s.739 - Dispute resolution

Dispute arising under enterprise agreement - orders sought requiring FRV to give UFU information provided to FSIM, and a response as to accuracy of FSIM report - dispute does not pertain to requisite relationships - no authority to determine dispute - no merit in proposed orders in any event - significance of Parliamentary privilege in report - application dismissed

• [1] The United Firefighters' Union of Australia (UFU) has made an application under s 739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) and the dispute resolution procedures in clause 21.1 of Division A and clause 26 of Division B of the Fire Rescue Victoria Operational Employees Interim Enterprise Agreement 2020 (Agreement). The application refers to the Commission for arbitration a dispute that has arisen between the UFU and Fire Rescue Victoria (FRV). The dispute is connected to the content of the Fire Services Implementation Monitor Annual Report 2023/2024 (Report) which was prepared by the Fire Services Implementation Monitor (FSIM), the Hon Niall Blair. The Report was tabled in the Victorian Parliament and published on 28 November 2024. It contained a number of statements that were critical of the operation of provisions in the Agreement relating to consultation and secondments to the Country Fire Authority (CFA). The UFU disagreed with these statements. The passages of concern to the UFU included the forward to the Report, which stated that the 'consult and agree' clause in the Agreement 'disables the ability of management to implement policies without reaching consensus with the Union', and that evidence given to the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission by former fire service executives aligned with information received by the FSIM about the 'long delays and barriers caused by this clause'. The forward to the Report also stated that the secondment arrangements between FRV and the CFA were an example of where the 'consult and agree' requirement was 'impeding agency interoperability and contributing to operational challenges such as the vacancy and relief issues experienced by CFA'. At page 34, the Report stated that in 2023/24, the CFA had an average deficit of 17 operational leaders each week; and that causes of the challenges in filling vacancies included the secondment model and the Agreement. I will refer to these references as the 'disputed statements'.

• [2] The UFU considered that the disputed statements might have drawn on information provided to the FSIM by FRV. It also considered that the statements were inconsistent with the views that FRV had previously conveyed to the UFU.

• [3] On 10 December 2024, the branch secretary of the UFU, Peter Marshall, wrote to FRV Commissioner Gavin Freeman about the Report. Under the heading 'Attack on the consultation clause', Mr Marshall referred to passages in the Report that were critical of the consultation arrangements in the Agreement and stated that the 'attack' was 'unfounded' and that it contained 'strong and emotive language without any particular examples to support their position'. Under a further heading 'Attack on secondment arrangements', the letter cited extracts from the Report concerning the secondment arrangements and stated that they contained various 'inaccuracies'. The letter then requested Mr Freeman to confirm whether the Report and its forward were provided to FRV prior to its publication, and if so, what FRV's response had been. It stated that the UFU was willing to work with FRV to address the 'impact' of the Report and requested FRV to confirm its 'position regarding Mr Blair's report', including the passages cited in the letter, by way of a written response.

• [4] On 16 December 2024, Mr Freeman replied to Mr Marshall, stating that the 'conclusions drawn and commentary made in the FSIM Report, about FRV and other agencies, are a matter for the FSIM'. He said that it was not appropriate for FRV to comment on individual interactions with the FSIM, but that if FRV is aware of factual inaccuracies it always points these out. Mr Freeman did not say whether FRV had received the Report and its forward prior to their publication.

• [5] The UFU was not satisfied with Mr Freeman's response. Attempts by the UFU to arrange a meeting with FRV to discuss the Report were unsuccessful. On 20 December 2024, the UFU lodged its s 739 application in the Commission.

• [6] The UFU submitted that it did not know what information FRV had provided to the FSIM or what FRV's position was in relation to the disputed matters in the Report, and that FRV had failed to provide it with the information it reasonably sought. It said that the Commission should resolve the dispute by making two orders. The first order would direct FRV to provide the UFU with the information that it gave to the FSIM in respect of consultation under the Agreement and the operation of the secondment arrangements with the CFA. The second order would require FRV to provide the UFU with a 'written response addressing the accuracy of the information included in the Report' in respect of these matters.

• [7] The UFU contended that the implication of the Report was that the disputed statements reflected the views of FRV. The Report contained various indications of FRV's endorsement of its content, such as references to the 'unanimous view held by stakeholders' that the secondment agreement, as originally conceived, was unlikely to be fully realised. Further, FRV had refused to confirm whether the Report was provided to FRV prior to its publication and, if it had been, what its response was.

