Tigridia [2025] QBCCMCmr 385 (4 November 2025)

REASONABLENESS - whether a decision not to change the regulation module applicable to the scheme was unreasonable.

Act, s 94

• [1] This dispute is about the reasonableness of a body corporate decision not to change the regulation module applicable to its scheme from the Body Corporate and Community Management (Standard Module) Regulation 2020 ('Standard Module') to the Body Corporate and Community Management (Specified Two-lot Schemes Module) Regulation 2011 ('Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module').

• [2] The scheme, Tigridia CTS 3965, comprises two lots and common property, and is currently regulated under the Standard Module.
• [3] The applicant, Ms Timmins, is the sole owner of Lot 2.
• [4] The respondent, i.e., the State of Queensland (as represented by the Department of Communities, Housing and Digital Economy) is the owner of Lot 1.

• [5] The body corporate for Tigridia has for some time engaged a body corporate manager to perform various tasks associated with the scheme.
• [6] The respondent (i.e., the State of Queensland) wishes to continue engaging such a body corporate manager. It states that the lack thereof would create an administrative burden that it is unable to discharge.
• [7] The applicant is of the view that this is, firstly, unnecessary given she is willing to perform the role of secretary and treasurer of the body corporate committee; and secondly, that the same is unreasonable given she ought not in the circumstances be required to contribute to half the cost of engaging such a body corporate manager.
• [8] The applicant also appears to point out that their existing body corporate manager has not performed its functions efficiently, highlighting that the insurance and maintenance quotations it obtained in the previous year were not competitive; and that had she (the applicant) not stepped in to obtain better quotations, both herself and the respondent would have paid significantly higher costs. In short, the applicant states she has no faith in body corporate management companies.
• [9] This argument appears to have somehow catalysed the applicant to propose changing the regulation module applicable for the scheme to the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module. Accordingly, by way of a motion for annual general meeting ('AGM') dated 30 May 2025, this proposal was made.
• [10] However, the motion was defeated with the applicant voting in favour, and the respondent voting against it.
• [11] The respondent states that the applicant is seemingly of the view that a change to the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module precludes the appointment of a body corporate manager. It argues that such a view is flawed. It also states that such a change will make the engagement of a body corporate manager more administratively burdensome for itself, given the term of such an engagement can only be for a maximum period of one year under the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module, as opposed to three years under the Standard Module.
• [12] The respondent adds that in order for it to protect its interest in Lot 1, it requires a functioning body corporate manager, regardless of the applicable regulation module. The respondent states that it finds greater comfort in the processes prescribed under Standard Module, as opposed to the 'lot owner agreement' based processes under the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module.
• [13] More importantly, the respondent states that without the availability of the sinking fund and administrative fund under the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module, it may be exposed to financial risks. It states that whilst any lot owner agreement ought to provide for direct payment to cover body corporate expenses, the levying process under the Standard Module increases the robustness of payment, and provides for a buffer - if the fund is large enough - for late payment, so that one lot owner is not compelled to make payment on behalf of the other owner (as might be the case under the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module).
• [14] The respondent states that the applicant will not be unreasonably prejudiced by the maintenance of the status quo under the Standard Module.
• [15] The applicant argues that the decision not to change the regulation module as proposed is unreasonable. She states that the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module was introduced in order to simplify the processes for two-lot schemes and to reduce the administrative burden if at all. Accordingly, the applicant seeks an order changing the scheme's regulation module to the Specified Two-Lot Scheme Module.

• [16] An adjudicator may make an order that is just and equitable in the circumstances to resolve a dispute about a claimed or anticipated contravention of the Act or the Community Management Statement ('CMS')[1] or about the exercise of rights or powers or performance of duties under the Act or CMS.[2] Further, an order may require a person to act, or prohibit a person from acting in a manner stated.[3] An order may also contain ancillary and consequential provisions the adjudicator considers necessary or appropriate. [4]
• [17] I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question by virtue of sections 276(1)(a) and (b) of the Act (read together with section 227(1)(a) and (b) of the Act).
• [18] Ideally, this application ought to have been lodged against the Body Corporate for Tigridia, as opposed to the owner of Lot 1. This is because the applicant, by way of this application, is essentially challenging a decision of the body corporate (on the grounds of reasonableness under section 94(2) of the Act).
• [19] There is no express indication that this application is challenging the opposition to the motion by the respondent on the grounds of reasonableness in the style of a resolution without dissent as discussed in Ainsworth v Albrecht[5] or under for e.g., section 276 of the Act read together with Item 26 of Schedule 5 of the Act. I note that the test in the aforesaid case would be inapplicable given a motion to change the regulation module does not call for a resolution without dissent. Further, an order based on the said Item 26 would also be inapplicable given this scheme does not meet the legislative definition of a 'specified two-lot scheme' being regulated under the Standard Module.
• [20] Accordingly, I reiterate that it is the Body Corporate for Tigridia that ought to have been named as the respondent to this application. However, given both members of the body corporate are parties to the application, and given this application is dismissed, I am satisfied that natural justice has been afforded notwithstanding the otherwise significant irregularity.

