Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - subpoenas and discovery - application to set aside subpoena addressed to a respondent - subpoena called upon during hearing of trial - appropriateness of issuing subpoenas so close to hearing date - appropriateness of calling subpoena during trial - usual processes available to parties are processes of discovery and inspection - availability of orders for particular discovery - usual processes not utilised by applicants - subpoena set aside as abuse of process.

Federal Court Rules, O 15 r 2, O 15 r 8, O 27 r 9 Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (1989) 88 ALR 90, cited

REASONS FOR DECISION On 6 May 1998, during the course of the trial of this matter, I made an order setting aside a subpoena served on the first respondent by the applicants ("the subpoena"). I indicated at that time that I would issue written reasons for the making of that order. These are those reasons. The subpoena was issued on 28 April 1998. It required the proper officer of the first respondent to attend at the Court on 6 May 1998 at 9.30 am to produce the following documents: "1. The personnel file of each of the following employees of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia: (a) Philip Rodney Catto (b) Bradley John Fowler (c) Vincent Mathew Kelly 2. The personnel files of John David Robertson, an employee of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia during the period 1964 to 1973." Each of Messrs Catto, Fowler, Kelly and Robertson has sworn an affidavit filed by the respondents in these proceedings. Mr Robertson has sworn an affidavit annexing a valuation report given by him as an expert valuer. He was an employee of the first respondent between 1964 to 1973 but not thereafter. Each of Messrs Catto, Fowler and Kelly was an employee of the first respondent at the time of the events with which this proceeding is concerned and remains such an employee. Mr Williams, counsel for the applicants, acknowledges that neither he nor his clients is or are aware of the contents of the files, the production of which are called for by the subpoena. The applicants wish to have the opportunity to inspect such files in order to ascertain if any of them does contain material adverse to the credit of any of Messrs Catto, Fowler, Kelly or Robertson, and, in the case of Messrs Catto, Fowler and Kelly, to ascertain whether their personnel files contain material which may reflect on their respective handling of matters relevant to this proceeding. Michael Bryan Joshua Lee ("Mr Lee"), a solicitor acting on behalf of the first respondent, has sworn an affidavit by which he deposes as follows: "6. The First Respondent has delivered to me all documents referred to in the Schedule to the Subpoena as remain extant. 7. I have perused the personnel files of Phillip Rodney Catto, Bradley John Fowler and Vincent Matthew Kelly ("the personnel files"). 8. A perusal of the personnel files does not include any reference whatsoever to: (a) the Applicants; (b) any company associated with the Applicants; (c) any company associated with Dr Fox; or (d) any matters in issue in these proceedings. 9. The personnel files contain a number of references to personal and private matters which do not relate to the performance of the individuals that are subject of the personnel files. 10. The First Respondent regards the personnel files as highly confidential and objects to their production or inspection." Mr Lee was not cross-examined on his affidavit. This matter has had quite a long history in the Court. On 5 September 1996, by consent, the Court made a number of orders. One order was that the applicants file and serve a verified list of documents on or before 6 September 1996. Other orders included that the respondents file and serve verified lists of documents on or before 16 September 1996, and that the applicants and respondents attend to inspection of discovered documents on or before 30 September 1996. The first respondent filed and served a verified list of documents on 17 September 1996. The solicitors for the applicants inspected the documents referred to in such list on 30 September 1996 and again on 26 March 1998. The proceeding has remained under the management of the Court since 5 September 1996. Directions have from time to time been made for the purpose of ensuring an orderly preparation of the matter for hearing. At none of the directions hearings in this matter have the applicants sought an order from the Court that the first respondent give further or better discovery or that it, by an appropriate officer, file an affidavit stating whether any particular document or class of document is or has been in its possession, custody or power (O 15 r 8). A number of subpoenas duces tecum has been issued in this proceeding. In accordance with the usual practice of the Court, in the interests of justice, including the efficient preparation of the matter for trial, such subpoenas required the production of documents ahead of the date of trial. On 30 October 1997 the matter was listed for hearing commencing on 4 May 1998. This hearing commenced on 4 May 1998 and is continuing. The subpoena was called upon before a Registrar of the Court at 9.30 am on 6 May 1998. The first respondent indicated that it did not have any documents to produce at that time. No application to set aside the subpoena was made or foreshadowed. Late in the morning of 6 May 1998, Mr Fowler was called to give evidence on the hearing. After his formal evidence in chief, I called on Mr Williams to commence his