... there is no s100 Internal Review submitted and after some outreach with the Applicant - his understanding was that he has submitted all material for the Review.

The Tribunal kindly requests if the Agency could advise if there is a s100 Internal Review on an Access decision for this Applicant to assist in progressing this matter.

1. On 5 August 2025, an NDIA officer replied, enclosing the decision dated 16 August 2024, noting that the application was filed 243 days outside of time, requesting that the applicant provide an explanation justifying an extension of time, and noting that the applicant could also make a new application for access to the Scheme.
2. The same day, the applicant replied that 'I would like to execute my civil rights and appeal this decision I have right of appealing any injustices.'
3. On 18 August 2025, a Tribunal officer wrote to the applicant advising him that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to review the decision, unless he applied for an extension of time to lodge a review.
4. There does not appear to have been any reply to that correspondence.
5. On 17 November 2025, the applicant lodged another application for review of decision identifying a decision dated 16 August 2024 and received on 20 August 2024 (which is clearly the decision dated 19 August 2024). The Tribunal registry allocated review number 2025-007-055 (so there are 2 review numbers allocated for review of the decision dated 19 August 2024 rather than 2 different applications to the Tribunal).
6. On 24 November 2025, a Tribunal officer wrote to the applicant with an extension of time application form.
7. On 9 December 2025, the applicant returned that form but indicated that the decision he wanted reviewed was dated 24 November 2025. He gave his reasons for applying for an extension of time as 'ref to UNHCR'.
8. He was asked to complete another form, but instead wrote (amongst other things):

I request that the ART rely on the evidence and material already provided in my application. I will not be providing further commentary on the substantive matters at this stage. For the avoidance of any doubt, nothing in my communications is to be construed as an admission, concession, or statement against my interests. I expressly reserve all rights.

1. On 17 December 2025, the Tribunal listed the matter for an interlocutory hearing on 27 February 2026. The listing notice refers to a 'dismissal application', though no one has applied for dismissal. It might have more accurately referred to a jurisdictional hearing or an extension of time hearing, depending on what is to be made of the form dated 9 December 2025.
2. On 3 February 2026, Ms Chanakira, who is lawyer at the NDIA and who represented the respondent at the interlocutory hearing, wrote to the applicant, requesting that he complete an application for extension of time form, and attaching a copy to the email. The applicant returned the form that day. He gave his reasons for applying for an extension of time as 'justice'. Ms Chanakira prompted him for more information, suggesting that he share any reasons for submitting the application outside of 28 days including, for example, whether there was something happening between August 2024 and May 2025 that made it hard to apply earlier. The applicant replied, 'I have a disability'.
3. The return of the form puts beyond doubt that the applicant has applied for an extension of time and puts the question of whether time should be extended to allow him to file an application for review of decision in May 2025 squarely before the Tribunal.

1. As at August 2024, decisions under the NDIS law were reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), this Tribunal's predecessor. The Tribunal replaced the AAT on 14 October 2024.
2. Item 20 of Schedule 16 to the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 provides that if a person was entitled to make an application to the AAT before the transition from the AAT to this Tribunal, they may make an application to the Tribunal as if the 'old law' (the laws of the Commonwealth in force from time to time before 14 October 2024) continued to apply in relation to the time for making the application, and otherwise in accordance with the 'new law' (the laws of the Commonwealth in force from time to time after 14 October 2024). The Tribunal must deal with the application in a manner that is fair and efficient and, as far as possible, deal with the application under the 'new law'.
3. Subsection 29(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provided a 28-day time‑limit to apply to the AAT following a reviewable decision and statement of reasons being given to the prospective applicant (though the AAT could extend time if reasonable in all the circumstances). Section 18 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (ART Act) and rule 5 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 have much the same effect.
4. Section 19 of the ART Act provides that a person may apply to the Tribunal to extent the period during which they may apply to the Tribunal for review of a decision. If so, the Tribunal may, by order, extend the period if the Tribunal considers that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
5. Where the applicant did not seek review within 28 days of being given the decision of 16 August 2024, I am not sure he was 'entitled' to seek review at the point of transition (14 October 2024). Regardless, the Transitional Rules require me to give effect to the current law in determining the application for an extension of time.
6. Under the current law, the applicant requires an extension of time of nearly 8 months - from 28 days after he was given notice of the decision until 14 May 2025 - to be allowed to file an application for review of the respondent's decision.
7. The considerations for the Tribunal[1] in determining an application for an extension of time are well known. They include:

(a) the length of the delay, > > (b) the reasons for the delay and the adequacy of the explanation for the delay, > > (c) any prejudice to the parties, > > (d) the public interest, and > > (e) the merits of the proposed substantive application.[2]

The length of the delay and reasons for the delay

1. As I have said, the length of the delay is nearly 8 months.
2. The applicant did not provide any cogent reasons for the delay in advance of the interlocutory hearing (as above, his written reasons had only ever been a few brief words) but was asked about the delay on 27 February 2026. The applicant said, essentially, that he had not had much regard for timeframes. He was not particularly sure when he had received the respondent's decision. He had no prior experience in navigating disputation with a decision of the respondent and had been generally unaware how to go about seeking a different outcome. He had first approached the ACT Civil & Administrative Tribunal (ACAT), before coming to this Tribunal.
3. He eventually became aware he could apply to the Tribunal.
4. He thought his disability might have played a role in the time he took to come to the Tribunal.
5. In my view, the applicant's reasons for the delay do not adequately explain a delay of such significant length. It appears to be the case that the applicant simply did not attend to his review rights, which were set out in the decision of 16 August 2024. Having a disregard for timeframes does not constitute an adequate explanation for delay.[3] I accept there was a procedural misstep - first approaching ACAT - but that could not account for a delay of more than mere days. The applicant's reference to his disability in playing a role was speculative and not supported by any medical or other evidence.

1. The respondent did not consent to nor oppose the application for extension of time. That was said to be because the respondent did not know what the applicant's reasons were (although the respondent did not seek more time to formulate a position after hearing reasons at the interlocutory hearing), and because the respondent had not notified the Tribunal within 14 days of being given notice of the extension application that it wished to oppose it.[4]
2. The respondent made no submissions as to prejudice and I am satisfied that little, if any, prejudice to the respondent would result if the application for extension of time was granted.
3. Conversely, the applicant will not suffer significant prejudice if the application is refused. As he is under 65 years old,[5] he is free to apply to the NDIA again for access to the Scheme and, if he is refused again, exercise his review rights. When I suggested that the course would be available to him, the applicant said it was not palatable as he has previously been rejected at least twice. Ultimately, that is a matter for the applicant.

1. This application for extension of time has the same feature as many others that come before the Tribunal. There is 'obvious and accepted public interest in the finality of decision‑making, and the need to prevent disruption to established practices'.[6] That is a factor that weighs against an extension of time, but not heavily.

Merits of the proposed substantive application

1. As much as can be said about merit from reading the decision under review and no more, I am satisfied that the proposed substantive application has merit. The respondent's reasons for refusing access to the Scheme are largely evidential matters that could, in principle, be remedied in the course of the proceeding. This is not a case where there is some clear, objectively determinable factor that would prevent a decision to grant access to the Scheme.[7]

1. In summary, the delay in coming to the Tribunal is quite significant and the applicant has not tended to provide an adequate explanation for the delay. There is public interest in refusing the application. Neither party is greatly prejudiced by an adverse decision. On the other hand, there may be merit in the proposed substantive application.
2. In my view, the length of the delay, the lack of reasons to explain a delay of that length, and the fact that the applicant can simply re-apply to the NDIA for access to the Scheme (and so suffers little prejudice by being prevented from filing the substantive application) comfortably outweigh any factor that would favour granting the application for an extension of time.
3. The result is that the application for an extension of time will be refused. The applicant can, if he wants to, re-apply to the NDIA for access to the Scheme.

[1] In the absence of mandatory relevant considerations, save for regard for the Tribunal's objective in section 9 of the ART Act: LFKZ and National Disability Insurance Agency (Practice and procedure) [2025] ARTA 558.

[2] Ralkon Agricultural Company Pty Limited v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 153; Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd and Others v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor [1996] HCA 25.

[3] See Englezos v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2023] FCA 31 at [38].

[4] That is a reference to subsections 19(6) and (7) of the ART Act. I note in passing that I do not read those subsections, as the respondent seems to have, as creating an obstacle to a party that wishes to oppose an extension of time after 14 days. The subsections provide a mechanism to protect a party that opposes the extension of time (by preventing the Tribunal making a decision to extend time without hearing from the opposing party in relation to the extension), not to restrict the rights of that party.

[5] Section 21 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013.

[6] Mason and John Holland Pty Ltd (Compensation) [2018] AATA 415 at [31].

[7] As in Jestrimski and Chief Executive Officer, National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIS) [2026] ARTA 150, in which the Tribunal refused to extend time to make an application in part because the applicant, as a resident of a country other than Australia, could not meet the criteria for access to the Scheme.