1. Mr Bean is 56 years old and resides in Port Pirie. He has been employed by Thiess for just over 4 years and has worked at Prominent Hill for close to 7 years. He works for 7 days, has 7 days off, and then works for 7 nights. He flies to Prominent Hill from Port Augusta on a Thursday to commence his seven day shift irrespective of whether he is scheduled to work on day shift or on night shift.
2. To get to Prominent Hill, Mr Bean drives from his home in Port Pirie to Port Augusta and then flies to Prominent Hill. He gave evidence that almost everyone who works at Prominent Hill is a fly-in, fly-out worker.[2] The closest town to Prominent Hill is Coober Pedy, some 130 kilometres away.[3]
3. In these reasons, "the Site" means the Prominent Hill Site, the whole of the land at Prominent Hill under the control of OZ Minerals Limited, the owner and operator of the Prominent Hill Mine (the Mine). The Site includes the Mine, the Prominent Hill Village (the Village) and an airport.[4] The Site is fenced and has only one entry point. There is no general public access to Prominent Hill. All who attend the Site must be allowed to enter by staff at the guardhouse. Mr Bean said an induction is required before anyone can undertake work on the Site.
4. An eleven page document entitled OZ Prominent Hill Village Rules (the Rules), was tendered at the hearing.[5] It contains rules and restrictions which range from prohibiting illegal activities like gambling, prostitution and the consumption of illicit substances, to not littering or removing low flow regulators in shower heads. The Rules regulate a broad range of behaviours and include a detailed code of conduct. Mr Bean explained that employees are expected to behave in accordance with the Rules from the time they board the flight to Prominent Hill. He said some employees had been dismissed as a result of unruly behaviour on such flights.
5. A plan of the Village was also tendered.[6] It shows a large number of accommodation cabins located behind the entry point to the Site, and general amenities like a sports area, a swimming pool, a dry mess, wet mess, office and bus stop. A bus takes mine workers to the Mine. An airport is positioned to one side of the Village and a road leading to the Mine extends from the other side of the Village.
6. Thiess employees travel from the Village bus stop to the Mine by at 5.15 am when working day shift and at 5.15pm when working night shift. All employees are required to blow into a breathalyser and attend a site meeting before commencing a shift. A shift is 12.5 hours long.

