Vaughn & Bramley (No 3) [2026] FedCFamC1F 22 (20 January 2026)

(a) $35,000 to the Applicant being a fixed contribution to the costs of the Applicant; and

(b) The balance of $49,566.63 to the Respondent as personal representative for Mr Bramley (deceased).

1. That all outstanding Applications and Responses are otherwise dismissed.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Vaughn & Bramley has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Arising from a Judgment delivered in this matter on 23 October 2025 (see Vaughn & Bramley (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1F 749, the Court ordered that funds held in Trust (by the Court) totalling $270,824 be distributed as to:
   • $90,000 to the Applicant Ms Vaughn; and
   • $180,824 to the Respondent Ms Bramley as legal personal representative of Mr Bramley (deceased).
2. The Applicant thereafter filed on 12 November 2025 an Application for costs. That Application also sought a stay of the Order made 23 October 2025, and on 19 November 2025, the Court ordered by consent:

That from the funds held by and paid into the Court (amounting to $270,824), the sum of $96,257.37 be distributed to the Respondent as personal representative for [Mr Bramley] (deceased) not earlier than as provided for in Order 2(c) of the Orders dated 23 October 2025.

with a balance of $84,566.63 to continue to be held in Court pending determination of the costs Application, and the Court also directed:

That by no later than 5.00pm (AEST) on 21 November 2025, the Respondent file and serve a Response and supporting affidavit in response to paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Applicant's costs application, and the Respondent is not permitted to rely on any material filed after 5.00pm (AEST) on 21 November 2025.

1. The Court has received and considered the following material:

(a) Application filed 12 November 2025;

(b) Affidavit of the Applicant filed 12 November 2025;

(c) Written submissions of the Applicant filed 26 November 2025;

(d) Further written submissions of the Applicant filed 19 January 2026;

(e) Response filed 21 November 2025;

(f) Affidavit of Respondent filed 21 November 2025;

(g) Written submissions of the Respondent filed 3 December 2025;

(h) Written submissions in reply of the Applicant filed 10 December 2025; and

(i) Further written submissions of the Respondent filed 19 January 2026.

1. The Applicant seeks an order for costs totalling $74,566.63 and a further $10,000 for the Application in a Proceeding, seeking a stay and costs. The Respondent submits that no costs order should be made at all.

1. The principles to be applied in costs Applications had, for many years, been prescribed by s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), however from 10 June 2025, s 114UB of the Act applies to proceedings heard after that date. As both the substantive hearing occurred on 29 August 2025 (between these parties) and the substantive costs application was, as noted earlier, filed in November 2025, the Court accepts that s 114UB may apply. However, the Applicant refers in the submissions to events (including the first part of the hearing) occurring as far back as 2021.
2. There are essentially few material differences between the two legislative provisions, and I note that the initial submissions of the Applicant were based on a pathway created by s 117, not s 114UB. As a result, the parties were invited to make a submission as to whether s 117 or s 114UB applied.

Legislative pathway as contended by the parties

1. The further written submissions filed on behalf of the Applicant on 19 January 2026 do not engage in any legal analysis or submissions as to whether s 117 or s 114UB should apply to these costs proceedings. The Applicant merely "accepts that the correct section number for the costs application is s 114UB..." and seeks to amend any references to s 117 in the previously filed submissions to s 114UB. Such approach was unhelpful.
2. The Respondent, by way of the written submissions filed on 19 January 2026, contended s 114UB should apply to the application for costs. In support of such position, the following submissions were argued:

(a) Amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the Act), whereby section 117 was repealed, and Section 114UB came into effect, commenced on 6 May 2024 pursuant to the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth).

(b) The relevant sections of the Act, as of the time an application is made, ought to be applied by the Court when determining the application (Navickas & Fried (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 80).

(c) The Application in a Proceeding in respect to costs was filed on 12 November 2025 (Costs Application).