cross-examination of Mr Fowler. Rather than commencing his cross-examination, Mr Williams called on the subpoena. Mr Forster SC, counsel for the respondent, responded by seeking leave to file in Court first, a notice of motion seeking an order setting aside the subpoena and secondly, an affidavit in support of the foreshadowed motion. He further sought leave to amend the notice of motion to add an alternative claim that the applicants be refused access to any documents produced in answer to the subpoena. Placing to one side the question of the appropriateness, in the circumstances, of the issue and service of the subpoena, the calling of a subpoena during the course of a witness's evidence is, in my view, plainly inappropriate. It is disruptive of the orderly conduct of the hearing and, moreover, likely to cause inconvenience to the witness. In this case I was obliged to excuse Mr Fowler from the witness box for an uncertain period of time to allow argument on the notice of motion. Even had the first respondent not sought to set aside the subpoena, time would have been taken attending to the formalities associated with the calling of the subpoena and the making of orders concerning access to the documents produced in response to the subpoena. Further delay would then, presumably, have ensued to allow the applicants' legal advisers time to inspect the documents produced in answer to the subpoena. A witness whose oral evidence has commenced should not ordinarily be expected to wait whilst such matters are attended to. It was also inappropriate, in my view, for the first respondent to delay filing and serving its notice of motion and supporting affidavit until such time as the subpoena was called. Having been served with a subpoena which it considered an abuse of process, the first respondent ought promptly to have filed the notice of motion. Had it done so, a time for argument on the notice of motion could have been fixed which would not have disrupted the orderly taking of evidence. I turn to the question of whether the subpoena should be set aside. Neither counsel was able to refer me to any authorities of this Court directly on the issue of whether a subpoena may be served on a party to proceedings from whom discovery has or may be obtained. A subpoena addressed to a party is not necessarily bad (Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Limited (1989) 88 ALR 90). On occasion such subpoenas are issued and answered without objection. However, the usual legal processes by which a party to a proceeding in the Court obtains access to the documents of opposing parties are the processes of discovery and inspection. Where the Court has by detailed directions set a timetable for the undertaking of the procedural steps necessary to bring a matter to readiness for trial, including a timetable for the discovery and inspection of documents, it is to be expected that the parties will seek such documents "relating to any matter in question between [them]" as they wish to have access to through the process of discovery and inspection (O 15 r 2(2)). If such documents are sought by subpoena or notice to produce issued close to trial, the Court's endeavours to manage the process of the preparation of the matter for trial, and to ensure that no interlocutory issues are outstanding at the hearing date, may be subverted. Order 15 rule 8 of the Federal Court Rules provides a procedure whereby particular discovery may be sought where a party is dissatisfied with the extent of discovery made by an opposing party. The discretion given to the Court by O 15 r 8, and the requirement that, before any order may be made under that rule, it should appear to the Court "…from evidence or from the nature or circumstances of the case or from any document filed in the proceeding that there are grounds for a belief that some document or class of document relating to any matter in question in the proceeding may be or may have been in the possession, custody or power of [the] party", ought not, in my view, to be able to be avoided by the simple device of serving a subpoena duces tecum upon an opposing party. In this case the applicants do not know whether the documents sought by the subpoena relate in any way to the matters in dispute between them and the first respondent. They concede the confidential nature of such documents. In the hope that something useful to their case might be found in such documents, their proposal was that I should read the documents. At the request of the applicant's counsel, the Court was shown three envelopes said to contain all but one of the documents the production of which was sought by the subpoena. The document not contained in an envelope was, the Court was informed, approximately ten pages long. The size of the three envelopes shown to the Court suggests that the task of reading all of the documents in them would be a not inconsiderable one. The rules of court do not place on judges the responsibility of determining for the parties which of their respective documents are required to be discovered. Judges have not traditionally assumed such a role. I do not consider that by choosing to issue a subpoena, rather than to seek an order pursuant to O 15 r 8 of the Federal Court Rules, a party should be able to achieve the result of placing such a responsibility on a judge. Moreover, in this case it would have been inappropriate for the conduct of the trial to have been further disrupted by my being required to read documents produced in response to a subpoena called during the course of the taking of evidence.