1. The Tribunal appointed a separate representative for UI and Ms Reid participated in the hearing in this capacity. Ms Reid visited UI on 6 February 2026 (two days prior to the hearing).
2. The separate representative recounted the details of her visit. The salient aspects of the separate representative's visit are summarised as follows:
   • UI lives in the secure dementia unit of the RACF.
   • He had no understanding of the proceedings currently before the Tribunal.
   • The separate representative showed UI the SA EPOA. He could not say what it was or meant.
   • The separate representative showed UI the SA advance care directive. He could not say what it was or meant.
3. On the basis of UI's evident confusion as a consequence of dementia, the separate representative formed the view that it would not be appropriate for UI to take part in this hearing.
4. The applicant did not oppose this course of action and agreed that her father would struggle with a hearing and would not know what was going on. She did note, however, that every time she has spoken with her father he has told her that he wants to be home. In her view, despite his severe dementia, he can still express his views.
5. HI did not suggest that his father should be required to take part in the hearing. He noted that with his advancing dementia, his father's cognition has deteriorated to a level where understanding things is difficult for him.
6. On the basis of the views expressed by each of these parties and the separate representative, we did not attempt to contact UI during the hearing.
7. We note that in respect of the requirement that we have regard to the wishes and preferences of UI, "as far as they can be ascertained" (ss 20(2)(a) & 51(2)(a)), we had before us the SA EPOA and the SA advance care directive made by UI on 25 March 2024. UI's capacity to make these appointments was not challenged in these proceedings. We took into account that UI, by the very fact of his appointment of HI as his substitute decision-maker, made clear his preference for his son to be appointed as his attorney and substitute decision-maker in these roles. The contents of these documents and their relevance to our understanding of UI's wishes and preferences, is discussed in more detail below.

1. Part 4 of the GAA Act sets out provisions in relation to the making of guardianship orders. Section 20 sits within Part 4 and provides as follows:

20. Guardianship order > > (1) The Tribunal, after a hearing, may make an order appointing a guardian for a person in respect of one or more personal matters if - > > (a) an application for an order appointing a guardian, or for an order appointing an administrator, has been made to the Tribunal in respect of the person; and > > (b) the Tribunal is satisfied that the person - > > (i) has impaired decision-making ability in respect of decisions relating to those personal matters; and > > (ii) is in need of a guardian; and > > (c) the Tribunal is satisfied that the order will promote the person's personal and social well-being. > > (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(ii) , in determining whether a person is in need of a guardian, the Tribunal must consider the following: > > (a) the wishes and preferences of the person, as far as they can be ascertained; > > (b) whether the needs of the person could be met by other means less restrictive of that person's freedom of decision and action; > > (c) the wishes and preferences of any close family members, carers and other significant persons in the life of the person who are present at the hearing and are entitled to be heard at that hearing. > > (3) If the Tribunal makes a guardianship order under subsection (1) , the order - > > (a) is to specify the personal matters for which a guardian is required; and > > (b) may be subject to such conditions or restrictions as the Tribunal considers necessary. > > (4) Two or more guardians for a person, each with authority in respect of different personal matters, may be appointed for that person under one or more guardianship orders. > > (5) An order made under this section may be expressed to take effect when the represented person attains the age of 18 years.

1. The provisions governing a person's eligibility to be appointed as guardian are set out in s 21 of the GAA Act as follows:

