Trend v Queensland Police Service [2026] QDC 27

Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 222, 222(2)(c), 223, 225, 232

Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) ss 9(2)(a)(ii), (2A), 159A

Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 754, 754(2)

Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) ss 78(1)(b), 131(10)

Chakka v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 213

Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; (2010) 242 CLR 520

McDonald v Queensland Police Service [2017] QCA 255

R v Burnett-Greenland [2017] QCA 159

R v Hillier [2007] QCA 279

R v Hopper; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] QCA 108

R v Horne [2005] QCA 218

R v Theuerkauf & Theuerkauf; ex parte A-G (Qld) [2003] QCA 94

Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the Respondent

[1] On 20 May 2025 the appellant pleaded guilty in the Richlands Magistrates Court to four charges, namely: unlawful use of a motor vehicle, evading police, dangerous operation of a vehicle, and driving without a licence.[1]

[2] The sentencing magistrate imposed concurrent penalties as follows:

Unlawful use of a motor vehicle, in the night, in company, with property damage (s 408A(1)(a), and (4) Criminal Code Act 1899)

18 months' imprisonment with parole release fixed at 19 September 2025. Disqualified absolutely.[2]

Evasion offence, at night, in company, with property damage (s 754(2) Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 1992)

Minimum penalty: 50 penalty units or 50 days' imprisonment served wholly in a corrective services facility; 2 years driver license disqualification.

18 months' imprisonment with parole release fixed at 19 September 2025. Disqualified absolutely.

Dangerous operation of a vehicle with circumstance of aggravation - excessive speeding (s 328A(1), (2)(b) Criminal Code Act 1899)

5 years' imprisonment or 400 penalty units; absolute driver licence disqualification (default 6 months).

18 months' imprisonment with parole release fixed at 19 September 2025. Disqualified absolutely.

Driving without a licence (s 78(1)(b)) Transport Operations (RUM) Act 1995)

6 months' imprisonment with parole release fixed as at 19 September 2025. Disqualified absolutely.

[3] The appellant appeals against those sentences pursuant to s 222 of the Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ('JA'). His sole ground of appeal is that "the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in the circumstances."[3]

[4] He served nine days in custody, from 20 to 28 May 2025, before being granted bail pending appeal.

[5] An appeal under s 222 of the JA is by way of rehearing on the original evidence given before the magistrate, subject to any fresh or additional evidence allowed by leave: s 223 JA.

[6] Section 222(2)(c) of the JA provides that if a defendant pleads guilty, they may only appeal under s 222 "on the sole ground that a fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment was excessive or inadequate".

[7] Section 225 of the JA provides for the appellate judge's powers upon hearing the appeal. The judge may confirm, set aside, or vary the appealed order, or make any other order the judge considers just.

[8] Under s 232, no order as to costs of the appeal may be made in relation to an indictable matter dealt with summarily at first instance.

[9] The nature of a rehearing under s 222 of the JA is well settled. In McDonald v Queensland Police Service,[4] Bowskill J (as her Honour then was) stated:

It is well established that, on an appeal under s 222 by way of rehearing, the District Court is required to conduct a real review of the trial, and the Magistrate's reasons, and make its own determination of relevant facts in issue from the evidence, giving due deference and attaching a good deal of weight to the Magistrate's view.

In Chakka v Queensland Police Service,[5] the Court of Appeal said that:

An appellate court, in hearing an appeal under s 223 of the Justices Act by way of rehearing, is required to carry out a real review of the decision below and make an independent assessment of the evidence before the original decision maker (unless fresh evidence is admitted) as well as the reasons of the Magistrate.

[10] The Court in Chakka also considered the proper construction of s 222(2)(c) of the JA, in particular whether the language of that provision ("on the sole ground that the [sentence imposed] was excessive or inadequate") contemplates the identification of specific error, or restricts the right of appeal to the issue of the excess or inadequacy of the sentence imposed at first instance. It was held that to succeed, an appellant must show both an error of a type identified in House v The King,[6] and that such error resulted in an excessive or inadequate sentence.

