1. accessed and used his birth certificate to ascertain details of his family members (the first incident); 2. provided his mobile telephone number to an external consultant without his consent (the second incident); and

1. failed to respond adequately to his request about what personal information it holds about him (the third incident).
2. The complainant alleges that these incidents represented breaches of the Information Privacy Principles (IPPs) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.1 and 5.2. He seeks damages for loss and damage of $17,028.40.
3. The complainant was employed as a solicitor and as a senior solicitor by the respondent between November 2011 and July 2019. The complainant was the subject of two allegations of misconduct in his employment, one relating to his conduct towards another employee and one relating to his use of data held by the respondent relating to numerous taxpayers. Each of these allegations was the subject of concurrent investigations in accordance with the Victorian Public Service Enterprise Agreement. It was during the course of the investigations that the alleged breaches occurred.
4. The respondent's defence is that collection and disclosure or use of the complainant's information was lawful.

1. Section 18 of the Act establishes the authority of IPPs in Schedule 1 of the Act. Section 20(1) of the Act states that:

An organisation must not do an act, or engage in a practice, that contravenes an Information Privacy Principle in respect of personal information collected, held, managed, used, disclosed or transferred by it.

1. Section 3 defines 'personal information' as:

information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part of a database), that is recorded in any form and whether true or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion, but does not include information of a kind to which the Health Records Act 2001 applies

1. Section 57(1) of the Act establishes the ability for an individual in respect of whom personal information is, or has at any time been, held by an organisation to complain to the Information Commissioner about an act or practice that may be an interference with the privacy of the individual.
2. Under section 77 of the Act the Tribunal can find a complaint (or part of it) proven and award damages and other remedies or it can find the complaint not proven and dismiss the complaint.
3. The relevant IPPs (or parts thereof) state:

1.1 An organisation must not collect personal information unless the information is necessary for one or more of its functions or activities.

1.2 An organisation must collect personal information only by lawful and fair means and not in an unreasonably intrusive way.

1.3 At or before the time (or, if that is not practicable, as soon as practicable after) an organisation collects personal information about an individual from the individual, the organisation must take reasonable steps to ensure that the individual is aware of -

(a) the identity of the organisation and how to contact it; and

(b) the fact that the individual is able to gain access to the information; and

(c) the purposes for which the information is collected; and

(d) to whom (or the types of individuals or organisations to which) the organisation usually discloses information of that kind; and

(e) any law that requires the particular information to be collected; and

(f) the main consequences (if any) for the individual if all or part of the information is not provided.

2.1 An organisation must not use or disclose personal information about an individual for a purpose (the secondary purpose) other than the primary purpose of collection unless -

(i) the secondary purpose is related to the primary purpose of collection and, if the personal information is sensitive information, directly related to the primary purpose of collection;

(ii) the individual would reasonably expect the organisation to use or disclose the information for the secondary purpose; or

(b) the individual has consented to the use or disclosure; or

(e) the organisation has reason to suspect that unlawful activity has been, is being or may be engaged in, and uses or discloses the personal information as a necessary part of its investigation of the matter or in reporting its concerns to relevant persons or authorities; ...

5.2 On request by a person, an organisation must take reasonable steps to let the person know, generally, what sort of personal information it holds, for what purposes, and how it collects, holds, uses and discloses that information.

1. At the hearing, the complainant sought to tender four new documents to which the respondent objected due to late production. I accepted these documents but indicated that, in light of the late production, I would make assessments as to the relevance and weight of the documents.
2. The complainant objected to the respondent's production of two documents to the Tribunal:
   1. a TRIM file checklist[1] on the grounds that it, or parts of it, had been fabricated; and
   2. a copy of his birth certificate[2].
3. Angela Karantoni was called[3] in relation to the TRIM file checklist and (as discussed below) I was satisfied that no part of if had been fabricated.
4. With respect to the copy of the birth certificate, I was satisfied that it was directly relevant to the complaint and I also allowed it to be tendered despite objections by the complainant that it was produced only on the day of the hearing.
5. Counsel for the respondent commenced proceedings with an objection to various aspects of the complainant's witness statements. For reasons given orally at the hearing, I made rulings that statements submitted by witnesses to other legal proceedings, references to breaches of privacy of individuals other than the complainant and the complainant's view of his whistleblowing conduct were not relevant to the proceedings. I accepted the respondent's argument that section 57 of the Act restricts an individual to making complaints about his or her own personal information and not the information of other persons. I struck out various parts of the complainant's statements and the corresponding attachments in accordance with these rulings.
6. I also struck out part of paragraph 24 of the statement by David Heywood for the respondent because it drew conclusions about the legal issues at hand.

