposed by the ICL.

1. Matters of alteration of property interests are provided for at s 79 of the Act where at sub-section (1) the Court is given a broad discretion to make such orders as it considers appropriate but subject to the limitations of the statute itself.
2. Amendments to s 79 of the Act pursuant to the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) commenced on 10 June 2025 and hence govern my consideration in this matter. Relevantly the amended Act at s 79(4) in respect of contributions and s 79(5) in relation to further adjustments provides as follows:

79 Alteration of property interests

Considerations relating to contributions

(4) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(i), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property, whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last‑mentioned property, whether or not that last‑mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them;

(c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

(ca) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the ability of a party to the marriage to make the kind of contributions referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c);

(d) the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage;

(f) any other order made under this Act affecting a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage;

(g) any child support under the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 that a party to the marriage has provided for a child of the marriage.

Considerations relating to current and future circumstances

(5) For the purposes of subparagraph (3)(b)(ii), the court is to take into account the following considerations, so far as they are relevant:

(a) the effect of any family violence, to which one party to the marriage has subjected or exposed the other party, on the current and future circumstances of the other party, including on any of the matters mentioned elsewhere in this subsection;

(b) the age and state of health of each of the parties to the marriage;

(c) the income, property and financial resources of each of the parties to the marriage and the physical and mental capacity of each of them for appropriate gainful employment;

(d) the effect of any material wastage, caused intentionally or recklessly by a party to the marriage, of property or financial resources of either of the parties to the marriage or both of them;

(e) any liabilities incurred by either of the parties to the marriage or both of them, including the nature of the liabilities and the circumstances relating to them;

(f) the extent to which either party to the marriage has the care of a child of the marriage who has not attained the age of 18 years, including the need of either party to provide appropriate housing for such a child;

(g) commitments of each of the parties to the marriage that are necessary to enable the party to support themselves and any child or other person that the party has a duty to maintain;

(h) the responsibilities of either party to the marriage to support any other person;

(i) the eligibility of either party to the marriage for a pension, allowance or benefit under:

(i) any law of the Commonwealth, of a State or Territory or of another country; or

(ii) any superannuation fund or scheme, whether the fund or scheme was established, or operates, within or outside Australia;

(j) if either party to the marriage is eligible for a pension, allowance or benefit as mentioned in paragraph (i)-the rate at which it is being paid to the party;

(k) if the parties to the marriage have separated or divorced, a standard of living that in all the circumstances is reasonable;

(l) the extent to which an alteration of the interests of the parties to the marriage in any property would enable a party to undertake education or establish a business or otherwise obtain an adequate income;

(m) the effect of any proposed order on the ability of a creditor of a party to the marriage to recover the creditor's debt, so far as that effect is relevant;

(n) the extent to which each party to the marriage has contributed to the income, earning capacity, property and financial resources of the other party;

(o) the duration of the marriage and the extent to which it has affected the earning capacity of each party to the marriage;

(p) the need to protect a party to the marriage who wishes to continue that party's role as a parent;

1. The consideration at s 79(2) was highlighted by the High Court in Stanford v Stanford[3] where the Court confirmed at [37] that it is necessary for a trial Court to actively consider whether it is just and equitable to make any order between the parties. That consideration is circumstantial but importantly not to be one simply conflated with the considerations of contributions at s 79(4). In the matter now before me, the parties have been separated since January 2023 and the marriage is irretrievable. Their finances have been intertwined and relevantly they are not the joint registered proprietors of the former matrimonial home at Suburb E where the wife seeks orders for the transfer of that property to her. There are three children of the marriage living with the wife.
2. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied that it is just and inequitable to consider an alteration of the parties' property interests.
3. Prior to the decision in Stanford, and continuing but perhaps now without its previous rigidity, there was a long-established approach of a four-step process in the s 79 determination being:

(i) to identify and value the parties' legal and enteral equitable interest in property;

(ii) to identify and assess the contributions of the parties to the property pool where contributions may be of a direct or indirect financial type or non-financial type including as homemaker and parent;

(iii) to then identify and assess any other factors (now at s 79(5)) in determining whether any further adjustments to either party are just and equitable following the consideration of contributions; and

(iv) to consider whether the proposed orders are themselves just and equitable but where justice and equity permeates the entire consideration.

1. A reading of the recent amendments to the Act makes it clear that:

(a) the property pool is to be established as it exists at the date of the trial;

(b) the previously available tool of "add-backs" or "notional property", where a party had unilaterally reduced a property pool or disposed of an asset following separation, is no longer available;

(c) issues of "wastage" may now be dealt with pursuant to s 79(5) of the Act; and

(d) issues of family violence come to be considered under the Act at both the contribution and the adjustment stages.

