1. The market value of the land is agreed, at $2,830,000.
2. This amount was not the subject of any debate or discussion at the hearing. No formal valuation evidence was called, or required to be called. This amount therefore forms part of the Tribunal's order for compensation as an agreed item, without further analysis.

The amount of compensation may be increased by such amount, not exceeding 10% of the market value of the land, by way of solatium as is reasonable to compensate the claimant for intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantages resulting from the acquisition.

1. Section 44(2) of the LAC Act requires the assessment to take into account 'all relevant circumstances applicable to the claimant', but also sets out a number of non-exhaustive factors to which regard must be had in considering solatium, comprising the following:

(a) the interest of the claimant in the acquired land; and

(b) the length of time during which the claimant had occupied the land; and

(c) the inconvenience likely to be suffered by the claimant by reason of removal from the land; and

(d) the period of time after the acquisition of the land during which the claimant has been, or will be, allowed to remain in possession of the land; and

(e) the period of time during which, but for the acquisition of the land, the claimant would have been likely to continue to occupy the land; and

(g) where the claimant at the date of acquisition is occupying the land as the claimant's principal place of residence, the number, age and circumstances of other people (if any) living with the claimant.

1. Common principles relating to solatium (upon which the parties did not materially disagree) include the following:
   • Solatium is an award 'apt to cover inconvenience and in a proper case distress caused by compulsory taking'[2], and covers 'subjective and imponderable factors such as nuisance, annoyance, inconvenience and distress'[3];
   • Solatium is not an amount for provable loss[4], either in the form of a loss to which the claimant is otherwise entitled under the LAC Act or as a placebo for other tangible loss not covered by the heads of compensation under that Act. As s 44(1) indicates, solatium covers intangible and non-pecuniary disadvantage;
   • Solatium may include an award for matters arising before the actual acquisition provided there is a connection[5];
   • Solatium is discretionary[6].
2. The Authority had offered 4% solatium, later increased to an offer of 5% of market value. Its key premise was that this was a tax-free lump sum equating to a significant and (in the Authority's view) reasonable sum of $141,500 for solatium having regard to the fact that:
   • The applicant's did not occupy the property as their principal place of residence. It was a holiday house.
   • The applicants had made a conscious decision not to sell their property to the Authority during the government buy-back program that commenced in 1985, and therefore had the continuing benefit of the property through to its formal acquisition in May 2008, with possession until September 2008.
3. The applicants claim 10% solatium, arguing that their intangible loss would well exceed this statutory cap.
4. Despite the Authority having itself offered solatium on a percentage basis, the Authority's counsel also raised a threshold issue, arguing that the 10% cap on solatium imposed by s 44(1) was not a starting or reference point that created a range of 0% to 10% within which solatium might be awarded on a percentage basis. Rather, it was appropriate to award solatium by determining an appropriate and reasonable dollar amount, provided that amount did not exceed the overall ceiling on solatium created by the 10% cap[7].
5. As the applicants conceded, this approach may be strictly correct following the wording of s 44(1), despite common practice and most decisions of courts and tribunals over the past 40 years adopting the more pragmatic approach of awarding solatium by way of a percentage amount.
6. The parties foreshadowed at the hearing a pending Supreme Court decision on this point, and in subsequent correspondence brought to my attention the actual decision in Roads Corporation v Love[8]. There, Justice Osborn indicated:

... whilst I accept that the statute does not require an award of a percentage of market value, I do not accept that questions of proportionality to market value are necessarily irrelevant to the disposition of the issue[9].

It has been the practice of successive judges in this Court to award solatium pursuant to the LAC Act by reference to a calculation of a percentage of market value[10].

I do not accept that it is not open to express an award of solatium by reference to a percentage of reduction in market value but I do accept the submission of both parties that the fundamental task is to assess an appropriate lump sum amount[11].

And, having assessed solatium as a fixed dollar amount in that case:

In these circumstances it is unnecessary to resolve the question of construction relating to the ceiling applicable under s 44(1) of the LAC Act[12].

