TRONOX MANAGEMENT PTY LTD -v- COKIC [2026] WASC 63 (6 March 2026)

Any judicial officer that was connected to the [State Solicitor's Office or SSO] during the 1980's, 1990's and current and or further worked at a law firm that completed transactions for Tronox (or its acquired predecessors including Cristal, Exxarro, Bemax etc) would be a conflict of interest for them to preside over matters which the evidence put forward by the Respondent tends to implicate these named persons/entities as either co-conspirators to the Respondent and or were potentially derelict in their duties as a public official in the SSO and in either case seeking to cover up matters.

1. I will briefly explain the manner in which the defendant articulates his concerns.
2. First, the defendant relies on my previous employment with the Crown Solicitor's Office, as it was then known. The defendant draws a connection between that office and the 'timeframe of the WA Inc Royal Commission'. This is a reference to the 'Royal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other Matters'.
3. The defendant asserts that solicitors within the Crown Solicitor's Office were involved with the Royal Commission and 'were entrusted with investigations' connected with that Commission. One of the subject matters of the Royal Commission was the development of a petrochemical project at Kwinana, which involved an entity known as 'Petrochemical Industries Company Limited' or PICL. The defendant submits that:

It appears to have been overlooked intentionally or unintentionally by authorities that whilst Petrochemical Industries Company Limited (PICL) was-obtaining EPA approval in October 1988, that less than 12 months after, Tronox was already seeking easement approvals from BP to essentially construct pipelines to take the Oxygen and Nitrogen from PICL's future supplier Air Liquide and of which consumes approximately 80% capacity.

1. The reference to 'Tronox' is a reference to the plaintiff in this proceeding, which carries on a business of refining and manufacturing titanium dioxide products and which appears to operate a pigment plant in Kwinana.[3] The defendant asserts that this pigment plant 'appears to have received the most benefit via services that were proposed or would have been required for PICL's success'. The defendant thus draws a connection between the Royal Commission, representatives of the Crown Solicitor's Office, and the business of the plaintiff.
2. The court takes judicial notice that the Royal Commission was established in January 1991 and delivered its final report to the Western Australian Government in November 1992. I commenced employment at the Crown Solicitor's Office in around February 1994, which was well after the conclusion of the Royal Commission. I was employed there until June 2000. I had no involvement in any matters which might be said to be connected to the Royal Commission.
3. Second, the defendant relies on my previous employment with, and partnership at, the law firm Mallesons Stephen Jaques, which later became King & Wood Mallesons, and which I understand is soon to revert to the name Mallesons. For convenience, I will refer to the firm as Mallesons. I was an employee of Mallesons from June 2000 to December 2004. I was then a partner of Mallesons from January 2005 to around February 2018. I worked wholly within the Dispute Resolution practice of that firm.
4. The defendant notes that the general counsel of the plaintiff in the Asia Pacific region, Ms Christine Williams, who has affirmed three affidavits in this proceeding, was an employee of Mallesons whilst I was at the firm. I recall who she is. The general counsel worked in a different practice group to mine, supervised by other partners of the firm. To the best of my recollection, I may also have had a professional association with the general counsel while she worked as in-house counsel at BHP, through my role as an external adviser to that entity at Mallesons, although it would not have been of any significance. I do not believe I have had any professional association with the general counsel for a decade, perhaps longer.
5. The defendant also states that Mallesons provided legal advice to the plaintiff, concerning a particular transaction. In particular, the defendant points to legal work undertaken by Mallesons for the plaintiff between 2021 and 2023. That was well after I had left the firm. The advice was provided by a partner of the firm working within the Energy & Resources practice group. The defendant says he had several interactions with that partner. I recall the lawyer in question. He was an employee of the law firm whilst I was a partner of the firm. To the best of my recollection, he briefly worked in the Dispute Resolution practice, but I understand he has worked predominantly in the Energy & Resources practice. I have had no professional association with him for the last eight years, since I left the firm. The defendant does not suggest that this particular partner has a direct role in the present dispute, in any respect.
6. Further, the defendant does not suggest that I undertook any work for the plaintiff whilst at Mallesons. Rather, he draws a connection between my time at the firm and the two lawyers to whom I have just referred.
7. I will now set out the relevant principles by which the defendant's applications falls to be assessed.