[11] Justice Brown (with whom Mullins P agreed) said:

[47] It is well established that a decision as to sentencing involves an exercise of discretion. In the context of an appeal against sentence, the majority in House v The King held that:

"It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred."[7]

[87] In my view, the correct construction of s 222(2)(c) having regard to the language used and the context of the provision is that "sole ground that a fine, penalty, forfeiture or punishment was excessive or inadequate" permits appellate intervention where an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind recognised by the House v The King is established, and the error has resulted in a sentence which is excessive. Similarly, if a sentence is said to be inadequate, it must be established that the error has resulted in a sentence being inadequate.

[89] Such a construction does not require the appellate judge to undergo an artificial exercise of determining the degree to which the sentence could be said to be excessive, but rather for the judge to be satisfied absent the error, the appellate judge would in all the circumstances have sentenced the defendant to a lesser sentence. Once the appellate judge is satisfied that without the error identified a lesser sentence should have been imposed in all the circumstances that were before the lower court, the sentence should be set aside and the sentencing discretion re-exercised. That would similarly apply where the sentence is said to be inadequate."

[90] Obviously, if the ground of error raised is that a sentence is "manifestly excessive" or "manifestly inadequate", that two stage process will not be required given the nature of the error raised. Otherwise, the two different types of error in the exercise of discretion would be conflated. The difference in approach adopted in determining whether there is specific error in the course of the sentencing decision, as opposed to considering by reference to the outcome of the sentencing discretion whether it is manifest excessive or manifestly inadequate, was discussed by Hayne J in AB v The Queen.

[91] Thus, while specific error alone is not sufficient to establish a ground of appeal under s 222(2)(c), it will be sufficient if it is shown to have caused a sentence to be excessive or inadequate.

[13] Section 222(2)(c) in its terms concerns a sentence being (merely) "excessive or inadequate". Given the ground of appeal in this case - being manifest excess - the error asserted is of the last kind mentioned in House; one that may not be identifiable, but which can be inferred from an unreasonable or plainly unjust outcome.[8]

[14] In Hili v The Queen, the High Court reiterated:[9]

As was said in Dinsdale v The Queen, "[m]anifest inadequacy of sentence, like manifest excess, is a conclusion". And, as the plurality pointed out in Wong, appellate intervention on the ground that a sentence is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate "is not justified simply because the result arrived at below is markedly different from other sentences that have been imposed in other cases". Rather, as the plurality went on to say in Wong, "[i]ntervention is warranted only where the difference is such that, in all the circumstances, the appellate court concludes that there must have been some misapplication of principle, even though where and how is not apparent from the statement of reasons". But, by its very nature, that is a conclusion that does not admit of lengthy exposition. And, in the present matters, the Court of Criminal Appeal, having described the circumstances of the offending and the personal circumstances of the offenders, said that "the sentence imposed in these matters is so far outside the range of sentences available that there must have been error". (footnotes omitted)

[15] As such, an appellant who appeals on the basis of manifest excess or inadequacy, whilst spared the need to identify specific error, must show more than that the appellate judge would have imposed a different sentence, or that the original sentence was markedly different from those imposed in other cases. Rather, what must be shown is a sentencing outcome that is unreasonable, plainly unjust, or so beyond the range of available sentences that there must have been an error.

[16] The sentence before the magistrate proceeded by reference to a schedule of facts. That schedule reveals a very serious, indeed alarming, episode of driving on the part of the appellant.

[17] At 10.43 pm on Saturday 15 February 2025, a vehicle being driven by the appellant was detected travelling on the Centenary Motorway. The vehicle was identified as stolen, and travelling at speeds of 140 kph to 160 kph, swerving between other vehicles. Police under lights and sirens endeavoured to intercept the vehicle, but it failed to stop. The stolen vehicle then entered the Ipswich Motorway, at one point reaching a speed of 205 kph. It then exited the motorway and continued at very high speeds through suburban streets, passing other vehicles as it went.