1. I endorse and adopt these comments, being in any event bound by them. Provided I am satisfied of the overall appropriateness of the lump sum amount I have assessed for solatium, it is not inappropriate if that amount approximates to, or is awarded as, a percentage of market value. Indeed, as I have indicated, despite its arguments, the Authority has itself offered solatium on a percentage basis in this proceeding.
2. I have assessed solatium, in the circumstances of this case and having regard to relevant matters including those in s 44(2) of the LAC Act, at $230,000. Whilst I consider this an appropriate and reasonable lump sum amount in its own right (for the reasons set out below), it is not in my view inappropriate that this lump sum also approximates to roughly 8% (rounded up) of market value.
3. In coming to the view, in the exercise of my discretion, that $230,000 represents an appropriate and reasonable amount for solatium, I have had specific regard to the following:
   • In offering solatium at only 5% of market value, I consider the Authority has placed undue weight on the property being a 'holiday house' rather than the applicants' principal place of residence. Section 44(2)(g) of the LAC Act (referred to above) does not expressly discriminate on this basis (i.e. whether or not the acquired property is a principal place of residence), but rather brings the resident's circumstances into account if the acquired property is a principal place of residence.
   • Whilst it may be common to assess higher solatium for the inconvenience or distress caused by the loss of a principal place of residence, each case turns on its own facts. There may be circumstances (as here) where a so-called 'holiday house' has greater emotional ties for a family than the principal place of residence of individual family members, and where the distress of its acquisition is more significant.
   • Here, the property 'Nanja' had been in the Verwey/Utber family for over 60 years, across 5 generations. It was, on any account, a unique and irreplaceable property with a ringside view of the world-renowned fairy penguin parade (indeed a reason for its acquisition). It was, on the uncontested evidence of Mrs Verwey, the very 'centre' of the family where various arms of the extended family came together for shared experiences and happy occasions, where there were fond memories of long childhood summers by the beach, where family ashes are scattered within the viewshed, and where Mrs Verwey herself intended to retire.
   • In the strict terms of s 44(2)(d) of the LAC Act, the applicants remained in possession only 4 months after the actual acquisition. Little turns on this. I consider that the Authority may have placed undue weight on the applicants having not participated in the government buy-back program operating since 1985, and having had the continuing benefit of use of the property since acquisition was first mooted.
   • I accept the evidence of Mrs Verwey that the reality was quite different. On any account, the buy-back and acquisition process for the Summerland estate has been extraordinary, continuing over 25 years. This included periods when the government had insufficient funds to complete voluntary buy-backs, periods when information was hard to come by, and other periods when compulsory acquisition appeared imminent. For the Verwey/Utber family, it was a lengthy period of on-going uncertainty. Despite having made a conscious decision (as they were entitled) to not participate in the voluntary buy-back scheme, they faced a long period where they could not really invest in the upkeep or future potential of their property, yet it was difficult to plan with certainty for a replacement property. The community and services around them dwindled, they were faced with restrictions resulting from the nature reserve being created around them, and they were in limbo with the threat of ultimate acquisition (at an unknown date) always looming. Whilst there was some information flow from the Authority during this period, family members were regularly involved in on-going requests for information, dialogue with the Authority, dealings with advisers, and contact with the ombudsman and politicians. The nuisance, annoyance, inconvenience and distress over an extended period is palpable and significant.
4. In terms of the factors under s 44(2) of the LAC Act that I must mandatorily have regard to, none dissuade me from the view that solatium should be assessed at a higher figure than the $141,500 offered by the Authority and that a figure of $230,000 is more reasonable. Indeed, in my view, these factors in combination support the amount I have assessed from a more general review of the relevant circumstances of the applicants. In saying this, it will be clear also that I am not persuaded that the intangible loss suffered by the Verwey/Utber family here is so extreme as to warrant an assessment of solatium exceeding $283,000 (i.e. the maximum payable under the 10% cap pursuant to s 44(1)), as contended by the applicants. As I have indicated, their intangible loss is palpable and significant, but a figure within the range of $230,000 for solatium is in my view a fair and appropriate assessment of compensation for such loss.