• [21] This dispute was the subject of a department conciliation session held on 1 August 2025, during which the parties were unable to reach an agreement.
• [22] Accordingly, the dispute persisted, and this application for department adjudication was lodged on the same day.
• [23] On 7 August 2025, the Commissioner's delegate sought further information from the applicant in accordance with section 240 of the Act.
• [24] Subsequently, on 11 August 2025, the applicant complied with this request.
• [25] On 19 August 2025, the Commissioner provided a copy of the application and invited the respondent to make a submission.
• [26] Subsequently, on 21 August 2025, the respondent filed a submission.
• [27] I note that on 12 September 2025, the applicant advised that she did not wish to obtain a copy of the submission made. Hence, the applicant did not make a reply.
• [28] On 7 October 2025, the Commissioner referred this dispute to department adjudication.
• [29] I have investigated the dispute by reviewing the application and submission in terms of section 271 of the Act.

• [30] The respondent states that Lot 2 is co-owned by the applicant and another individual. It raises a preliminary objection regarding the second co-owner of Lot 2 having not been made a party to this application.
• [31] I note that Queensland Titles Registry previously recorded Ms Timmins and Robert Timmins as joint tenants of Lot 2. However, on 23 April 2025, these records were updated to reflect the passing of Robert Timmins[6]. Accordingly, Ms Timmins is now the sole owner of Lot 2 being a surviving joint tenant.
• [32] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that natural justice has been afforded and procedural fairness observed.

• [33] The question before me for determination is whether the body corporate decision not to change the applicable regulation module from Standard Module to the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module is unreasonable and hence contrary to section 94(2) of the Act.

3.1 What is the test of reasonableness?[7]

• [34] There is a general requirement under section 94 of the Act that a body corporate must act reasonably in among other things, enforcing its CMS (including the by-laws), carrying out its functions under the Act and CMS and making or not making any related decisions.[8]
• [35] Similarly, under section 100(5) of the Act, the committee is required to act reasonably in making a decision. (Further, section 100(1) of the Act states that a decision of the committee is a decision of the body corporate.)
• [36] In the event this does not occur, an adjudicator may intervene to make an order that is just and equitable to resolve a dispute.
• [37] The question of whether a body corporate has acted reasonably is not a straightforward one. What is reasonable is a question of fact, based on a consideration of all relevant matters in the circumstances of the particular case.
• [38] There is no onus on a body corporate to satisfy an adjudicator that it acted reasonably.[9]
• [39] In addition to the duty to act reasonably, bodies corporate and their committees are subject to mandatory general law duties such as:
  1. The duty to act in good faith; and
  2. The duty to make fully considered, rational and reasonable decisions that are not conflicted, arbitrary, patently absurd or plainly unjust.[10]
• [40] The test of reasonableness was considered by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal ('QCAT') in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall[11] ('Beaches') which held as follows:
  1. 'Reasonable action is evidence-based and rational';[12]
  2. 'A finding that a decision or action in issue is "not irrational, absurd or ridiculous" does not necessarily mean it is a reasonable one';[13]
  3. Whether an action is contaminated by unreasonableness is a finding or inference of fact.
• [41] Importantly, a legally reasonable decision is not a uniquely right one. It involves matters of degree about which contrary - even opposite - conclusions can be reasonably reached on the same body of evidence by different lines of reasoning or by reference to other determinants without either being demonstrably right or manifestly wrong'.[14] Accordingly, it is not sufficient to find that the body corporate could have made a better or more reasonable decision, or that a different body corporate could reasonably have come to a different decision.[15] It is not the adjudicator's role to substitute his/her own view as to what would be the preferable decision by the body corporate.[16]
• [42] QCAT also held in Beaches that legal unreasonableness encompasses decision-making errors such as irrelevance, adding that decision-making in practice requires that 'all relevant matters [be] taken into consideration and irrelevant ones left out'.[17] It held:

A decision will offend the relevancy doctrine where it was made without considering something that the decision maker was bound by the law to take account of or, conversely, acting on a factor that had no logical role to play in resolving the issues.[18]

• [43] Where the body corporate has considered irrelevant factors in making a decision, an adjudicator in my view is unlikely to invalidate the decision unless the irrelevant factors were determinative of the decision.[19] It was held in Hilltop Villas at Sunshine[20] that 'a finding that the body corporate did not properly consider the relevant factors does not necessarily mean an order deeming the motion passed is appropriate or warranted'.[21]
• [44] I note the relevant view posited by Sir Neil MacCormick[22]:

In such cases on the relevancy of grounds of decision, it obviously makes sense to say that among the plurality of grounds offered, each may "severally co-operate" with every other in favour of the decision made and as showing it to be relevantly grounded. Yet the attack made upon the decision will seek to isolate some one or more of the grounds as having been both irrelevant and determinative of the decision. If a dominant motive for a decision is a wrong one, that may be fatal to it even though there are, or might be, perfectly acceptable other reasons for the same decision. [citing Padfield v Minister of Agriculture [1968]]. While "reasonableness" may arise from a plurality of grounds, it may be that the presence of a single improper or irrelevant consideration is sufficient to "tilt the balance" the other way.

