Ursini & Flaherty [2025] FedCFamC2F 888 (29 May 2025)

1. Until further order, the Mother have sole responsibility for making long-term decisions in regard to the health (including counselling) and education of X.
2. For the avoidance of doubt, the Mother be and is permitted to arrange for X to attend a therapist and the Mother be and is at liberty to provide such therapist with:

(a) The Mother's affidavits filed in these proceedings on 10 December 2024 and 24 April 2025;

(b) These orders; and

(c) The reasons delivered in relation to these orders.

1. The respondent Father, MR FLAHERTY ('the Father'), be and is at liberty to consult and be involved in any therapy for X, subject to the therapeutic discretion and direction of the therapist.
2. The Mother do all acts and things to keep the Father informed of the contact details of the therapist.
3. For the avoidance of doubt, the therapy referred to in orders 3 - 5 herein is not confidential as between the Mother and the Father, and is reportable.

1. Pursuant to section 62G of the Act, the parties and X born in 2018 are directed to attend with a Court Child Expert (practicing under their appointment as a family consultant) nominated by the Court Children's Service (the Court Child Expert) for the purposes of the preparation of a Child Impact Report at the dates and times below, or as otherwise directed by the Court Child Expert.

Part 1 of the event will occur by video, using Microsoft Teams, on Monday 7 July 2025 with:

(a) The applicant Mother to attend at 9.00 am; and

(b) The respondent Father to attend at 10.30 am.

Microsoft Teams links will be provided to the parties by the Court Child Expert prior to the event.

Part 2 of the event will occur in person at the Melbourne registry on the morning of Wednesday 9 July 2025. Specific details regarding the attendance of the parties and X on this date will be provided to the parties in Part 1 of the event.

1. Each party do all things necessary to ensure that X attend upon the Court Child Expert pursuant to Section 62G(3A), unless otherwise determined by the Court Child Expert that Section 62G(3B) applies.
2. The parties and X shall continue to attend at such times, dates and places as the Court Child Expert may advise.
3. Not later than 4.00 pm on Thursday 5 June 2025 the parties must provide their contact telephone numbers and email addresses to ChildImpactReports ...@....
4. Pursuant to order 7 herein, the Court Child Expert shall provide a written report to the Court regarding the welfare and best interests of X.
5. Upon completion, the Child Impact Report shall be provided to the registrar for release to the parties, including by way of order made in Chambers.
6. The Court Child Expert shall be at liberty to inspect any material filed by the parties, and any subpoenaed documents and/or information sharing documents if available.

1. The Mother and the Father do all acts and things to cause and ensure that each of them undergoes psychiatric examination by the same psychiatrist appointed as a Single Expert Witness pursuant to Division 7.1.2 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth), and such psychiatrist prepare a psychiatric report of the mental health of each of the parents of X.
2. For the purpose of order 14 herein, the Mother and the Father do all acts and things to provide to the psychiatrist all of the documents she/he has filed in these proceedings relating to X's welfare.
3. IT IS REQUESTED that Victoria Legal Aid assist the Mother with the cost of the psychiatric report referred to in order 14 herein.

1. Pursuant to section 68L(2) of the Act, X be independently represented, and IT IS REQUESTED THAT Victoria Legal Aid arrange such independent representation and, if practicable, appoint the Independent Children's Lawyer involved with the previous proceedings regarding X and:

(a) forthwith upon appointment by Victoria Legal Aid and the Independent Children's Lawyer file a notice of address for service;

(b) within 48 hours of notification of such appointment the solicitors for the respective parents (or, if unrepresented, then the parent themselves) provide to the Independent Children's Lawyer copies of all applications and affidavits upon which that party relies together with any existing orders and copies of any relevant reports;

(c) the Independent Children's Lawyer fulfil the requirements set out in 'Guidelines for the Independent Children's Lawyer' as published on the website of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia, and in particular carry out the tasks set out in clauses 5, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7; and

(d) the Independent Children's Lawyer prepare a minute of the orders they will recommend be made as final orders.

1. Leave be and is granted to the Independent Children's Lawyer to inspect and copy:

(a) All subpoena material that has been produced in these proceedings;

(b) Any material produced by the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing that has been filed in response to a notification made under s 67ZBD;

(c) Documents produced by the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing in response to any order to provide documents or information under a s 67ZBE Order.

1. The Father be and is excused from compliance with order 8 of the final orders dated 4 September 2023 ('the Final Orders').
2. All non-school day changeovers are to continue to occur at Woolworths in Suburb B.
3. The Mother be and is permitted to enrol X at a primary school within the Suburb C school catchment area.
4. The Mother do all acts and things to keep the Father fully informed of all educational matters relating to X.
5. Orders 1 and 17 of the Final Orders be and are discharged.
6. The Final Orders otherwise remain in full force and effect save as provided in these orders.

1. All extant interim applications be and are otherwise dismissed.
2. The matter be and is referred to Judicial Registrar Dixon for such further directions and management as appropriate.

1. Pursuant to ss 65DA(2) and 62B of the Family Law Act 1975 the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders are set out in Annexure A and these particulars are included in these orders.
2. If in any proceedings there are allegations of family violence and the provisions of section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 apply (see attached Family Violence Information Sheet), any unrepresented party will not be permitted to personally cross-examine the other party/parties.

1. Affected unrepresented parties may apply to the court and then to the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme") for representation but any such application must be made at least 12 weeks prior to the final hearing.

1. Further information about the legislation and the Scheme can be found at Part 4 of the attached Family Violence Information Sheet.
2. If s102NA applies and a party becomes unrepresented after trial directions have been made, that party is required to promptly advise the Court.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. These are the settled reasons of a judgment delivered ex tempore. These reasons were delivered orally. These settled reasons have been corrected from the transcript where appropriate to correct grammatical errors, to add citations, passages of authorities and evidence, and to attempt to make the orally delivered reasons easier to read. The substance is unchanged.