1. The complainant gave evidence and called his father, Robert John Tucker as a witness.
2. The complainant's evidence in respect of the first incident is that on 9 June 2017, he was removed from his place of employment and that an investigation commenced into his conduct as an employee. A letter of the same date outlined the basis of the investigation. The letter alleged inappropriate behaviour towards a fellow employee. It also alleged searches of the SRO eSys database between 24 November 2016 and 23 May 2017 of the records of 18 taxpayers when such searches were not related to any known SRO business purpose. A second letter dated 4 July 2017 alleged searches of the SRO eSys database of a further five taxpayers between 6 January 2015 and 22 December 2015. One of the taxpayers is described in the second letter as 'Robert James Tucker'. The complainant's father's name is Robert John Tucker which he notes in his statement is 'similar, but not identical, to my father's name'.
3. The respondent engaged an investigator who wrote a letter and report dated 7 February 2018. The investigator concluded that the complainant correctly denied of a search of Robert James Tucker, but stated the complainant did conduct a search of Robert J Tucker, therefore the second letter dated 4 July 2017 contained an administrative error. The report stated:

Toby's birth certificate was obtained from his SRO Human Resources file. The birth certificate shows a Robert John Tucker nominated as his father. ... [I have omitted further personal details about the complainant's parents]

The evidence strongly points to Robert J Tucker being Toby's father.

From the information available to me I have concluded that on the balance of probabilities there was no search by Toby of a customer named 'Robert James Tucker' during the period.

Therefore, I find that the allegation in respect of customer D, (incorrectly identified as 'Robert James Tucker') cannot be substantiated.

1. At the hearing the complainant said that he did not know how the respondent came to be in possession of his birth certificate and denied that he provided it with the birth certificate. He alleged that the use of his birth certificate to ascertain the name and date of birth of a member of his family was an interference with his privacy.
2. The complainant's father, Robert John Tucker, briefly gave unchallenged evidence to the effect that he did not participate in any investigations by his son's employer and did not authorise access to his personal information as part of those investigations.
3. In respect of the second incident, the complainant gave evidence that the respondent interfered with his privacy when it gave his personal mobile telephone number to an external investigator, Lisa Klug, who was investigating the allegations about his conduct towards another employee. His evidence was that, at a point after he had informed the respondent that he was engaging legal representation in relation to the matters under investigation, the investigator called him on one occasion on his mobile telephone. He did not give consent for his mobile telephone number to be disclosed to her. He said that knowing that his personal mobile telephone number had been given to a person outside the respondent organisation exacerbated his feelings of being bullied by the respondent.
4. When cross-examined, the complainant was shown the Personal Details Form he completed at the commencement of his employment. He agreed that no home telephone number was provided on the form, but a mobile telephone number was provided. He acknowledged correspondence from the respondent dated 21 June 2017 indicating that Ms Klug had been appointed as investigator and that he would be advised of the investigation process and timelines as soon as possible. One week later, the investigator contacted him on his mobile telephone number. He told the investigator to contact his lawyers and she did not approach him directly again. The complainant stated that he was not expecting her call as he expected any approach to be made through his solicitors.
5. In respect of the the third incident, the complainant's documentary evidence includes an email dated 1 October 2018 where the complainant requested the respondent's representative to provide, amongst other things:

... a detailed list of what other personal and private information is being held by the SRO regarding me, and why the SRO is holding such information.

Also included is a letter from the respondent dated 30 November 2018 in reply.