1. Section 41(1)(d) of the LAC Act provides that, in assessing compensation, regard must be had to any loss attributable to disturbance, with that term defined in s 40 as meaning, essentially, any pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant as the "natural, direct and reasonable consequence" of the divesting of the claimant's interest in the land.
2. Common principles relating to disturbance loss (upon which the parties did not materially disagree) include the following:
   • Whether a pecuniary loss is a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of acquisition, depends upon whether these factors are satisfied objectively, according to there ordinary English meaning, as a matter of fact[13];
   • The word 'natural' in this context means arising according to the usual course of things[14];
   • The word 'direct' in this context connotes an immediate and substantial causal connection, and excludes what is indirect[15];
   • The word 'reasonable' in this context connotes a reasonable response to the event triggering the right to compensation[16];
   • The three adjectives in combination connote a very close and limited connection between the event of disturbance and the financial loss suffered[17];
   • A loss may be the natural, direct and reasonable consequence of acquisition even it was suffered before the acquisition occurred. The expression requires a causal connection rather than a temporal connection[18]. Causation should be considered in a common sense factual way[19];
3. Loss attributable to disturbance will commonly include the purchase costs of a replacement property (where conveyancing costs, transfer fees and stamp duty etc are actually incurred), as it will commonly be the natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the claimant's divesting of his or her property that leads to the purchase of a replacement property. The loss attributable to disturbance may involve the purchase of more than one property, provided the purchased properties that in combination comprise the 'replacement' are reasonably necessary to place the claimant in a similar position and their overall value does not exceed the comparable value of the acquired property[20].
4. The Authority has agreed to compensate the purchase costs of a partial replacement property at Ventnor Beach Road, Ventnor, purchased in 2009. The Authority contests the claim for the purchase costs (and associated holding costs) for a partial replacement property in Glamis Road, Ventnor, purchased in 1999. The Authority claims the Glamis Road costs are not a pecuniary loss suffered by the claimant as the 'natural, direct and reasonable consequence' of the compulsory acquisition in 2008. I will deal with these matters in turn.

1. This item relates to the costs of purchase of a partial replacement property at 201 Ventnor Beach Road, Ventnor. At the time of the hearing, a replacement property had not been purchased by the Verwey arm of the family, and a time limit imposed by the Authority for such a purchase (if purchase costs were to be compensated as an actual pecuniary loss) had expired. A 'hypothetical' claim for anticipated purchase costs (then claimed at $80,675.00) was contested by the Authority, and I had reserved my decision on this item.
2. Shortly after the hearing, the applicants advised the Tribunal that a property had been purchased at 201 Ventnor Beach Road on 29 December 2009. The Authority subsequently advised that, subject to this purchase being completed[21], it would agree to reimburse purchase costs for stamp duty, registration and legal fees in the claimed amount of $51,525.00. I have therefore included this item in the order for compensation without further discussion of the debate that had taken place on this item at the hearing.

