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[2019] FCA 1979
Federal Court of Australia
2018-11-30
Burley J
Original judgment source is linked above.
3.1 Ground 1: failure to consider probative evidence 18 In ground 1 the applicant contends first, that the Tribunal failed to consider evidence that supported his claim as to the nature and strength of his relationships with his family members (at [53]) and secondly that it failed to consider character references from community members in reaching its finding at [55]. The applicant submits that the alleged failure to consider that evidence amounted to a failure on the part of the Tribunal to consider the mandatory relevant consideration found in paragraph 14(1) of Direction 65, or alternatively, amounted to a failure to engage in an active intellectual process in reviewing the material before it, citing Burgess v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 69; 259 FCR 197 at [81] - [85] (Charlesworth J). 19 The applicant's case must be considered in light of the way that it was advanced before the Tribunal. In the Personal Circumstances Form upon which he relied, the contention relevant to the strength nature and duration of his ties to Australia (i.e. paragraphs 14(1)(b) and14.2(1) of Direction 65) was directed to the relationship that he had with his parents and his claim that he intended to be their carer once released from detention. He also says that he has a stable home to stay in Australia and that he will have no accommodation and no support from his family if removed from Australia. In a statement submitted to the Department he says that he misses his family and that his parents are sick and that "all I want to do is look after them there [sic] struggling without me as I am struggling without them". He says that his mother and father miss him which stresses his mother out, and he reiterates that he wishes to focus on both of them. 20 These matters, to which the applicant draws particular attention, demonstrate a claim made by the applicant that he has close ties with his parents and that he wishes to remain in Australia to support them as their carer. They are addressed by the Tribunal in [54] of its reasons. There the Tribunal took into consideration his proposed role as carer. It noted that despite his intentions, there is evidence that the carer role has been undertaken by the applicant's sister and that the applicant had been incarcerated for many years, and most recently since February 2017, during which time the family has not been dependent on him either financially or otherwise. 21 The Tribunal also assessed the applicant's claim that he is close to his mother and siblings. In this regard it states at [53] that there is no evidence (beyond that of the applicant) as to the nature and strength of his relationship with his family members and that there have been no statements in support of the applicant provided by any members of his family. The reference to an absence of evidence and statements in support is criticised by the applicant, because various other documents before the Tribunal were nevertheless relevant to this consideration. However, the majority of those documents were not current (dated 2009 and 2010), and were statements from the applicant as to his relationship with his parents, which the Tribunal clearly considered. One potentially relevant document that the applicant points to in this regard (not written by the applicant himself) is an Intensive Correction Order Co-Resident Form dated April 2017. It appears to have been completed by Corrective Services and/or Community Corrections and simply states "all family supportive". It appears from the context that the family (apparently, his parents and siblings) are supportive of the applicant living at his parents' home. This adds little to any rational consideration of the strength of the applicant's relationship with his siblings. Taken together, the document and evidence as a whole is opaque as to the nature and strength of the applicant's relationship with his siblings. The Tribunal was entitled to make the findings it did in this regard. 22 Having regard to these matters, in my view it cannot be said at the level of factual analysis that the Tribunal failed to consider the relevant evidence in finding at [54] that the strength, nature and duration of the applicant's ties to Australia "slightly favour" him. 23 The applicant relies on the following passage in Burgess: [81] In Carrascalao v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; (2017) 347 ALR 172 the Full Court identified some of the salient features of the power to cancel a visa conferred by s 501(3) of the Act, including the reposing of the power in the Minister personally, the nature of the enquiry as to what the national interest requires and the statutory exclusion of the rules of natural justice, particularly as they affect a person who cannot in fact satisfy the Minister that he or she passes the character test: see at [53] - [59]. Reflecting upon those features, the Full Court said (at [60]): These features of the statutory framework, particularly the displacement of the requirements of natural justice and the limited scope of the representations which an affected person may make in seeking to have the Minister revoke a visa cancellation decision, highlight the need for the Minister to exercise his important power under s 501(3) of the Act with appropriate care and attention, including by engaging in an active intellectual process in reviewing relevant materials placed before him to assist in the discharge of this significant statutory function. 24 In my view, having regard to the matters to which I have referred above, it is not the case that the Tribunal failed to engage in an active intellectual process in reviewing the materials placed before it. As the Minister correctly submits, the Tribunal must, of course, consider the applicant's personal circumstances. However, it is not necessary for it to mention every item of evidence advanced in support of a claim. A finding of fact may not be required if the claim or issue is irrelevant or if it is subsumed within a claim or issue of greater generality: Minister for Home Affairs v Buadromo [2018] FCAFC 151; 362 ALR 48 at [46] (Besanko, Barker and Bromwich JJ). 