[18] At 11.02pm police successfully employed a tyre deflation device, puncturing all four tyres. The vehicle continued, however, at times driving on the wrong side of the road and (on one occasion at least) nearly colliding with another vehicle. The vehicle lost two of its tyres, and continued on its rims.

[19] The police abandoned following the vehicle in the interests of public safety, and at approximately 11.14pm, it came to a halt in a suburban street in Rocklea, where the appellant and two others decamped. They were located a short while later with the assistance of the police dog squad.

[20] The appellant was interviewed and initially claimed to have been a passenger only, but later confessed to being the driver. He was unlicenced at the time. In fact, he has never held a licence.

[21] As at the date of the offence, the appellant had turned 18 years of age seven weeks earlier. He had no criminal or traffic history, either as an adult or juvenile.

[22] The police prosecutor submitted that the offending called for a term of imprisonment. It was noted that the defendant was 18 years of age with no previous criminal history, but as against that, the circumstances were of protracted, wilful driving at dangerous speeds, in a stolen car.

[23] Reliance was placed on the case of R v Burnett-Greenland,[10] a matter involving a charge of dangerous operation of a vehicle causing grievous bodily harm with a circumstance of aggravation (leaving the scene).[11] In that case the 19 year old defendant drove too fast to safely negotiate a corner, causing the car to spin out, mount the gutter, and ultimately, collide with a power pole. He was unlicenced at the time. Both passengers were knocked unconscious, but the defendant (driver) ran away. One of the passengers spent two weeks in hospital with fractures and a subdural haematoma, subsequently requiring surgery. He was off work for 10 weeks.

[24] The defendant, who had no criminal history and who pleaded guilty, was initially sentenced to two years' imprisonment with release on parole after nine months. On appeal that was reduced to two years' imprisonment suspended after serving five months. The Court of Appeal regarded that as reflecting "the leniency which is generally accorded to youthful offenders, particularly those with no previous criminal convictions, whilst reflecting the objective seriousness of such offending...".[12]

[25] The Court also noted that "a number of factors are relevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion. One is the seriousness or quality of the actual driving. Another is its consequences. The personal circumstances of the applicant need to be considered and compared with the circumstances of offences in broadly comparable cases."[13]

[26] In the appellant's case, after referring to R v Burnett-Greenland, the prosecutor submitted 12 months' imprisonment as being within range, for the defendant (appellant) to serve a third of that sentence.

[27] The sentencing magistrate challenged that, saying:

"you're making a big deal about the maximum penalty being five years, and that having some marvellous impact in terms of sentence. Can you think of a more serious example of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle where there haven't been any injuries, ultimately, than one where you're evading police at 200 ks an hour when you've never been licenced, when you've- driving a stolen car? ... after your tyres have been deflated at high speed ..."

[28] The prosecutor subsequently withdrew the submission of 12 months' imprisonment and conceded that the circumstances supported a longer term. The prosecutor also submitted that it was open for the court to decide that an absolute disqualification might apply, noting that such a disqualification still allows the defendant to re-apply for a new licence after two years.[14]

[29] The appellant was legally represented. The defence solicitor conceded that the appellant's actions were reckless, disgusting, putting himself and other people in danger, and that a period of imprisonment (of up to 18 months), although a last resort, was warranted. Emphasis was placed on the appellant's very young age, his lack of criminal history and his admissions to police. The magistrate was urged to fine him for the evasion charge,[15] and to order immediate release on parole otherwise.

[30] The defence solicitor made reference to the cases of Hopper[16] and Horne,[17] regarding young offenders being sent to jail and thereby exposing them to the prison cohort. It was submitted that the magistrate would structure a release that would take into account the "rehabilitation aspect".

"Yes. But sometimes people commit criminal offences that are serious enough that that's the result ... I mean, people go to jail who have no criminal history whatsoever ... not infrequently ... for all sorts of things... Gerard Baden-Clay had no criminal history, for example."

[32] The defence solicitor reiterated that here the defendant was a young 18 year old man, who acknowledged his offending, who made admissions to police, submitting that, "Your Honour can still structure a sentence that sees the prospects of his rehabilitation advanced in the community."