1. The applicants also seek the inclusion, as a compensable item, of replacement costs in the sum of $6,654.00 for the purchase of what the applicants contend was another partial replacement property at Glamis Road, incurred some 8 years before the actual acquisition.
2. The contract note for the purchase of the Glamis Road property[22] is dated 2 November 1999 - the date of acceptance by the vendor. Given that it was for a purchase of 2 acres of vacant land for $160,000.00, and the 'improved' value of the property 'Nanja' was a matter of unresolved valuation dispute at the time, it is by no means clear that this property represented one half of the intended replacement for 'Nanja'. There was no evidence of valuation or development cost to support this. Moreover, the land was purchased jointly by the family trust together with Mrs Verwey and Mrs Utber, and it is again not clear that that the land was then intended solely for the Utber arm of the family[23]. Although the Authority argued that I should not be at all confident that the Glamis Road purchase was always intended as a partial replacement property for the Utber arm of the family, I am prepared to accept Mrs Verwey's evidence that this was the case.
3. The question remains as to whether the purchase of Glamis Road in 1999 was the 'natural, direct and reasonable consequence' of the compulsory acquisition in 2008. Based upon the principles set out earlier (i.e. the requirement for a causal rather than a temporal connection to establish a loss attributable to disturbance), the 8 year lapse of time is not of itself fatal to the applicants' claim.
4. The Authority contends that, when the Glamis Road property was purchased in 1999, the voluntary buy-back scheme within the Summerland estate was still continuing, and there was no formal acquisition pending for the 'Nanja' property. A compulsory acquisition was not imminent. Indeed, from contemporaneous correspondence[24], Mrs Verwey was aware of this. The actual decision to compulsorily acquire was not made until September 2007. The Authority therefore contends that the Glamis Road purchase was not 'natural' (in the sense of arising according to the usual course of things), 'direct' (in the sense of having an immediate and substantial connection to an imminent acquisition), or 'reasonable' (in the sense of being a reasonable response to the compulsory acquisition in 2008).
5. The applicant's counsel contended that the Authority's position reflected a lawyerly, beguiling, and somewhat semantic deconstruction of events that misrepresented the reality of the situation then prevailing. On this aspect, I tend to agree (although, as will be seen, I do not hold this view on other aspects of the Authority's response).
6. As I have indicated, on any account, the buy-back and acquisition process for the Summerland estate has been extraordinary, continuing over 25 years. The documentary evidence before me, contained in the affidavits of Mrs Verwey and Mr U'Ren, shows that this extended process included periods of some uncertainty for the applicants. An original information memorandum from 1985 indicates that the buy-back program would run for 15 years (i.e. until 2000), with no-one forced to sell within that period. The clear inference is that compulsory acquisition of the remaining properties would then occur in or soon after 2000. In 1991, the Authority confirmed that compulsory purchase would not occur 'until the final stages of the program'. In 1998, the Authority indicated that, if the buy-back program could not be completed by the target date in 2000, negotiations would continue for so long as funding was available, but that there was then no current intention to acquire properties compulsorily. Despite this, Mr U'Ren conceded that the 2000 target date (to complete the voluntary buy-back program) still stood when the Glamis Road purchase occurred, and compulsory acquisition always still remained as the final option for those (such as the Verwey/Utber family) not voluntarily selling as part of that program.
7. I agree with the applicants that it was reasonable for them to assume, from the totality of the information before them in the period from 1985 to 1999, that a compulsory acquisition may still occur as early as 2000 (i.e. the scheduled end of the buy-back program) or relatively soon thereafter. It was therefore reasonable for them to purchase a partial replacement property in late 1999 in contemplation of the likely pending acquisition of 'Nanja'. They were not to know that the compulsory acquisition of 'Nanja' would not occur until 2008 when funding finally became available to acquire the remaining properties. I agree with the applicants that the timing of the Authority's compulsory process was beyond their control in this regard, and could equally have occurred in say 2002 or any other year, such that the Authority's 'delay' until 2008 is not legally relevant to the reasonableness of the applicants' actions in 1999 in purchasing the Glamis Road property.
8. In my view, on an objective and common sense view of the facts and circumstances of this case, there is a sufficient causal nexus to establish that the Glamis Road purchase was the 'natural, direct and reasonable' consequence of a pending acquisition of 'Nanja', notwithstanding that the actual acquisition did not arise for some years.
9. I have therefore allowed this item in the claimed amount of $6,654.00.

Claimed 'loss of use of money' resulting from purchase of Glamis Road

1. As a result of the applicants' purchase of Glamis Road in 1999, and the acquisition of 'Nanja' not occurring until 2008, the applicants claim to have lost the use of the $160,000 purchase price for that period. At an assumed interest rate of 6.5% to the date of advancement of compensation monies, they claim an amount of $83,200.00 for loss of use of money, as an additional pecuniary loss attributable to disturbance.
2. Whilst there was some debate as to quantum, and whether there should be a 'trade off' between this loss (if established) and a capital gain realised on the Glamis Road property during the same period, I do not need to decide those matters. I agree with the Authority that this item fails at a more threshold level.
3. For this component to succeed as a compensable item, it must be separately established that this pecuniary loss suffered through the loss of use of money arose as a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the later compulsory acquisition of 'Nanja'. I do not accept that this outcome should necessarily follow from my finding that the purchase of Glamis Road was itself a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of acquisition. There are other surrounding facts that lead me to a different view on this item.
4. As indicated, the applicants purchased Glamis Road on 2 November 1999. Somewhat remarkably, they did not tell the Authority about this purchase until after the compulsory acquisition of 'Nanja' in 2008. This was no oversight on their part. In particular:
   • By letter dated 5 November 1999[25], Mr U'Ren wrote to Mrs Verwey advising the Authority's estimate of the value of 'Nanja' at $380,000 and seeking to ascertain if she wished to proceed with a voluntary sale ahead of the Authority obtaining a valuation and making a formal offer;
   • By letter dated 10 November 1999[26], Mrs Verwey responded to the effect that:

'we have been looking in the market place to relocate'

'we have looked along the south coast at blocks ... and these are offered at $200,000 and $300,000 with no buildings and services ...'