• [8] The UFU said that FRV's lack of clarity about the Report was detrimental to the relationship between FRV and its operational employees, and to the relationship between the UFU and FRV. The disputed statements were a matter of great importance to employees of FRV, many of whom are the UFU's members, and to the relationship between the UFU and FRV. In its oral submissions, the UFU said that the Report had made adverse statements about employees' conditions of employment, namely those governing consultation and CFA secondments, and had also stated that 'something must change.' Yet FRV would not engage with the union as to what it thought about these statements. The UFU further contended that, if it was the case that FRV wanted to implement change to matters affecting the application or operation of the Agreement, or pertaining to the employment relationship, the consultation clauses would be engaged, and it would be important for the ongoing effectiveness of these provisions and the CFA secondment arrangements that the UFU understand the nature of any concerns held by FRV. It said that information as to any 'conflict' between the UFU and FRV on these issues would be important in order for the UFU to take appropriate steps to work with FRV and to protect the terms and conditions of employment of its members.

• [9] The UFU said that, despite its efforts, it remained unaware of FRV's position about the disputed statements in the Report, and that this fact alone supported the granting of the orders it sought. It said that, if on the other hand the Report did not reflect the position of FRV, the UFU stood ready to work with FRV so that clarity could be provided, including to employees, and that this was also a good reason for the Commission to grant the orders sought.

• [10] The UFU relied on the evidence of its industrial officer, Laura Campanaro, who in her witness statement spoke to the relevant background, the Report and its contents, why the UFU did not agree with the disputed statements, the correspondence between the UFU and FRV in relation to the Report, and various other matters. Ms Campanaro said that the UFU was concerned that the Report might have been premised on information provided by FRV which was either inaccurate or contrary to what FRV had communicated to the UFU; and that it was industrially important for FRV to respond to the Report's findings and make clear its position on any criticisms of the UFU and the secondment and consultation clauses, in order for the UFU to respond to the Report and to protect the conditions of employment of FRV employees. Ms Campanaro said that the lack of a response from FRV had led to a wedge in the relationship between FRV and the UFU, and that it was unclear why FRV had refused to engage with the union and confirm its position. She said that a substantial public response from FRV would greatly assist in alleviating the concerns of members and repair the working relationship between the parties.

• [11] FRV objected to the application on jurisdictional grounds. First, it submitted that the dispute fell outside the scope of the dispute resolution procedures in the Agreement because it was not about the employment relationship or the FRV-UFU relationship. Instead, it was concerned with the relationship between FRV and the FSIM, and the exercise by the FSIM of its powers under ss 122 to 144 of the Fire Rescue Victoria Act 1958 (Vic) (FRV Act). FRV noted that s 172(1) of the Act requires that enterprise agreements be about 'permitted matters', namely matters pertaining to the employer-employee and employer-union relationships and limited other subject matter, and that the meaning and operation of the dispute procedures must be read down accordingly. The procedures would in any event have no effect, pursuant to s 253 of the Act, to the extent that they purported to operate beyond these limitations. FRV said that in this regard, any connection between the dispute in this case and the employer-employee relationship or the union-employer relationship was merely 'indirect' or 'consequential' (see Re Cram ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association Limited [1987] HCA 28; (1987) 163 CLR 117 (Re Cram) at 134), and therefore the dispute did not pertain to these relationships in the statutory sense. Nor did the dispute relate to FRV as an employer, but instead to its role as an agency of government complying with a duty to cooperate with another governmental actor, the FSIM, under the FRV Act. The Commission therefore lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute.

• [12] Secondly, FRV contended that the UFU had not followed the mandatory steps in the dispute resolution procedures before lodging its application in the Commission. The matter had not been submitted to 'the appropriate senior officer', the appropriate 'delegated industrial representative', or to the manager of employee relations. Ms Campanaro's evidence was that these steps had only occurred in January 2025, after the matter was referred to the Commission, whereas the dispute resolution provisions in the Agreement state that a referral to the Commission will occur 'following progression through the disputes procedure'. Mandatory steps in a dispute resolution procedure cannot be ignored (see Australian Workers' Union v MC Labour Services Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 5032 at [37] to [40]). Although a second s 739 application had belatedly been filed and listed for hearing concurrently with the initial application, this was merely a device, and in any event the first jurisdictional objection disposed of it; but if the Commission concluded that this was not the case, the appropriate course, said FRV, would be for the Commission to list the second application for a conciliation conference.