1. The respondent called Ms Karantoni and David Heywood.
2. Ms Karantoni was called as a witness on short notice because, on the day of the hearing, the complainant alleged for the first time that certain documents provided by the respondent had been fabricated and that he had not provided the respondent with his birth certificate and did not know how it came to be in possession of a copy of it.
3. Ms Karantoni is employed by the respondent and was at relevant times responsible for arranging the complainant's documentation for the commencement of employment with the respondent. She gave evidence of her usual practice on such occasions as, other than the written contents on the relevant forms, she did not have an independent recollection of the events in 2011.
4. Ms Karantoni explained that some blank forms requiring personal information were sent to the complainant for completion as a 'new starter'. She said that, as part of the new starter process, a new starter must provide a birth certificate, a passport or citizenship certificate as proof that the person has rights to work in Australia. On the TRIM records this is noted as 'Proof of Residency (Birth Certificate or Australian Citizenship or Passport)'. She said any of these Proof of Residency documents would be acceptable and that often people do not have a full birth certificate, but they might have a passport. She indicated that she always insists on sighting and copying original Proof of Residency documents and in respect of birth certificates it must be the full certificate, not an extract.
5. From the completed forms and TRIM records, Ms Karantoni concluded that the complainant brought a birth certificate to her office and the completed forms on 23 November 2011. He commenced work on 28 November 2011. These processes were administratively confirmed by Ms Karantoni on 17 January 2012 and approved by her supervisor on 19 January 2012. Because the various stages of the process were completed on different days and her supervisor also signed approval on the TRIM records, different coloured pens and different handwriting were evident on the respondent's documents. Ms Karantoni confirmed that any initials or signatures on the documents purporting to be hers were genuine. She confirmed that the words 'Birth Certificate' corresponding to the item 'Proof of Residency (Birth Certificate or Australian Citizenship or Passport)' were in her handwriting and would have been recorded on 23 November 2011.
6. Under cross-examination, Ms Karantoni explained that the complainant would not have been authorised to commence work (or entered on the payroll) unless all forms were completed and the Proof of Residency was provided. She indicated that she has no capacity to obtain an employee's birth certificate and that the only means by which she could have sighted and copied such was for an employee to have provided it to her.
7. Mr Heywood gave evidence that he is employed as Branch Manager for Human Resources for the respondent. His statement annexed the various new starter documents referred to in Ms Karantoni's evidence, including the SRO's Information Privacy Policy. He detailed the allegations about the complainant's workplace behaviours and the engagement of an external investigator to investigate those behaviours.
8. Mr Heywood explained that Ms Klug was originally retained to investigate both allegations and that she gave an undertaking as to confidentiality regarding all information in the investigations. Subsequently the investigation was split and Ms Klug only investigated the allegations about the complainant's alleged inappropriate behaviour towards a fellow employee. He admitted to providing Ms Klug with the complainant's mobile telephone number on 27 June 2017 'because the Complainant was suspended at the time and could not be contacted on his work telephone number'.
9. Mr Heywood gave evidence that Don Di Federico, Branch Manager for Compliance, was appointed to conduct the investigation into the allegations about searches of the SRO eSys database which were not related to any known SRO business purpose to the records (which he referred to as the Second Allegations). He stated:

As part of Don Di Federico's investigation into the Second Allegations, Don asked the Complainant about a person named 'Robert James Tucker,' whom the Complainant denied knowing. I understand that Don thought this might have been the Complainant's father and so he asked whether we had information in our HR records that may assist him in resolving the allegation. I provided him [Mr Di Federico] with access to the birth certificate for this purpose.

1. Under cross-examination, Mr Heywood agreed that he had not sought the complainant's consent to provide the investigator with access to the birth certificate.

1. As the respondent admitted the collection and disclosure of the telephone number and the birth certificate, there are few factual issues requiring my determination.
2. I found Ms Karantoni to be a reliable and credible witness, especially as she had not been expecting to attend and give evidence and had not been briefed. She gave a sensible account of her usual processes for inducting a new starter and the records reflect that she followed that process in respect of the complainant's commencement of employment. I do not consider that the TRIM records have been fabricated in any way. I also accept that the complainant provided his birth certificate to her in person on 23 November 2011 as Proof of Residency. She copied it and the copy was placed on his file at that time. I find the fact that the complainant had no recollection of that event is merely a product of the administrative nature of the activity and the long period of time between 2011 and the bringing of this complaint and not as proof that it did not occur. Where Ms Karantoni's evidence differs from the complainant's evidence or recollection, I prefer Ms Karantoni's evidence.

1. There was no dispute that the complainant's mobile telephone number and his birth certificate constitute personal information. The respondent admitted to the collection and disclosure of the information. The basis of the argument was, essentially, whether the collection and disclosures were lawful.
2. In accordance with directions I gave on 13 November 2019, the complainant and the respondent exchanged and filed written submissions on 12 December 2019 and reply submissions on 19 December 2019. The following are my findings with respect to the alleged breaches of the IPPs.