1. On 22 March 2016, Mr Bean was scheduled to work on the night shift. He was in his cabin, getting ready to start work. He was leaving his cabin at about 3.30pm in anticipation of eating at the dry mess when the kitchen there opened at 4.00pm. As well as eating, he was going to make "lunch" to take into the Mine, have a cup of tea, and talk to some of his work mates.[7]
2. In his statement of evidence dated 22 September 2016, Mr Bean described injuring his knee by bending over to pick up his pen and keys which had fallen out of his crib bag when the bag's strap became caught on the door handle as he was leaving his cabin. While bending to pick up the spilt items, he felt a pop in his right knee which then started to swell.[8] He went to receive medical attention. He was unable to work his shift.
3. In cross-examination, an incident report completed by Mr Bean on 22 March 2016 was put to him.[9] The incident report makes no reference to the strap of Mr Bean's crib bag becoming caught on a door handle. Mr Bean explained that the omission was because at the time he filled out the incident report, he was "arguing" with Stephen Kitching. Mr Bean was concerned about how and where he would receive treatment for his knee injury.[10] In re-examination Mr Bean said that Mr Kitching told him that making a claim was probably a waste of time because he wasn't entitled to compensation.[11]
4. Mr Kitching produced a statement of evidence and was cross-examined at the hearing. Mr Kitching is employed by Thiess as a HSET Superintendent[12] at the Prominent Hill operation.[13] He gave evidence that OZ Minerals Limited operates the Site. He referred to OZ Minerals as "the client."[14] Mr Kitching agreed it was necessary to obtain permission for anyone to enter the Site and added that Federal Police checks are required for any prospective employee.[15]
5. Mr Kitching disagreed that he told Mr Bean that making a claim was likely to be a waste of time.[16] Later in cross-examination he moved from that position somewhat when he said he may not now be able to recall the interaction with Mr Bean in detail due to the passage of time.[17]
6. I accept Mr Bean's account of how he sustained injury. He was careful in giving evidence. He did not strike me as prone to exaggeration. He was straightforward and to the point when answering questions. His explanation of why he did not mention that the strap of his crib bag became caught on a door handle in the incident report is believable. He was concerned about whether he would receive appropriate treatment for his injury and about how he would get home when he met with Mr Kitching and filled out the incident report form. The injury happened on a Tuesday and he was not due to fly back to Port Augusta for another two days. He was also worried that liability for the injury would not be accepted by Thiess. It is not surprising in such a context that Mr Bean did not describe the mechanics of the injury on the incident report form.
7. I also accept Mr Kitchings' evidence in the main. Where his evidence varies with that of Mr Bean in relation to their meeting soon after Mr Bean was injured, I prefer Mr Bean's account. Mr Bean had a far more active interest in the meeting's outcome. Mr Kitching acknowledged his recall of events may not be completely reliable. I accept Mr Kitching's evidence that it is a four minute walk from Mr Bean's accommodation in room D-29 to the dry mess.[18]
8. I do not find that Mr Kitching attempted to try and persuade Mr Bean to not make a claim. I accept his evidence that it was a matter for Mr Bean whether he made a claim or not. Mr Kitching was attempting convey his view that the injury was not a work injury within the meaning of the RTW Act to Mr Bean as the injury took place when Mr Bean was not scheduled to work and was not performing duties of employment.

1. Mr Luke for Thiess submitted that Mr Bean was not preparing for work within the meaning of s 7(5)(a) of the RTW Act when injured as the injury occurred at about 3.30pm, quite some time before he was due to board the bus to go to the Mine at 5.15pm. He added that the dry mess did not open until 4.00pm and was only a 4 minute walk from Mr Bean's cabin. Mr Luke submitted that Mr Bean attending the dry mess before starting work was not "in order to prepare, or be ready, for work" within the meaning of s 7(5)(a) of the RTW Act:

"In my submission, it's confined to those circumstances where the worker is at the place of employment and engaging in activities that are a necessary incident of preparing for the work ahead to actually be able to engage and be ready for the work".[19]

1. Mr Luke argued that extending the parameters of what constitutes preparation for work to accommodate the facts of this matter would lead to almost anything done by Mr Bean at Prominent Hill being done in compensable circumstances.[20] He said the primary submission made on behalf of Thiess was that "going to the mess is not part of preparing for work."[21]
2. Mr Luke submitted that s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act requires there be a "causal connection between the activity the worker is engaged (in) and the employment."[22]
3. Mr Luke also submitted the decision in Comcare v PVYW supported the position taken by Thiess. That was so because in PVYW the High Court held that in the case of an injury occurring between periods of actual work and which is associated with the place where the injury occurs, for the injury to be compensable it ordinarily will "involve something occurring to the premises or some defect in the premises."[23]
4. Mr Livesey QC for RTW SA submitted that s 7(5)(a) of the RTW Act applies to this matter. He argued that the circumstances of Mr Bean's employment, undertaken as it is at an isolated and enclosed location with his accommodation provided and paid for by the employer, should be taken into account.
5. Mr Livesey submitted that applying PVYW to the facts of this matter produced a favourable result for Mr Bean. Mr Livesey said that both the "place test" and the "activity test" described in PVYW were satisfied by the circumstances of Mr Bean's injury.
6. Mr Livesey outlined the rationale behind counterpart provisions to s 7(2) in other jurisdictions. He observed s 7(2) requires a connection between employment and injury, not between the course of employment and injury.[24] He submitted that in this case, the requirement that employment be a significant contributing cause of the injury applies to an interval between periods of actual work.[25] Mr Livesey submitted that in s 7(2):

"employment" means less than "the course of employment". Secondly, the adverb "significant" has been chosen designedly. Thirdly, the adjective "contributing" must be given some work to do... The combined effect is that the work or other activities of the employee must have been, and must have continued to be, a significant cause of the injury in question."[26]

"(1) This Act applies to an injury if (and only if) it arises from employment.