1. The applicable test to assess whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias was restated by Quinlan CJ in Ogbonna v CTI Logistics:[4]

[9] In relation to the former [that is, the test for apprehended bias], the test to be applied in determining whether I should recuse myself by reason of a reasonable apprehension of bias is well established. A judge is disqualified if a fair minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.

[10] In applying this principle, it is necessary to identify what is said might lead a judge to decide a case other than on its legal or factual merits, and to articulate a logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The test is objective and the fair minded observer taken to be reasonable and to remember that the person being observed is a professional judge whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require him or her to discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial. (footnotes omitted)

1. In support of the above passages, Quinlan CJ cited the statements of principle expressed by Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy,[5] as follows:

[6] Where, in the absence of any suggestion of actual bias, a question arises as to the independence or impartiality of a judge (or other judicial officer or juror), as here, the governing principle is that, subject to qualifications relating to waiver (which is not presently relevant) or necessity (which may be relevant to the second appeal), a judge is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide. That principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done, a requirement which reflects the fundamental importance of the principle that the tribunal be independent and impartial. It is convenient to refer to it as the apprehension of bias principle.

[7] The apprehension of bias principle may be thought to find its justification in the importance of the basic principle, that the tribunal be independent and impartial. So important is the principle that even the appearance of departure from it is prohibited lest the integrity of the judicial system be undermined. There are, however, some other aspects of the apprehension of bias principle which should be recognised. Deciding whether a judicial officer (or juror) might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of a question that has not been determined requires no prediction about how the judge or juror will in fact approach the matter. The question is one of possibility (real and not remote), not probability. Similarly, if the matter has already been decided, the test is one which requires no conclusion about what factors actually influenced the outcome. No attempt need be made to inquire into the actual thought processes of the judge or juror.

[8] The apprehension of bias principle admits of the possibility of human frailty. Its application is as diverse as human frailty. Its application requires two steps. First, it requires the identification of what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits. The second step is no less important. There must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. The bare assertion that a judge (or juror) has an "interest" in litigation, or an interest in a party to it, will be of no assistance until the nature of the interest, and the asserted connection with the possibility of departure from impartial decision making, is articulated. Only then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed. (footnotes omitted)

1. These statements were recently reiterated in the unanimous decision of the High Court in Charisteas v Charisteas.[6]
2. While the fair-minded lay observer 'is not to be assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge, the reasonableness of any suggested apprehension of bias is to be considered in the context of ordinary judicial practice'.[7] The question must also be determined by remembering that the judge is a professional 'whose training, tradition and oath or affirmation require [that he or she] discard the irrelevant, the immaterial and the prejudicial'.[8]
3. The application of the fair-minded lay observer test involves, in the words of Tottle J in Barnel Investments Pty Ltd v Conceptual Technologies Pty Ltd,[9] a 'value judgment which is to a significant extent an intuitive judgment not readily susceptible of close analysis'.
4. I will apply these principles in assessing the recusal application advanced by the defendant.