• [13] FRV contended that, if the Commission concluded that it had jurisdiction to determine the matter, it should nevertheless dismiss the application on the merits. The substance of the union's case was its disagreement with the disputed statements in the Report. The document did not attribute any finding or opinion to information received from FRV, and it was merely speculation on the part of the UFU that the disputed statements were connected to such information. The UFU was entitled to its opinions about the Report and could make those opinions known. FRV had replied to the UFU's questions. It had made clear that the views expressed in the Report were those of the FSIM and that the UFU should engage directly with the FSIM about its concerns. FRV said that it was simply not appropriate for the Commission to make orders compelling FRV to provide the UFU with the information it sought.

• [14] FRV further submitted that the Report was subject to Parliamentary privilege (see s 142(6) of the FRV Act) and that the Commission would ordinarily observe the privilege, even if it was not obliged to do so (see Commonwealth of Australia v CPSU [2017] FWCFB 4200). The Supreme Court of Victoria had held that a privileged document cannot be tendered as evidence for the facts and opinions contained in it, or be 'used in such a way as to enable inferences to be drawn from it to establish facts and opinions, such that an examination would have to be made of its contents and conclusions' (see 5 Boroughs NY Pty Ltd v State of Victoria; Roberts v State of Victoria [2021] VSC 785 at [231]), yet this was precisely the use that the UFU sought to make of the Report in this case. The union was asking the Commission to infer that FRV agreed or might agree with the disputed statements. Further, the proposed orders involved looking behind the Report to the work undertaken by the FSIM pursuant to its statutory powers to gather information. The starting point of the UFU's case was that it disagreed with the disputed statements in the Report, including because they were not 'accurate'. FRV submitted that it was clear that the UFU sought to impeach the document. It said that the Commission should decline to allow the UFU to make such use of the Report, and that without this document, the UFU's evidentiary case fell away.

• [15] FRV further submitted that it would be inappropriate for the Commission to order FRV to disclose information that it provided to the FSIM under a statutory duty to cooperate; that such orders would interfere with the statutory functions of the FSIM; that any attempt to obtain information exchanged between government bodies should be made under freedom of information (FOI) legislation rather than pursuant to a dressed-up industrial dispute referred to the Commission under the Agreement; and that there was no obligation on FRV to disclose the information that it provided to the FSIM or to provide the 'written response' sought by the UFU, nor should any such obligation now be created by order of the Commission.

• [16] In reply, the UFU submitted that the dispute was one which pertained to the employment relationship because it related to the consultation and secondment clauses in the Agreement, which were conditions of employment of FRV employees. The Report had said that 'something must change' and the UFU sought to understand the relevant issues now before any change was afoot. The dispute also pertained to the relationship between FRV and the UFU, as the union wanted to know what FRV told the FSIM about the operation of these provisions in the Agreement so that it can effectively represent its members. These were not indirect or consequential matters, but things of substance and the fact that they had arisen following the tabling in Parliament of the Report was merely context. The UFU rejected FRV's contention that it had not complied with the steps in the disputes procedures prior to lodgment of its application but said that in any event it had now unequivocally taken those steps and subsequently filed a new s 739 application in respect of the dispute (C2025/2479). That application was listed concurrently with the initial application and the Commission should treat evidence and submissions in the one matter as received for the purposes of the other. There could now be no impediment to the Commission determining the application under the disputes procedures in the Agreement and the jurisdictional objections should be dismissed.

• [17] The UFU contended that Ms Campanaro had explained why it was industrially important for FRV to respond to the Report's finding and make clear its position on any criticism of the UFU and the secondment and consultation arrangements in the Agreement. The UFU said that its use of the Report in the proceeding did not affect the document's privileged status; the fact that the union did not agree with aspects of the Report did not mean that it sought to impeach the document. Further, the existence of other avenues to obtain the information, such as FOI applications, did not mean that the Commission should not make the proposed orders, nor was the absence of a current obligation on FRV to provide the information of any relevance. The UFU said that the function of the Commission under the disputes procedures was to utilise its powers to 'settle the dispute' and that the Commission should proceed to do so by making the orders sought.