(2) Subject to this section, an injury arises from employment if -

(a) in the case of an injury other than a psychiatric injury -

the injury arises out of or in the course of employment and the employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury.

1. For compensation to be payable under the RTW Act, a worker must have sustained a "work injury". Section 4 provides: "Work injury means an injury that arises from employment under section 7."
2. Section 7(2)(a) provides that in the case of any physical injury, the injury must "arise out of or in the course of employment" and the employment must have been "a significant contributing cause of the injury."
3. Mr Bean was injured during an interval between periods of actual work. He was not performing his work duties or being paid to work when he was injured. His shift was not due commence for some two hours. It was argued he was preparing for work when injured. That argument will be dealt with in the context of considering s 7(5)(a) of the RTW Act.
4. Comcare v PVYW is a case which concerns a worker who was injured out of working hours during a visit to a regional office at her employer's request.[27] During the visit, the worker stayed overnight at a motel which had been booked by her employer. In the motel, she sustained injury whilst engaged in sexual intercourse. A light fitting above her bed was pulled from its mount and hit her on the head. In dealing with injuries which occur in intervals between periods of actual work the High Court said:

"The starting point in applying what was said in Hatzimanolis, in order to determine whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment, is the factual finding that an employee suffered injury, but not whilst engaged in actual work. The next enquiry is what the employee was doing when injured. For the principle in Hatzimanolis to apply, the employee must have been either engaged in an activity or present at a place when the injury occurred. The essential enquiry is then: how was the injury brought about? In some cases, the injury will have occurred at and by reference to the place. More commonly, it will have occurred while the employee was engaged in an activity. It is only if and when one of those circumstances is present that the question arising from the Hatzimanolis principle becomes relevant. When an activity was engaged in at the time of injury, the question is: did the employer induce or encourage the employee to engage in that activity? When injury occurs at and by reference to a place, the question is: did the employer induce or encourage the employee to be there? If the answer to the relevant question is affirmative, then the injury will have occurred in the course of employment."[28]

1. Mr Luke submitted that by reference to the place test as formulated in PVYW, Mr Bean's injury is not a work injury because there was nothing about the place where the injury occurred to connect it employment. This submission derives from the following passage in PVYW:

"An injury occurring to an employee by reference to or associated with a place where the employee is present may involve something occurring to the premises or some defect in the premises. For example, if the light fitting in this case had been insecurely fastened into place and simply fell upon the respondent, the injury suffered by her would have arisen by reference to the motel. The employer would be responsible for injury because the employer had put the respondent in a position where injury occurred because of something to do with the place. Liability in those circumstances is justifiable. Liability for everything that occurs whilst the employee is present at that place is not."[29]

1. In PVYW, the court explained that its earlier decision in Hatzimanolis v ANI Corporation_[30]_ had been misunderstood:

"Nothing said in Hatzimanolis suggests that an association between the circumstances in which injury is suffered by an employee and the employment is not necessary. In stating the purpose of earlier tests as being, properly, to limit compensation for injury which is work-related, the joint reasons in Hatzimanolis may be taken to acknowledge the need for that association or connection with the employment.

This is not to suggest that there should be added to the application of the principle in Hatzimanolis a separate test of connection or association. That would run counter to what Hatzimanolis sought to achieve and the method by which it did so. Whilst the decision did not doubt the correctness of the object of earlier tests, it was able to effect the necessary connection by other means. Instead of testing for connection, as by the enquiry whether something done was incidental to employment, it enquired whether the employer had induced or encouraged that which was done. The connection or association it achieves with the employment is a by-product of the principle, but it is not itself a test.

The principle in Hatzimanolis should nevertheless be understood to have sought, and achieved, a connection or association with employment. For present purposes that understanding is helpful to explain, if it be necessary, that for an injury occurring in an interval in a period of work to be in the course of employment, the circumstance in which an employee is injured must be connected to the inducement or encouragement of the employer. An inducement or encouragement to be at a particular place does not provide the necessary connection to employment merely because an employee is injured whilst engaged in an activity at that place."[31]

1. Mr Livesey contended there is debate about the effect of PVYW on the decision in Hatzimanolis:

"I think there are two views about PVYW and what it does to Hatzimanolis. One view is that in terms of a specific class of cases and specific types of activity or place for the injury cases, it refines those. The other view is that despite affirming Hatzimanolis, it actually changes the whole nature of the test and I find it quite difficult to work out which of those views is correct."[32]

1. In James v The State of South Australia, I found that a worker who was directed by her employer to submit her time sheets and annual leave request forms to the employer in order to be paid, and who was injured in doing so, was entitled to compensation.[33] The worker was not working when she was injured delivering the time sheets. She was unable to work because of a non-compensable injury. I found that the worker was injured in an interval between periods of work and that she was encouraged or induced by the employer to attend the place where she was injured in the sense contemplated by Hatzimanolis. I also found that the worker satisfied the place test in PVYW because there was a defect in the place she was injured which was connected with her injury_.[34]_
2. While the outcome in James was confirmed on appeal, and while the Full Bench agreed that the worker was encouraged or induced by the employer to attend the place where she was injured, the Full Bench held the worker did not have to satisfy the place test in PVYW.[35] The Full Bench held that because the Hatzimanolis principle applied to the worker's attendance at the place where she was injured, it was not necessary to satisfy the PVYW place test:

"What the worker did fell within an incidental aspect of employment in an everyday sense and met the test provided by the authorities. It was so consequential upon or incidental or ancillary to the employment that it was something in virtue of or in pursuance of employment."[36]

1. The approach I took in James represented the latter of the two views of PVYW referred to above by Mr Livesey. I held that in addition to the presence of encouragement and inducement as required by Hatzimanolis, a worker who is injured in an interval between periods of work also has to satisfy either the place test or the activity test described in PVYW. The Full Bench took a different view of PVYW and found that James was not an interval case. The Full Bench also held that even if James was an interval case, the tests of causation described in cases like Henderson,[37] Speechley,[38] Kavanagh[39] and Danvers,[40] remain relevant and applicable to interval cases following PVYW.[41]
2. In James, the Full Bench adopted the reasoning of Bromberg J in O'Loughlin v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd.[42] Mr O'Loughlin was a tanker driver who had just finished filling the underground tank of a service station with fuel when he was assaulted and injured. The hose of his tanker was still connected to the underground tank when he was assaulted.[43] He had not finished his work at the service station when injured. Bromberg J noted no finding was made in the hearing below that Mr O'Loughlin was injured in an interval between periods of work. His Honour therefore found that PVYW had no application.[44] I respectfully agree. Mr O'Loughlin was in the ordinary course of his employment when injured. Ms James was neither performing her ordinary work duties nor being paid to work when she was injured.
3. Regardless of whether or not the circumstances of O'Loughlin and James are distinguishable, if the central legal issue in this matter is the same as the issue that arose in James, then I am bound by the principles of stare decisis to apply the reasoning of Full Bench in James to this matter regardless of what I consider to be the scope of the application of PVYW.
4. In Goward v The Commonwealth, the High Court found that a worker who lived in a camp for work purposes and who was killed on a railway line near the camp did not die in compensable circumstances.[45] The matter was determined adversely to the claimant because there was no evidence of what the worker was doing on the rail track or where he was going when he died.[46] The court made observations about the legal effect of working in a camp provided by an employer upon employment:

"Logically there is of course a preliminary question, namely, whether the deceased's living in the camp fell within the general conception of the 'employment'. But upon this question there could hardly be any doubt. Theoretically he could live where he liked so long as he was at hand to attend to his actual duties. But this was an entirely theoretical proposition. The postal department recognised the necessity of a camp, established and regulated camps, organized camping parties and paid a camping allowance. To live in the camp may therefore be regarded as an incident of the employment."[47]

1. Given the approach taken by the Full Bench in James, and having regard to the passage set out from Goward, I find that the reasoning of the Full Bench in James is applicable to this matter and that I am bound to apply the reasoning in James to this matter. In _James t_he Full Bench found:

"What the worker did fell within an incidental aspect of employment in an everyday sense and met the test provided by the authorities. It was so consequential upon or incidental or ancillary to the employment that it was something in virtue of or in pursuance of employment. That the requirement on the worker to return to work to fill in her time sheets and submit her annual leave application was an incident of her employment is well evidenced by the Kronos Guidelines."[48]

1. In this matter, there is a close nexus between Mr Bean's employment and what he was doing when he was injured. His employment involved living at an isolated location in order to be able to undertake his work. He was injured in accommodation provided by his employer. At the time he was injured, he was in the process of leaving his room with his crib bag to head to the dry mess before eating and preparing food to eat later during his shift. The dry mess was the place that he and presumably most Thiess employees at Prominent Hill ate at and prepared food to eat during shifts.
2. Mr Bean's injury occurred when the strap to his crib bag became caught on the door handle to his room as he was leaving and some of the contents of the bag fell to the floor. He bent down to pick up those things, and in doing so, injured his knee. Following the approach of the Full Bench in James I find that that what Mr Bean was doing when injured was "so consequential upon or incidental or ancillary to fundamental to the employment that it was something in virtue of or in pursuance of employment." [49]

1. In Roberts v State of South Australia (TAFE SA) I noted that s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act contains a requirement that employment be "a significant contributing cause" of any physical work injury.[50] I reviewed some authorities which concern some interstate equivalents of s (7)(2).[51] Although the language of each such provision is somewhat different, all the provisions considered are directed to a similar purpose. I also referred to and agreed with the comments of Gilchrist DPJ in Ward v The State of SA.[52] The conclusions I drew from the authorities cited in Roberts are:
   • whether employment is a significant contributing cause of an injury is a question of fact which will be determined by the facts of each case. Some causal significance must attach to the incident which causes injury for it to be a significant contributing cause;[53]
   • the use of the indefinite article before the word "significant" in s 7(2) qualifies its effect and means there can be more than one significant contributing cause of an injury;[54]
   • not infrequently, satisfying the causal requirement in s 7(2) that an injury "arises out of employment" will also satisfy the other requirement in s 7(2) that employment is "a significant contributing cause" of the injury.
2. The last observation was made by Ashley J of the Victorian Supreme Court in Hegedis v Carlton and United Breweries and HIH Winterthur Workers Compensation (Vic) where his Honour said:

"Save in pretty exceptional cases the causal requirement imported by the phrase 'arising out of the employment' and that imported by the requirement that employment be a significant contributing factor to injury will cover the same ground."[55]

1. The equivalent to s 7(2)(a) in Victoria requires that employment be "a significant contributing factor" of the injury rather than "a significant contributing cause" of the injury.[56]
2. Hegedis concerned an injury which arose in the course of employment. The worker injured his hand peeling fruit during a paid break from work. Ashley J held that course of employment injuries "would all but disappear" if the "significant contributing factor" requirement was applied to all such injuries in an unqualified way.[57] His Honour held that with an "injury in the primary sense" the "significant contributing factor" did not apply.[58] By "injury in the primary sense", Ashley J was referring to injuries other than diseases and aggravations, etc. of prior injuries. Under s 3 of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (the repealed Act) "secondary injury" was defined to mean: "An injury that is, or results from, the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation, deterioration or recurrence of a prior injury". The pre-1992 amending Act definition of "injury" in the Victorian Act is very similar to the definition of "secondary injury" in s 3 of the repealed Act. [59]
3. _Hegedi_s was confirmed on appeal. Leave to appeal to the High Court was refused.[60] Hegedis was followed by the Victorian Full Supreme Court in Zlateska v Consolidated Cleaning Services Pty Ltd and Anor.[61]
4. In Badawi v Nexon Asia Pacific Pty Limited, the NSW Court of Appeal considered the NSW equivalent of s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act.[62] Sections 9 and 9A of the NSW Act require that an injury arise out of employment and that employment be "a substantial contributing factor."[63]
5. In Badawi, the worker sustained injury while on a business trip and skiing with her partner. The worker was trying to make a sale to the company that operated the ski resort she was staying at and was staying at the resort with her supervisor for that purpose. The worker had just been called by her supervisor and asked to meet with him. She was injured skiing down the slope in order to meet her supervisor to discuss business issues.
6. The NSW Court of Appeal held that the requirement the injury arise out of employment and the requirement employment be a substantial contributing factor were both tests of causation, but had to be considered separately. A finding that injury arose out of employment does not mean that employment was a substantial contributing factor to the injury.[64] For employment to be a "substantial contributing factor", the causal connection must be "real and of substance."[65]
7. Even though the conclusion reached in Badawi is expressed in more qualified terms than those used by Ashley J in Hegedis, the NSW Court of Appeal noted the two causal requirements in s 9 and s 9A of the NSW Act can overlap:

"It should be said, however, there may be circumstances where the factors considered necessary and sufficient to satisfy the test 'arising out of employment' for the purposes of s 9, are sufficient to satisfy the test in s 9A. Whether that is so will depend on the facts. Both are factual questions. The question under each section is differently expressed and must be considered separately. It is not sufficient to find that injury arose out of 'employment' and to thereby be able to conclude that the employment concerned was a 'substantial contributing factor'. Such a reasoning process is expressly proscribed by s 9A(3)."[66]

1. The primary obligation when interpreting a statute is to interpret the language of the provision in question by reference to its terms and context. The corresponding provisions in the NSW Act and the Victorian Act have prescribed factors which must be taken into account when determining whether employment is a significant contributing factor to an injury.[67] The RTW Act has no prescribed factors. The substantial/significant contributing factor requirements in NSW and Victoria were added to existing Acts while s 7 of the RTW Act is a new provision. Section 7 should be interpreted by reference to its own terms.
2. The structure of s 7 means that in the case of an injury that is a work injury by virtue of it arising out of employment, two causal tests must be satisfied: the injury must arise out of employment and employment must also be a significant contributing cause of the injury.
3. Adding further requirements to the "arising out of or in the course of employment" test is not new in South Australia. Under the repealed Act, some injuries had more stringent causal requirements than others. In the case of a secondary injury which arose in the course of employment, employment also had to contribute to the injury for it to be compensable under s 30(2)(b) of the repealed Act.[68] For an illness or disorder of the mind to be compensable under s 30A of the repealed Act, employment had to be a substantial cause of the mental injury.
4. Mr Bean must satisfy the requirement in s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act that employment was a significant contributing cause of his injury.
5. In Roberts I concluded that the motivation behind the introduction of the "a significant contributing cause of the injury" requirement was to ensure that employment was in some real sense responsible for a work injury rather than the injury just being a matter of happenstance.[69] That accords with what Ashley J concluded in Hegedis and with the observation in Badawi that the causal connection must be "real and of substance". In Roberts the worker sustained injury during an interval between periods of actual work. I found that employment was a significant contributing cause of injury because of where the injury occurred. The worker was injured in Andamooka, far from her home in suburban Adelaide. She was there purely for work. The same is true of Mr Bean.
6. The "a significant contributing cause of the injury" requirement in s 7(2)(a) is directed to employment, not to duties of employment, and not to the course of employment.
7. In TransAdelaide v Karanikos, the Full Supreme Court considered the phrase "duties of employment" in s 30(5) of the repealed Act.[70] Doyle CJ, with whom the rest of the court agreed held that the phrase "duties of employment" in s 30(5)(a) was a narrower expression than the phrase "course of employment."[71] Even so, his Honour noted:

"The concept of duties of employment in my opinion extends beyond things which the employee is obliged to do. I also consider that one is obliged to take into account contemporary conditions and contemporary understandings of the concept of duties of employment."[72]

1. The concept of employment includes considerations which go beyond the duties performed by a worker and extends, in my view, to more general circumstances of a worker's employment. In my view, those more general circumstances include the atypical circumstances of the relevant employment in this matter and in Roberts.
2. Employment is a broader concept than either duties of employment or the course of employment. Parliament could have chosen to restrict the definition of "work injury" further than it did, for example, by requiring that employment be the significant contributing cause of injury, as it did with mental injuries.[73] Parliament did not do so, in my view, because it did not intend to create a wholesale limitation on the range of physical injuries which can be claimed for under the RTW Act. Parliament was concerned to ensure the connection was more than happenstance or coincidence.
3. In my view, Mr Bean's employment was a significant contributing cause of his injury within the meaning of s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act.

"(5) For the purposes of this Act, a worker's employment includes -

(a) attendance at the worker's place of employment on a working day but before the day's work begins in order to prepare, or be ready, for work; and ..."

1. Section 7(5) describes attendances at places which will form part of the course of employment if a worker is injured during such an attendance. Placita (a), (b) and (c) of s 7(5) all concern attendances at work, but not while duties of employment are being performed.
2. Section 4 of the RTW Act defines "place of employment":

"place of employment means a place where a worker is required to carry out duties of employment and, if the place is a building, includes land within the external boundaries of the land on which the building is situated".

1. "Building" is not defined in s 4. "Building" is defined by the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: "A thing which is built; a structure; an edifice; a permanent fixed thing built for occupation, as a house, school, factory, stable, church, etc." Other dictionary definitions of building are more general. The Macquarie Dictionary defines building as: "anything built or constructed." In either case, it seems the definition comprehends some sort of structure built for habitation of some type. A mine has a form, but it is not built or designed for habitation, other than to allow miners to extract minerals from the ground. I note the definition of "place of employment" comprehends a building situated on land rather than excavations designed to take minerals out of the ground. In my view, the word "building" in s 7 (5)(a) does not include a mine.
2. Mr Bean was not required to carry out his duties of employment in a building. As a result, I find that the Mine, and not the Site or the Village, was Mr Bean's place of employment. He performed his duties of employment at the Mine.
3. By reference to Karanikos, the expression "duties of employment" is a narrower expression than the expression, "course of employment". In my view, in adopting the term "duties of employment" in s 7(5)(a), Parliament intended to confine the scope of the statutory extension of the course of employment created by s 7(5)(a). The connection under s 7(5)(a) is enlivened once a worker reaches that place where he or she performs duties of employment. Mr Bean had not yet reached that place when he was injured.
4. I appreciate the point is not clear and the opposite conclusion could easily be reached. However, I am swayed by the narrower expression used in s 7(5)(a) by comparison to the expression "arising out of or in the course of employment". I am also swayed because if the broader interpretation is correct, a very wide range of activities undertaken by Mr Bean at Prominent Hill would be capable of being work injuries. For example, if he were to fall and hurt himself in the shower after waking, that could be said to be "in order to prepare, or be ready, for work" irrespective of when he was due to commence work. To my mind, the definition of "place of employment" does not warrant that approach.
5. I have also considered whether the Rules might change the result. It could be argued that the restrictions imposed by the Rules create various duties of employment Mr Bean is to observe while on the Site.
6. Although the Rules apply to any place on the Site, that does not mean they should be interpreted to expand the definition of duties of employment in the RTW Act. It was not suggested that any rule in the Rules applied to what Mr Bean was doing when he was injured. I also note that the Rules were promulgated by OZ Minerals, not by Thiess.
7. Because I have found Mr Bean was not injured at his place of employment, I do not need to decide whether he was preparing for work within the meaning of s 7(5)(a) when injured. If I am wrong, I would have gone on to find that Mr Bean was preparing for work when injured. He was in the process of leaving his cabin to attend to other matters that needed attention before he commenced work for the day. It seems to me that in the context of his employment at Prominent Hill, and away from his home, he was injured while preparing for work.