• [45] Whilst it is clear that it is not the adjudicator's role to weigh up and balance competing factors and effectively re-determine the decision of the body corporate[23], if it is demonstrated that the body corporate apportioned sufficient weight to an irrelevant consideration to tilt the balance the other way, the decision is at risk of invalidation or intervention by an adjudicator.

3.2 Was the decision to defeat the motion unreasonable?

• [46] On the one hand, the respondent finds the highly regulatory processes under the Standard Module more suitable considering its own circumstances. It states that a conversion to the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module would create an additional administrative burden because for e.g., the term of engagement for a body corporate manager can only be for a maximum period of one year as opposed to three years under the Standard Module.
• [47] On the other hand, the applicant argues that the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module was introduced in order to provide a simpler regulatory process for two-lot schemes. She appears to be of the view that it is accordingly unreasonable for the body corporate/respondent to claim that it creates an additional administrative burden, given this regulation module if at all eases such a burden.
• [48] There is prima facie some merit to the applicant's argument. However, whether something creates a burdensome situation for a particular person considering their individual circumstances can be subjective and a matter of opinion. In this instance, the evidence indicates that the respondent made such a subjective statement with regards to what it considers to be more burdensome for itself with the management of Lot 1, i.e., a state-owned property - as opposed to an objective analysis of which regulation module would have an overall less burdensome effect in terms of administrative tasks. I note further that there is no evidence to indicate that the respondent claimed that the proposed change would create a greater administrative burden for the body corporate.
• [49] More importantly, I find (based on the submission made and other evidence) that this subjective statement or opinion was informed by fact and relevant factors (i.e., key differences between the characteristics of both regulation modules) to the exclusion of any irrelevant factors or inaccuracies.
• [50] It is also pertinent to note that the Standard Module is not unsuitable for two-lot schemes. In fact, it was designed to be the default that is suitable for all schemes. It is therefore not an unreasonable option for a two-lot scheme such a Tigridia CTS 3965.
• [51] Accordingly, for such a scheme, either of these two regulation modules are reasonable options. Hence, a body corporate that chooses one over the other in having fully considered the characteristics of each, cannot be said to have made an unreasonable decision.
• [52] Similarly, even if by some objective standard, one regulation module can be said to be better than the other (on the basis of certain determinants), it does not necessarily make a decision to adopt the other unreasonable.
• [53] Accordingly in these circumstances, I am not satisfied that the decision to defeat the motion proposing a change in the regulation module to be unreasonable, or that the same was made unreasonably.

• [54] I find that the statement made by the respondent - regarding the proposed change of the applicable regulation module to the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module creating an additional administrative burden to the respondent - to be a subjective statement or opinion. I also find, more importantly, that this opinion was informed by facts and relevant considerations, i.e., an accurate comparison of the Standard Module and the Specified Two-Lot Schemes Module.
• [55] Accordingly, I cannot find that the body corporate decision not to change the applicable regulation module for the scheme is unreasonable or made unreasonably.
• [56] In these circumstances, I must dismiss this application.

[1] The CMS includes the scheme's by-laws

[2] Sections 276)(1)(a) and (b) of the Act

[4] See Brighton on Broadwater Breezes [2018] QBCCMCmr 243 at [8]

[5] [2016] HCA 40

[7] For a more elaborate discussion of the concept see Notting Hill Terraces [2024] QBCCMCmr 322 at [36] to [53]

[9] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[10] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [35]

[11] [2016] QCATA 177

[12] SZLGP v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2008] FCA 1198 [15] - [16] as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [23]

[13] McKinnon v Secretary, Department of Treasury [2006] HCA 45; (2006) 228 CLR 423 [60] (Hayne J) as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [24]

[14] Woden Valley Glass v Psaila (1993) 122 ALR 378, 391 as cited in Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47]

[15] Edgecliff Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 30 at [23] to [27] citing Ainsworth v Albrecht [2016] HCA 40; Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177

[17] Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [36] and [42]

[19] Crown Towers [2021] QBCCMCmr 372 at [149] and [177]; Bowen Terrace Apartments [2021] QBCCMCmr 33 at [5], [6] and [29].

[20] [2024] QBCCMCmr 68 at [48]

[21] This is also consistent with the decision of the High Court of Australia in Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58 regarding ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affected the exercise of power. (See also Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317)

[22] Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1575 (1999)

[23] See Body Corporate for Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [33] and [105]