[1998] VSC 56
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Victoria
1998-09-01
HARPER, J.
Original judgment source is linked above.
(i) a declaration that the judgment of Chernov, J. was obtained by the fraud of the defendants; (ii) an injunction, both interlocutory and permanent, restraining each of the defendants from taking any steps to enforce that judgment; (iii) damages; (iv) exemplary damages; (v) an order that the present defendants pay the plaintiffs' costs on a solicitor-client basis; and (vi) such further or other relief as is deemed appropriate.
(a) "Sean Buckley and the late Peter Buckley at no time had any beneficial interest in any of the 570 shares in UTA held beneficially for Layerose"; (b) a man named K.K. Wong (who was said by the defendants to be involved in transactions concerning intellectual property rights over aspects of the Ultra Tune business which UTA purchased from UTSA) "was a person separate and distinct from Sean Buckley and was not a fictitious person"; (c) at no material time did Sean Buckley have any control over the trust into which the 570 UTA shares were placed; (d) Anne-Marie Moore controlled Layerose, and Layerose held the shares in UTA on behalf of that trust (which was known as the "Friends Family Trust"); (e) "Anne-Marie Moore, through Layerose, was the beneficial owner at all material times in 95% of the shares in UTA"; (f) that the intellectual property transactions "were commercially viable deals for UTA"; (g) that Sean Buckley neither owned nor controlled the entities which bought the relevant intellectual property rights.
(a) "as at 30 June 1994, Sean Buckley and/or the late Peter Buckley did have a beneficial interest in the 570 shares in UTA held beneficially for Layerose"; (b) "Mr. K.K. Wong was a fictitious person or a person controlled by Sean Buckley"; (c) "at all material times Sean Buckley did have control over the Friends Family Trust"; (d) "at no material time did Anne-Marie Moore own and control Layerose"; (e) "Anne-Marie Moore was not at all material times the beneficial owner, through Layerose, of 95% of the shares in UTA"; (f) the intellectual property transactions "were not commercially viable deals for UTA"; (g) Sean Buckley did own and control the entities which purchased the relevant intellectual property rights.
(a) that the shareholding of Layerose in UTA was (I quote from the cross-claim as set out in sub-paragraph (1) of the particulars under paragraph 28 of the statement of claim in the present proceeding) "settled into the Friends Family Trust by Sean Buckley and Anne-Marie Moore as directors of Layerose, such shareholding having been acquired as set out in the cross-claim, and that the Friends Family Trust was vested on 12 June 1998 in the proportion 34% to Layerose, 34% to Sean Buckley, 17% to Sean Buckley's brother Clayton Buckley, and 10% retained as a lien for creditors, including the cross-claimant and others owed funds by the trustees in relation to the Ultra Tune proceeding"; (b) in or about 1993, Anne-Marie Moore and her sister acquired all the shares in Layerose on trust for Sean Buckley and Anne-Marie Moore; (c) Layerose acquired its UTA shares in 1994 using knowledge provided by Sean Buckley, and funds which were contributed by both Mr. Buckley and Ms. Moore; (d) the purchase by Layerose of 95% of the shares in UTA (and, accordingly, the acquisition of the business conducted by UTSA) was funded solely by Sean Buckley's own moneys together with the profits from the joint share-trading activities of Mr. Buckley and Ms. Moore, or each of them together with Layerose, all of them acting on the advice of Mr. Buckley.
(a) that in the affidavit of 26 June 1998, Mr. Buckley swore: (i) that in November 1994 the shareholding of Layerose in UTA, which was intended by Ms. Moore and Mr. Buckley to form part of the joint assets of their relationship, was transferred into the Friends Family Trust, the beneficiaries of which were Sean Buckley, his brother Clayton, and Layerose itself; (ii) that the decision to incorporate Layerose was made by Mr. Buckley and Ms. Moore when, having $30,000 to invest, they bought Layerose as an investment vehicle; (iii) that he did not seek from Ms. Moore in the New South Wales proceedings "any more than half of what I believed were my assets"; (iv) that each of the two principal assets of Layerose (land at 14 Fitzgerald Way, Baulkham Hills and shares in a company called Arcadia Minerals) were acquired with funds provided by Mr. Buckley before the commencement of the proceedings before Chernov, J. in July 1997; (v) that in late April 1998 Ms. Moore informed Mr. Buckley that she had decided to give him nothing, to which he responded by telling her that he would "fight [her] all the way" because she was "being totally unfair" since the dispute was over assets which "were bought with ... joint money" and to which Mr. Buckley was entitled to his share; (b) that in the affidavit sworn by Mr. Buckley on 7 July 1998, he stated that, in the New South Wales proceedings, Ms. Moore wanted to remove "the only asset which I managed to obtain from the relationship ... that being some shares in UTA"; (c) that in the affidavit of 9 July 1998, Mr. Buckley swore that he was a director of a company named Sellick Pty. Ltd. which was "entitled to 52% of the shares in UTA"; (d) that in the affidavit of 20 July 1998, Mr. Buckley swore: (i) (by way of repetition of his affidavit of 26 June) that the beneficiaries of the Friends Family Trust were himself, his brother Clayton and Layerose; (ii) that Mr. K.K. Wong is not a fictitious person.
(a) that Mr. Buckley has made upon her a demand for, and asserted an entitlement to, half the shares held by Layerose in UTA;
(b) that Mr. Buckley told her that he was an appointor for the Friends Family Trust (with, it is to be assumed, the powers attendant upon that position); and
(c) that he was really Mr. K.K. Wong, and the owner of the entities which purchased the intellectual property rights to the Ultra Tune business.