1. By virtue of the circumstances of his employment and what he was doing when injured, Mr Bean's right knee injury arose out of his employment with Thiess Pty Ltd and employment was a significant contributing cause of the injury within the meaning of s 7(2)(a) of the RTW Act.
2. Mr Bean was not injured during an attendance at his place of employment on a working day but before the day's work had begun in order to prepare, or be ready, for work within the meaning of s 7(5)(a) of the RTW Act.
3. I will hear from the parties before making orders.

Parties are advised that if a party wishes to appeal against any part of this decision which is appealable pursuant to s 67(1)(a) of the SAET Act such appeal must be filed with the Registrar in accordance with the form titled Notice of Appeal within 14 days of the delivery of this decision and must be served on all parties.

It is the practice of this Tribunal to publish its reasons for decision in full on the Internet. If any party or person contends that these reasons for decision should not be published in full the party or person must make an application within seven days of the delivery of these reasons. The application shall be by an Application for Directions with a supporting affidavit and should be addressed to the presiding member(s). If no such application is lodged within the time specified these reasons will be published in accordance with the Tribunal's usual practice.

[1] [2013] HCA 41.

[12] Health, Safety, Environment and Training Superintendent.

[22] Applicant's Outline of Submissions 24 October 2016 [23].

[23] [2013] HCA 41 at [45]

[24] Respondent's Outline of Submissions 21 October 2016 [17]

[27] [2013] HCA 41.

[30] [1992] HCA 21; (1992) 173 CLR 473.

[31] [2013] HCA 41 at [58] - [60].

[33] [2015] SAWCT 52.

[34] [2013] HCA 41 at [38], [45].

[35] The State of South Australia v James [2016] SAET 17 at [48] - [50].

[37] Henderson v Commissioner of Railways (WA) [1937] HCA 67; (1937) 58 CLR 281.

[38] Humphrey Earl Ltd v Speechley [1951] HCA 75; (1951) 84 CLR 126.

[39] Kavanagh v The Commonwealth [1960] HCA 25; (1960) 103 CLR 547.

[40] Danvers v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) [1969] HCA 64; (1969) 122 CLR 529.

[41] [2016] SAET 17 at [49].

[42] [2015] FCA 1000.

[45] [1957] HCA 60; (1957) 97 CLR 355.

[46] per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ at [18] and per Mc Tiernan J at [2].

[47] per Dixon CJ, Williams, Webb and Kitto JJ at [18].

[50] [2016] SAET 58.

[52] [2016] SAET 28.

[54] op cit at [87]. See also Ward at [35], [36].

[55] [2000] VSC 380 at [51].

[56] Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 82(1).

[57] [2000] VSC 380 at [51].

[58] [2000] VSC 380 at [1].

[59] Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic), s 5: the recurrence, aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration of any pre-existing injury or disease where the worker's employment was a contributing factor to that recurrence, aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation or deterioration.

[60] Carlton and United Breweries and Anor. v Hegedis [2002] VSCA 61.

[62] [2009] NSWCA 324.

[63] Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).

[64] [2009] NSWCA 324 [85], [91].

[67] Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW), s 9A; Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic) s 5(1B).

[68] Secondary injury was defined by s 3 to be "an injury that is, or results from, the aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation, deterioration or recurrence of a prior injury."

[70] [1996] SASC 5536.