Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. This is a parenting case and the Court has before it two interim applications for determination. On 9 July 2025 the mother filed an Application in a Proceeding. On 23 July 2025 the mother filed a further and different Application in a Proceeding. These Reasons for Judgment are in respect of both of those applications. As will be seen, these Reasons are also in respect of a further Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 31 July 2025.

Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 9 July 2025

1. On 9 July 2025 the mother (Ms Conner) filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking twenty-one (21) Orders.
2. The first order sought by the mother requested an adjournment of the trial that had been scheduled to commence on 4 August 2025. The Independent Children's Lawyer informed the Court (at a Case Management Hearing) that the matter was not ready and so the trial was adjourned in any event.
3. Next, the mother sought an injunction "...that the Court make no further orders for psychiatric or psychological assessment of the parties pending the determination of an appeal filed [by the mother] on 12 June 2025...". That appeal was dismissed by the Full Court of this Court on 30 October 2025. In any event, prior to 30 October 2025, the mother had already attended a psychiatric assessment organised by the Independent Children's Lawyer. There is no need to consider paragraph 2 of the Application in a Proceeding filed 9 July 2025 any further.
4. In paragraph 3 the mother sought alternate orders relating to a subpoena to be served on the Queensland Police Service. As to paragraph 3(a) - it is a matter for the Independent Children's Lawyer to determine whether any further subpoena ought to be served on the Queensland Police Service.
5. In relation to paragraph 3(b) - it seems to be the case that a person named Ms P is the person about whom the mother wanted a subpoena issued to the Queensland Police Service. This request by the mother has, in my view, been superseded by Order 14 made by the Court on 24 July 2025. That Order reads:

"14. The Independent Children's Lawyer has leave to issue subpoenas directed to:

(a)The Queensland Police Service; and

(b)The Department of Families, Seniors, Disability Services and Child Safety (Qld).

in relation to [Ms P]."