(d) Where the Cost Application was filed after 6 May 2024, the relevant provision of the Act, which it is respectfully submitted should be applied by this Honourable Court, is Section 114UB.

1. The Respondent's submissions make reference to the incorrect legislative amendments. As stated at the commencement of the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("the Amendment Act"), the commencement of Schedule 4, Part 1, Divisions 1 to 3 occurred on 10 June 2025.
2. The Respondent's submissions further make reference to Navickas & Fried (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC1A 80, being a Full Court decision relating to a judge who had incorrectly applied the new legislative pathway (in relation to parenting proceedings) where a final hearing had commenced prior to those legislative amendments commencing.

1. In light of the submissions received by the parties, I note the following:

(a) The transitional arrangements under sch 4, div 3, s 15 of the Amendment Act provide that the application of amendments relating to costs, shall apply:

(i) to "proceedings instituted on or after the day this Division commences" - being 10 June 2025 as set by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) commencement; or

(ii) to "proceedings instituted before, and not finally determined before, the day this Division commences, other than proceedings in respect of which a final hearing has commenced before that day".

(b) The substantive proceedings were the subject of a final hearing, which commenced on 27 September 2021 and judgment thereafter being reserved on 29 September 2021. The proceedings were reopened due to the tragic passing of the husband (and the husband and wife's children) - with the second tranche of the hearing being conducted on 29 August 2025. Final Judgment finalising all matters between the parties (save for costs) was delivered on 23 October 2025. As a result, these proceedings had been instituted before the subject amendments commenced, were not finally determined, albeit a final hearing had commenced (sch 4, div 3, s 15(b) of the Amendment Act);

(c) Flowing from the final Judgment being delivered, an Application for costs was filed by the Applicant by way of an Application in a Proceeding on 12 November 2025; and

(d) Section 4 of the Act defines "proceeding" as "...a proceeding in a court, whether between the parties or not, and includes cross-proceedings or an incidental proceeding in the court of or in connection with a proceeding". Under the above circumstances, it can be found that such Application for costs is indeed an incidental proceeding in connection with a proceeding. As discussed by Altobelli J in Dajani & Dajani (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 432 (albeit in relation to stay proceedings) (see [63] and [64]), the subject Application for costs flows from the substantive proceedings, as but for the substantive proceedings occurring, the costs application would not have occurred.

1. In the circumstances outlined above, I am satisfied that s 117 applies.
2. The Act provides for each party to bear their own costs of proceedings, however if the Court is satisfied that the circumstances justify an order for costs, then after considering the factors set out in s 117(2A), the Court is empowered, in the exercise of its discretion, to make such order as to costs which is just.

1. The Applicant is a health professional earning a modest income. Her submission contends that she received a total of $342,668 from this litigation of which $252,668 remains in superannuation. The cash sum of $90,000 will have to meet her costs of $74,566.63 - leaving a small balance of $15,433.37.
2. The Respondent Estate was entitled to receive $184,482.41, and if required to pay the costs of $74,566.63 - a balance of approximately $110,000 will remain. However, the Respondent contends Estate expenses (notwithstanding the benefit from having pro bono legal representation) will use most of this "surplus".
3. The Applicant failed to acknowledge that her financial circumstances were improved by the personal injuries award.
4. In my assessment, the financial circumstances of the parties is not a factor which favours either party.

1. The Applicant did not have the assistance of legal aid and whilst the deceased father did have a grant of legal aid for the hearing in 2021, the Estate has had pro bono assistance. It is noted that the claim for costs relates to the period from 25 January 2022 and, clearly, only in respect of the property proceedings.