25 The second aspect of this ground concerns the statement at [55] of the reasons of the Tribunal that the applicant has not filed any character references in support from community members. In this regard the applicant draws attention to evidence concerning medical practitioners; a pastoral leader, who considered the applicant's criminal charges to be out of character and had always found the applicant to be reliable, friendly and respectful; a friend, who considered the applicant would go out of his way to do someone a good turn; two priests and an academic, who said that he was a mature person, was regretful for the trouble he had caused and was ready to change his ways, and was always respectful to the church; and a correctional centre skills teacher who listed the units the applicant had completed. In this regard he submits that the Tribunal failed to have regard to relevant evidence. 26 However, the Tribunal's statement at [55] was factually correct (as the applicant quite rightly accepts). The applicant did not file in the application before the Tribunal any character references in support from community members. That statement should be understood to mean that no character references prepared in support of the current revocation application had been filed by the applicant. The matters to which the applicant draws attention are references provided by people in 2009 and 2010 for the purpose of sentencing hearings conducted in the District Court of New South Wales. The only exception to this is the two letters the applicant refers to originating from medical practitioners in 2017 and 2018, the first being a confirmation that documents had been faxed to the National Character Consideration Centre, and the second stating that the applicant was the only one looking after his parents. Neither can be considered to be "character references". The fact is that no character references were supplied to support the applicant in his present, 2018 application for revocation of the cancellation of his visa is a matter that the Tribunal considered to be relevant in considering the strength and nature of his ties to the community in Australia. Although it could have been more fully expressed, it is apparent that the Tribunal considered that there were no more recent references concerning his ties to the community, the most recent being some 8 years out of date. That is a matter that the Tribunal was entitled to take into account. 27 In the first sentence of [55] the Tribunal observes that the applicant's employment history demonstrates a limited contribution to the Australian community, a finding that is not challenged. 28 Having regard to the foregoing, in my view it is not apparent that the Tribunal failed to engage in an active intellectual process in reviewing the relevant materials as contended by the applicant in the second aspect of ground 1. Furthermore, in relation to both aspects of ground 1 in my view the applicant has not demonstrated that the Tribunal failed to have regard to the strength, nature and duration of the applicant to Australia in accordance with Direction 65 at paragraph 14.2(1). 29 Accordingly, ground 1 of the application for review fails.
3.2 Ground 2: critical finding without logically probative evidence 30 In ground 2 the applicant contends that the Tribunal made a critical finding without logically probative evidence by stating, at [58] of its reasons, that in New Zealand the applicant would have access to social welfare and public health systems broadly comparable to those in Australia which would be available to him if he were to suffer any financial or medical hardship in New Zealand. In his submissions, the applicant contends that because the impugned conclusion lacked any rational connection to the materials before the Tribunal and upon which it made its decision, citing Muggeridge v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 200; 255 FCR 81 at [33] - [35] (per Charlesworth J, with whom Flick and Perry JJ agreed). 31 In my view it was not a jurisdictional error for the Tribunal to reason as it did in relation to the extent of impediments that the applicant would face if removed from Australia. 32 Direction No 65 relevantly provides that the Tribunal was required to consider the matters set out in paragraph 14.5(1) as follows: (1) The extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account: a) The non-citizen's age and health; b) Whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and c) Any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country. 33 The "no evidence" ground advanced concerns an absence of evidence to underpin the conclusion reached by the Tribunal that as a New Zealand citizen, the applicant would have access to a social welfare and a public health system comparable to those of Australia, which would be available to him if he were to suffer any financial or medical hardship in New Zealand. 34 No specific evidence is required to support the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant would have access to a public health system and social welfare if he were returned to New Zealand: see Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 348; 248 FCR 296 at [69] (Robertson J); McLachlan v Assistant Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 109 at [35] - [37] (McKerracher J); Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 662 at [38] (Griffiths J) (and on appeal in [2018] FCAFC 225; 364 ALR 423 at [44] per Allsop CJ); ZGWQ v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1096 at [9] (Robertson J). As noted by Robertson J in ZGWQ at [11], Ministerial Direction 79 (or in this case, Direction 65) does not as a matter of language or of construction, require a comparison between the health and welfare systems of New Zealand and Australia. 35 Furthermore, the applicant did not before the Tribunal submit that he would be unable to access the public health and social welfare systems of New Zealand. There was evidence before the Tribunal to indicate that he had in the past suffered from some mental illness issues, including a report in 2011 suggesting that he suffered from stress, anxiety and depression, but as the submissions made on his behalf before this Court indicate, since he was incarcerated he had not experienced any serious life-threatening medical issues, and it is apparent that he did not submit otherwise before the Tribunal. In this regard, the position is different to that which I considered in Schmidt v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1162; 162 ALD 495 at [27] - [32]. 36 Accordingly, ground 2 must fail.