[33] The magistrate was informed that the appellant finished school in year 9, and that his mother was in court to support him. He had been exposed to domestic violence in his childhood. He was not currently working but he had a job as a roofer lined up should he not go to jail. He came to be in the stolen car after being picked up by one of the co-offenders. He made full admissions to the police, and it was an early plea.

[34] In sentencing the appellant, the magistrate indicated that he took into account the pleas of guilty, and reduced the penalty that he otherwise would have imposed. He noted that he took into account the appellant's age and lack of previous history, indicating that had he been older, he would have been looking at a head sentence in the order of two to two and a half years for this level of seriousness. He noted that the community is "fed up to the back teeth with" this sort of behaviour, and that is why Parliament has passed the "Adult Crime, Adult Time" legislation to apply to juveniles who are under 18.

"Whilst the fact that you are 18 years old and you do not have any criminal history is obviously relevant to the sentence, the courts act solely in public interests. And the public interest of course is entirely on the side of the safety of the community and the prevention of criminal behaviour by criminals that put other peoples' lives in danger of either termination or serious injury."

[36] With reference to the principles found in Burnett-Greenland, the magistrate regarded it as a miracle that there were no serious consequences to other people caused by the appellant's behaviour. He regarded the seriousness of the actual driving as the crucial issue, noting that he could not think, off the top of his head, of more serious examples of the offences where no one was injured or killed. He noted the appellant would get the benefit of the fact. He regarded the actual driving as exposing every other member of the community to danger, and that the evasion offence showed contempt for lawful authority.

[37] In concluding that a head sentence of 18 months was an appropriate sentencing response, he noted that "there is an overwhelming need for general deterrence. There is an overwhelming need for personal deterrence, community denunciation and punishment". He indicated that "the rehabilitative aspect of the sentence is taken care of by your release on parole." He regarded "the criminal behaviour is so serious that the sentencing disposition that [the defence solicitor] has submitted" - namely, immediate release on parole - "would not reflect the nature and seriousness of the offending, or the requirements of the other purposes of sentencing set out in section 9". He noted an intention to reduce the time in custody to take account of the appellant's age and lack of criminal history, "but in my view, the criminal behaviour is so serious that no other penalty is either justified or appropriate in the circumstances."

[38] In written and oral submissions, the appellant argued that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive in all of the circumstances. It was emphasised that the offending behaviour was all part of one course of conduct, and that there was no history of any kind alleged against the 18 year old appellant. In essence, it was submitted that the sentencing magistrate allowed the seriousness of the conduct to overwhelm the other features of the case, such that the sentencing discretion miscarried. It was submitted:

• Contrary to his Honour's repeated assertions that he couldn't envisage a more serious example of this type of offending without injury or death, it was easy to do so;
• Rehabilitation was spoken of but only in a general way, and on one view, dismissively, with his Honour indicating it could be taken care of in the form of parole;
• The sentencing outcome reflects a mere two month reduction in the usual recognition for a plea of guilty, [18] despite the appellant being 18 years old and with no history;
• The absolute driver licence disqualification is a significant penalty given a lack of prior convictions and was imposed without explanation;
• His Honour clearly found the need for general and specific deterrence, along with community protection, overwhelmed all other considerations, so as to lead him into error.
• Burnett-Greenland involved the causing of actual grievous bodily harm, and involved charges carrying a 20 year maximum penalty.

[39] In reply, the respondent submitted that the penalty imposed was within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion and therefore not manifestly excessive. Whilst contending that a period of actual custody was within the sound exercise of sentencing discretion, it was accepted that a sentence not involving a period of actual custody would also be within range. A sentence of imprisonment (wholly suspended or otherwise) was warranted given the seriousness of the offending, despite the appellant's youth and lack of criminal history. It was acknowledged that the absolute disqualification of the appellant's driver licence was "undoubtedly a severe penalty", but ultimately not manifestly excessive.