1. In the matter of Ursini and Flaherty, the matter came before me on 21 May 2025 for a defended hearing in regard to the issue of section 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('the Act'). In addition to that, the parties both sought interim orders. The respondent father sought orders, in the alternative, that if leave pursuant to section 65DAAA was granted, then he sought a psychiatric examination of the applicant mother. The applicant mother sought a suite of orders but, on the day, only pressed orders that there be leave to bring proceedings under section 65DAAA and, as a matter of urgency, that she be permitted to engage the child in therapy.
2. The matter was listed before me on a busy interim week at the Dandenong registry where, due to a number of other hearings before me that day which each required determination, I was unable to commence this matter until late in the day. The applicant, Ms Ursini ('the Mother') appeared with counsel at the hearing, and the respondent Father, Mr Flaherty ('the Father'), appeared on his own behalf. I am grateful to both the Mother's counsel and to the Father for the efficient way in which they each presented their case before me to ensure the matter was properly heard.
3. The material each party relied upon is described in Appendix A to these reasons.

1. The parties have one child, X, born in 2018 and now seven. On 4 September in 2023, final orders were made by consent between X's parents and the Independent Children's Lawyer ('ICL') representing X. Those orders provided, inter alia, that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility for X and that X lived with his Mother. Changeover was to occur from 2024 onwards as follows. If on a school day, changeover shall occur at school with the Father to collect the child at the commencement of time. And at the conclusion of time, changeover shall occur as agreed between the parties in writing and, failing agreement, then, while both parties reside in Suburb D, changeover shall occur at Woolworths in Suburb B, provided always that if either party relocates out of Suburb D, then changeover shall occur at the service station that Google Maps shows as being closest to the midway point between the parties' respective residences.
2. In addition, the orders provided that each party was to keep the other informed of their residential address. The clear purpose of that was to enable, if a party had moved, that there be an ability to calculate a midpoint changeover. The midpoint changeover was clearly important to the parties and part of the scheme of the orders of that time.

1. These proceedings commenced when the Mother issued new proceedings on 10 December 2024 ('the second wave of proceedings'). The Mother had been the respondent to the previous proceedings that had been initiated by the Father on 6 June 2021.

Section 65DAAA

1. In this matter, and in parenting matters, by legislative intent Parliament has made clear by reason of section 65DAAA of the Act that final parenting orders are not to be reconsidered in further court hearing unless certain conditions are satisfied.
2. Section 65DAAA is as follows:

65DAAA Reconsideration of final parenting orders

(1) If a final parenting order is in force in relation to a child, a court must not reconsider the final parenting order unless:

(a) the court has considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made; and

(b) the court is satisfied that, in all the circumstances (and taking into account whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made), it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be reconsidered.

(2) For the purposes of determining whether the court is satisfied as mentioned in paragraph (1)(b), and without limiting section 60CC, the court may have regard to any matters that the court considers relevant, including the following:

(a) the reasons for the final parenting order and the material on which it was based;

(b) whether there is any material available that was not available to the court that made the final parenting order;

(c) the likelihood that, if the final parenting order is reconsidered, the court will make a new parenting order that affects the operation of the final parenting order in a significant way (whether by varying, discharging or suspending the final parenting order, in whole or in part, or in some other way);

(d) any potential benefit, or detriment, to the child that might result from reconsidering the final parenting order.

(3) Despite subsection (1), the court may reconsider a final parenting order with the agreement or consent of all the parties to that order.

(4) The failure of a court to comply with subsection (1) does not affect the validity of any order made by the court.

1. Lest it be misunderstood that section 65DAAA(1)(a) meant that a court had to consider whether there had been a change of circumstances but not determine whether there had been, that issue has been resolved with the authority of the Full Court in the decision of Radecki & Radecki [2024] FedCFamC1A 246 ('Radecki'). I refer to and repeat relevant passages where the Full Court observed:
   1. A literal reading of "consider" in s 65DAAA(1)(a), contrary to the rule in Rice & Asplund, does not require a change of circumstances nor mandate the Court to make a finding of fact about a prima facie change of circumstances, rather the requirement is to "consider" whether or not there has been a change of circumstances.
   2. In practical terms, whilst applying the first stage of the rule in Rice & Asplund, the dilemma is whether the Court is still required to make a finding about changed circumstances or alternatively, merely "consider", whether or not there has been any change.

...

1. For the reasons that follow, we consider there is no discernible difference between the first stage test or threshold to be applied under the new statutory regime, and the common law principles espoused by the rule in Rice & Asplund.

...

1. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023 ("the Amendment Bill"), which preceded the enactment of the new legislation, explained the context and purpose of the statute, which is to codify the common law rule established by Rice & Asplund and said (at 28):

   1. New section 65DAAA codifies the common law rule established by Rice & Asplund [1978] FamCAFC 128; (1979) FLC 90-725 and elaborated on in subsequent cases, that is, where final parenting orders are in place the applicant must establish that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the making of the orders before those orders can be reconsidered [Rice & Asplund; Marsden & Winch; Marsden v Winch [2013] FamCAFC 177; (2013) 50 Fam LR 409 ("Marsden v Winch"); SPS and PLS]. The rule is founded on the notion that continuous litigation over a child or children is generally not in their best interests [Marsden & Winch at [49]; Marsden v Winch at [36].

2. There is no ambiguity to be found in the Explanatory Memorandum, which specifically refers to both the intention to codify the common law rule established by Rice & Asplund and the first stage of application of the rule, requiring an applicant to establish that there has been a significant change in circumstances since the making of anterior parenting orders, before those orders can be reconsidered. ...

...

1. The wording of the Second Reading Speech, and in particular "making it clear... a significant change in circumstances must have occurred", is similarly at odds with a literal interpretation of s 65DAAA adopted in Rasheem, Melounis and Whitehill & Talaska. The comments make it abundantly clear, a significant change in circumstances is a mandatory precursor for a parenting order to be reconsidered. ...

2. Relying on permissible extrinsic evidence, or "legitimate aids to construction", in this case, the Explanatory Memorandum, including cited authorities and the wording of the Second Reading Speech, the context and purpose of the new statute was to codify the rule in Rice & Asplund and existing case law. It was not to ameliorate or modify the rule, by removing the requirement to make a factual finding about a significant change in circumstances in the application of the first stage. In that context, it is a misconception to apply the text of s 65DAAA so literally to only require a court to embark upon a consideration of whether or not there has been a change of circumstances, but without imposing an obligation to make a positive finding about that pivotal issue.

...

1. We therefore conclude, for the purposes of s 65DAAA(1) of the Act, and having regard to the principles espoused in Rice and Asplund and subsequent authority, the proper interpretation of "consider" should not be a literal one. The word "consider" in s 65DAAA should be construed to mean the Court is required to contemplate the evidence and to make findings of fact as to what changes in circumstances (if any) there have been since the making of the anterior parenting orders. If there is no positive finding of changed circumstances, that is the end of the matter. If there is a positive finding as to changed circumstances, the second stage of the process requires the Court to make its determination, subject to the overarching best interests principle, as prescribed by s 65DAAA(1)(b) and otherwise having regard to relevant s 60CC considerations and the matters referred to in s 65DAAA(2).

1. As a result of the Full Court's decision in Radecki, which binds me, the long and the short of it is that section 65DAAA(1)(a) means to the effect that an order is not to be reconsidered unless the Court has considered whether there has been a change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made and, if it has determined that there has been, then go on and consider the matters set out in the rest of section 65DAAA.
2. Whether under the law as provided in Rice & Asplund,[1] as discussed in Radecki and the many authorities that follow that, or solely by reference to section 65DAAA as interpreted by the Full Court, it is clear that not only common sense, but Parliament has determined that repeated litigation about a child is ordinarily not in the child's best interest and is of itself highly likely to be harmful to the welfare of the child. Common sense and ordinary human experience would command the same observation.
3. I also refer to and repeat paragraph 83 of SPS & PLS (2008) FLC93-363 ('SPS & PLS') where the Full Court more recently adopts the principle in the context of section 65DAAA.
   1. Accordingly, the rule may not impede hearing an application for a small alteration, which may require only a short and narrow enquiry, but may properly prevent a hearing in respect of more far-reaching changes.

Section 60CC

1. Section 65DAAA refers to and incorporates section 60CC. Section 60CC is as follows:

60CC How a court determines what is in a child's best interests

Determining child's best interests

(1) Subject to subsection (4), in determining what is in the child's best interests, the court must:

(a) consider the matters set out in subsection (2); and

(b) if the child is an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child--also consider the matters set out in subsection (3).

(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:

(i) the child; and

(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);

(b) any views expressed by the child;

(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;

(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs ;

(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;

(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.

(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

Additional considerations--right to enjoy Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture

(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(b), the court must consider the following matters:

(a) the child's right to enjoy the child's Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander culture, by having the support, opportunity and encouragement necessary:

(i) to connect with, and maintain their connection with, members of their family and with their community, culture, country and language; and

(ii) to explore the full extent of that culture, consistent with the child's age and developmental level and the child's views; and

(iii) to develop a positive appreciation of that culture; and

(b) the likely impact any proposed parenting order under this Part will have on that right.

1. When hearing a matter on an interim basis, the law sensibly provides that a court should be cautious and circumspect about making factual findings on an interim hearing. I must have regard to the procedure and the law followed on an interim hearing in the decision of Goode & Goode [2006] FLC 93-286[2] where at [81] and [82] states:

[81] In making interim decisions the Court will still often be faced with conflicting facts, little helpful evidence and disputes between the parents as to what constitutes the best interests of the child. However, the legislative pathway must be followed.

[82] In an interim case that would involve the following:

(a) identifying the competing proposals of the parties;

(b) identifying the issues in dispute in the interim hearing;

(c) identifying any agreed or uncontested relevant facts;

(d) considering the matters in s 60CC that are relevant and, if possible, making findings about them (in interim proceedings there may be little uncontested evidence to enable more than a limited consideration of these matters to take place); ...

1. The long and the short of it is that on an interim hearing, the Court must grasp and come to grips with the issue of risk of events adverse to the child's welfare and care. The circumstance that the Court cannot determine whether allegations made are correct or not does not remove from the Court the obligation to grasp the nettle of dealing with risk, even if the affidavit material is uncertain. In this case, there is significant affidavit material carefully prepared, and prepared over a significant period of time. In addition, there is further information that has arisen as a result of requests by the Court for the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing ('Child Protection') to provide information to the Court.
2. However, the issue of interim rules, whether there should be any change to the final orders, even on a 'just-for-the-time-being', or interim, basis can only be made if the significant and intended restriction on issuing further parenting applications, as contained in section 65DAAA, is overcome. It also needs to be noted at this point that the issue of determination of fact, or likely facts, when dealing with the section 65DAAA aspect of a hearing is very different to the aspect of fact determination on an interim hearing.
3. In the circumstances where it has now been authoritatively determined that section 65DAAA is, or at least includes, a codification of the law under the principles previously known as the rule in Rice & Asplund, it is now abundantly clear that the body of jurisprudence (what I refer to as the nuts and bolts of how the Rice & Asplund) and hence, now, how the section 65DAAA consideration would proceed, has been settled.
4. I will refer to and repeat my reference to the nuts and bolts in the decision of W_hitehill & Talaska_ [2024] FedCFamC2F 768 ('Whitehill & Talaska'). It is of comfort to me that the decision of Whitehill & Talaska was considered in the matter of Radecki, but my observations in regard to the nuts and bolts has not been criticised.
   1. Final orders are meant to be final. From 6 May 2024, Parliament replaced the previously applicable body of law known as the rule in Rice & Asplund [1978] FamCAFC 128; (1978) 6 FamLR 570, (1979) FLC 90-725 ('Rice v Asplund') with section 65DAAA of the Act. The rule in Rice & Asplund was a body of Judge made law to the effect that once final parenting orders were made further litigation about parenting orders would not be heard unless there had been a sufficient change in circumstances that warranted reopening litigation about children's arrangements. The settled rationale of the rule was that repeated litigation about children was usually not in the best interests of the children involved and should be avoided. That body of law was refined, elaborated and explained over and over again in various decisions of the Family Law Act courts. This body of law developed consequential or attached rules as to evidence and procedure, but always retained flexibility to deal with the multitude of factual matters that arose, in the best interests of the children. The inquiry to ascertain whether further litigation would be permitted was often described as a "threshold hearing".

...

1. Although always considered through the prism of the best interests of the children, the frequently accepted or orthodox recitation of the rule in Rice & Asplund, required that there must be a prima facie change of circumstances sufficient to justify embarking upon a further inquiry as to what parenting orders were in the best interests of the children with all the trouble, grief and strife for all involved that often entailed.

...

1. Alternatively, if I am wrong about Parliament's intention, and it is necessary to re-invent the wheel and the nuts and bolts to make section 65DAAA actually work, I am satisfied the wisdom contained in the previously applicable consequent or attached rules or previously existing case law should guide me and I will apply those rules or guidance unless they limit or extent the operation of the scheme of section 65DAAA.

