Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)

Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)

COMMITTEE MOTION - whether decisions of the committee were a restricted issue.

REASONABLENESS - whether the committee acted reasonably in proceeding with proposals, particularly where those proposals previously failed to pass at a general meeting.

JURISDICTION - whether part of the application should be dismissed to a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.

Act, s 100(5), 270(1)(b), 270(1)(c); Accommodation Module, ss 91, 95, 170.

1. The application is dismissed pursuant to section 270(1)(c).
2. Within one month of the date of this order, East Brisbane Investments Pty Ltd ATF Annecy Trust must pay $2,000 to Philippe Tassin and Lynne Tassin to partially compensate for legal expenses incurred in responding to this application.

• [1] This application for final orders follows an unsuccessful application for interim orders, The Wellington Boutique Apartments [2024] QBCCMCmr 355.
• [2] This application is brought by the caretaking and letting service contractor for the scheme, who also owns 30 of 40 lots in the scheme. They bring this application against the body corporate in their capacity as a lot owner.
• [3] The applicant takes issue with several decisions by the committee to engage contractors to undertake various works at the scheme. The same proposals had already been considered at a general meeting. At the general meeting the applicant voted against the relevant motions, resulting in all the relevant motions failing. Despite this, the committee passed its own motions to proceed with engaging the same contractors for the same works. The applicant seeks orders that these decisions were invalid. The applicant also seeks several orders against committee members and the body corporate manager in relation to the matter.
• [4] I have dismissed the application for final orders as I am not satisfied the proposals were a restricted issue for the committee. Nor am I satisfied that the committee acted unreasonably.
• [5] I have dismissed the application pursuant to section 270(1)(c) of the Act for being frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or without substance as the applicant:
  1. was on notice that several of the orders sought were not appropriate as they were sought against persons who were not named respondents. Yet, the applicant continued to pursue such orders
  2. misstated the relevant committee spending limit. Initially the applicant submitted the committee spending limit was $8,000, despite being aware that this figure had changed to $25,000. Later, the applicant altered their submission to the committee spending limit being $4,800 despite being aware that members of the committee do not recognise the general meeting the applicant relied upon to say that was the limit,
  3. was on notice several of the arguments raised were frivolous following the interim decision and continued the dispute with a largely unchanged application.

• [6] The scheme is a building format plan subdivision in Kangaroo Point, Brisbane, and operates under the Accommodation Module.
• [7] The applicant applies in their capacity as owner of 30 of the 40 lots in the scheme, and is also the caretaking and letting service contractor.

• [8] On 14 December 2023 the body corporate held its annual general meeting (December 2023 AGM). Several motions proposed various works, which will be collectively referred to as the Apollo Works. In summary, they were:
  1. Motion 26, which was titled 'Item 4 - Safety Report - Trip Hazard - Uneven Concrete' at a cost of $579.00 (excluding GST).
  2. Motion 27, which was title 'Item 5 - Safety Report - Trip Hazard - Cracked Tiles' at a cost of $1,727.00 (excluding GST).
  3. Motion 28, which was titled 'Item 6 - Safety Report - Slip Hazard - Oil Spills/stains Carpark' at a cost of $2,370.00 (excluding GST).
  4. Motion 29, which was titled 'Item 7 - Safety Report - Uneven, Cracked Concrete' at a cost of $2,347.00 (excluding GST).
  5. Motion 30, which was titled 'Item 8 - Safety Report - Vehicle Impact Hazard - Downpipes' at a cost of $3,888.00 (excluding GST).
  6. Motion 31, which was titled 'Item 9 - Safety Report - Speed Humps' at a cost of $4,260.00 (excluding GST).
  7. Motion 32, which was titled 'Item 10 - Safety Report - Trip Fall Hazard - Handrails' at a cost of $275.00 (excluding GST).
  8. Motion 33, which was titled 'Item 11 - Safety Report - Bollard' at a cost of $473.00 (excluding GST).
  9. Motion 34, which was titled 'Item 12 - Safety Report - Uneven Surface, Gradients' at a cost of $389.00 (excluding GST).
  10. Motion 35, which was titled 'Item 16 - Safety Report - Mould, Slime, Grime' at a cost of $1,225.00 (excluding GST).
  11. Motion 36, which was titled 'Item 19 and 20 - Safety Report - Pool Area' at a cost of $675.00 (excluding GST).
  12. Motion 37, which was titled 'Item 22 - Safety Report - Fall Hazard - Handrail' at a cost of $1,937.00 (excluding GST).
• [9] There was also the following motion, which proposed works referred to as the Switchboard Works:

38. Safety report - switchboard upgrade: > > 38.1. Safety Report - Switchboard Upgrade: > > Moved that the body corporate approves Ehlerth Electrical to upgrade the switchboard as identified in the 2022 Safety Report for an amount of $21,344.49 including GST as per their quotation number #9045 dated 17 November 2023 with the costs for the work to be paid from funds currently held in the sinking fund.

• [10] The applicant voted against all motions proposing the Switchboard Works and the Apollo Works. As the applicant is the owner of the majority of the lots in the scheme, those motions failed to pass by ordinary resolution at the December 2023 AGM.

• [11] On 19 April 2024, the committee passed resolutions that approved the Apollo Works and the Switchboard Works. These are the disputed decisions of the committee, referred to as the April Decisions.