21 Persons eligible to be appointed as guardian > > (1) The Tribunal may only appoint as a guardian for a proposed represented person - > > (a) a person who is eligible for appointment under subsection (2) ; or > > (b) if the Tribunal is satisfied that no person is eligible for appointment as a guardian for the proposed represented person under subsection (2) , the Public Guardian. > > (2) A person who is of or over the age of 18 years is eligible for appointment as a guardian for a proposed represented person if - > > (a) the person consents to act as a guardian; and > > (b) in the Tribunal's opinion, the person - > > (i) understands their obligations and duties and will act in accordance with the requirements of this Act; and > > (ii) is a suitable person to act as a guardian for the proposed represented person in respect of the personal matters specified in the guardianship order under section 20(3)(a) . > > (3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) , a person consents to act as guardian if the person gives to the Tribunal a written declaration, in a form approved by the Tribunal, that states the following: > > (a) that the person consents to act as a guardian for the represented person; > > (b) that the person understands the person's obligations and duties under this Act; > > (c) that the person understands the consequences of failing to comply with the person's obligations and duties under this Act; > > (d) that the person undertakes to act in accordance with this Act; > > (e) such other information, if any, as may be prescribed. > > (4) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b)(ii) , in determining whether a person is a suitable person to act as a guardian for a represented person, the Tribunal must take into account the following: > > (a) the wishes and preferences of the proposed represented person, so far as they can be ascertained; > > (b) the desirability of preserving existing relationships that are important to the proposed represented person; > > (c) the compatibility of the person proposed as guardian with the proposed represented person and with the administrator (if any) for the proposed represented person; > > (d) the extent to which the person's interests may conflict with the interests of the proposed represented person; > > (e) the desirability of appointing a person who has a personal relationship with the proposed represented person, rather than a person without such a relationship; > > (f) whether the person will be available to act as the proposed represented person's guardian; > > (g) whether the person has the requisite skills and access to appropriate support to competently perform the role. > > (5) For the purposes of subsection (4)(d) - > > (a) the fact that the person is a close family member of the proposed represented person does not, of itself, mean that the person's interests are likely to conflict with the interests of the proposed represented person; and > > (b) the fact that the person may be a beneficiary of the proposed represented person's estate on the proposed represented person's death does not, of itself, mean that the person's interests are likely to conflict with the interests of the proposed represented person; and > > (c) the fact that the person is in conflict with a close family member of the proposed represented person does not, of itself, mean that the person's interests are likely to conflict with the interests of the proposed represented person.

2. Part 5 of the GAA Act sets out the provisions in relation to the appointment of enduring guardians as well as the review powers exercisable by the Tribunal.
3. Part 10 of the GAA Act sets out a number of miscellaneous provisions including s 81A in Division 4. This provision concerns enduring guardianship instruments (sometimes called advance care directives) made under corresponding laws in other Australian states and territories.
4. Section 81A of the GAA Act provides as follows:

81A. Instruments made under corresponding laws > > (1) Where it appears to the Minister that a law in force in another State, or in a Territory or country has substantially the same effect as Part 5 of this Act, the Minister may by notice published in the Gazette declare that the law is a corresponding law for the purpose of this section. > > (2) Subject to subsection (3) , if an instrument appointing an enduring guardian that is made in another State, or in a Territory or country under a corresponding law complies with that corresponding law, the instrument is taken to be an instrument appointing an enduring guardian made in accordance with Part 5 . > > (3) An instrument referred to in subsection (2) is valid only to the extent that it would be valid if it were an instrument appointing an enduring guardian made in accordance with Part 5 . > > (4) For the purposes of this section, a certificate, from an Australian legal practitioner or from the Registrar of a relevant Court, Board or Tribunal exercising a guardianship jurisdiction, that the instrument appointing an enduring guardian satisfies the requirements of the relevant corresponding law is evidence of that fact. > > (5) An instrument appointing an enduring guardian recognised in accordance with this section must be registered in accordance with section 89(1)(c) . > > (6) A notice under subsection (1) is not a statutory rule for the purposes of the Rules Publication Act 1953 .

89. Duty to keep register > > (1) The Tribunal must keep a register, or cause a register to be kept, containing particulars of - > > ... > > (c) any instruments of appointment as an enduring guardian under Part 5;... > > (2) The register is to be made available for inspection by persons in accordance with the regulations.

6. By way of a Notice given under s 81A of the GAA Act (Tasmanian Government Gazette, Wed 9 November 2022, No. 22 252, p.849), the former Minister for Justice declared, relevantly, the following laws to be corresponding laws for the purpose of s 81A of the GAA Act:

(e) Parts 3,5 and 7 of the Advance Care Directives Act 2013 of South Australia > > (f) Schedule 1 of the Advance Care Directives Act 2013 of South Australia

1. Part 7 of the GAA Act sets out provisions in relation to the making of administration orders. Section 51 sits within Part 7 and provides as follows:

51. Administration orders > > (1) The Tribunal, after a hearing, may make an order appointing an administrator for a person in respect of the person's financial matters if - > > (a) an application for an order appointing an administrator, or for an order appointing a guardian, has been made to the Tribunal in respect of the person; and > > (b) the Tribunal is satisfied that the person - > > (i) is a person with impaired decision-making ability in respect of decisions relating to those financial matters; and > > (ii) is in need of an administrator; and > > (c) the Tribunal is satisfied that the order will promote the person's personal and social well-being. > > (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(ii) , in determining whether a person is in need of an administrator, the Tribunal must consider the following: > > (a) the wishes and preferences of the person as far as they can be ascertained; > > (b) whether the needs of the person could be met by other means that are less restrictive of that person's freedom of decision and action; > > (c) the wishes and preferences of any close family members, carers and other significant persons in the life of the person who are present at the hearing and are entitled to be heard at that hearing. > > (3) If the Tribunal makes an administration order under subsection (1) , the order may be subject to such conditions or restrictions as the Tribunal considers necessary. > > (4) The Tribunal must not make an order appointing an administrator for a person in respect of the person's financial matters unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the administrator is eligible to be appointed in respect of that matter under section 54 . > > (5) An order made under this section may be expressed to take effect when the represented person attains the age of 18 years. > > (6) The Tribunal may exercise its powers under this section on an application under Part 4 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2000.

2. Section 53 prevents the making of an administration order in certain circumstances:

53. Administration order may not be made if enduring power of attorney is in force > > (1) Where a proposed represented person has granted an enduring power of attorney under section 11A of the Powers of Attorney Act 1934 or under section 30 of the Powers of Attorney Act 2000 , it is not competent for the Tribunal to make an administration order in respect of the proposed represented person's financial matters so long as the enduring power of attorney is in force unless the order is made under Part 8 . > > (2) If any such enduring power of attorney relates to only some financial matters for the proposed represented person, the Tribunal may make an administration order for the proposed represented person in respect of the financial matters that are not subject to the enduring power of attorney. > > (3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) , any action taken by a person purporting to act under an administration order before the person has notice of an enduring power of attorney is valid and effectual.

3. Provisions relating to interstate powers of attorney are set out in Part 6 of the POA Act. Provisions relevant to the matter before us are as follows:

42. Recognition of registration in other States and Territories > > (1) An instrument creating a power of attorney that is registered in another State or a Territory under a law that corresponds to this Act is taken to be registered in Tasmania for the purposes of this Act. > > (2) For the purposes of this section, the provisions for filing and noting of instruments of the Transfer of Land Act 1893 of Western Australia are taken to be a corresponding law. > > 43. Registration of foreign powers of attorney > > (1) An instrument creating or revoking a power of attorney may be registered in Tasmania for the purposes of this Act, whether or not it was executed in accordance with the law of Tasmania. > > (2) If any such instrument is not executed in accordance with the law of Tasmania, it may be registered in Tasmania only if it was executed in accordance with the law of another State or a Territory or with the law of the place in which it was executed. > > (3) This section does not affect the operation of any law that prohibits the registration of an instrument unless the requisite amount of tax or duty has been paid in respect of the instrument. > > 47. Enduring powers of attorney made outside Tasmania > > (1) The application of this Part extends to a power of attorney that has the same, or substantially the same, effect as an enduring power of attorney and is registered under this Part. > > (2) The Tribunal may exercise its powers under Part 4 for the purpose of giving effect to any order, whether made by a court or not, that is in force under a law of another State or a Territory corresponding with this Act or the Guardianship and Administration Act 1995 .

1. We considered the status of the SA Advance Care Directive in Tasmania and whether there was any impediment to proceeding to consider the making of a guardianship order under s 20 of the GAA Act.
2. We determined that we could proceed to consider the guardianship application for UI for the following reasons.
3. UI's SA advance care directive was made pursuant to Part 3 of the Advance Care Directives Act 2013 (SA).
4. Part 3 of the Advance Care Directives Act 2013 is declared to be corresponding law for the purposes of s 81A(1) of the GAA Act. Accordingly, the SA advance care directive made by UI is taken under s 81A(2) (subject to the requirements under sub-s (3)) to be an instrument appointing an enduring guardian made in accordance with Part 5 of the GAA Act.
5. However, s 81A(5) of the GAA Act requires that an instrument appointing an enduring guardian recognised in accordance with s 81A must be registered in accordance with s 89(1)(c). Section 89(1)(c) of the GAA Act mandates that the Tribunal keep a register containing particulars of any instruments of appointment as an enduring guardian under Part 5 of the GAA Act.
6. The evidence before us was that the requirements of s 81A(5) of the GAA Act have not been met in this case. The evidence given by HI was that the SA advanced care directive made by his father has not been registered in Tasmania. A search of the register maintained by the Tribunal in accordance with s 89(1)(c) of the GAA Act confirms that this is the case.
7. Even if the instrument had been registered in accordance with s 89(1)(c) of the GAA Act, it was not clear that such registration would prevent consideration of an application for the appointment of a guardian under the GAA Act. There is no equivalent to s 53(1) of the GAA Act in respect of guardianship proceedings and instruments recognised as enduring guardian instruments under Part 5 of the GAA Act. It was unnecessary, however, to determine this point. On the facts before us in the current matter, as UI's SA advance care directive has not been registered in Tasmania as required by s 81A(5) of the GAA Act, we saw no impediment to proceeding with consideration of the application for guardianship.