IPP 1.1 - Was the collection of the birth certificate and telephone number necessary?

1. The complainant submitted that it was not necessary for the respondent's functions and activities for the respondent to collect his birth certificate, noting that a passport, visa or citizenship certificate would have sufficed as Proof of Residency. The respondent submitted that collection of the birth certificate was necessary for a legitimate purpose of employment. The complainant submitted that the respondent changed the nature of its argument regarding IPP 1.1 in breach of directions given by this Tribunal. However, I consider that the change, if any, was merely semantic.
2. Ms Karantoni's evidence was that production and copying of a Proof of Residency documents was required by the respondent to establish that a new employee can work in Australia. Employees may choose which of the passport, citizenship certificate, or birth certificate they supply as Proof of Residency. She stated that without such verification, an employee would not be permitted to commence work. In this case, I am satisfied that the complainant chose to supply his birth certificate rather than his passport (I infer from the evidence[4] that a visa or citizenship certificate would not be applicable to him). In making this finding, I am rejecting the complainant's evidence that he did not provide the birth certificate, although I accept that it may be the case that he does not recall providing it.
3. In Ng v Department of Education[5] Deputy President Macnamara adopted a relaxed meaning of 'necessity' in IPP 1.1, being whether the collection is 'reasonably required or legally ancillary to the accomplishment of the Department's functions?' Further, Member Duggan in Jurecek v Director of Transport Safety Victoria[6] stated:

An employer is in a position to collect personal information from an employee, as it is from any other individual and obviously needs to do so in order to properly manage its workforce.

1. I am satisfied that requiring a new employee to produce Proof of Residency whether by means of a birth certificate, passport, visa or citizenship certificate is reasonably required or legally ancillary to the accomplishment of the respondent's functions and activities as an employer. It does not alter its necessity that the collection of alternative personal information would have met the same ends.
2. Although the complainant hasn't addressed the collection of the telephone number in his submissions, for the sake of completeness I am also satisfied that it was necessary in the respondent's functions and activities as an employer to collect a personal contact telephone number from the complainant at the commencement of his employment.
3. I am not satisfied that the respondent is in breach of IPP 1.1.

IPP 1.2 - Was personal information collected by lawful and fair means and not in an unreasonably intrusive way?

1. The complainant submitted that the respondent breached IPP 1.2 because it collected his birth certificate without his knowledge and consent.
2. I am satisfied that the respondent came to be in possession of a copy of the complainant's birth certificate because the complainant provided the original to Ms Karantoni on 23 November 2011 when she made a copy of it and placed that in his personnel file as Proof of Residency. He was offered a choice of the kind of documentation he might supply, as noted above. There was nothing unlawful, unfair or unreasonably intrusive about the collection of this personal information.
3. I am not satisfied that the respondent is in breach of IPP 1.2.

IPP 1.3 - Did the respondent take reasonable steps to ensure that the complainant was aware of aspects of the collection of personal information?

1. The complainant submitted that the respondent breached IPP 1.3 because it did not make him or members of his family aware of the disclosure of his mobile telephone number or his birth certificate during its investigation of allegations of misconduct.
2. The respondent submitted that the complainant was subject to workplace policies and responsibilities during his employment which means that he would be on notice of the reasons for collection of the information and the issues required by IPP 1.3.
3. With respect, I consider that IPP 1.3 is not relevant to the investigation process or to times post-induction as appears to be assumed by the complainant and the respondent in their submissions. The words 'At or before the time (or, if that is not practicable, as soon as practicable after) an organisation collects personal information' (emphasis added) suggests to me that IPP 1.3 is limited to the point of collection of the information. I consider that the investigations brought forward issues of use and disclosure but not collection of the personal information. I consider that 'collection' refers to the point at which the information was introduced to the respondent. That point was 23 November 2011 or thereabouts.
4. As to the particular aspects of IPP 1.3, I note as follows:
   1. The respondent's identity and contact details were patently clear to the complainant at the point of collection, which occurred at the respondent's premises.
   2. It is reasonable to assume that any employee (especially a person who had been previously employed, as the complainant had) would be aware that they can access their employment files.
5. I have made a finding that the telephone number was provided by the complainant when he completed the Personal Details Form[7] and his birth certificate was provided by him in the meeting with Ms Karantoni on 23 November 2011 as Proof of Residency. Ms Karantoni's evidence was that she would have invited the complainant to meet with her prior to commencing employment to complete the 'on-boarding' process and asked him to bring the requisite Proof of Residency documentation.
6. IPP 1.3 only requires that the respondent take reasonable steps to ensure that the individual is aware. The new starter documents[8] refer to the Act, the IPPs and the Health Records Act 2001 and the Acceptance of Employment Terms signed by the complainant sets out the duty of an SRO employee not to disclose confidential information_._ I consider that, these documents together with the meeting conducted between Ms Karantoni and the complainant prior to his commencing employment, demonstrate that the respondent took reasonable steps to make the complainant aware of the purposes for which the information was collected, to whom the respondent would usually disclose the information, any laws that required the particular information to be collected and possible consequences for the complainant if the information was not provided, specifically in this case that he would not be able to commence employment without Proof of Residency.
7. I am satisfied that the respondent complied IPP 1.3 with respect to the collection of the relevant personal information at the time it was collected.