1. It is fair to consider this factor within the highly unusual and stressful environment that existed after the tragic death of the father and the two children. As my earlier Judgment sets out, the elongated nature of the procedures (especially the superannuation dispute) and the conflict over the children's personal items, demonstrated how both parties found it difficult to reach compromises. To this end, the Applicant's complaints that the Respondent failed to make reasonable compromises; left to the last moment any response or resolution in respect of procedural issues (for example, leave to provide documents to Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA); or generally would not seek to narrow the dispute, has some foundation - but must be seen in the context of the Applicant's persistence to challenge the decision made initially by the Trustee of Superannuation Fund 1, which favoured the position adopted by the Respondent.
2. Significant delays were then experienced as a result of the Applicant's complaint to AFCA lodged around 7 March 2023. With the benefit of the original decision (and the expectation of the receipt of the entirety of the late father's superannuation benefit), my impression is that the Respondent played "hard ball". Whilst this fight about the money continued (and even with Superannuation Fund 1 agreeing to pay funds into the Court, when able to do so), the ongoing dispute about the children's items continued as well. The latter issue was fuelled by emotion rather than logic - but both ladies were rigid at times. I agree the steps taken and time and costs incurred were disproportionate.
3. Complaints about full and complete disclosure by both parties are levelled. Again, I am satisfied both parties can be criticised in this regard - with perhaps most of the material issue being the progression and resolution of the Applicant's claim for personal injury against the Estate of the Mr Bramley (deceased).
4. I see no purpose in trying to dissect every particular application made and the surrounding correspondence which has been annexed to the somewhat self-serving affidavits of the Applicant and the Respondent. I accept both parties, because of the emotional context, were likely to be difficult clients to manage which can cause more correspondence to issue than may always be appropriate. This is in no way a criticism of the lawyers engaged by the parties, who at times, when they appeared before me, demonstrated hints of frustration and exasperation.

1. The Applicant submits that the Respondent was "unsuccessful" on all three Applications in a Proceeding - although most were ultimately resolved by consent orders. The Applicant says the Respondent was "wholly unsuccessful" on two legal issues:

(a) Whether the death benefit payment was a financial resource, or as found by the Court, property; and

(b) Whether an order should be made pursuant to the threshold consideration posed by s 90SM(8)(b), an argument rejected by the Court.

(a) neither party "lost", "won" or was "wholly unsuccessful";

(b) neither party obtained final orders in the respective terms sought by them at final hearing. I agree with this submission; and

(c) the questions of law to be determined in the matter were not simple, with experienced Counsel unable to agree on the exact principles to be applied.

1. In my view, whilst the need for the filing by the Applicant of the Applications in a Proceeding can be questioned, the Applications generally were the catalyst for some forward movement in the pending litigation - although, as the Respondent contents, much of the relief sought was ultimately the subject of negotiated consent orders. However, the final hearing was listed and proceeded because the parties could not reach a compromise as to how to divide the funds deposited into Court of $270,824. Each party's primary articulated position is that they should receive 100% of the funds. In determining that the funds were distributed as set out at [1] of these Reasons, it is clear neither party was "wholly unsuccessful".

1. The Applicant points to three offers of settlement that she says the Respondent ought to have accepted being:

(a) an offer to receive $87,117.66 on 13 June 2023 - being a payment of $85,000 from the death benefit claim and $2,117.66, being 50% of the outstanding wages owed to the deceased.

(b) after an offer was made on 4 October 2023 by the Respondent for the Applicant to receive $20,000 (which offer lapsed), on 30 September 2024 the Applicant made an offer of settlement reflecting the terms of the lapsed offer, which was not accepted by the Respondent; and

(c) at a round table conference held on 10 October 2024, a settlement was reached for payment of $18,000 from the death benefit claim to the Applicant, however the Applicant withdrew her offers of settlement.