1. What is important when considering in the one hearing both an interim hearing and a section 65DAAA is the different basis of proceeding on the facts. Dealing, firstly, with the section 65DAAA question, as set out in the many previous authorities dealing with the Rice & Asplund question, the evidence of the applicant, which can also be put as the case for the applicant, in determining whether or not there has been a change of circumstance, is to be taken at its highest. That is settled law, and it remains settled law under section 65DAAA. That is, the applicant's case evidence is taken at its highest unless it is clearly implausible or internally contradictory.
2. In this case, it is clear that many of the matters alleged by the Mother are disputed by the Father. It is clear that he disputes those matters for the purpose of the section 65DAAA hearing, as well as on any interim hearing.

Is section 65DAAA satisfied?

1. But of course, an interim hearing can only occur following leave or permission or the crossing of the barrier of section 65DAAA. Hence, it is necessary that I deal with section 65DAAA first.
2. The Mother asserts that there has been a significant change of circumstance since the orders of 4 September 2023 were made and the Father says there has not been such a change. It cannot escape notice that it is a little over a year after those orders were made that the Mother issued the further proceedings. The orders were made on 4 September 2023, and they were made by consent.

Equal Shared Parental Responsibility

1. The parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the child [X] born [in] 2018.

Living Arrangements

2. The child live with the Mother.

Father's Spend Time Arrangements

1. From the date of these Orders the child shall spend time with the Father as follows:

3.3.1. Each alternate weekend from 4.00pm on Friday until 5:00pm Sunday; and

3.3.2. Each Tuesday from 4.00pm until 7:30pm;

3.4. At such other times as the parties may agree in writing including via Appclose.

...

1. The parents advise and keep the other parent advised of in writing any change to their residential address, mobile telephone number and email address within 48 hours of such change.

Changeovers

9. Changeover to occur as follows:

9.2.1. if on a school day, changeover shall occur at school with the Father to collect the child at the commencement of time and at the conclusion of time changeover shall occur as agreed between the parties in writing and failing agreement, then while both parties reside in [Suburb D] changeover shall occur at the Woolworths in [Suburb B] provided always that if either party relocates out of [Suburb D], then changeover shall occur at the service station that Google Maps shows as being closest to the midway point between the parties' respective residences;

9.2.2. if on a non-school day, changeover shall occur as agreed between the parties in writing and failing agreement, then while both parties reside in [Suburb D] changeover shall occur at the Woolworths in [Suburb B] provided always that if either party relocates out of [Suburb D], then changeover shall occur at the service station that Google Maps shows as being closest to the midway point between the parties' respective residences.

Injunctions

10. The parents are restrained by injunction from:

10.1. Denigrating the other parent or their family members or partners, to or within the hearing of the child and from permitting any other person to do so;

10.2. Discussing their wishes in relation to parenting issues with the child or in the presence or hearing of the child and allowing anyone else to do so.

10.3. Neither party shall enrol the child in any extracurricular activity that falls on the child's time with the other party without the prior written consent of the other party.

School and Health Care

...

1. Each parent is at liberty to attend all kindergarten, school, sporting and extracurricular activities as are usually attended by parents.

2. The parents will keep each other advised of any health issues relating to the child and the parents are at liberty to communicate directly with any treating medical practitioner upon whom the child attends and obtain any information relating to the child's health.

3. The parents will follow the reasonable directions and recommendations of the child's treating medical practitioners.

4. The parents shall each inform the other parent as soon as is reasonably practicable of any significant illness or injury suffered by the child in their care, including the name and contact details of any treating medical practitioner or other allied health professional the child attends upon.

5. In the event of the child suffering a serious injury or illness requiring hospital attention in one of the parent's care, that parent shall immediately contact the other parent by telephone and the parents are authorised by these orders to obtain information from the child's treating medical practitioner.

6. Neither parent is permitted to enrol or change the enrolment of the child in kindergarten or school without the agreement in writing of the other parent.

...

Declaration

1. Pursuant to s.68Q of the Family Law Act 1975 the Court declares that to the extent that the Family Violence Intervention Order dated [...] 2022 is inconsistent with this order, this order prevails.

1. It is clear enough that those orders provide for equal shared parental responsibility, being equal shared parental responsibility for long-term decisions relating to the child that include matters as important as the child's health and education. Not only were they made by consent, but can only have contemplated, implicit within that order, that at least some degree of consultation and sharing of responsibility and inevitable consultation between the parents was in accordance with the Act.
2. Although the child was to live with the Mother, the orders provide for the child to spend alternate weekends from after school until Sunday evening and each Tuesday from 4 pm until 7pm. The orders also provided for special days, and I note that orders as to ensuring both parents were informed about the child were also included.

1. In the context of those orders, the Mother alleges the following events have occurred. The Mother alleges at paragraph 4(a) her affidavit filed 24 April 2025 ('the Mother's second affidavit'), that X returned to her care following time with the Father and:

...was displaying very distressing and unusual behaviour, saying that he would kill himself and kill my mum and I and physically hitting my mum and I and throwing things at us. I have never seen [X] behave like this, and I was so concerned that I took [X] to the police station, who advised me to take [X] to [E Hospital], which I did, where [X] was assessed and ... tests were done and ... the hospital informed Child Protection.

1. At paragraph 4(b) of the second affidavit, the Mother refers to the reports of Child Protection. The first report is dated 5 March 2025[3] and relevant parts of that document are as follows:

The Child Protection file for [X] identifies that there has been 6 previous reports prior to the current involvement for [X]. All 6 reports have previously closed at intake.

...

Child Protections current involvement was initiated on the 21/10/2024, with reported concerns for [X]'s behaviours following contact with his Father, resulting in his Mother taking him to [E Hospital] for an assessment. It was reported that [X] had a sudden behavioural change when collected by his Mother following contact with his Father, whereby he was displaying verbal and physical aggression towards the Mother and Maternal Grandmother.

...

Since the report was received Child Protection have interviewed the Mother and [X], however despite multiple attempts, the Father refuses to meet with Child Protection.

...

On the 03/12/2024, Child Protection substantiated the protective concerns on grounds (emotional harm) under the Children Youth and Families Act 2005. Child Protection assessed the Father as the person likely to cause emotional harm to [X]. Child Protection had hoped to engage the Father and address these concerns through support services, however the Father continues to refuse to meet with Child Protection.