IPP 2.1 - Was the personal information used or disclosed for a primary purpose or a permitted secondary purpose?

1. The complainant did not consent to the disclosure of his mobile telephone number to the investigator, Ms Klug, nor to Mr Di Federico accessing his birth certificate, so I agree with the complainant that IPP 2.1(b) is not applicable.
2. Regarding the use or disclosure of the birth certificate, the complainant argued as follows: The respondent embarked on an investigation of the complainant's conduct in using the SRO eSys database to search a Robert James Tucker. The investigator concluded that no such search was made. Therefore, the investigation was based on a false allegation and there was no probative basis and no proper reason for the respondent to have accessed his birth certificate. As none of the 23 taxpayers whose records he was alleged to have accessed had lodged complaints against the respondent or the complainant about the alleged searches, the complainant argued that the respondent had no grounds on which to investigate the complainant. Further, he argues that the investigator could have obtained the complainant's father's name by asking either the complainant or his father[9].
3. The complainant argued with respect to the disclosure of his mobile telephone number that it was not necessary because he had engaged legal representatives, and Rule 33 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015 would require exceptional circumstances before contacting him directly.
4. The respondent submitted alternative grounds in defence. First it submitted that the personal information was collected for the primary purpose of employment and both workplace investigations were also for the purpose of employment and therefore the disclosures or uses of that information were consistent with the primary purpose.
5. Alternatively, the respondent submitted that the respondent has a positive obligation to investigate complaints against an employee and ensure that the public sector workforce is operating in accordance with the Victorian Public Sector Code of Conduct (the Code). It argues that if the investigation is a secondary purpose, then that secondary purpose is directly related to the primary purpose of collection and that the complainant would reasonably expect the organisation would use or disclose the information for the secondary purpose.
6. As a further alternative, the respondent argued that it suspected that, in unauthorised access of the SRO eSys database, the complainant breached the Code which has force of law under sections 61 and 7(1)(b) of the Public Administration Act 2004. The respondent stated that it used the birth certificate while investigating a possible breach of the Code (i.e. unlawful activity).
7. I do not accept the complainant's submission that because no misconduct was found in relation to a search of Robert James Tucker, there was no reason to conduct an investigation and therefore no reason to access the birth certificate.
8. Mr Di Federico's investigation report responded to allegations of unauthorised searches of 23 taxpayers in the respondent's database. In its letter of 4 July 2017 establishing the terms of the investigation, the respondent referred to one of those taxpayers as Robert James Tucker. The investigator found that the complainant searched a Robert J Tucker on 22 December 2017 but did not search a Robert James Tucker and therefore that allegation was not substantiated. I do not accept the proposition that if an investigation finds no misconduct that the investigation should not have occurred. I also do not accept that the investigator erred in not questioning the complainant or his father as to his father's name instead of accessing the birth certificate.
9. In Jurecek[10], Member Duggan found that without an ability for employers to conduct investigations into allegations of employees' misconduct, the employment relationship could not operate effectively. She found that it is incumbent upon employers to properly investigate serious allegations[11] and that:

It cannot be that the effect of the Act is to prohibit or impede an appropriate investigation into misconduct.[12]