1. The Tribunal had before it a Health Practitioner Report in relation to guardianship and administration prepared by Dr Mia Venter, General Practitioner, dated 2 February 2026. Dr Venter indicated that she had known UI for 2-3 months and had seen him four times in that period. She had last seen UI via telehealth on 29 January 2026. Dr Venter indicated that UI's current medical conditions are:
   • Dementia.
   • Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
   • Crohn's disease.
   • Ischaemic heart disease.
2. It was Dr Venter's opinion that UI lacks decision-making ability in relation to personal matters including where he lives, care services, medical and dental treatment and health care. Dr Venter expressed the opinion that due to the effects of dementia, UI is unable to understand information relevant to decisions, retain information relevant to the decision for a sufficient time to make and consistently communicate the decision, use or weigh information relevant to the decision and communicate the decision. Dr Venter considered that UI does have capacity to make decisions about people with whom he has contact or visits.
3. No-one participating in the hearing disputed the contents of Dr Venter's report.
4. HI gave further examples of his father's impaired decision-making capacity including ongoing decline with his memory. Prior to his admission to the RACF, behaviours relating to his dementia surfaced, including wandering, which has led to UI being cared for in a secure dementia specific unit.
5. UI's granddaughter, OM, who is the applicant's daughter, told us that since the last directions hearing when the extended family were made aware of UI's current whereabouts, she and her own son have spoken with UI by telephone once a week and sometimes more. Although she did not dispute her grandfather's confusion about some matters (UI told her in one call that he was finishing up his holiday and would be coming back to the family), she felt that he "absolutely knows it's me" that he is speaking with.
6. Having regard to the medical and oral evidence before us, we were satisfied pursuant to s 20(1)(b)(i) of the GAA Act that UI is a person who has impaired decision-making ability in respect of personal matters including where he lives, care services, medical and dental treatment and health care.

(c) Is there a need for a guardianship order and will the order promote UI's personal and social well-being?

1. For the reasons that follow, pursuant to s 68(1) of the TASCAT Act a majority of the members (Senior Member Fougere and Member Jones) were satisfied that UI is in need of a guardian (s 20(1)(b)(ii) of the GAA Act) and that the order will promote UI's personal and social well-being (s 20(1)(c)). The third member's reasons as to why she was not satisfied of these matters are set out at [100]-[104].
2. As the SA advance care directive has not been registered pursuant to s 81A(5) of the GAA Act, HI does not have legal authority in Tasmania as his father's substitute decision-maker concerning the personal matters set out in the SA instrument.
3. Despite this, many decisions have been able to be made in UI's interests since his move to Tasmania, albeit some of which may have been made in the mistaken belief that HI was his father's appointed substitute decision-maker in Tasmania.
4. UI was cared for by his son and daughter-in-law in their home for many months until his care needs increased beyond the level that they were able to provide. He has been a permanent resident at the RACF since 10 October 2025 and there was no evidence before us to suggest that he is receiving anything other than an appropriate level of care and services. The evidence indicates that UI's medical needs are being met (no mention being made of outstanding dental issues). We were satisfied that there is a framework within the GAA Act for a "person responsible" to make any substitute decisions about UI's medical or dental treatment should that become necessary in accordance with ss 4 (1), 39(1) and 43 of the GAA Act.
5. There was general agreement by those participating in the hearing that since the applicant and her extended family in South Australia have been made aware of UI's new location at the RACF, they have been able to have frequent and unimpeded telephone contact with him, subject only to the availability of staff to assist with facilitating telephone calls between UI and members of his family. We note Dr Venter's opinion that UI is able to make decisions about who he has contact with and it appears that he has been doing so.
6. For these reasons, we saw no need for a guardian to be appointed in relation to UI's medical and dental treatment, care services or contact.
7. However, we arrived at a different conclusion in relation to the need for a decision-maker about where UI lives.
8. As the hearing progressed, it became clear that the primary reason for the guardianship application related to the circumstances in which UI left South Australia and the decision made by HI that UI should live permanently in Tasmania following that move.
9. Written documentation provided by the applicant shows that she instituted guardianship and administration proceedings with the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal ("SACAT") in October 2024. Her initial application included allegations that HI had been abusive towards their father. Later correspondence with SACAT alleged that HI was preventing contact between the applicant and her family with UI. Eventually, by way of an email dated 24 February 2025, the applicant informed SACAT that she had been told that HI would be taking their father to Tasmania the following week. The applicant writes that "my brother has isolated my father from the family", he "does not have family in Tasmania" and that she is "desperate for a hearing".
10. By the time that notice of a hearing to be held on 22 May 2025 had been issued by SACAT, UI had already left South Australia with HI. A copy of a SACAT order dated 22 May 2025 records that SACAT dismissed the applicant's applications for guardianship and administration on the basis that SACAT no longer had jurisdiction to make the orders. It is noted that this was because UI was no longer a resident of South Australia and because there was no longer any property belonging to UI in South Australia.
11. In her oral and written evidence in these proceedings, the applicant repeated her concerns that there was no consultation with her or UI's extended family prior to the move taking place. According to the applicant, the actions of her brother have resulted in UI's isolation from members of his extended family.
12. The applicant also drew our attention to Part 3a) of the SA advance care directive in which UI had written, under the heading "When decisions are being made for me, I want people to consider the following":

13. She also drew our attention to Part 3d) of the SA advance care directive in which UI had written, under the heading "Where I wish to live":

I wish to remain living in my own home for as long as possible, with services and supports via my home care package. Residential care is a last resort for me. I would like all other options to be explored prior to considering residential care. If my care needs become too high, and residential care is the only viable option, I would like my son to find a facility that is in the local area, where I can have my own room, and has good quality food.

14. The applicant submitted that the "local area" referred to in Part 3d) means the area in South Australia where her father used to live, not Tasmania.
15. In contrast, HI gave written and oral evidence that he acted in accordance with his obligations as the substitute decision-maker for his father under the SA advance care directive. He spent approximately six months living with his father in South Australia after UI's discharge from hospital. He investigated residential care facilities. The only suitable and available facility he could find was approximately 30 minutes away from UI's local area and approximately one and a half hour in travel time from the applicant's home. HI was concerned that this would isolate his father. According to HI, his father did not wish to go into a nursing home. Ultimately, with his father's agreement according to HI, they decided that UI would move to Tasmania to live with HI and his wife so that HI could provide him with around the clock care.
16. HI made allegations about the applicant's conduct towards their father, asserting there was minimal contact between the applicant and UI for a lengthy period of time before UI left South Australia. The applicant denied that this was the case. HI also alleged that the applicant acted in an abusive manner towards their father leading up to the time that they left for Tasmania.
17. That there is an acrimonious relationship between UI's two adult children was evident from the material filed in these proceedings and in the hearing before us. The circumstances in which UI left South Australia heightened what was already a very fraught set of circumstances surrounding UI. This situation, and the conflict between UI's children, continues and runs the risk of flowing into UI's day-to-day life, if it has not already done so.
18. In our view, even though he has lived in Tasmania since March 2025, given the very divergent views about where UI should be living, the objective fact that he no longer lives in close proximity to extended family although he lives in close proximity to his son and daughter-in-law, and the potential impact that conflict about this issue may have on UI's well-being, led Members Fougere and Jones to form the view that there is a need for the appointment of a guardian about the issue of where UI should live.
19. In arriving at this view, we had regard to UI's wishes and preferences as far as they could be ascertained (GAA Act, s 20(2)(a)). Whilst he was not able to express views about these matters to the separate representative for the reasons outlined, we had regard to his clear preference to appoint HI as his substitute decision-maker in the SA advance care directive. However, we also had regard to the preferences contained within that document about where UI, at the time that he made the advance care directive, would choose to live if he required supported accommodation.
20. As previously outlined, we also had regard to the views of close family members including HI and the applicant (GAA Act, s 20(2)(c)).
21. UI's freedom of decision and action is restricted by the nature of his illness and he has not made decisions on his own behalf since at least 10 September 2024 as per the letter written by Dr Sully. The conflict over where he lives continues to be a live issue despite the arrangements UI put in place by way of the SA advance care directive to be a has been a live issue since his move to Tasmania despite the existence of the SA advance care directive. For these reasons, we do not believe that UI's needs about this issue could be met by other means less restrictive of his freedom of decision and action (GAA Act, s 20(2)(b)).
22. We were also satisfied that a relatively short order that empowers a substitute decision-maker to examine and make a final decision about the issue of where UI should live will promote his personal and social well-being. We understood from the evidence that UI has settled into the aged care facility where he now lives and has regular in person contact with his son and daughter-in-law and telephone contact with relatives in South Australia. It is not clear, however, that the decision to move from South Australia to Tasmania took account of UI's extended family relationships and the importance of these relationships to UI. In our view, appointing a guardian with this limited area of decision-making will ensure that regard is had to UI's existing supportive relationships (GAA Act, s 5(g)) and his right to live in a dignified manner (GAA Act, s 5(1)) that includes being able to live free of ongoing family conflict around him about this issue.