Child Protection conducted a further interview of [X] on the 26/02/2025, during a home visit. [X] disclosed again not feeling safe in the Fathers care, and not wanting to spend time with his Father. [X] reports feeling angry when with his Father, which results in his behaviour change upon returning to his Mothers care, where he has thrown chairs.

At the current time Child Protection plan to close their involvement with [X], as they do not assess him to be at immediate and significant risk of harm in either parents care, also acknowledging the current Family Law Court matters. As part of the closure Case Plan, Child Protection would recommend the Father engage in a Men's Behaviour Change Program and a Psychologist. Child Protection would also recommend therapeutic supports for [X], which the Mother is in agreement with, however the Mother reports the Father refuses to consent to this. ...

1. The Mother also relies on what she says X has told her about not feeling safe in the Father's car. Further, she relies on the fact that from around May 2024, the Father moved to a new residential address but has ignored all requests from the Mother to provide his new address as required by order 8 of the final orders of September 2023. The Mother then relies upon the fact that she has moved from Suburb B to a not totally distant, but not immediately nearby, suburb of Suburb C to a property owned by her Mother. She says that move was to achieve greater housing security and to be closer to her Mother's support.

1. She says that a further new fact and circumstance of considerable weight is that the Father refuses to provide his new address, and hence she is unable to determine the new or midpoint changeover location when not at school. And so, as a result, changeover is still occurring at Suburb B Woolworths, as determined under the previous orders.

1. Further, she says the Father has refused to consent to X being enrolled at F School.

1. The Mother asserts that the Father has continued to consistently denigrate her to X. She asserts that there has been a complete breakdown of the co-parenting relationship between the parents and that:

Over the past year, the Father has refused to respond to almost all of my messages.

1. Further, the Mother alleges that following the orders, the Father has repeatedly exposed X to behaviour that is inappropriate. To demonstrate the circumstance that the Father actually does denigrate her to X, the Mother points to drawings that she says were made by the Father and provided to X to provide to her.
2. The first was 17 October 2023, which is nearly a bit more than a month after the final orders were made. The Mother complains about a picture, which is exhibited to her affidavit, which shows a person and, I infer, the Mother on a boat and, on the Mother's interpretation, has circles or spots on her neck. The Mother alleges that she previously had a cancerous tumour on her neck and had it removed. That picture may or may not be disturbing; it may or may not be innocent. I place little regard on it. However, the Mother alleges that on 22 October 2023, which is a few days after the boat picture, she sent him a message complaining about the boat drawing as being inappropriate. The Mother alleges that the Father asserts, at that time, that X does not do the drawings, but she does.
3. One artefact of the prior history of the parents is that the Mother asserts that many years ago and prior to the birth of X, she had worked, as I understand it, as a dancer at what are colloquially and inaccurately described as 'gentlemen's clubs'. The Mother described her employment from long ago as a stripper that involved the use of a 'stripper pole'. The Mother complains that after the complaint about the boat picture, the Father drew another picture depicting a person, who the Mother understands is herself, and, the Mother understands that is herself. That is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the picture of a woman holding on to what would appear to be a pole and , not inaccurately, is regarded by the Mother as a stripper pole. The picture comes with the words:

1. The Mother points out that X could not read or write, and that the picture can only have been drawn and written on by the Father. The drawing also had, and the Mother infers, spots on the neck that she understands replicates the tumour. The drawing contains a bag of money and what may be a garter around the persons (or dancers) thigh and, perhaps, nipples on the breasts of the woman on the pole. One inference that the Mother asked that I draw from this pole drawing is that it was intended to humiliate her and involved X in the humiliation. The Mother addresses this within parts of her second affidavit.
   1. On 22 October 2023 I sent [the Father] a message about him making inappropriate drawings of me and sharing them with [X]. [Mr Flaherty] said that he does not do the drawings and that [X] does the drawings. Once I collected [X] and we got into my car, [X] showed me another drawing that be said his dad had drawn of me. ...
   2. I sent the following message to [Mr Flaherty] on 22 October 2023 by AppClose: "Drawing pictures like that for [X] to colour in is highly inappropriate. He is 5 and clearly has no understanding in the picture that you drew, and its clear you have drawn these pictures for me to see and to get some sort of reaction... [The Father] did not reply.
2. By a quirk of the court's directions to have the matter come before me, the parties were directed to file further material and the Mother filed another affidavit, the second, on 24 April 2025. That affidavit contains, with the benefit of consistency from the age of the word processor or computer, identical word-for-word paragraphs from the Mother's initial affidavit, sworn and filed for the purpose of initiating these proceedings back in December. Sensibly, the Father had in March himself filed an affidavit, where he took issue with many of the factual allegations made by the Mother. The matters alleged in paragraphs 15 to 17 of the second affidavit were, for practical purposes, save for numbering, identical to that contained in the first affidavit, filed 10 December 2024.
3. In the first affidavit, the matters covered at paragraphs 15 to 17 were set out at paragraphs 36, 37 and 38, and are, for practical purposes, the same. In the Father's responding affidavit, filed 7 March 2025, he, helpfully, specifically dealt with allegations of particular paragraphs. In regard to the corresponding paragraphs dealing with the drawings, the Father alleged that, as follows at paragraph 25:
   1. In relation to paragraphs 36 to 38, 40 and 41, I deny these allegations and say further that the applicant has fabricated these stories to assist her with this proceeding and her application, and that this further demonstrates her ill mental state and capacity as a parent and deeply concerns me, as this conduct would negatively impact [X].
4. Hence, the inference that I draw from the interaction of those affidavits is that the Father alleges that the pictures have been fabricated by the Mother. I am unable to determine that factual dispute on an interim hearing, but in any event, on the question of 65DAAA, I must take the Mother's evidence at its highest. Hence, for the purpose of this question, section 65DAAA, I proceed on the basis that the Father did write or draw those pictures as alleged by the Mother.

1. The Mother also relies upon and refers to the breaches of intervention orders that each have either been, she says, convicted of or have pleaded with guilty to.