1. Relying on this decision, the respondent submitted that the personal information was collected for the purposes of employment and the investigation (including the access to the telephone number and the birth certificate) was also for the primary purpose of employment.
2. Verification of an employee's identification and proof of residency are fundamental to the commencement of an employment relationship (i.e. the commencement of a person's status as an employee) and that was the primary purpose of the collection of the birth certificate. The use to which the investigator put the birth certificate was for identification of the complainant's father, which I consider to be a secondary purpose. I consider that the secondary purpose was related to the primary purpose because it was within the context of a workplace investigation and therefore related to the complainant's ongoing status as an employee.
3. The complainant most likely would argue that he did not expect the respondent to use or disclose the information for that secondary purpose. However, I do not consider that to be reasonable. I consider that any employee under investigation for workplace misconduct (particularly where his or her ongoing employment is imperilled) ought to reasonably expect that all relevant personal information on his or her personnel file is available to an investigator, especially if that information may exonerate the employee. In this case, the access to the information directly led to a conclusion that the allegation was not substantiated.
4. Finally, I accept the respondent's argument that it suspected that the complainant breached the Code and that it used the birth certificate while investigating a possible unlawful activity. Richards J in McLean v Racing Victoria Ltd[13] noted that 'unlawful activity' is not limited to criminal activity and embraces all law and rules, whether criminal or civil. Accordingly, investigation of possible breaches of the Code is relevant to this IPP. I do not accept the complainant's argument that because no taxpayer had complained or, alternatively, because the specific allegation was unsubstantiated, the investigation of alleged unlawful activity was unnecessary. As in Jurecek[14], the respondent had been made aware of serious allegations against its employee and it was required to investigate regardless of the source of the allegations or the fact that none of the taxpayers had lodged grievances. The outcome of the investigation does not bear on the fact that an investigation must be made into serious allegations.
5. I am not satisfied that the respondent breached IPP 2.1 by enabling Mr Di Federico to access a copy of the complainant's birth certificate.
6. With respect to the use of the complainant's telephone number, I am satisfied that the information was collected for the purpose of being able to contact the complainant about important work-related matters when he is not at work. The telephone number was disclosed to Ms Klug when she was conducting the investigation into important work-related matters when he was not at work; it was used for its primary purpose. As there is no evidence before me that Ms Klug is a legal practitioner, I am not aware of why she would be required to conduct herself in accordance with the Legal Profession Uniform Law Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015 as argued by the complainant.
7. I am satisfied that the telephone number was disclosed by the respondent in accordance with its primary purpose and such disclosure is not a breach of IPP 2.1.

IPP 5.2 - Did the respondent take reasonable steps to let the complainant know, generally, what sort of personal information it holds, for what purposes, and how it collects, holds, uses and discloses that information?

1. This aspect of the complaint relates to a request by the complainant in an email dated 1 October 2018 for the respondent to provide:

... a detailed list of what other personal and private information is being held by the SRO regarding me, and why the SRO is holding such information.

In his submissions, the complainant also referred to additional requests made after the referral of this complaint from the Information Commissioner. However, I am satisfied that the letter in reply from the respondent dated 30 November 2018 both answers the complainant's request and meets its obligations under IPP 5.2. I note that some of the complainant's requests are for very specific information. IPP 5.2 only requires the respondent to take reasonable steps to inform him, generally, of the sort of information held. IPP 5.2 does not require an inventory or audit of the personal information held, so specific requests for an audit or inventory are not relevant to IPP5.2.

1. I am satisfied that in respect of the request made by the complainant on 1 October 2018, the respondent has complied with IPP 5.2 and in respect of later more specific requests, IPP 5.2 does not apply.

[3] Angela Karantonis was called and gave evidence without notice. Her evidence was interspersed with the complainant's witnesses in order that the proceedings not be adjourned due to a procedural matter.

[4] Exhibit DH-2 to the witness statement of David Heywood.

[5] [2005] VCAT 1054 [84].

[6] [2015] VCAT 253 [92] (I note but dismiss the complainant's attempt to distinguish this case on a factual basis).

[8] Exhibits DH-1, DH-2, DH-3 to the witness statement of David Heywood.

[9] I am uncertain how the respondent could ask his father without knowing his name.

[10] Jurecek v Director of Transport Safety Victoria [2015] VCAT 253 [172] and [198], she stated that the ability to carry out such an investigation is a necessary function of an employer.

[13] [2019] VSC 690 [63-65].

[14] Jurecek v Director of Transport Safety Victoria [2015] VCAT 253.