• [18] I will first consider FRV's objection that the UFU did not take certain steps in the disputes procedures that are a precondition to the Commission's function of arbitrating the dispute. I consider that, in respect of the original application, the mandatory steps were not taken and that for this reason the Commission is not authorised to arbitrate the dispute pursuant to that application. The Agreement makes clear that disputes may be referred to the Commission at step 5 only 'if the matter is not settled following progression through the disputes procedure'. This requires the earlier stages to have been completed. Step 1 and perhaps step 2 may not have any practical application in this matter, but steps 3 and 4 did so, and these steps were not taken prior to the lodgment of the first application. Section 739(5) of the Act states that the Commission cannot make a decision that is inconsistent with a fair work instrument, which includes an enterprise agreement. Unlike many other enterprise agreements, the Agreement does not say that the dispute can be referred to the Commission at any stage of the dispute resolution procedure. The first application is dismissed.

• [19] However, the second application (C2025/2479) was lodged after the required steps were taken. Objections in s 739 proceedings to the effect that steps in a disputes procedure have been overlooked frequently offer the objector a pyrrhic victory because the relevant deficiencies can often be cured by a new application after the omitted steps have been taken. This is the case here. The sensible course is to treat evidence and submissions in the one matter as having been received also for the purposes of the other, as the UFU proposes. I see no point in the course of action that was proposed by FRV, which was to adjourn the second application and relist it for conciliation at a later date. The second application concerns the same dispute as the first. It was not resolved in conciliation, and I see no reasonable basis to expect that further conciliation pursuant to the second application would be productive. I will proceed to determine the second application.

• [20] The next question is whether the dispute pertains to the relationship between FRV and its employees or to the relationship between FRV and the UFU. An enterprise agreement must be about matters pertaining to these relationships or be about authorised deductions and operational provisions (s 172). A term in an enterprise agreement has no effect to the extent that it is not a term about a permitted matter (s 253(1)(a)). Dispute resolution procedures in enterprise agreements are to be read consistently with the limitations in s 172. The Commission's authority to arbitrate a dispute under an enterprise agreement derives from the agreement, and therefore authority is limited to the legal confines of the agreement itself. If the present dispute does not relate to the employment relationship or the employer-union relationship, the Commission has no authority to determine it.

• [21] The parties concurred as to the case law that is applicable to the consideration of whether a matter pertains to the employer-employee or the employer-union relationships. I do not propose to recite all of this jurisprudence. It suffices to note that the High Court in Re Cram held that 'pertaining to' means 'belonging to' or 'within the sphere of', and that the employment relationship refers to the relation of an employer as an employer to an employee as an employee. The High Court also stated that, for a matter to pertain to the employment relationship, it is not enough that there is only 'the possibility of an indirect and consequential effect' (see Re Cram at 134). An analogous approach is to be taken to the question of ascertaining whether a matter pertains to the employer-union relationship.

• [22] In my opinion, while the dispute in this case might relate to the employment relationship and to the FRV-UFU relationship, it does not pertain to those relationships in the relevant sense. The subject matter of the Report concerns conditions of employment, including the consultation and secondment provisions, and also the relationship between FRV and the UFU, including the 'consult and agree' provision in the Agreement, but the dispute is not about these things. The dispute is about FRV's relationship with the FSIM, specifically, its interaction with the FSIM in respect of the preparation of its report, and FRV's views about the Report. FRV has provided information to another government body, the FSIM, as it is required to do under the FRV Act. Its stance on the Report is that of a governmental actor, not that of an employer. It is unsurprising that FRV adopted a neutral position about the Report in response to the UFU's request for its comments on that document.

• [23] The UFU submitted that it was only concerned with the substance of these issues, not with the 'context' in which those issues sit, which relates to the FSIM. I reject this. In my view, reflection precisely on this proposition is helpful in resolving the debate between the parties about the true character of the dispute in this matter. If the UFU were really concerned with the substance of the issues, it would want to know what FRV thinks about whether the consultation and secondment clauses in the Agreement work well, and whether there are problems with the operation of the Agreement that the parties might need to consider and address. It would not care about the information that FRV gave the FSIM or what it thinks about the report. But of course, this is not what the UFU wants. It does not want FRV to provide information about how the consultation and secondment provisions are working. It does not want a report from FRV about its opinion on these matters. What the UFU wants is for FRV to provide the union with the information that it gave to the FSIM, and for FRV to report to the UFU in writing on its views about the accuracy of the FSIM's Report.