"In general, judgments rendered after a trial are conclusive between the parties unless and until reversed on appeal. Certainly in general judgments of superior courts cannot be overturned or questioned between the parties in collateral actions. Yet there is a type of collateral action, known as an action of review, by which even a superior court's judgment can be questioned, even between the parties, and set aside. By recognising that a judgment is open to this kind of attack, the courts recognise an exception to the principles of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. The attack in no way resembles an appeal; but when it is against a superior court's judgment, it is always made in the trial court that gave the first judgment, which is asked to rescind that judgment. If the action of review runs its full course, it results in a second trial, in part at least upon oral evidence. An action of review is now always based on a claim (a) that the original judgment was based on fraud, or (b) that new evidence has been found that shows the first judgment to have been wrong on the facts. At intervals complaints have been made that such actions are anomalous and imperil the concepts of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. Certainly it is anomalous that judgments not even claimed to be void should be attacked collaterally. But the remedy by such review must have been recognised for something like four centuries, and by such high authority that it is too firmly established to be disturbed."
"The equity courts observed the principles of res judicata and the conclusiveness of judgments, when entered, only a little less strictly than the common law courts did; yet they recognised as an exception thata judgment could be impeached by a bill of review and set aside. Review, as opposed to appeal, was conditional on the discovery of new evidence since the trial; but a necessary distinction developed between new evidence that presented the case in a new light and evidence (however new) that merely corroborated indecisively evidence that the courts had disbelieved at the trial. This distinction was seen to be most important when the new evidence produced went to prove perjury at the trial. It is impossible to show on the authorities that the equity courts ever laid down that they would not recognise perjury as a type of fraud remediable by review. The cases were all the other way, and it was only in 1879 that the first serious suggestion was made that perjury should be repudiated as a ground for review. Even yet this suggestion has never been accepted as good law and the only support for general exclusion of perjury has been in dicta and a few textbooks. Of course, even before 1879 courts had seen the difficulty inherent in relief for fraud consisting of false evidence. Except in motions for new trials before entry of judgment, the common law courts refused to go into evidence. When they treated judgments that had been given after a trial as void for fraud, this would be for collusion and other extrinsic fraud, and they ignored the evidence given at the trial. The equity courts repeatedly went into charges that judgments had been obtained by false evidence; yet they came to see that they would ask for trouble if they went beyond a certain point. The difficulties that none could miss were these: perjury is fraud, and when fully proved should be relieved against. But when is perjury fully proved? Strong evidence of perjury may be contradicted by denials just as strong. Charges of perjury can be perjured. The fallibility of curial methods for learning the truth where there is serious conflict makes certainty an unattainable ideal. Yet in order to function the courts must hold that at some stage certainty for their purposes is reached. When conflicting evidence is nicely balanced it is more than possible that if this were submitted to two different judges or two different juries, then two opposite verdicts (and neither perverse) would be reached. But anything like this competition of verdicts is what the courts must avoid at all costs, if they are not to lose all credit. And that competition is just what could result if the courts allowed unrestricted allegations of perjury in actions of review."
"Evidence of perjury on review must be so that it could reasonably be expected to be decisive at a rehearing, and if unanswered must have that effect."
"In my view, the evidence does not establish that Peter Buckley or Norris acted in relation to the sale motivated, in any relevant sense, by the desire to see that Sean Buckley would gain such a benefit from it. They knew, of course, that he would probably benefit if Layerose made the purchase. That was obvious, bearing in mind his relationship with Moore. But this falls far short of saying that the evidence supports the contention that a material reason why Peter Buckley and Norris voted in favour of the sale, was to confer such a benefit on Sean Buckley. As to Sean Buckley, he was obviously motivated by the likelihood of a personal gain from such a sale, but that was pursued by him in his capacity as adviser to Layerose. He played no role for UTSA in connection with the sale. In any event, as I have already mentioned, he had the consent of the UTSA directors to advise Layerose in relation to it. Moreover, for reasons I give later when I consider the plaintiffs' claim that the Buckleys breached their fiduciary duty by not accounting to UTSA for the benefits they gained from their association with UTA, although Sean Buckley was in a fiduciary relationship with UTSA, the scope of it was such that in the circumstances which prevailed, it was not a breach of his duty to seek to gain such a personal advantage from the sale, particularly given the directors' consent to his advising Layerose."
"I find that neither Peter Buckley nor Sean Buckley had any direct or indirect interest in the purchaser, although it was obvious that Sean Buckley stood to gain indirectly if Layerose were to be a purchaser, but such benefit would come not through his control of Layerose, but because of his efforts in helping to make the Ultra Tune business profitable and because of his relationship with Moore. Thus, I find that in acting in respect of the sale on behalf of UTSA, Peter Buckley did not have a conflict between his duty to UTSA and self-interest. He may have subjectively favoured a sale which would give his son the opportunity of playing a significant role in the operation of the new venture and thereby gain an advantage to himself from that and from his relationship with Moore. I find, however, that he did not act in relation to the sale in order to achieve that end or that it was a material consideration in his acting on behalf of the company in effecting such a sale. Consequently, I find that he did not breach his fiduciary duty to UTSA in acting as he did in respect of the sale. I come to the same conclusion with respect to Sean Buckley. He did not have a direct or indirect interest in the purchaser. Moreover, on the evidence, his position with UTSA was that of a senior executive (and, for the reasons I give later, not that of a general manager or chief executive officer as was contended for by the plaintiffs). He had no role to play for UTSA in relation to the sale. He advised Layerose as to that with the approval of the directors. In my view, although he may have acted in anticipation that he would ultimately make a gain from the new venture, in the circumstances, this did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty by him in relation to UTSA ... In advising Layerose he did not enter into competition with UTSA and attempt to acquire for himself or Layerose a benefit sought by the company. In any event, he had the directors' consent so to act."
Titan Corporation Ltd
Untra Tune P/L [1998] VSC 56