'we believe that a more realistic figure for our property would be closer to some three times the Valuer-General's current estimate'

'nevetheless, to proceed the matter further, I suggest you obtain the formal valuation of the property as soon as possible'

1. Mrs Verwey chose not to mention that, rather than just looking to relocate, the applicants had just 8 days earlier purchased a partial replacement property. The price was $160,000, well below the $200,000 to $300,000 range she quoted. At that time, Mrs Verwey also held a valuation from Herron Todd White that suggested 'Nanja' was worth $650,000 - less than double the Authority's estimate, rather than the 'three times' she indicated. Mrs Verwey also at least implied that a voluntary sale may be possible by requesting the Authority proceed to obtain a valuation.
2. I do not suggest Mrs Verwey's conduct was in any way unlawful. However, the applicants had clearly embarked on a deliberate tactical response, withholding some information and seeking to create an impression about other information, presumably intended to influence the timing of acquisition and/or maximise the applicants' ultimate compensation in future negotiations.
3. This situation prevailed over the next few months. For example:
   • By letter dated 21 March 2000[27] to both Mrs Verwey and Mrs Utber, Mr U'Ren indicated 'Nanja' had been valued at $374,000 and he was prepared to recommend it be purchased at that figure. He suggested that the applicants obtain a valuation as a basis for an asking price, and the respective valuers could then convene a valuers conference to determine the value. A notice of intention not to acquire by compulsory process was attached (which had the effect under the LAC Act of deferring any possible compulsory process for at least 12 months);
   • By letter dated 4 May 2000[28], the family trust responded, declining the offer and suggesting negotiations be deferred, "perhaps even until the properties are the subject on the compulsory acquisition process".
4. The applicants' letter does not mention the Glamis Road purchase, nor the Herron Todd White valuation of 'Nanja'. It essentially closes the door on a voluntary sale, and nothing material then occurred until September 2007 when the government announced it would acquire the remaining properties in the Summerland estate.
5. The applicants' counsel contended that to hold this conduct in some way against the applicants on the 'loss of use of money' claim would again be a lawyerly and semantic deconstruction of events that misrepresented the reality of the situation. On this aspect, I do not agree. Objectvely considered, the Glamis Road purchase was a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the later acquisition of 'Nanja'. However, I believe the applicants' subsequent deliberate conduct, in not telling the Authority about this purchase, exaggerating the extent of the difference in valuations for 'Nanja' (and thus polarising rather than resolving the valuation issue), and then unilaterally withdrawing from negotiations, was significant. It had the combined effect of breaking any close and limited connection that might have made the 'loss of use of money' a direct or reasonable consequence of the acquisition. The Authority was not made aware of the pecuniary loss accruing over 8 years, and was therefore given no opportunity to mitigate the loss. It was deprived of the opportunity to advance funds for the Glamis Road purchase, or to offer a cheaper form of funding than the credit interest claimed. It was deprived of the opportunity to bring forward an acquisition of 'Nanja' (if it had been minded to do so as a consequence of the Glamis Road purchase) or to purchase 'Nanja' in a reasonably contemporaneous market to the property market prevailing when Glamis Road was purchased. The pecuniary loss was therefore incurred primarily as a result of the applicants' conduct, rather than being a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the later acquisition. Had the applicants put the Authority on notice that this loss was being incurred, or at least told the Authority about the Glamis Road purchase so that such a loss might be reasonably foreseeable, I may well have reached a different view.
6. It follows in my view that this item should be disallowed.

Claimed 'out of pocket' holding costs resulting from purchase of Glamis Road

1. As a result of the applicants' purchase of Glamis Road in 1999, and the acquisition not occurring until 2008, the applicants also claim to have incurred holding costs on Glamis Road. They claim an amount of $25,467.00 for council and water rates, land tax, and fire hazard removal, as an additional pecuniary loss attributable to disturbance.
2. I do not agree with the applicants that allowance of this item outcome should automatically follow from my finding that the purchase of Glamis Road was itself a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of acquisition. For the same reasons as those outlined for the preceding item, I do not consider these holding costs to be a natural, direct and reasonable consequence of the later acquisition of 'Nanja'.