• [24] Further, although the forward to the Report stated that 'something must change', there is no suggestion in this matter that any such change is imminent. If at some point there is a proposal to make some change to the consultation or secondment arrangements, or to any other matter relating to the relationship between FRV and its employees or between FRV and the UFU, this will necessarily involve consultation with the UFU. The Agreement will require this. The Agreement, together with its consultation and secondment clauses, remains in effect. It cannot be altered unless it is replaced, varied, or terminated pursuant to the relevant provisions of the Act. The subject matter of the dispute involves at most only indirect and hypothetical consequential effects for employees and the UFU sometime in the future. Any effect is at this point entirely speculative and uncertain. This dispute lies beyond the bounds of the relationships referred to in s 172(1) of the Act. It does not pertain to those relationships. The second jurisdictional objection is upheld.

• [25] Had I reached a different conclusion on jurisdiction, I would nevertheless have declined to make the orders sought by the UFU, based on considerations of merit. The power of the Commission to make the orders sought is discretionary in nature. The Commission would need to be persuaded that it was appropriate to grant the proposed orders. I am not so persuaded. On the contrary, I consider that such orders would be inappropriate. I consider that there is both an absence of positive reasons for granting the orders, and the presence of negative ones telling firmly against this course.

• [26] As to the first proposed order, I do not consider that there is any good reason why FRV should tell the UFU what information it provided to the FSIM. Generally speaking, FRV should be able to talk to third parties about the fire service without having to make disclosures to the UFU. The UFU says that it wants to know what was said. But this is not a contention of merit. It is an expression of curiosity. And in furtherance of what interest held by the UFU or its members? Contrary to the suggestion of the UFU, the first order would not serve to protect the rights of the UFU or employees under the Agreement. As noted above, no specific changes to existing rights have even been proposed. The possibility of change has been flagged only in the most abstract terms, and by the FSIM, a third party with no power to initiate changes to those rights. Nor is the first order directed at addressing problems that might be caused by the Agreement. Its focus is the information given by FRV to the FSIM, not the specific concerns that have been identified in the Report.

• [27] I consider that an order of this kind would be intrusive and unreasonable. It would facilitate the UFU's demand that FRV give an account of itself to the union about its dealings with the FSIM and the role that it played in the genesis of the disputed statements with which the union vigorously disagrees. This is not appropriate. From the UFU's point of view, information produced by the order would confirm whether FRV shares the FSIM's views, but while this might be of interest to the union, it has no objective merit. The information might also show that FRV did not give the FSIM any information that supports the disputed statements, which would no doubt assist the UFU to criticise the Report. But it is not appropriate for the Commission to facilitate this. The first proposed order is not supported by considerations of industrial or other merit.

• [28] The second proposed order is also without merit. I do not consider that FRV should be required to provide a written response to the UFU about the Report.

• [29] First, it is simply not appropriate to compel FRV to express any further opinion on the Report. The UFU asked FRV for its comment on the Report. FRV provided a response. It told the UFU that the views in the Report were the views of the FSIM. There is nothing more that FRV wishes to say to the UFU about the Report. Mr Freeman stated in his letter to Mr Marshall that it was not appropriate to say more. As noted above, this statement is unsurprising. What is more, I agree with it. It would be very different if the UFU simply wanted to talk to FRV about the problems with the operation of the Agreement. But again, that is not what the union seeks. In my assessment, the UFU wants FRV to take sides in the union's opposition to the 'attacks' that it perceives in the Report's treatment of the consultation and secondment arrangements in the Agreement. FRV has refused to take sides. It should not be compelled to do so.

• [30] Secondly, the proposed order is uncertain. It would require FRV to prepare and submit to the UFU a document 'addressing the accuracy of the information' in the Report in respect of consultation under the Agreement and the operation of the secondment arrangements with the CFA. But the disputed statements are largely opinions, not questions that can be assessed as accurate or inaccurate. The UFU submitted that the Commission could overcome this problem with careful drafting. I doubt this. In any event, no alternative formulations were proposed by the UFU. Further, even if the order were recast to require FRV to express an opinion on the Report, it is foreseeable that any such opinion might be a deferential one akin to the view expressed by Mr Freeman in his reply to Mr Marshall on 16 December 2024, in which case the UFU would presumably seek further orders. In practical terms, the second order would be likely to require the Commission's supervision. This would be undesirable, for obvious reasons, including because it would not be a good use of the Commission's time.