1. In terms of the Father's allegations, he makes serious allegations against the Mother. These allegations are helpfully set out within his affidavit of 9 May 2025.
   1. Furthermore, the Applicant is a serial and vexatious litigator and enjoys re-hashing the past and continuing to involve herself in my life. I feel that by virtue of her conduct she is obsessed with me and my life and that she seeks constant attention from me in order to feel important and relevant. She constantly demonstrates a need to know and control everything and have everything her way, despite the Final Orders. This behaviour has become increasingly evident since the Final Orders, as the Applicant has on many occasions failed to follow the Final Orders and has consistently contacted me unnecessarily under the guise of "discussing parenting arrangements" and has sought to make unreasonable and nonsensical changes to the Final Orders previously and now with this current proceeding. She has also made a series of false allegations to the Police in an attempt to breach me in relation to her IVO and to have it extended. This behaviour is continuing, and I have grave concerns that her behaviour is significantly impacting [X]'s well-being and her ability to co-parent effectively.
   2. I do not intend to rebut each and every paragraph of the Applicant's Affidavits and maintain that this should not be construed as an admission or acceptance of any allegations against me. However, I will respond to certain matters for the sake of clarity and to demonstrate the inconsistency in the Applicant's evidence and the fact that she has mislead and deceived the court in relation to various matters (outlined in detail below), pertaining to what she attempts to disguise and pass off as significant changes in circumstances, her conduct, current criminal charges and the circumstances resulting in my IVO.

...

1. In a message on 29 August 2024, the Applicant confirmed that she is incurring "unnecessary fuel expenses" driving [X] to and from school..." I cannot see how this can reasonably constitute a significant change in circumstances and how it has anything to do with [X] and say that the Applicant just wants [X] to move schools so she can save money and continue to spend it on herself as she always has. Any money saved from fuel, will not benefit [X] in any event, as the Applicant receives Centrelink and most of [X]'s schooling needs are subsidised and funded by the government, so the Applicant does not absorb those costs anyway. This reason also makes no sense, in circumstances where she has confirmed in the Applicant's Affidavits, that she moved to [Suburb C] to reside in a property owned by her Mother and which she pays much cheaper rent, which would indicate that she is already saving more money. The Applicant has made an effort to purchase and wear new outfits to each changeover and continues to get plastic surgery like botox and lip fillers, as she has always been very vain and self-loving, so in my view, this demonstrates that the Applicant is not concerned about [X]'s best interests, but rather that she is selfish and greedy and wants to have more available money to spend on herself. Further, I understand that the Applicant does not even drive [X] to and from school each day and shares this with each of her parents regularly.

...

1. In response to the allegations in the Applicant's Affidavits regarding disclosure of my new residential address and my alleged lack of responsiveness I say as follows:
   1. I have not disclosed my new residential address as I have very serious concerns for the safety and welfare of my wife, [Ms G] ([Ms G]) and myself, given the conduct exhibited by the Applicant following the Final Orders. Police share the same concerns and hence, [in early] 2024 they applied for an IVO on my behalf against the Applicant and an interim full no contact IVO protecting me was granted [in early] 2024 and remains in place, pending determination of the final order, which the Applicant is contesting and will not agree for me to have a full no contact IVO against her. The only thing that can be implied from her reluctance to accept my IVO, is that she wants and intends to have contact with me outside of the scope of the IVO and that she wants the option to be physically near me and come to my residence once she knows where it is, which I find extremely concerning and distressing. ... There is absolutely no need for the Applicant to know my address, especially after she attended my previous address (despite the fact that at the time she had an IVO against me) on Christmas Eve in 2023, banging on my front door and threatening to kill me. ...
   2. I do not respond to the Applicant's messages unless it is absolutely necessary for me to do so and the messages require a response, which they often do not, and it is largely the Applicant making statements rather than asking questions. The reason I do not respond unless I absolutely need to, is because since the Final Orders, the Applicant has repeatedly made false reports to Police about the content of my messages in an attempt to breach me in relation to her IVO and for a period of time, I found that each time I would send an AppClose message to the Applicant, I would shortly thereafter be contacted by Police to discuss alleged breaches of the IVO.

...

1. There has not been a break-down of the co-parenting relationship as alleged by the Applicant and the Final Orders have operated well aside from the Applicant constantly seeking to change and vary them to suit herself. The Final Orders are thorough, and the Applicant had legal advice at the time they were made and agreed to them. The Applicant consented to the Final Orders and everything that she has alleged has changed significantly since the Final Orders and that she was unaware of at the time of consenting are not true. All matters, except for her change of residency were known at the time of the Final Orders and all allegations she has made in this proceeding, she has made in the Previous Proceeding and everything was resolved. The Applicant is clearly seeking to re-litigate a matter that I suspect, now does not suit her and ultimately, she may regret consenting to the Final Orders as they are no longer convenient to her.

...

1. ... To be clear, in the IVO matters, there have not been any allegations regarding family violence and [X]. The allegations relate to matters between the Applicant and myself.

1. Hence, the Father's account is that he is not emotionally or otherwise abusing X when X is in his care, but that the Mother is abusing X when X is in her care.

1. The Father's wife, Ms G, prepared an affidavit that the Father filed, acting on his own behalf, on 9 May 2025. The affidavit of Ms G paints a picture of the time X spends with her and her husband as being enjoyable, pleasant and far from abusive, but expresses a concern in regard to the Mother's conduct in the proceedings, her messaging, and the issue of the safety of herself and the Father from the Mother. Relevant paragraphs of Ms G's affidavit are as follows:
   1. Based on what I have personally observed and experienced, I believe that it is extremely unsafe for [Mr Flaherty] to disclose his address given the history and level of family violence that the Applicant has committed and continues to commit against [Mr Flaherty] and [X] and what she is exposing [X] to. Further, I do not feel safe or comfortable for the Applicant to know [Mr Flaherty]'s address, as in the past when she did know [Mr Flaherty]'s address, she frequently caused (or had other people on her behalf cause) damage to our vehicles and property and had me repeatedly followed, under surveillance and almost run off the road on several occasions, which has been reported to Victoria Police. Finally, on Christmas Eve in 2023, at approximately 9pm and while [X] was in [Mr Flaherty]'s care, the Applicant physically attended [Mr Flaherty]'s house alone (and despite the fact that she had an IVO against him to protect her), banging on his front door and threatening to kill him. I was on loudspeaker on [Mr Flaherty]'s phone at the time and witnessed the entire event and then witnessed [X] screaming and crying in distress as a result of what he had just observed the Applicant do.
   2. Based on what I have personally observed and experienced, I believe there is no basis for the Applicant to seek a change to, decrease or suspend the current spend time arrangements that [Mr Flaherty] and [X] have pursuant to the Final Orders. I understand that as aside from the Applicant's unsubstantiated allegations, no evidence has been put forward to support the allegations or the changes sought.