3.3 Ground 3: misconstruction of Direction 65 37 In ground 3 the applicant contends that at [52] of its reasons the Tribunal misconstrued paragraph 14.2(1)(a)(i) of Direction 65 by stating that the applicant had arrived in Australia shortly after he was born and then subsequently giving less weight to the duration of his residence in Australia because he had started his criminal offending when he was aged 18. 38 Paragraph 14.2(1)(a) of Direction 65 reads: 14.2 Strength, nature and duration of ties (1) The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia. Reflecting the principles at 6.3, decision-makers must have regard to: a) How long the non-citizen has resided in Australia, including whether the non-citizen arrived as a young child, noting that: i. less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia; and ii. More weight should be given to time the non-citizen has spent contributing positively to the Australian community. 39 In my view this ground must be rejected because it involves a misreading of the reasoning of the Tribunal. In [52] the Tribunal notes, as it is required to do, that the applicant has resided in Australia for the majority of his life having arrived shortly after he was born. It then says that less weight is given to this consideration "because the applicant started criminally offending at the age of 18 and has continued to commit criminal offences since that time; a period spanning nearly 20 years". The applicant's submissions ignore the balance of the sentence commencing "and". When those words are given proper weight, it is apparent that the Tribunal here is balancing the fact that the applicant arrived in Australia as a young child against the fact that he has continued to commit criminal offences for a period of 20 years, commencing when he was aged 18. The stipulation at paragraph 14.2(1)(a)(i) of Direction 65 that less weight should be given where the non-citizen began offending soon after arriving in Australia is not inconsistent with the Tribunal giving less weight to this consideration in circumstances where the applicant has frequently committed offences throughout his adult life. No jurisdictional error is demonstrated in this approach.
3.4 Ground 4: failure to consider relevant considerations 40 In ground 4 the applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to consider or misconstrued or misapplied Direction 65 by failing to consider relevant considerations. The applicant submits that in deciding not to revoke the cancellation of the applicant's visa, the Tribunal failed to take into account the impact on Australian business interests, impact on victims and international non-refoulement obligations. Each of these is listed in Direction 65 at paragraph 14(1). 41 The difficulty with this submission is that none of these matters arose for consideration before the Tribunal. The applicant accepts that he did not raise them. The chapeau to paragraph 14(1) of Direction 65 provides that in deciding whether to revoke the mandatory consideration of a visa, other considerations must be taken into account "where relevant", including (a) international non-refoulement obligations, (c) impact on Australian business interests and (d) impact of victims. There is no basis upon which it may be inferred that these matters were of relevance to the decision-making of the Tribunal or that the Tribunal failed to consider their relevance when arriving at its conclusions: cf Minister for Home Affairs v HSKJ [2018] FCAFC 217; 363 ALR 325 at [44] - [48] (Greenwood, McKerracher and Burley JJ). 42 Accordingly, ground 4 must be rejected.
Vaokakala
Minister for Home Affairs