1. Earlier amendments to the Act mandated that superannuation was to be "treated as property" although often not crystallised in the form of a tangible asset. The Court may determine the property settlement on either a "one pool" basis being inclusive of both superannuation and tangible assets or, alternatively, on a "two" pool basis dealing separately with the tangible assets and superannuation. In this matter, counsel for the wife urges me to take a two-pool approach where the value of the tangible assets is limited but where the husband's superannuation has a value of $300,000. I accept that submission.

1. The parties disagree and there are issues of credit between them as to many items subject to inclusion or not in the property. They do, however, agree that the former matrimonial home registered solely in the name of the husband and situated at D Street, Suburb E, Victoria is valued at $560,000.
2. The wife acknowledges the initial contributions of both parties of real property in Country H and Australia and, the husband's superior initial financial contribution in this respect. She argues, however, for a significant adjustment to her by reason of relevant s 79(5) factors and including wastage of assets by the husband since separation together with her primary responsibility for the care of the children and a significant earning discrepancy between she and the husband. Matters of family violence are prevalent in the wife's case.
3. The husband says that he made a greater initial and superior financial contribution during the relationship. He claims that his non-financial contributions equal those of the wife. He claims that his contributions were made more onerous by the wife's family violence against him. He says that the wife has wasted assets since separation. The husband says that the evidence favours an alteration of the property pool in his favour by reason of contributions and that there should be adjustments to him by reason of the s 79(5) factors including his "serious heart condition" and an age discrepancy between he and the wife. The husband argues, therefore, that he should receive 80 per cent of the property pool. He concedes a superannuation split to the wife of $100,000 from his superannuation entitlements.
4. At separation the parties had funds in an offset bank account with a balance of $122,678. The current balance is $700. It is not in dispute that it is the husband who has had sole use of the account. The wife gives evidence of the husband making regular and substantial cash withdrawals until the funds were virtually exhausted. He has been unable to account in any detail for the expenditure of those funds.
5. The husband in his affidavit of 27 June 2025 at [72] disputes the quantum of the bank account at separation but where there is also a discrete dispute as to the date of separation, I accept the wife's evidence as to the balance of the bank account being $122,678.
6. The husband was cross-examined and given an opportunity to explain his expenditure of the $122,000. He says that the money was used to pay legal fees ($11,000), overseas travel and expenses ($9,000), family support in Country H and medical expenses for his father ($5,000), an engagement gift for his brother ($,5000) and accommodation and related expenses for five months of separation ($10,000) together with "daily living expenses and basic needs" ($8,000).
7. At the time of his expenditure of the $122,000, the husband was in full-time employment with an income of $156,000 per annum. He also deposes to have taken loans from relatives and acquaintances of $107,000.
8. I do not accept that the husband's evidence as to his disbursement of the bank account balance to be for "reasonable expenditure". I consider that he has wasted the asset of the bank account balance and this is a matter now to be considered at s 79(5)(d) of the Act.
9. The parties dispute the value of the wife's property at F Street, City G, Country H (Clinic). The wife deposes at [126] to signing an "off-the-plan-contract" for the purchase of this commercial property in March 2015 for $65,000 USD and paying a deposit of $35,000 USD. The wife says that the property is valued at $64,000 USD (AUD $100,000). The husband says the property is valued at $96,000 USD or $148,000 AUD.
10. In October 2023 a court order was made to value the property. Not unusually, the wife was to nominate three valuers and the husband was to make an election from the nominees. This occurred. The evidence is that the husband immediately obtained a valuation from the nominated valuer but without full disclosure as to its family law purpose. The valuation was $96,000 USD. It followed that the valuer was then properly instructed by joint letter for the court ordered valuation. Fully informed, that valuation was $64,000 USD. The discrepancy is not explained save and except that the husband did not disclose the purpose of the valuation when unilaterally instructing the valuer. The husband did not call the valuer to justify the inflated valuation over and above the court ordered valuation. In all the circumstances, I prefer the wife's argument based on the valuation prepared with the informed court order and at $64,000 USD $100,000 AUD.
11. The husband was the owner of or had an interest in properties at J Street, City G, Country H (an apartment) and K Street, L Town, Country H (vacant land). The husband did not co-operate in obtaining a valuation. The wife obtained valuations from the same valuer who provided the court ordered valuation for the clinic. Those valuations are $117,500 (AUD) and $112,200 (AUD) respectively.
12. The husband says that he has disposed of the property. He provides some documentary evidence of a purported sale to his brother. The husband claims to have held a partial interest only and a mortgage on those properties. His evidence was vague and uncertain. The wife disputes his evidence. The husband did not adduce evidence from his brother on affidavit or otherwise. The wife produces utility bills/electricity bills that are in the husband's name and far out date the asserted sale of the property.
13. The wife at [137] concedes that the husband owned these properties as at the date of marriage. She says that the husband refused to include the property in an asset pool in negotiations prior to the trial and would not participate in a valuation.
14. In respect of the mortgage, the wife says at [142] that an economic crisis commenced in Country H in 2019 causing a significant depreciation of the Country H currency against the USD. She says that the husband maintained his mortgage repayment held with the Country H Bank whilst the Country H currency was losing its value against the US dollar and took advantage of that depreciation by sending money to Country H for an earlier satisfaction of the mortgage. She says that by December 2020 the mortgage was only $13,000 USD ($19,000 AUD) and now likely satisfied.
15. The wife says that the husband's claim to have sold the properties occurred only during the course of marital problems leading to separation. She concedes that there was a contract signed in February 2021 with the settlement date being March 2022 which was after the parties' separation. She says that the purported sale was, in any event, made at less than value. She says that the husband has not been forthcoming with an explanation as to the sale of the properties at less than market value.
16. At [150] the wife deposes and where her evidence is unchallenged:

Though the properties have been registered in the [husband's] brother's name, all the utility bills with the relevant authorities remain in the [husband's] name as well as the [husband's] name noted at the entrance of the building. This transaction is not genuine and the transfer has been done by the [the husband] in an attempt to reduce the value of the asset pool.

1. I also generally accept the wife's evidence as against the husband. Significantly, he has not adduced evidence from his brother on affidavit or otherwise as to the purported sale where the wife clearly challenges the bona fides of that asserted. He has provided no explanation for the sale apparently under value. He has given no explanation as to the distribution of the proceeds of sale. He cannot explain why utility bills remain in his name and that his name appears at the front of the property. Consistent with the evidence of the husband generally, I do not accept his evidence in respect of the sale of the properties, and they will be included at value in the property pool on the husband's side of the ledger albeit noting the initial contribution of these properties by the husband.
2. There is a M Bank mortgage secured against D Street, Suburb E. The wife deposes that the liability under the mortgages at the date of separation was $308,092. That liability is now considered by the husband to sit at $334,000. An interim order was made in April 2023 inter alia for the husband to pay the mortgage, rates and taxes on the D Street, Suburb E property until resolution of this matter or further order. In June 2023, without further court order or the consent of the wife, the husband commenced paying interest only on the mortgage liability until November 2023. He has made no payments on the mortgage since November 2023 and hence the current liability under the mortgage is $334,000.
3. There appears to have been no application by the husband to vary or discharge the interim order obligating him to pay the mortgage.
4. The husband gives no satisfactory explanation as to why he has not complied with the court order and paid the mortgage. During this period the husband was in full-time employment with an income of $156,000 per annum. He has had the benefit of $122,000 diminished from the M Bank offset account. He says that he has obtained loans from acquaintances and relatives of $107,000. Taking all of these matters into account, I am not convinced that the husband has provided a reasonable excuse for breaching the interim order and not paying the mortgage. This constitutes wastage as now noted in the Act at s 79(5)(d).
5. The husband claims to have taken personal loans for $107,000 from acquaintances and relatives and asks that this amount be included in the balance sheet as a matrimonial liability. He does not give evidence of reasonable expenditure for the disbursement of the funds apparently received by loan where at the time of the loans the husband was in receipt of income of $156,000 per year; had the benefit of $122,000 disbursed from the mortgage offset account; and was not complying with a Court order to meet the mortgage and other outgoings on the former matrimonial home. The husband did not call evidence from any of the purported lenders. I do not accept that these are genuine liabilities of the marriage and should not therefore be included in the property pool.
6. The husband in his case summary alleges the wife to have either withdrawn funds or have an account with her mother totalling $214,745. If the husband makes an assertion of fact then he carries the onus to prove that assertion on the balance of probabilities. The wife was not cross-examined or cross-examined relevantly as to these allegations. The husband simply makes bold assertions which the wife denies at [154] of her affidavit. The husband has not proved his assertion on the balance of probabilities.
7. Having made the above findings, I crystallise the property pool as follows:

K Street, L Town, Country H (vacant land) (husband)