1. The Applicant says she achieved an outcome "which exceeds any offer she made in an effort to resolve the matter and avoid the costs of litigation" and had the Respondent accepted any of the Applicant's offers, the Respondent would have benefited as set out at paragraph 32 of the submissions.
2. The Respondent submits that where the Applicant failed to disclose the existence and progression of a personal injuries claim in a timely manner - with a Settlement Deed dated 8 April 2025 only disclosed on 2 July 2025 - with a resultant payment to the Applicant of $525,000, the offers of settlement of 13 June 2023, 30 September 2024 and October 2024, "had expired and were incapable of acceptance by the time [the Applicant] had provided her more substantive disclosure of 11 August 2025."
3. Furthermore, it is submitted that at the time of the offers, the outcome arising from the Applicant's challenge of the decision by Superannuation Fund 1 to pay the full death benefit entitlement to the Respondent (as legal personal representative) was unknown. It was not until June 2025 that the Applicant confirmed she was not intending to appeal further the decision of the Trustee of Superannuation Fund 1.
4. I regard the attempts by the Applicant to seek to resolve the matter through the offers made as significant and an important but not decisive factor.

1. The Applicant properly confirmed that she does not seek a costs order for the first part of the property proceedings, or of course the parenting aspects of the litigation, but informs the Court that she incurred costs to, I infer, the conclusion of the "first part" of the proceedings on 29 September 2021. The Applicant seeks to assert mostly because of the pro bono assistance provided to the Respondent, that even after paying the Applicant's costs of $74,566.63, the outcome for the Estate is a benefit of $95,257.37.

1. Where these parties were so emotionally challenged, for understandable reasons, it appears as if the positions of the parties throughout the litigation, post appointment of Ms Bramley on 1 June 2022, were shaped by:

(a) the conflict over the children's clothing and items;

(b) the Applicant's sense of injustice arising from the decision of Superannuation Fund 1 to pay the entirety of the deceased's benefit to his Estate;

(c) the Respondent's sense of injustice arising from the benefits ultimately pursued by the Applicant for personal injuries; and

(d) the overall context that the Applicant and the deceased father had finally separated in July 2019, with all the family issues post separation (and the mother's request to relocate with the children) created.

1. It is possible a number of these factors have caused a lack of objectivity and focus of the parties to be distorted.
2. However, overall, notwithstanding the submissions of the Respondent, in my view the circumstances justify an order for costs in favour of the Applicant limited to:

(a) preparation for and the final hearing concluded on 29 August 2025; and

(b) the application for costs.

1. This is not a matter where the Court would order costs be paid on an indemnity basis.
2. After the Applicant gave details of her personal injuries settlement - a relevant factor as my substantive Reasons for Judgment reveal (see [41] and [42]), with disclosure only made fully in July 2025, was about the same time the Applicant decided not to pursue a further application or review of the Superannuation Fund 1 decision.
3. The Applicant's schedule of costs was annexed at MSV-31 to the Applicant's affidavit filed 12 November 2025 and commences with an entry on 25 November 2022. Between that date and 2 July 2025 (when the Deed of Release and disclosure was produced to the Respondent), much of the services from the particulars related to the superannuation dispute. I have already indicated I am not satisfied that costs are justified for the negotiations and Applications before 2 July 2025.
4. Although I do not accept it is my task to act as a taxing officer/registrar, the claimed costs (on MSV-31) from 2 July 2025 total $17,890.92. Additionally, disbursements (excluding Counsel's fee for Mr Bunning) since 2 July 2025 on a "billed basis", amount to $2,205.75 - which includes taxi fares, for what purpose is not clear.
5. Additionally, the Applicant claims:

Accommodation for solicitor for the final hearing

1. At its highest therefore, the Applicant seeks $32,082.63 for the period post 2 July 2025. I accept, additionally, at a time when it was hoped that the matter would proceed on the papers, written submissions were prepared and filed - and were in part relied upon at the trial.
2. At paragraph 25(a) and (b) of the Respondent's response submissions, some objections are raised to the quantification of costs. In the reply submissions, the Applicant challenges some of those objections.
3. This is a case where, for the benefit of finality, I have decided to fix costs in a total figure of $32,000, being:

1. I will allow a sum of $3,000 for the costs application.
2. In the circumstances, the funds remaining from the payment into the Court of $84,566.63 shall be disbursed as to:

(a) $35,000 to the Applicant; and

(b) $49,566.63 to the Respondent.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Baumann.