1. The applicant had included in its claim, as a separate item, an amount of $5,417.00 for the cost of planning and valuation reports prepared in 1999 by Perrott Lyon Mathieson and Herron Todd White respectively in relation to 'Nanja'.
2. There was little (if any) comment on this item at the hearing, and neither party dealt with the issue in evidence or in formal submissions.
3. The Perrott Lyon Mathieson planning report was not produced to me and I have no basis to assess its relevance. The existence of the Herron Todd White valuation report was dealt with more broadly in submissions, as discussed earlier. Although the report was obtained ostensibly for use in pending acquisition discussions, and might therefore have become a claimable item, the applicants chose not to use the report in this way and did not produce it to the Authority (nor rely on the valuation in it) in the discussions and correspondence with the Authority within this period.
4. In the absence of other supporting material, this item is disallowed.

1. This item was agreed at $18,011.00 before the hearing, and was not the subject of any debate or discussion at the hearing. The amount therefore forms part of the Tribunal's order for compensation as an agreed item, without further analysis.

1. The consequence of the foregoing discussion is that the applicant's claim is allowed in part, as detailed in my orders.
2. The Authority has already made substantial payments to the applicants in line with its offers to date, including the full market value of the land. My findings and order lead to a higher award of compensation, so there will be a further nett payment to the applicants. Interest is payable on any unpaid amounts in accordance with sections 53(1) and 56 of the LAC Act 1986, and my orders allow for this. I do not have sufficient material before me to determine interest, nor know the date of ultimate payment(s). I expect the Authority can quickly assess the appropriate amount at the time of payment, and this should not be a matter of any controversy. However, if there is any disagreement, the orders allow interest to be determined by the Tribunal.
3. At the parties' request, I have reserved costs. As noted in the order, to provide for certainty, any application for costs or a determination of interest is to be made in writing (including supporting submissions) and filed with the Tribunal and served on the other party within 60 days of the date of this Order.

[1] The land is comprised in Plan of Consolidation 101809 contained in Certificate of Title Volume 8992 Folio 322, together with Lot 21 on Plan of Subdivision 13744 contained in Certificate of Title Volume 8253 Folio 257.

[2] March v City of Frankston [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350, 356-8

[3] Robertson v Commissioner for Main Roads (1987) 63 LGRA 420, 426

[4] March v City of Frankston [1969] VicRp 44; [1969] VR 350, 356-8

[5] King v Minister for Planning [1993] VicRp 11; [1993] 1 VR 159, 189-191

[6] Dacakis v Roads Corporation [1995] 2 VR 308, 537-538

[7] Following Mayberry v Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works (unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria (Barber J.), 8 June 1970).

[8] [2010] VCAT 32. The matter of solatium is dealt with at paragraphs [766] to [797]

[13] Roads Corporation v Schembri [2009] VSC 369 at [24]- [27], see also Melbourne Citylink Authority v Teford Pty Ltd [2001] VSCA 54 at [23]

[14] Halwood Corporation Ltd v Roads Corporation (1995) LGERA 280, 297-305

[17] Halwood at 305, summarised in Schembri at [24]

[18] King v Minister for Planning [1993] VicRp 11; [1993] 1 VR 159, 184

[19] March v Stramare [1991] HCA 12; (1991) 171 CLR 506, applied in Halwood at 298-299

[21] Settlement was due on 1 March 2010. The Tribunal has assumed that the purchase has been completed.

[22] Exhibit JHV-10 to the first affidavit of Jean Verwey.

[23] The Verwey arm of the family purchased the Ventnor Beach Road property in late 2009, and had only a short time earlier transferred their interest in the Glamis Road property to the Utbers.

[24] Letter dated 19 October 1999 from Mrs Verwey to Geoff U'Ren, then property manager (acquisitions) with the Authority - Exhibit GU-12 to the affidavit of Geoffrey U'ren.

[25] Exhibit GU-13 to the affidavit of Geoffrey U'ren

[26] Exhibit GU-14 to the affidavit of Geoffrey U'ren

[27] Exhibit GU-15 to the affidavit of Geoffrey U'ren

[28] Exhibit GU-16 to the affidavit of Geoffrey U'ren