1. The wife concedes that the husband owned the properties at Suburb E and in Country H (two properties) at the date of commencement of cohabitation. She says that the Suburb E property was purchased in June 2015 for $420,000. Notably cohabitation commenced in December 2016. The mortgage liability is currently $334,000. The husband says in his trial affidavit at [346] that the equity in the property at the date of commencement of cohabitation was "at least approximately $110,000". There is no evidence to contradict this estimate.
2. The husband says that he entered the relationship with superannuation entitlements of approximately $100,000. There is no evidence to contradict this assertion.
3. The husband said he had savings of $20,000 and Motor Vehicle 2 valued at $20,000 at the commencement of cohabitation.
4. The husband says in his trial affidavit at [349(d)] that the purchase of the property in Country H being the Clinic was completed in December 2018 and that he withdrew $30,000 from his mortgage account with $35,000 from savings in his offset account to finance this purchase. He says the also gave $50,000 to the wife's mother, to repay a loan made by the wife's mother to the wife. The wife's mother and the wife disputed that the payment was accepted. I prefer their evidence. As such, I accept that the wife's parents contributed towards the purchase of the wife's clinic.
5. The husband's affidavit at [349] alludes to various contributions he said he made during the relationship. However, as these payments were made during the marriage and where both parties were in employment, I cannot find these to be contributions specifically by either party. Notably, the parties were living together in a family unit with three children born during the relationship. It is clear that the wife worked as self-employed in both Victoria and Country H and that the husband was gainfully employed. The contributions asserted by the husband should be seen within this context.
6. I accept that the wife has been the primary homemaker and principal carer or the children during the relationship. The husband, however, has worked consistently and productively in his professional field.
7. Where the husband had equity in the three properties in his name included in the balance sheet as at the date of commencement of cohabitation but also noting the wife's parents contribution to her property in Country H together with the wife's superior post-separation contribution to the care of the children together with the husband not meeting his child support obligations until about November 2023 then I consider, on contributions, that the property pool should be divided as to 57.5 per cent to the husband and 42.5 per cent to the wife.

SECTION 79(5) CONSIDERATIONS

1. Relevantly, on the basis of my findings above, I must take into account here that the husband has had the use of $122,000 from the mortgage offset account together with the non-payment of the mortgage, contrary to court orders, allowing that mortgage liability to draw out by some $26,000. These are weighty matters given the limited value of the property pool and the requirement of these Courts to give some form of reality in respect of these considerations rather than just a nominal percentage.[4]
2. Further, the wife by reason of my orders will now have primary care of the children who are still young.
3. Whilst the wife is self-employed, her income from all sources, including Centrelink benefits, amounts to about $62,000 per annum where the husband enjoys a superior income of approximately $156,000 per annum. The husband will also be in a position to further superannuate himself.
4. A further and weighty consideration is the issue of family violence perpetrated by the husband on the wife during the relationship. Whilst the wife does not specifically seek any amount by way of damages, the violence was consistent and varied in its type and included physical, emotional, psychological, financial and coercive/controlling violence. The husband was demeaning and humiliating of the wife during the relationship. I have found that the husband attempted to influence the wife's professional body so as to cause difficulties with her self-employment and similarly to cause suspension or removal of her driver's licence. The husband has litigated this matter vigorously through unnecessary use of subpoena. He has consistently suggested that the wife suffers a mental illness and hence her capacity to parent children is compromised but where there is no diagnosis and I am comfortably satisfied that the husband has raised this matter without evidence and it is, therefore, a form of psychological abuse. I am satisfied that the nature of the husband's concerted violence of various types has impacted seriously and negatively on the wife in making her obligations as a parent to these three young children more arduous and onerous.
5. Taking all of these matters into account and again noting the limited value of the property pool, I am persuaded that an adjustment of 20 per cent of the property pool to the wife would be just and equitable.

1. On the basis of my findings as to contributions and s 79(5) considerations, I will distribute the property pool as to 62.5 per cent to the wife and 37.5 per cent to the husband. Such a distribution would give the wife, on my calculations, property at value of $369,187 where the wife seeks only to retain the equity in the home, (subject to the mortgage), her Motor Vehicle 1, and the Country H Clinic. I calculate that she would receive net property of $361,000 which is within the range of her entitlement from my findings. I will order accordingly.
2. The wife seeks a splitting order from the husband's superannuation entitlement of 50 per cent. I accept the husband's unchallenged evidence that he had a superannuation entitlement as at the date of the marriage of approximately $100,000. I note, however, the significant contributions made post-separation by the wife as homemaker and parent together with the relevant s 79(5) factors considered above. I am easily persuaded, therefore, that an equal division of the husband's superannuation entitlement would be just and equitable where the wife has no current personal superannuation but that the husband will be in a position to continue to superannuate himself for the duration of his working life.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-three (143) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice McGuire.

[3] (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52.

[4] Clauson & Clauson [1995] FamCA 10; (1995) FLC 92-595.