1. Although HI sought to be appointed as guardian and consented to act as his father's guardian, if appointed, pursuant to s 21(2)(a) of the GAA Act, we were not satisfied that he was a suitable person to act as guardian for his father in respect of the issue of where UI should live. Whilst he has cared for his father and made decisions on his father's behalf in what he has believed has been in his father's interests, we were not satisfied that for the purpose of deciding where UI should live as he would be able to give adequate regard to the desirability of preserving existing relationships with other family members that are important to UI (GAA Act, s 21(4)(b).
2. Given this finding, and in circumstances where no-one else sought to be appointed guardian, we appointed the Public Guardian as UI's guardian. We note that at the hearing the Public Guardian's representative supported the making of a short guardianship order, limited to the issues of where UI should live. The reality of UI's circumstances was also noted by the Public Guardian's representative, including whether a move would be feasible for someone with advanced dementia. This, along with the principles to be observed as set out in s 8 of the GAA Act, and the decision-making process set out in s 9 of the GAA Act, will be matters that the Public Guardian will be bound to apply.

1. We decided to make an order of six month's duration. This was the length of time suggested by the representative of the Public Guardian as the length of time that would be likely to be needed to consider afresh the issue of where UI should reside. We formed the view that once this decision is made by an independent decision-maker, it is likely that there will no longer be a need for a guardian (GAA Act, s 24(2)(b)). As previously noted, UI has "persons responsible" available to him that can make future decisions about his medical or dental treatment. There were no other matters identified in the evidence available to us to suggest that a guardian is needed in other areas of UI's life.
2. In arriving at the decision to make a six-month order, we also took into account the nature of UI's decision-making impairment and that there is no likelihood of improvement in his decision-making ability (GAA Act, s 24(2)(a)). An order of a short duration also in our view recognises that UI had put in place other decision-making arrangements via the SA advance care directive, albeit that that instrument has not yet been registered in Tasmania (GAA Act, s 24(2)c)).

1. We also considered the status of the SA EPOA in Tasmania and whether there was any impediment to proceeding to consider the administration application under s 51 of the GAA Act.
2. We determined that we could proceed to consider the application for administration for UI for the following reasons.
3. The evidence before us was that the SA EPOA has not been registered in Tasmania.
4. Registration of the SA EPOA under ss 43(1) or (2) of the POA Act would have supported an argument that there was an enduring power of attorney "in force" under s 53(1) of the GAA Act and that it was "not competent" for the Tribunal to make an administration order.
5. Registration of an enduring power of attorney is significant as any actions taken by an attorney have no legal effect unless it is registered (POA Act, s 16(b)). This provision forms part of the broader statutory scheme in relation to the registration of powers of attorney. It requires that the Recorder keep a register of both enduring and non-enduring powers of attorney (POA Act, s 4) and provides transparency for third parties in relation to the currency of powers of attorney (CX (Federal Jurisdiction Issue) [2025] TASCAT 158, at [60]).
6. In the absence of actual registration, we had to consider whether the SA EPOA could "be taken to be registered in Tasmania" under s 42(1) of the POA Act.
7. The SA EPOA was made pursuant to the Powers of Attorney and Agency Act 1984 (SA). It was not, however, registered under that Act as there are no registration provisions contained in that legislation.
8. In evidence before us was a document recording the registration of the SA EPOA with the Land Titles Registration Office of South Australia. This occurred in accordance with the provisions contained in the Real Property Act 1886 (SA). Section 155 of that Act provides that a person may, by power of attorney, authorise any person to act for him in making applications to bring land under the provisions of the Real Property Act and to execute all or any instruments that may be necessary for giving effect to any dealing with land. Section 156 requires that a duplicate or attested copy of a power of attorney referred to in s 155 must be deposited in the Land Titles Registration Office and the date and time of depositing must be noted on the duplicate or attested copy.
9. Under s 42(1) of the POA Act, an instrument creating a power of attorney that is registered in another State under a law that corresponds to the POA Act is taken to be registered in Tasmania for the purposes of the POA Act.
10. Whilst s 42(2) of the POA Act describes certain provisions under the Transfer of Land Act 1893 (WA) as being "taken to be corresponding law", the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) is not referred to under s 42 or elsewhere in the Act. Nor are we aware of any other provisions under Tasmanian law that describes any interstate laws as corresponding laws under s 42(1) of the POA Act. The applicant's written submissions dated 6 February 2026 did not address this matter or 42(1) of the POA Act.
11. We conclude therefore that the SA EPOA cannot "be taken to be registered in Tasmania" pursuant to s 42(1) because the relevant provisions of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) are not laws that correspond to the POA Act.
12. As there has been no actual registration of the SA EPOA in Tasmania, and as a consequence of our finding that the SA EPOA cannot be taken to be registered in Tasmania, the SA EPOA is not in force in Tasmania and there is no impediment to proceeding with consideration of the application for administration.