...

1. From the commencement of my relationship with [Mr Flaherty], I have observed the Applicant to be obsessive towards [Mr Flaherty] and jealous of mine and [Mr Flaherty]'s relationship by virtue of the conduct I have observed her engage in for the duration of my relationship with [Mr Flaherty] and the fact that she has consistently attempted to remain in contact with [Mr Flaherty], extort him for money and flirtatiously try and engage with him at every opportunity she could. It appears that at the start of our relationship, she was trying to win [Mr Flaherty] back and get him to prioritise her over me and break us up. ...

1. In that context, I now turn to the application of the allegations, and the Mother's case with section 65DAAA. I had not been referred to any of the material previously before the Court at the time the existing orders were made. I infer, and I would be surprised if it was not so, that each made serious allegations against the other. Assuming that is so, and assuming that there were allegations made beforehand that each of the parties had acted very poorly and/or physically and/or emotionally abusive to each other and to X, I am satisfied that the orders which provided for unsupervised time with one parent, and for the child to live with the other parent, and equal shared parental responsibility, contemplated that there would be something like peace on the prairie and that the child would not be exposed to emotional abuse and/or high conflict between the parents.

1. I now turn to section 65DAAA(1)(a).
2. I have considered whether there has been a significant change of circumstances since the parenting order was made, and in the circumstances discussed above, including the pole dancing picture and the allegation of denigration and/or humiliation of the Mother and the child's involvement in it and taking the Mother's case at its highest, I am satisfied that there has been a significant change in circumstances. Those circumstances include the interaction with Child Protection and the conclusions of Child Protection stated in the reports above. Those circumstances include the high conflict demonstrated by the breaches of intervention orders prosecuted in the state Courts. Those changed circumstances also include the Father's allegations that the Mother has placed his partner and himself at risk and that she or her agents have attended his premises and slashed the tyres of the motor cars of Ms G. On the Mother's case, that is a false allegation. Taking all those circumstances into account, in my view, it is an overwhelming circumstance that there has been a change of circumstances.

1. I now turn to section 65DAAA(1)(b). That is that, in all the circumstances, and taking into account that there has been a change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made, it is in the best interests of the child for the final parenting order to be considered. Section 65DAAA(2) requires that I have regard to the matters under section 66C.

What arrangements would promote the safety of the child...

1. I must have regard to what arrangements would promote the safety of significant people in the child's life and the child. Taking the Mother's allegations at its highest, there is a real risk to the emotional safety and psychological health of X if those allegations are true or substantially true. Though declining to intervene, that was the view of Child Protection in the reports I have referred to above.
2. I do not place any weight on what each parent alleges has been stated by the child as I am not satisfied that, at this stage, given the high conflict between the parents, those matters could be considered as reliable views of the child. But the circumstance that each of the parents alleges in strong and even passionate terms, what each of them says the child has said about the other, is a matter that I take into account.

The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child.

1. I take into account the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of X. X's developmental, psychological and emotional needs are for some significant degree of harmony and peace when living with and spending time with each parent. On either parents' account, at this time, there is a significant risk that X's developmental, psychological, emotional needs are not being met adequately by one parent or the other. If substantial aspects of what each parent says is correct, then it would indicate that those developmental, psychological and emotional needs are not being met by either parent.

Capacity to provide for developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs.

1. I must take into account the capacity of each parent who is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs. If what either parent says is true, or substantially true, about what X is exposed to in either parents' household, then both parents lack a proper and sufficient capacity to care for the developmental, psychological and emotional needs. At this point, that is, in the s 65DAAA consideration, taking the Mother's case at its highest, the Father does not have the capacity to provide for the child's developmental, psychological and emotional needs.

Benefit of a relationship with the child's parents & other (significant) people (if) safe

1. I must take into account the benefit of the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents and other people who are significant to him. If the Mother's allegations are true, or substantially true, that would mean that, on many, if not most of the time, the child spends time with his Father, he is exposed to denigration of his Mother and/or denigration and humiliation of his Mother and being involved as an agent of that denigration and humiliation. If that were so, that calls into question the benefit of the child having a relationship with his Father. If the Father's allegations are true, and in particular the abusive interrogation of the child following visits as he alleges, that calls into question the benefit of the child having a relationship with his Mother.

Anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child

1. I must take into account anything else that's relevant to the particular circumstances of the child. I proceed on the basis and assume that further litigation, ordinarily, other things being even reasonably satisfactory, would be significantly contrary to the welfare of X. I am concerned, and very concerned, that X is stuck in the middle of two highly conflictual parents. On the Mother's case, that conflict arises from the Father's style of communication and his attitude to her. On the Father's case, that arises from the Mother's personality and perhaps psychiatric ill health.

1. I must take into account any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child. I cannot place very much weight on that consideration at this point because of the highly conflictual allegations each makes. The Father's case is that the Mother has taken violence to an extreme, including attending his home with threats to kill and malicious damage to the tyres of his partner's motor car.
2. The Mother, in substance, denies those allegations, and points to the allegations as demonstrating the Father's denigration of her. To the extent that those allegations are relevant on the 65DAAA question, I am required to take the Mother's case at its highest, which would mean that she has not committed those acts of violence as alleged, and merely has been dealt with for breach of an intervention order on the basis of requesting payment of child support. I am required to take into account any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family. To the extent that intervention orders have been made in this case, they've been consented to, as I understand it with a denial of necessity. So, forensically, little weight can be placed on the fact of those orders on this section 65DAAA hearing.
3. I do not have available to me reasons and the material on which the final parenting order was based. It was an order by consent. There were no reasons.

1. In terms of section 65DAAA(2)(b), I am not satisfied that there is any material now available that was not available to the court when the final order was made on 4 September 2023. But that issue was not explored in submissions by counsel or the Father.

1. I take into account, as contemplated by section 65DAAA(2)(c), the likelihood that if the final parenting order is reconsidered, the court will make a new parenting order that affects the operation of that order in a significant way. If there is substance to the Mother's allegations about the Father and that informs the risk or likelihood of that behaviour continuing in the future then, without determining what would or would not happen, there is a likelihood that a court would make a new parenting order.