1. I have confidence that the Independent Children's Lawyer will be able to obtain all relevant material from the Queensland Police Service relating to Ms P. There is no need for the Court to grant the mother leave that she sought in paragraph 3(b) of the relevant Application in a Proceeding.
2. As to paragraph 4 - the mother in her application sought legal costs against the father's lawyers in the sum of $4,600. In paragraph 6 on page 18 of the mother's written submissions filed 30 July 2025 - the mother seeks $15,250 against the father and his lawyer (jointly and severally). The mother is not legally represented in these proceedings. In her material the mother has not provided any or any proper basis for an order for costs against the father or his lawyers.
3. The mother also seeks an order that the father's lawyer be referred to the Legal Services Commission. Again, I have not been able to ascertain any proper basis for making such an order.
4. In paragraph 5 of the Application in a Proceeding filed 9 July 2025, the mother seeks the leave of the Court to use an affidavit of Ms T "...dated 25 June 2025 in proceedings external to the Family Court". The Court does have the power pursuant to section 114Q of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) to permit the use of Court documents which would identify the parties to family law proceedings or others involved in the proceedings. There is nothing contained in the mother's Affidavit filed 9 July 2025 (accompanying the relevant Application in a Proceeding) that would persuade the Court to grant the leave requested by the mother. The mother says (in paragraph 31 of that Affidavit) that she wants to use the affidavit "in proceedings external to the Family Court for purposes including, but not limited to, complaints and regulatory processes". The mother has not specified in her Affidavit or in her written submissions (filed 30 July 2025) the precise reasons why the mother seeks the leave that she does in paragraph 5 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding. The Court is reluctant to grant such leave to a self-represented litigant (or indeed any litigant) in the absence of evidence specifying precisely what the affidavit is to be used for and then the Court could give the request proper consideration.
5. In paragraph 6 of the Application in a Proceeding of 9 July 2025 the mother seeks an Order that the Court exclude an affidavit of Ms T. Ms T is the manager of the K Children's Contact Centre. The Application to exclude the Affidavit of Ms T (filed 25 June 2025) is, in my view, premature. It is very difficult for the Court to make a determination prior to the commencement of the Final Hearing. The Independent Children's Lawyer filed the Affidavit of Ms T - but I do not know at this stage whether the Independent Children's Lawyer will be relying upon that Affidavit at the final hearing. If the mother so desires - she can revisit her Application to exclude the Affidavit of Ms T at the commencement of the Final Hearing.
6. In paragraph 7 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother seeks the leave of the Court for a subpoena to be issued and directed to Our Family Wizard. The Court record indicates that a subpoena was filed and directed to Our Family Wizard on 18 September 2025 and that certain records were produced by that organisation on 17 October 2025. There is no need for the Court to consider paragraph 7 any further.
7. In paragraph 8 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother seeks the exclusion of a psychiatric report of Dr C. As at the date that the Application in a Proceeding was filed - namely 9 July 2025 - there was no psychiatric report prepared by Dr C in relation to the mother. The mother had refused at that stage to attend for the purpose of a report with Dr C. The father had attended upon Dr C but the Court record indicates that the report of Dr C was not released until 16 September 2025. Hence, I am not prepared to entertain the hearing of an Application (outlined in paragraph 8 of the Application in a Proceeding) in circumstances where there was, at the relevant date, no report in the possession of the parties (or the Independent Children's Lawyer) by Dr C. If, in the fullness of time, the mother seeks to exclude a report of Dr C - then the mother will be able to bring a fresh application.
8. In paragraph 9 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother seeks an order from the Court that she be granted leave for various subpoenas to be issued and served upon certain individuals. The purpose of the subpoenas is to require those persons to attend at the Court (presumably at the final hearing) to give oral evidence. In the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother has not specified the precise terms of the order she seeks. The mother has not included the names of the people whom she wishes to subpoena to give evidence. The terms of the order sought are too broad. The Court cannot make an Order in the terms sought by the mother - because the proposed order is too broad.
9. In paragraph 10 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother seeks an order which she describes as "protection from costs for psychiatric assessment". There is no proper basis for the making of such an order. In any event, the Court is not in a position at this stage to consider such an order.
10. The trial has been adjourned to a date to be fixed and, at an appropriate time, should the mother seek leave to attend by electronic means, she may make a request at that time. There is no need for the Court to consider paragraph 13 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding any further.
11. In paragraph 14 the mother seeks the exclusion of the father's Affidavit of Evidence in Chief, It is said that this affidavit was filed on 7 July 2025. I presume this was the father's trial affidavit for the proposed August 2025 trial. That trial did not go ahead. In due course, I will hear from the mother in relation to the exclusion of any particular affidavit. But I will not make such a judicial determination until the first morning of the trial - whenever that may be.
12. The order sought by the mother in paragraph 15 is bordering on incomprehensible. Using my best endeavours - the mother seems to want an injunction to prevent references to her mental health. The mental health of the parents is always a relevant consideration in parenting proceedings. The Court will not be making an Order in the terms sought by the mother in paragraph 15.
13. In relation to paragraph 16 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding the mother does not appear to have provided the Court with a draft Amended Response - or at least my attention has not been adequately drawn to this by the mother. Without a draft Amended Response the Court is not in a position to make a decision about whether leave should be granted. If the mother wishes to renew such an Application with a draft Amended Response this can be looked at in due course by the Court. If the mother does wish to proceed with an Amended Response - she will need the leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 2.50(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021.
14. In paragraph 17 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding, the mother seeks the exclusion of a witness (presumably at the trial) - namely Ms T of the K Children's Contact Centre. The mother has not set out any proper basis for the exclusion of Ms T as a witness. The mother appears to be upset with Ms T as the mother seems to think the evidence of Ms T will not favour the mother. The Court will not be making an Order in the terms of paragraph 17 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding.
15. Paragraph 18 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding is too vague for the Court to ascertain what the mother actually wants or why the mother wants it. I have not been able to find anything in the affidavit filed 9 July 2025 that would assist the Court in ascertaining what the mother seeks and why the mother seeks it.
16. In paragraph 19 the mother again seeks the striking out or the exclusion of the father's Affidavit of Evidence in Chief which he filed on 7 July 2025 in anticipation of the Final Hearing which was schedule to commence in August 2025. The trial has been adjourned. The mother has not suffered any prejudice. No order will be made of the kind sought by the mother in paragraph 19.
17. The mother also seeks that the matter be set down for an undefended hearing against the father. There is no basis for the Court to make the Order sought by the mother in paragraph 20 of the relevant Application in a Proceeding. The father's trial affidavit (it appears from the Court record) was filed one and a half hours late. That is not a sufficient reason for the Court to make an order that the matter be set down for an undefended hearing against the father. This is especially so given the trial was adjourned.
18. In the circumstances, the appropriate approach for the Court to take is to dismiss the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 9 July 2025.

Mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 23 July 2025

1. The Court made an Order on 24 July 2025 (amended on 25 July 2025) directing that the parties and the Independent Children's Lawyer file written submissions in respect of both of the relevant Applications. By the Order dated 24 July 2025 - the mother was required to file and serve her written submissions by no later than 5.00pm on 30 July 2025. The mother filed her written submissions on 30 July 2025 at 2.38pm. The father and the Independent Children's Lawyer both had until 4 August 2025 to provide written submissions. The father filed his submissions on 31 July 2025 at 10.37pm. The Independent Children's Lawyer filed her submissions on 4 August 2025.
2. Inexplicably and without leave, the mother, on 31 July 2025 at 12.13pm filed a document whereby she purported to amend her Application in a Proceeding which she had filed on 23 July 2025. Conducting or attempting to conduct litigation in this way is not appropriate. By the Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 23 July 2025 she had sought 16 orders. In the document which she filed on 31 July 2025 the mother stated, in a paragraph number 18 - "18. That the orders sought on July 23 2025, be replaced/amended in accordance with the updated orders set forth in this application, and that the original orders be superseded by these revised terms...". The mother then sought 23 orders in numbered paragraphs from 19 to 41. The Court cannot permit litigation to be conducted in this way. Directions had been issued by the Court - and those directions made it clear what the Court was to determine - by specific reference to the dates that the two relevant Applications in a Proceeding had been filed. A litigant (in this case the mother) cannot simply attempt to "move the goal posts_"_ on the day the father filed his written submissions. This type of conduct amounts to an abuse of process.
3. As I pointed out in Conner & Conner [2025] FedCFamC1F 422 (earlier this year) a litigant cannot conduct themselves in such a way so as to cause unjustifiable oppression to the other party - in this case, the father. Further, this type of conduct (by the mother) does bring the administration of justice into disrepute. I again draw attention to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 507[1] and UBS AG v Tyne (As Trustee Of The Argo Trust) (2018) 265 CLR 77.[2] The Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 31 July 2025 states on the front (in the top right hand box) that is was filed on 22 July 2025. This is not correct. It was indeed filed on 31 July 2025.
4. The correct approach for the Court to take is to dismiss both the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 23 July 2025 and the mother's Application in a Proceeding filed on 31 July 2025. Both of these applications will be dismissed on the basis that the mother's conduct of the litigation in the manner described amounts to an abuse of process.

1. From what I can ascertain - an Order for the suspension of the father's time with the child was the most pressing aspect of the Orders that the mother had been seeking. On 21 November 2025 the Court will be hearing (amongst other things) the father's Application in a Proceeding to vary the interim parenting orders. The Court is also hearing an Application in a Proceeding filed by the mother on 4 August 2025 where she again seeks that the father's time with the child be suspended. On 21 November 2025 the mother will have an opportunity to be heard in relation to her submissions concerning her proposed variation to the interim parenting orders.

1. The Independent Children's Lawyer sought an order that costs be reserved in respect of all of the Applications referred to in these Reasons for Judgment. That is an appropriate order.

I certify that the preceding thirty (30) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Howard.

[1] See especially at paragraphs 24 & 25 per French CJ, along with Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ.

[2] See especially per Kiefel CJ, along with Bell and Keane JJ at paragraph 1.