(b) Impaired decision-making - administration

1. Dr Venter reached the same conclusion in relation to UI's decision-making ability in relation to financial matters as he did in relation to his personal affairs as set out in [39]-[40] above.
2. No-one participating in the hearing disputed the opinion expressed by Dr Venter about this issue.
3. Having regard to the medical and oral evidence before us, we were satisfied pursuant to s 51(1)(b)(i) of the GAA Act that UI is a person who has impaired decision-making ability in respect of financial matters.

(c) Is there a need for an administration order and will an order promote UI's personal and social well-being?

1. For the reasons previously outlined, because the SA EPOA has not been registered pursuant to s 43 of the POA Act, there is currently no-one with the legal authority in Tasmania to manage UI's financial affairs on his behalf. We accept that many significant financial decisions have already been made on UI's behalf. His home in South Australia has been sold, personal and other effect were dealt with prior to his move to Tasmania and HI has ensured that his father's accommodation bond and residential care fees are met as well as his day-to-day financial needs.
2. Nevertheless, we were satisfied that there is a need for an administration order to be made and that it would promote UI's personal and social well-being to make an order. To leave UI without a substitute decision-maker would, in our view, fail to respect UI's inherent dignity (GAA Act, s 5(a)). Making an order will ensure that his finances are protected (GAA Act, s 5(c)) and that all ongoing day-to-day financial needs are met.
3. In deciding that there is a need for an administrator, we were unable to obtain UI's wishes and preferences for the reasons set out by the separate representative (GAA Act, s 51(2)(a)). However, we were able to have regard to the clear steps he took to make arrangements for the management of his financial affairs and his appointment of HI as his attorney in South Australia to undertake this task.
4. We were satisfied that there is currently no less restrictive means by which UI's financial needs could be met (s 51(2)(b)). For reasons outlined below, however, we note that registration in Tasmania of UI's SA EPOA could provide a less restrictive means by which UI's financial needs could be met if that is a pathway that HI chooses to follow within the next six months.
5. In arriving at the decision to make an administration order, we also took account of the views of HI and the applicant. It was not clear whether HI understood that the SA EPOA was not in force in Tasmania, even though that was the legal position argued for by the applicant in her written submissions. We note, however, that HI was of the view that if an administration order were to be made, he wished to be appointed as the administrator for his father. The applicant very clearly put the position that an administration order should be made but that the Public Trustee should be appointed as her father's administrator.

