Tordis & Manrey [2026] FedCFamC1F 135 (3 February 2026)

(a) the Applicant not be permitted to personally cross-examine the First Respondent; and

(b) the First Respondent not be permitted to personally cross-examine the Applicant.

1. North Brisbane Law pay the sum of $11,000 from the monies held in trust on behalf of the Applicant and First Respondent in the Mackenzie Ross Lawyers Law Practice Trust Account, to the trust account of the solicitors for the applicant, Syd Murphy Pty Ltd trading as Creevey Horrell Lawyers Practice Trust Account.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

These Reasons for Judgment were delivered Ex Tempore on 3 February 2026 and have been settled and corrected for grammatical errors and in order to convey the precise intention of the Court.

1. In relation to the application for an Order under section 102NA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), the view that I have formed, having regard to: the submissions; the evidence; noting that there is in place a Domestic Violence Order made in 2025 (which will be in place until 2031); and noting the mandatory protections for parties stated in section 102NA of the Act - is that the Court does not have any discretion at this stage to do anything other than issue what we call a "banning order" so that the parties are not permitted to personally cross-examine each other but can only do so through a lawyer.
2. Even if there was a discretion involved I would have exercised it in favour of making such an order in any event. This is so because the first respondent has recently spent time in prison for breaching the Domestic Violence Order. It is most definitely the sort of case where section 102NA applies. I will make that Order now.
3. The only other outstanding issue before the Court today relates to paragraph number 3 of the Application in a Proceeding filed on 12 January 2026 on behalf of the applicant, who is the de facto wife in the proceedings. In that paragraph, the applicant sought a payment of $33,000 from the trust account of North Brisbane Law. The sum of $466,000 is held by North Brisbane Law. That firm has a trust account which is in the name of 'Mackenzie-Ross Lawyers Law Practice Trust Account'. That money is the net proceeds of sale of what I will call "the former home of the parties" which traditionally we would call in this jurisdiction "the former matrimonial home" - even if they weren't married.
4. The sale of that property took place in accordance with certain other Orders that were made on 14 February 2025. Not only were they made on 14 February 2025 - but they were also made by consent on that occasion. The first respondent was represented by Mr Armfield and the applicant was also represented by a lawyer on that occasion.
5. The application is for some litigation funding, and originally $33,000 was sought because it was anticipated that the trial might run three days. Mr Steel is the solicitor on behalf of the applicant. He now estimates that only one day will be required. Counsel has been briefed and I am now asked to make an order requiring payment of an amount of $11,000 from the trust account of Mackenzie-Ross Lawyers Law Practice Trust Account to the trust account of the solicitors for the applicant, Syd Murphy Proprietary Limited trading as Creevey Horrell Lawyers Practice Trust Account.
6. I heard today from Mr Steel - the lawyer for the applicant and I heard from the first respondent in person. The first respondent opposes the application and is against the payment of the money. He does not agree to it. There does not seem to be any particularly substantial argument against the making of the order. There is money available. It is in the trust account of the lawyers. It is the proceeds of sale of the former home where the parties lived. On the first respondent's own admission today - the parties lived in the former home for six or seven years.
7. That property was registered in the first respondent's name but I did explain to him that, in this jurisdiction, the Court has the power under section 90SM of the Act to alter the property interests of parties - if it is just and equitable to do so. I am satisfied that it would benefit the Court and the administration of justice if a payment of some money is made to pay the lawyers so the trial dates will not be lost and the matter will be ready to proceed. I asked the first respondent if he wanted to make a submission in relation to a payment of an amount of money to him or, at least, into a trust account on his behalf so that he may retain a lawyer for the hearing given, especially now, there is a banning order in place under section 102NA.
8. The first respondent did not request that any such payment be made. The door would remain open though in respect of that particular aspect. That is to say if the first respondent subsequently decided that he would seek a payment of some funds to pay lawyers from that trust account, then he could bring an application back to the Court before the commencement of the trial so he can engage a lawyer. Although I do note today that his current position is that he does not wish to engage a lawyer for the trial.
9. The first respondent made various other submissions relating to issues such as human rights and the power of the Court to make orders. I attempted to explain to the first respondent the situation in relation to the Act - and how it is the case that this Court has the power to do the sorts of things that it is doing and has done in relation to, especially, the power to adjust people's property interests etc.
10. So far as the applications which are before the Court for hearing today - there was no merit in any of the arguments raised by the first respondent relating to human rights etc. In the current circumstances, given the orders sought today, there is nothing that exists either at common law or under any statute that would infringe upon the Court's power to make the sorts of orders that it is making today - including the power to make orders requiring the payment of money to assist with the funding of litigation.
11. There is ample authority which makes it clear that the Court does have the power to make payments to assist in respect of litigation funding. This is an appropriate set of circumstances where the Court should exercise its discretion to make such a payment given the amount of money in the trust account and the amount of money sought.

I certify that the preceding eleven (11) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard.