[2025] QIRC 157
General information, not legal advice.
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
2025-06-25
Original judgment source is linked above.
INDUSTRIAL LAW - QUEENSLAND - AGREEMENTS - EMPLOYEES IN EMPLOYMENT OF STATE - arbitration of an industrial dispute - where certified agreement changes ordinary hours - where agreement does not contain methodology for conversion of leave accruals - where parties made an agreement about methodology to be applied after certification - where parties are in dispute about correct methodology - correct methodology for conversion of leave accruals - consideration of intent of parties - where leave directives are not applicable - annual leave - sick leave - long service leave
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8
State of Queensland (Department of Health) v Australian Salaried Medical Officers' Federation Queensland, Industrial Organisation of Employees [2023] QIRC 061
Mr M. Thomas and Mr K. McKay for Together Queensland Industrial Union of Employees.
Mr C. Claydon for Australian Maritime Officers Union.
Ms T Cowburn, Ms A Rogers and Mr R Moxham for Department of Transport and Main Roads.
To convert the accrued days of leave recorded as hours in the department records, it is necessary to determine the number of accrued days for each type of leave and to convert it to hours utilising the new daily debit hours arrangement.
The Commission's task is to determine how those changes or the methodology that should be used to implement those changes to ensure the employees are neither disadvantaged nor advantaged in line with the intent of the parties. And that principle's agreed. The employees were not to be advantaged, they weren't to be disadvantaged. What apparently is in contention now is what the - what is that intended to mean?
So we would submit that at essence, this is an interpretation issue. When you look at the clauses in the agreement that changed the rates of daily hours and the rates of accrual, it's what's the interpretation of how that change was to be introduced in order to ensure the intent of the parties that employees would neither to be advantaged or disadvantaged is to be achieved.
[39] In James Cook University v Ridd ('Ridd'), Griffiths and SC Derrington JJ provided a convenient summary of the established principles in the interpretation of an enterprise agreement made and approved under the Fair Work Act 2009. Their Honours stated:
[65] The relevant principles applicable to the interpretation of an enterprise agreement may be stated as follows:
(i) The starting point is the ordinary meaning of the words, read as a whole and in context (City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378; City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813; (2006) 153 IR 426 at [53]; WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131; (2018) 264 FCR 536 at [197]).
(ii) A purposive approach is preferred to a narrow or pedantic approach - the framers of such documents were likely to be of a "practical bent of mind" (Kucks v CSR Ltd (1996) 66 IR 182 at 184; Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association v Woolworths SA Pty Ltd [2011] FCAFC 67 at [16]; WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131; (2018) 264 FCR 536 at [197]). The interpretation "turns upon the language of the particular agreement, understood in the light of its industrial context and purpose" (Amcor Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2005] HCA 10; (2005) 222 CLR 241 at [2]).
(iii) Context is not confined to the words of the instrument surrounding the expression to be construed (City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813; (2006) 153 IR 426 at [53]). It may extend to "... the entire document of which it is a part, or to other documents with which there is an association" (Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 at 518; Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Treasurer of the Commonwealth [1998] FCA 249; (1998) 82 FCR 175 at 178).
(iv) Context may include "... ideas that gave rise to an expression in a document from which it has been taken" (Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 at 518).
(v) Recourse may be had to the history of a particular clause "Where the circumstances allow the court to conclude that a clause in an award is the product of a history, out of which it grew to be adopted in its present form ..." (Short v FW Hercus Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 511 at 518).
(vi) A generous construction is preferred over a strictly literal approach (George A Bond & Company Ltd (in liq) v McKenzie [1929] AR (NSW) 498 at 503-504; City of Wanneroo v Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union [2006] FCA 813; (2006) 153 IR 426 at [57]), but "Awards, whether made by consent or otherwise, should make sense according to the basic conventions of the English language. They bind the parties on pain of pecuniary penalties" (City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 362 at 380).
(vii) Words are not to be interpreted in a vacuum divorced from industrial realities but in the light of the customs and working conditions of the particular industry (City of Wanneroo v Holmes [1989] FCA 369; (1989) 30 IR 362 at 378-379; WorkPac Pty Ltd v Skene [2018] FCAFC 131; (2018) 264 FCR 536 at [197]).
[40] Recourse may be had to extrinsic material in the construction of a certified agreement where there is ambiguity. Ambiguity exists when a provision in an enterprise agreement is capable of more than one meaning. The matter of whether there is ambiguity must be considered objectively.
[41] In terms of recourse to extrinsic material in such circumstances, both parties referred to the decision of Berri where a Full Bench of the Fair Work Commission relevantly stated:
[61] Having identified ambiguity it is permissible to consider evidence of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to the task of interpreting the agreement. As Mason J observed in Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority (NSW) (Codelfa):
... evidence of surrounding circumstances is admissible to assist in the interpretation of the contract if the language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning. But it is not admissible to contradict the language of the contract where it has a plain meaning.
[62] The admissibility of evidence of the surrounding circumstances is limited to evidence tending to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties and the subject matter of the contract. Evidence of such objective facts is to be distinguished from evidence of the subjective intentions of the parties, such as statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations. As Mason J observed in Codelfa:
... when the issue is which of two or more possible meanings is to be given to a contractual provision we look, not to the actual intentions, aspirations or expectations of the parties before or at the time of contract, except insofar as they are expressed in the contract, but to the objective framework of facts within which the contract came into existence, and to the parties' presumed intention in this setting.
[63] As noted in Golden Cockerel, evidence of relevance to the objective framework of facts will include:
(i) evidence of prior negotiations to the extent that the negotiations tend to establish objective background facts known to all parties and the subject matter of the agreement;
(ii) notorious facts of which knowledge is to be presumed; and
(iii) evidence of matters in common contemplation and constituting a common assumption.
[64] As to category (i), evidence of prior negotiations will be admissible - but only for a defined purpose. As Mason J observed in Codelfa:
Generally speaking facts existing when the contract was made will not be receivable as part of the surrounding circumstances as an aid to construction, unless they were known to both parties, although, as we have seen, if the facts are notorious knowledge of them will be presumed.
It is here that a difficulty arises with respect to the evidence of prior negotiations. Obviously the prior negotiations will tend to establish objective background facts which were known to both parties and the subject matter of the contract. To the extent to which they have this tendency they are admissible. But in so far as they consist of statements and actions of the parties which are reflective of their actual intentions and expectations they are not receivable. The point is that such statements and actions reveal the terms of the contract which the parties intended or hoped to make. They are superseded by, and merged in, the contract itself. The object of the parole evidence rule is to exclude them, the prior oral agreement of the parties being inadmissible in aid of construction, though admissible in an action for rectification.
[65] Admissible extrinsic material may be used to aid the interpretation of a provision in an enterprise agreement with a disputed meaning, but it cannot be used to disregard or rewrite the provision in order to give effect to an externally derived conception of what the parties' intention or purpose was. So much is clear from the oft-quoted statement of Madgwick J in Kucks v CSR Ltd: But the task remains one of interpreting a document produced by another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some anteriorly derived notion of what would be fair or just, regardless of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing award means is a process quite different from deciding, as an arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So, for example, ordinary or well-understood words are in general to be accorded their ordinary or usual meaning.60
Leave entitlements exist to provide employees with paid time away from the workplace. If as at 30 September 2022, the employee had accrued enough leave to have X number of days away from the workplace, the conversion must ensure they can still access the equal number of days away from the workplace on 1 October 2022, no more, no less.
Department of Transport and Main Roads (the Department)
Leave entitlement before change x daily hours after change (10.35 hours)/daily hours before change (10.86 hours) = leave entitlement after change.
assuming the only increase in wages was due to the change in ordinary working hours, if two employees have the same leave balances on the last day of the previous agreement, and one employee ceased employment on the last day of the previous agreement and the other ceased employment on the first day of the current agreement, then both employees should have received the same amount of money for their accrued leave paid out.
It was also discussed and TMR advised that any change to how leave is credited and debited would also adjust existing balances to align with the revised application. No concerns were raised in relation to credits and debits providing the accumulation was the same and it was aligned with the future state.
"TMR advise that it will incur an expense with the application of the annualised salary and naturally will need to consider offsets". In respect to this, that TMR acknowledge that the overtime currently being paid on overtime hours worked outside of that included in the aggregated salary are being paid on the aggregated salary rate, resulting in employees receiving payment well in excess of the Award rate for overtime. And TMR had a proposal to freeze that overtime amount at the current rate.
And I would say that that proposal didn't eventuate. But those, ah, were the issues and there was also - they were trying to look at issues with, ah, how casuals were paid to offset it, ah, and that was not adopted in the - in the final agreement. There as a change to when casuals would get paid - would be considered to get paid the overtime, ah, that was included in the agreement but, ah, those were the areas where TMR was seeking to offset the costs.
And, as I indicated, those issues with the overtime didn't, ah, come to fruition but they were the issues - the only issues raised by TMR in the negotiations, if you'd like, to try and offset the costs.
They sat there - you - you were there. You sat there meekly and didn't say, "This is not correct". It's all in the transcript.
The Department has not called any evidence about the intentions of the parties
The formula proposed by Together Queensland would be the correct formula to use so employees are no worse off in terms of the number of shifts of recreational leave they would be entitled to as the date of the current agreement.
Department as to how it might pay for wage increases and the necessary changes to ensure the new agreement aligned with the award, the evidence of Mr McKay was that any suggestions made were not actioned. In any case, there is no evidence that there was a discussion or any contemplation that the Department would offset other increases by decreasing the leave balances of the VTSOs.
In answer to the question for arbitration, namely:
What is the correct methodology to convert accrued annual leave, long service leave and sick leave balances for Vessel Traffic Service Operators as at 30 September 2022, to account for the change to ordinary hours of work and entitlements that commenced on 1 October 2022 under the Maritime Safety Queensland Maritime Operations Certified Agreement 2022?
Accrued Hours prior to certification/10 x 10.35
Accrued hours prior to certification/7.6 x 10.35
[1] The terms formula and methodology are used interchangeably.
[4] Together Queensland submissions filed 14 February 2025.
[5] Facts not in dispute document filed 17 October 2024.
[7] Together Queensland Written Outline of Argument ('Together Queensland submissions') [26].
[8] Together Queensland submissions [29].
[9] Together Queensland submissions [30].
[12] As Together Queensland points out at [40] of its submissions filed 14 February 2025, 'in most situations when employees move from a 38hr week to a 36.25hr week, the daily debits and corresponding credits change from 7.6 hrs to 7.25 hrs. The accrued leave expressed in hours would reduce accordingly. The employees in those cases have the same number of accrued days leave after the change in hours as they did under the longer weekly hours arrangement.'
[13] Together Queensland submissions [41].
[14] Together Queensland submissions [38].
[19] Superseded Directive: 04/17 (Recreation Leave).
[20] AMOU submissions filed 14 February 2025 [13]-[14].
[22] Department of Transport and Main Roads Written Outline of Argument filed 28 February 2025 ('Department submissions') [3].
[50] T1-20 ll35-T1-21 l7; referring to Exhibit 4, page 5.
[65] T1-32; Having regard to Exhibit 4, I take Mr Roubicek's reference to 'in the room' to be a reference to the 12 October 2022 meeting.
[67] I take this to be a reference to the conversion formula originally proposed by Together Queensland but eventually abandoned by the parties.
[74] Affidavit of Andrew Boal, Exhibit A, page 6.
[75] T1-50; I make no criticism of Mr Boal, he was simply undertaking the task the Department engaged him to undertake.
Together Queensland Industrial Union of Employees
State of Queensland
(1989) 30 IR 362
(2006) 153 IR 426
(2018) 264 FCR 536
(1996) 66 IR 182
(2005) 222 CLR 241
(1993) 40 FCR 511
(1998) 82 FCR 175