1. HI sought to be appointed as his father's administrator. We had to consider whether he was eligible for appointment under s 54(2) of the GAA Act. The applicant opposed HI's appointment as administrator and sought the appointment of the Public Trustee.
2. We were satisfied that HI consents to act as his father's administrator (GAA Act, s 54(2)(a)). HI completed a written declaration in the form approved by the Tribunal that confirmed each of the requirements set out in s 54(3) of the GAA Act.
3. We were positively satisfied that HI understands what his obligations and duties would be under the GAA Act and will act in accordance with the requirements of the Act (GAA Act, s 54(2)(b)(i)).
4. We also had to consider whether HI is a suitable person to act as administrator (GAA Act, s 54(2)(b)(ii)).
5. The applicant made a number of allegations about her brother's actions as attorney for UI. She asserted that her father may be subject to financial abuse due to his inability to make financial decisions on his own and his isolation from the rest of his family makes him vulnerable. The sale of UI's home in South Australia, undertaken without the applicant's knowledge, as well as the sale of belongings from her father's home has also led to her concerns that her brother has taken advantage of their father.
6. However, there was no evidence before us that financial decisions made in South Australia by HI as attorney were contrary to UI's interests. The bank statements and documentary evidence provided to us indicated that the funds from the sale of UI's former home are accounted for by way of a payment of a refundable accommodation deposit to the RACF for UI. UI holds the remainder of these funds in a term deposit account and in a savings account. HI provided a detailed expenses log in which he recorded all transactions he undertook as attorney on his father's behalf from October 2024 to August 2025. The expenses log indicated that UI paid to HI and his wife a regular amount for board and lodgings to cover expenses. This payment was ceased when UI entered residential care. The applicant queried some of the entries in the expenses log, namely those relating to purchases from Anaconda. These were explained by HI as being purchases of clothing items for UI to cope with the cooler weather in Tasmania. The applicant also queried other handwritten records of matters relating to her father's finances. However, these were matters that took place over 20 years ago and were not relevant to these proceedings.
7. The evidence before us did not support the allegations of financial abuse or mismanagement made against HI. Whilst HI may have mistakenly relied on the SA EPOA in Tasmania to act on his father's behalf, there was no evidence that this occurred deliberately or that UI's finances have suffered in any way.
8. We decided that HI is a suitable person to be appointed as administrator. In doing so we have given weight to what we understand of UI's wishes and preferences given his appointment of HI as his attorney in South Australia (GAA Act, s 54(4)(a)); the manner in which HI has managed his father's finances to date demonstrating that he has the requisite skills to perform the role (s 54(4(g)); his availability for the role (s 54(4)(f)); the close relationship between UI and HI (s 54(4)(c)); and the desirability of appointing someone who has a personal relationship with UI (s 54(4)(e)).

1. We decided to make an order of six month's duration. The making of an order will ensure that UI's financial affairs can be properly managed over that time. Given the nature of UI's decision-making impairment, there is no likelihood of improvement in his decision-making ability (GAA Act, s 52(2)(a)). Over the six-month period, it will be a matter for HI as to whether he elects to seek registration of the SA EPOA. If he chooses not to go down that path, then an administration order of a longer duration may need to be sought. An order of six months duration will therefore accommodate any potential changes that may mitigate the need for an order (s 52(2)(b)) and recognises the decisions and actions taken by UI when he appointed HI as his attorney under the SA EPOA (s 52(2)(c)).

1. I was not satisfied that UI is in need of a guardian (s 20(1)(b)(ii) of the GAA Act) or that making a guardianship order with an accommodation function would promote his personal or social well-being (s 20(1)(c) of the GAA Act).
2. In my view, there was no need for a guardianship order to be made about the issue of accommodation since the evidence suggested that UI was settled into his current RACF. No evidence was presented that there was a need to change accommodation to better promote UI's personal and social well-being. Furthermore, given the apparent frailty and advanced dementia experienced by UI, any potential change if it were to occur would likely cause deterioration in UI's social and personal well-being.
3. I accepted the evidence that HI did not arrange local placement in South Australia for a RACF even though placement in a local RACF reflected UI's wishes as expressed in the advance care directive. This was because one was not available, the closest being some distance from his local area, with the only other option being a prolonged stay in hospital in SA, not ideal either. HI lived with UI in UI's home for a number of months. These actions by HI appeared to work to promote the personal and social well-being of UI.
4. Sometime later, for practical reasons HI organised move of UI to Tasmania since that is where HI lived. UI lived with HI and HI's wife. The evidence indicated that HI's support of UI in Tasmania promoted UI's social and personal well-being: for example, phone calls to UI's friends was facilitated by HI regularly once the move was made; appropriate clothes were purchased; and charges to UI by HI for board and lodging seemed reasonable.
5. I accept that it was not ideal that HI did not inform his sibling of their father's move to Tasmania, but I do not feel that the appointment of a Public Guardian now to review accommodation will have any impact on the social and personal well-being of UI in his current condition of advanced dementia. Even if the result of the Public Guardian's appointment facilitates resolution of sibling conflict, this would unlikely have any impact on UI given the severity of his dementia now. There is no limitation to any visitation to UI from either sibling, and this will not be impacted by appointment of a Public Guardian for accommodation.