• [31] Thirdly, I do not consider that the proposed orders would be beneficial for the relationship between the UFU and FRV. The orders would be beneficial to the UFU, because the UFU wants to receive the information that was provided to the FSIM, as well as the written response document; but the orders would be unbeneficial to FRV, which does not wish to provide this information. In my view it would be unfair to require one party to do the other's bidding in the absence of any good reason, and there is no good reason in this case.

• [32] Fourthly, I consider that there would be a real risk that making the second order could lead to further disputation between the parties, either in respect of the sufficiency of the written response of FRV, or about other dimensions of its content.

• [33] Fifthly, as noted earlier in respect of the first proposed order, there is no suggestion of any imminent change to the rights of the UFU or its members who are employed by FRV. If any concrete proposal for change emerges, the UFU and employees will need to be consulted about it and any disputes about the adequacy of the information provided to the union and employees will be dealt with at that time. The need for change has been flagged in general terms only. Presently, the interactions between FRV and the FSIM are of no practical relevance to the conditions of employment of employees or the rights of the UFU. The Report has been tabled in Parliament. What if any further action may ensue is unknown. There is simply no practical utility in making the proposed orders.

• [34] The above matters are more than sufficient to conclude comfortably that it is not appropriate to issue the proposed orders. But there are additional considerations that weigh heavily against the UFU's case.

• [35] It is clear that the Report is the subject of Parliamentary privilege. In my opinion, the use that the UFU seeks to make of the Report is inconsistent with that privilege. Although the UFU does not ask the Commission to make any determinations about the accuracy or validity of the report, it invites the Commission to draw inferences from the Report in relation to the possible derivations of the disputed statements. Further, the UFU not only disagrees with the Report, it impeaches the document. The union stated in its letter to Mr Freeman on 16 December 2024 that the Report was an 'attack' on conditions. This language was repeated in a UFU bulletin to members on 14 February 2025, which referred to the 'organisational attack via the Fire Service Implementation Monitor'. The bulletin also told union members that the UFU was 'before the Fair Work Commission in a dispute with FRV regarding disparaging remarks made by the FSIM about the secondment program'. The inescapable conclusion is that a purpose of the UFU in these proceedings is to respond to the disputed statements and to impugn the Report. It is also clear, as FRV points out, that the UFU's proposed orders would look behind the Report to how its conclusions were reached and that they directly call into question the 'accuracy' of the Report. The use that the UFU seeks to make of the Report is contrary to the privilege that attaches to that document. I do not propose to exclude the Report. I will have regard to it for the purpose of understanding and explaining the background to this matter. But it would be wholly inappropriate for the Commission to facilitate the UFU's proposed use of the document by making the orders sought.

• [36] Finally, I consider that it is desirable that all relevant persons, including officers and employees of government agencies, have no hesitation in providing information to the FSIM. I am concerned that issuing orders of the kind sought by the UFU could have a chilling or dissuasive effect that might deter cooperation with the FSIM. The concern is not that someone might fear that if they speak to the FSIM, legal proceedings will be brought against them in the Commission or elsewhere. The concern is that persons might fear that if they provide information to the FSIM, they will be asked to explain themselves to the UFU. Of course, this might occur also if no orders are issued. But if the Commission made the proposed orders, it would legitimise the demands for information that the UFU has made of the FRV in this case and make the possibility of a chilling effect more likely. The concern I hold is a realistic one, particularly in respect of employees of FRV who are members of the UFU. If the concern materialised it would be contrary to the public interest, which favours full, frank and fearless engagement by all relevant persons with the FSIM, and for that matter with any other actors concerned with the effectiveness of the Victorian fire service.

• [37] The dispute does not pertain to the employment relationship or the relationship between FRV and the UFU. The Commission is therefore not authorised to arbitrate the dispute. In any event, if there were jurisdiction to arbitrate the matter, I would decline to issue the orders sought because it is not appropriate to do so.

C. Murdoch KC and J. McKenna of counsel for the UFU

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