1. I also consider, as required or contemplated by section 65DAAA(d), any potential benefit detriment to the child that would result from reconsidering the final parenting order. The benefit to the child would be the competing allegations, personalities, and psychiatric health of the parents in this highly conflictual matter being considered, rather than simply acknowledged and then moving on. The detriment to the child is being involved in very formal conflict of parenting proceedings between his parents. Litigation continues in regard to whether or not there should be a final intervention order involving the Mother. Hence, it appears that the parties are going to continue in conflict, whether or not these final orders are reconsidered.
2. Considering all of those matters, and returning to section 65DAAA(1)(b), I am satisfied, in all of the circumstances, taking into account that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the final parenting order was made, it is unfortunately in the best interests of the child that the final parenting orders be reconsidered. Balancing all of the matters, I repeat that I am satisfied that it is in the child's best interests for the final parenting order to be reconsidered.

1. I now turn to the issue of interim orders to be made. The Mother pressed for a suite of orders in her application, but on the interim hearing before me, did not press the order that she sought reducing the Father's time to only the Wednesday. I raised with the parties the benefit of determining as many issues as I fairly could with procedural fairness. Implicit in the Father's resistance to the Mother reopening the case is that he should be excused from non-compliance with the order about providing his residential address to the Mother, as required by order 8 of the final orders.
2. I note that the Father's case includes that after he moved and did not tell the Mother where he moved to, and she does not know where he lived, the attacks on his partner's car and the violent visits of the Mother to his home no longer occurred.
3. I repeat that on the interim hearing, I do not accept either parent's case and evidence of disputed matters as asserted and, rather, attempt to determine the best interests of the child by reference to uncontroversial or agreed facts. It is common ground that, rightly or wrongly, the Mother has relocated to some distance away from the child's school. The Mother asserts that if she has permission to change the child's school, she would not do so until the start of the following year. At this point, it is likely that necessary inquiries and enrolments would be necessary for that to occur.
4. For the purpose of this interim hearing, I do not accept what the Mother says about the Father and I do not accept what the Father says about the Mother.
5. However, there are matters that indicate the Mother's concerns are not without substance, and in particular, the circumstances alleged of the drawing, or what can be described as the "pole dancing" drawing, where it is asserted that the child has provided a drawing done by the Father to the Mother (or the Mother has fabricated the drawing). The Father did not expressly say that the Mother had fabricated the drawing, but the manner in which he dealt with the allegations in his affidavit leaves that inference open. It may be that he only meant to deny the allegation that he was denigrating the Mother by the picture, rather than fabrication of the picture itself.

1. Nonetheless, I am sufficiently troubled by the circumstances, including the observations of Child Protection cited above, that it is necessary that there be an urgent inquiry into the child's welfare. Hence, I'm satisfied that there should be a child impact report, as pressed by the Mother. That is so notwithstanding that there may well be a full family report down the track. I was troubled about the concept of having the child interviewed by yet another professional. He may be interviewed by the independent children's lawyer that I intend to appoint. He has already been interviewed by Child Protection.
2. However, balancing the intrusive aspect of being interviewed about his parental relationships with his welfare, I am satisfied that it is unfortunately necessary to impose that intrusive burden upon the child at this point of the proceedings.

1. I am also satisfied that the Mother should be able to enrol the child at a school closer or close to her home where she lives. The Father's case is that the 40 minutes or so of travel each way in the car is not burdensome upon the Mother and that many children travel further or longer. There is no application that the Mother be restrained from living where she chooses to live.
2. The practicality of the existing orders is the Mother does the bulk of the travel and that the travel arrangements, if burdensome on her, have a significant impact on her and the travel, if burdensome on the Father, have a much lesser impact, because in each fortnight he would attend the school on three occasions, that is, after school on each Tuesday and on each alternate Friday. For the reason of the convenience to the Mother and on an interim basis, I am satisfied that the Mother should be able to change the child's school.
3. I do so acknowledging that an interim change of school may well have significant weight when that matter is determined finally, if it is not agreed.

1. I am satisfied of the Father's application that the Mother be psychiatrically examined, and the Mother's response to that was that both parties should be psychiatrically examined. The Father is prepared, as I understand it, to pay the fees of his own psychiatric examination, and the Mother asserts (and I have no reason to contradict that) that she needs the assistance of Legal Aid to fund her examination.
2. In the circumstances of the allegations each party makes against the others, I am troubled about each parent's psychiatric and personality stability. I am satisfied that there should be an examination of the psychiatric health of each of the parents at this time and a report prepared to the court, and I will make that order.

Appointment of an Independent Children's Lawyer

1. I am also satisfied there should be an Independent Children's Lawyer appointed, in the circumstances of there being serious allegations of emotional abuse by each of the parents against the other. I stress that the allegations that each parent makes on the interim applications that I am considering are not accepted or rejected. Rather, I have to deal with the issue of risk and likely behaviour in the short-term future.

1. I am also satisfied in the circumstances of the competing allegations, and the circumstances where I do not dismiss the Father's allegations against the Mother, that he should be excused from compliance with order 8 of the final orders, that is, the requirement that he provide his residential address to the Mother. All non-school changeovers are to continue to be at the changeover point in the previous final orders. Save as varied in these orders, the final orders otherwise remain in full force and effect, that is, save as provided in these orders.
2. Those are my reasons.

I certify that the preceding seventy-four (74) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the ex tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge O'Shannessy.

• Outline of case filed 15 May 2025;
• Affidavit of the Mother filed 10 December 2024;
• Notice of Child Abuse Family Violence or Risk filed 10 December 2024;
• Application for Final Orders filed 10 December 2024;
• Affidavit of the Mother filed 24 April 2025;
• DFFH Section 67ZBD Response dated 5 March 2025;
• DFFH Section 67ZBD Response dated 27 March 2025; and
• Affidavit of the Father filed 9 May 2025.

• Outline of case filed 15 May 2025;
• Response to Initiating Application filed 7 March 2025;
• Affidavit of the Father filed 7 March 2025;
• Family Violence Order filed 7 March 2025;
• Notice of Child Abuse Family Violence or Risk filed 7 March 2025;
• Affidavit of the Father filed 9 May 2025;
• Affidavit of Ms G filed 9 May 2025.

[1] [1978] FamCAFC 128; (1978) 6 FamLR 570, (1979) FLC 90-725

[2] As adapted to the current provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

[3] At page 195 of 272 of the Court book prepared by the Mother's solicitor.