[40] The respondent relied on two comparable cases to suggest that the sentence imposed was within range: R v Theuerkauf & Theuerkauf; ex parte A-G (Qld)[19], and R v Hillier.[20]

[41] Theuerkauf's offending[21] involved excessive speeding to evade police, reaching 80 kilometres per hour on a rural road, including driving towards a parked police car at high speed, requiring avoidant action by police to avoid being hit. He was convicted upon a plea of guilty of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle. The vehicle had no operable brakes, and the driving (it may be inferred) took place over an appreciable distance. He was 24 years old at the time and had previous drug and traffic convictions, including two prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Court of Appeal unanimously held that a 12 month intensive correction order "involved unsustainable leniency"[22] and he was re-sentenced to a term of two years' imprisonment, suspended after nine months for a three year operational period.

[42] Hillier also involved dangerous operation of a vehicle, and a police chase over eight kilometres, with speeds of up to 150 kilometres an hour, including driving against oncoming traffic, dangerous overtaking manoeuvres and ignoring stop signs. Hillier had an extensive criminal history (traffic, drugs and bail offences but also including a burglary and unlawful use of a motor vehicle) and the dangerous operation offence occurred whilst he was on parole. His original sentence of 18 months' imprisonment to be served cumulatively upon an existing sentence was not disturbed on appeal.

[43] In the present appeal it was submitted by the respondent that whilst the magistrate had only given a two month reduction in the term of actual custody the appellant might have otherwise expected to serve, a result that was "certainly not as lenient a reduction as might have been imposed",[23] the sentencing magistrate plainly did have regard to the appellant's youth and lack of criminal history. Given the notional starting point (of 2 to 2.5 years' imprisonment) referred to by the magistrate, he plainly reduced not only the head sentence but also the period of actual custody.

[44] Whilst the sentencing magistrate described the purposes of specific and general deterrence, along with denunciation and punishment as "overwhelming", his Honour did not exclude the purpose of rehabilitation from his consideration, specifically referring to parole as "permitting" it.

[45] As discussed above, whilst many of the appellant's submissions focused on specific errors said to be evident in the magistrate's approach, the appeal ground relied on here does not require the identification of any such error. Rather, an unreasonable or plainly unjust sentencing outcome, or one falling outside the permissible range, is required to be shown.

[46] Considering the appellant's dangerous driving in this case, the potential for serious harm, and the authorities referred to, a head term of imprisonment of 18 months was within the exercise of a sound sentencing discretion. So much was conceded by the appellant.

[47] The more taxing issue is whether, by requiring the appellant to serve four months in prison, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.

[48] In this case the sentencing magistrate was confronted with a youthful first offender who had committed serious acts of dangerous driving and evading police, in a stolen car, whilst unlicenced.

[49] The courts have long regarded youthful first offenders as deserving of special leniency. In Hopper, Fraser JA (with Morrison JA agreeing) said: [24]

The second matter referred to by the sentencing judge as favouring a non-custodial sentence was the respondent's youthfulness. The sentencing judge referred to R v Mules, in which the President, with whose reasons Keane JA and Mullins J agreed, observed that the previous decision in R v Horne made it clear that because the rehabilitation of young offenders is in the interests of the community, "youthful offenders with limited criminal histories and promising prospects of rehabilitation who have pleaded guilty and cooperated with the administration of justice, even where they have committed serious offences ... should receive more leniency from courts than would otherwise be appropriate." The sentencing judge also took into account the long experience of the Courts, to which Burbury CJ referred to in Lahey v Sanderson in a passage quoted in R v Lovi, "that imprisonment is likely to expose a youth to corrupting influences and to confirm him in criminal ways, thus defeating the very purpose of the punishment imposed" so that it had been universally accepted by the Courts in England, Australia and elsewhere "that in the case of a youthful offender his reformation is always an important consideration and in the ordinary run of crime the dominant consideration in determining the appropriate punishment to be imposed." (footnotes omitted)

[50] Whilst these principles focus upon youthful offenders with "limited criminal histories", it is noteworthy here that the appellant had no criminal or traffic history whatsoever. Moreover, he had just recently turned 18 years of age at the time of the offending. Both those features distinguish his case from those of Theuerkauf and Hillier.