1. The principal difficulty faced by the defendant in mounting his application is that he has not drawn any rational connection between the matters and issues which arise in the present proceeding and any of the prior associations or connections upon which he relies (and which have given rise to his concerns).
2. The present proceeding concerns claims against the defendant, in his capacity as a former employee of the plaintiff, for breach of contractual obligations and fiduciary duties, as well as statutory obligations, for retaining, using and publishing information said to be confidential to the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges the defendant failed to return the plaintiff's property upon the termination of his employment, and disclosed information which was confidential to the plaintiff on his LinkedIn account in October, November and December 2025. The defendant is alleged to have been employed by the plaintiff between November 2020 and August 2024, with his employment being terminated on around 15 August 2024.[10]
3. The plaintiff pleads breaches of contract, a claim in conversion, a claim for breach of confidence, a claim for breach of s 183 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and a claim for injurious falsehood.
4. The plaintiff seeks mandatory injunctions, including permanent injunctive relief, together with damages and compensation from the defendant for the breaches and the alleged wrongdoing.
5. None of the matters raised on the face of the proceedings appear to have any connection with the Crown Solicitor's Office, with the law firm Mallesons, or with me. The matters raised by the defendant in his recusal application have multiple degrees of separation from any matters with which I have had a prior association or connection. Indeed, I consider that, to the extent to which the defendant relies on my prior association with the Crown Solicitor's Office and with the law firm Mallesons generally, or the Energy & Resources partner to which I have referred, his concerns are speculative and without substance.
6. I acknowledge, however, that the general counsel of the plaintiff was previously a lawyer employed by Mallesons. I recognise that the general counsel has affirmed affidavits in this proceeding. Those affidavits have been filed only for the purposes of interlocutory applications, but it remains possible that the reliability and credibility of the general counsel, as a potential witness in due course, may fall to be considered by the court. I accept it is relevant to assess this potential prospect when assessing the recusal application. Further, it is necessary to consider whether this prior professional association might impact my overall assessment of the plaintiff's case, and my assessment of the defendant's responses, other than on their merits.
7. The question is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of these proceedings. As earlier noted, this principle gives effect to the requirement that justice should both be done and be seen to be done. The principle admits of the possibility of human frailty.
8. The foregoing leads to the first step in the analysis, which is to identify what it is said might lead me to decide the case other than on its legal and factual merits. The essential point here is that the defendant says I have a prior association with the general counsel, having worked at the same law firm previously. That connection is a slender one.
9. The second step in the analysis requires an articulation of the logical connection between the foregoing matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits. In my view, the defendant's submission, to the extent it addressed this step, is unreasonable and provides no basis on which to rationally connect the two propositions. I say that for the following reasons:

(a) First, the law firm in question was, and is, a large law firm, in which hundreds if not thousands of lawyers were employed during the period of my employment and partnership. The commonality of prior employment between myself and the general counsel must be seen in this context. Something more than a commonality of employment between the judicial officer and the party or witness will be required to engage the reasonable apprehension of bias principle, in my view, particularly bearing in mind that a number of judicial officers were partners in large law firms prior to their appointments.

(b) Second, the general counsel of the plaintiff did not work in the Dispute Resolution practice.

(c) Third, the general counsel of the plaintiff was not a partner of the firm, nor did she work as an employed solicitor under my supervision at any point.

(c) Fourth, I have had no professional association with the general counsel for at least a decade, and have had no professional association with the general counsel in relation to her work for the plaintiff.

1. The fair-minded lay observer would recognise these matters as being highly relevant to the assessment of the connection on which the defendant relies, and as pointing strongly against any conclusion that the court might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the case. In my view, for the foregoing reasons, the relevant observer would not reasonably apprehend that I might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the present proceedings by reason of any of the matters identified by the defendant.
2. In assessing the defendant's application, I recognise it is important that justice must be seen to be done. Equally, I recognise the weight to be attributed to the notion that judicial officers must discharge their duty to sit, and not to encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge they will have their case tried by someone thought to be more likely to decide the case in their favour.[11]
3. Parties may be encouraged in this regard if judges too readily accede to suggestions of an appearance of bias. Fundamentally, a judge should not disqualify himself or herself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias unless substantial grounds are established.[12] There are no such grounds present in this case.

1. For these reasons, I concluded that the defendant's recusal application should be dismissed and made an order to that effect on 5 March 2026.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

[1] See the email from the defendant sent on 19 February 2026 (5.26pm), the email from the defendant sent on 5 March 2026 (12.42am), and the email from the defendant sent on 5 March 2026 (2.33pm).

[2] That affidavit was sworn on 19 December 2025.

[4] Ogbonna v CTI Logistics [2021] WASCA 21.

[5] Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337.

[6] Charisteas v Charisteas [2021] HCA 29; (2021) 273 CLR 289 [11] - [18] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane, Gordon & Gleeson JJ).

[7] Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; (2000) 201 CLR 488 [12] - [13]; Webb v R [1994] HCA 30; (1994) 181 CLR 41, 73 (Deane J). In this court, see Hill J in Rayney v Reynolds [No 3] [2022] WASC 324.

[9] Barnel Investments Pty Ltd v Conceptual Technologies Pty Ltd [2022] WASC 8 [25] (Tottle J).

[11] Re JRL Ex parte; CJL [1986] HCA 39; (1986) 161 CLR 342, 352 (Mason J).

[12] Re JRL Ex parte; CJL (352); MTI v SUL [No 2] [2012] WASCA 87 [13] (Newnes & Murphy JJA).