[51] There were other matters in mitigation too which had to be weighed against the objective seriousness of the offending.

[52] Importantly here, no injury was caused to any person (cf Burnett-Greenland). That is a matter falling in the appellant's favour, even if by sheer good luck. As the Court of Appeal made clear in Burnett-Greenland,[25] the actual consequences of one's offending, whether they be calamitous or fortuitously benign, are matters relevant to the sentencing discretion. It also meant this remained a case whereby a sentence that allowed the offender to stay in the community was legislatively designated as "preferable".[26]

[53] The appellant pleaded guilty early, after co-operating (even if belatedly) with the police. He had prospects of employment in the event he was not imprisoned.

[54] Giving due weight to these factors, I consider that the penalty imposed upon the appellant - particularly, the requirement that he serve four months in prison before being released on parole - was beyond the permissible range of penalties available in the circumstances, and was therefore manifestly excessive.

[55] I regard the absolute disqualification imposed in respect of the appellant's driver licence similarly. For an 18 year old to lose his licence for life as a result of one episode of serious offending, in circumstances where no one was hurt and where there is cause for optimism as to his future prospects, cannot be regarded as reasonable in all the circumstances. It is irrelevant that he has a legal option available to him to apply through the courts for a new licence after a two year period; the order must be considered as it stands, and on its face it is unreasonable.

[56] That being so, it falls to this court to resentence the appellant.

[57] In this case the appellant applied to admit two items of further evidence. This was not opposed by the respondent, and leave was granted.

[58] The first item is a letter from the appellant's employer, advising the appellant has worked for him for several months, and "has proven himself to be an absolute asset to the business." The employer advised that the appellant works long days, Monday through Saturday from 8.00 am to 6.00 pm, and consistently demonstrates commitment, respect and a strong work ethic, such that the appellant has been offered a management position within the business.

[59] The second item of new evidence is a report under the heading of a Mr Dacolias of the Guiding Light Organisation. Mr Dacolias is the founder and a senior counsellor of that organisation, a rehabilitative service specialising in structured behavioural intervention, trauma informed counselling and offender reintegration support. His report confirms that the appellant has been actively and consistently engaged in a therapeutic program, attending on a weekly basis, and demonstrating reliability and commitment and a genuine desire to improve his mental health, emotional regulation and long-term stability. In the author's opinion, the appellant is actively rehabilitating his life and demonstrating measurable growth and development.

[60] In the circumstances, I consider that the appropriate order is one which does not return the appellant to custody, but allows him to continue his employment, and his rehabilitation, in the community. He has already served nine days in jail, and it is hoped that experience will have been a salutary one for him.

• The appeal against sentence is allowed. The orders of the sentencing magistrate are set aside.
• In respect of the charge of unlawful use of a motor vehicle, I sentence the appellant to imprisonment for a period of 18 months, suspended after serving a period of nine days, and that the appellant not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of two years if he is to avoid being dealt with for the suspended term of imprisonment. I also order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of two years from 20 May 2025.
• In respect of the charge of dangerous operation of a vehicle, I sentence the appellant to imprisonment for a period of 18 months, suspended after serving a period of nine days, and that the appellant not commit another offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of two years if he is to avoid being dealt with for the suspended term of imprisonment. I also order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of two years from 20 May 2025.
• Both terms of imprisonment are to be served concurrently. Pursuant to s 159A of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992, I declare that the nine days the appellant has served in custody (from 20 to 28 May 2025) be deemed time served under these sentences.

In respect of the charge of evading police, I order that the appellant be fined the sum of $8,065.00,[27] to be paid within 12 months, and if not paid within that time, I direct the Registrar to refer the non-payment to the State Penalties Enforcement Registry. I further order that the appellant be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver licence for a period of two years from 20 May 2025.

• In respect of the charge of driving without a licence, I order that the appellant be convicted and not further punished.
• A conviction is recorded in relation to each charge.

[1] Relevant circumstances of aggravation are noted in the table at paragraph [2].