• [12] The applicant takes issue with the committee's April Decisions arguing they were invalid or unreasonable. The applicant seeks the following final orders:

(i) A declaration that the [Switchboard Works] and/or the [Apollo Works] were not validly authorised by the Body Corporate;

(ii) A declaration that the Committee of the Body Corporate failed to act reasonably in accordance with section 100(5) of the BCCMA in making the [April Decisions] and proceeding with the [Switchboard Works];

(iii) A declaration that the [April Decisions] of the Committee of the Body Corporate to proceed with the [Switchboard Works] and/or the [Apollo Works] was a decision on a restricted issue within the meaning of section 44(1)(d) of the Accommodation Module;

(iv) That within three (3) months of the date of this order, the Committee reinstate the Switchboard Area to the condition that it was in before the Committee commenced the [Switchboard Works] (Reinstatement Works);

(v) A declaration that the Committee members who decided to proceed with or took steps in furtherance of the [Switchboard Works] acted in Bad Faith;

(vi) A declaration that the Committee members who decided to proceed with or took steps in furtherance of the [Switchboard Works] acted negligently;

(vii) That the Body Corporate should take all reasonable steps to recover from the Committee members who decided to proceed with or took steps in furtherance of the [Switchboard Works] the following:

• (A) Any Unapproved Costs paid by the Body Corporate;
• (B) Reinstatement Costs;

(viii) That the Committee members who decided to proceed with or took steps in furtherance of the [Switchboard Works] are liable to the Applicant for loss as follows (still to be quantified):-

• (A) The Applicant's legal fees;
• (B) bookings that were cancelled as a result of the Loss of Electricity; and
• (C) compensation that he had to pay to occupiers of his Lots as a result of the Loss of Electricity;

(ix) Pursuant to section 270(1)(b) of the BCCMA, that the Adjudicator should dismiss the request for the final order sought in paragraph 26(b)(vii) of the application so that the claim can be made in a court of competent jurisdiction as against the Committee members and the Body Corporate Manager;

(x) Pursuant to section 16 of Schedule 5 of the BCCMA, an order that the Body Corporate Manager comply with the terms of her engagement, particularly as it relates to the Code of Conduct; and

(xi) such other orders as the Adjudicator deems appropriate.

• [13] The applicant sought interim orders that the body corporate cease any works subject of the committee's April Decisions, and that the body corporate be restrained from paying any contractor that may have completed any works. The applicant also sought interim orders that they be provided with various documents to help them understand the nature and extent of the works that have taken place.
• [14] I dismissed the application for interim orders as I found that (on my preliminary view):
  1. The applicant showed little prospect of success in obtaining final orders.
  2. Many of the orders sought impact individual committee members and the body corporate manager who are not named respondents.
  3. Part of the works were already completed with contractors paid.[1]
  4. The balance of convenience did not justify relief where the decisions to undertake the remaining outstanding works appear to be validly authorised by the body corporate, have been identified as requiring maintenance in an expert report, and failure to complete the works may have impacted the body corporate's insurance.
  5. The body corporate had provided reasonable access to the records, and the order to provide the applicant with copies of the records is not interim in nature.

• [15] For this application for final orders, the applicants argue that in the interim decision I made an incorrect finding of fact that the committee's spending limit at the scheme was $25,000. They submit that the committee spending limit was reduced via an extraordinary general meeting in 2023 and is currently $4,800.
• [16] Submissions opposing the application were received from the committee on behalf of the body corporate, as well as the co-owners of two lots who are committee members (Opposing Owners). The body corporate's submissions were prepared by a solicitor, whose costs were personally incurred by the Opposing Owners as there is $1,000 limit on the legal costs the committee may incur.[2]

• [17] The applicant argues the April Decisions were invalid as:
  1. Proposals to proceed with the same works were defeated at the December 2023 AGM.
  2. The Switchboard Works and the Apollo Works are a restricted issue for the committee.
  3. The committee acted unreasonably.
  4. The expense was not provided for in the sinking fund budget.

• [18] The applicant brings this application in their capacity as a lot owner. The named respondent is the body corporate. The applicant has not listed any other respondents.
• [19] Several of the orders the applicant seeks are against persons in their capacity as committee members and the body corporate manager (or, rather, an employee of the body corporate manager). In the interests of natural justice, I do not find it appropriate to seek orders against persons who are not named respondents.
• [20] Further, the Act relevantly defines a respondent to be a "person against whom the application is made"[3] which can only be the person against whose interests an order is sought. Section 227(2) of the Act clearly implies that the respondent is the other of the two parties to a 'dispute' as defined in section 227(1), other than applicant. If another party is not thereby named as being involved in the dispute, then the applicant has no dispute within jurisdiction for an adjudicator's order, under section 276 of the Act. In other words, the adjudication process is clearly premised on the applicant naming, as a respondent, each person against whom they seek an order to be made to resolve a dispute. Further, an application must be made in the 'approved form'[4] and the content of the approved form, BCCM Form 15, must provide for naming the respondent.[5] Then, when read with the accompanying guide, the form describes the respondent with reference to the combination of parties permitted in section 227(1).[6] Therefore, an application is not made in the approved form if it does not name, as a respondent, a person against whom an order is sought. Other provisions of the Act also clearly require a person against whom an order is to be made to be named as a respondent, so that, for example, they be given notice of the order.[7]
• [21] All requested orders relevant to persons not named as a respondent will therefore be dismissed.[8]

• [22] The body corporate argues that the application should be dismissed as it has been lodged out of time. Section 242 of the Act provides that an application seeking for a resolution of the body corporate to be declared void must be made within 3 months of the resolution passing. Part of the application is seeking to invalidate the April Decisions and was lodged approximately one month out of time.
• [23] I may waive non-compliance with the timeframe for good reason.[9] The objects of the Act suggest a strict view should not be taken regarding having a good reason for waiving non-compliance, however the onus is on the applicant to satisfy me that the time limit should be waived in the circumstances.[10]
• [24] The applicant says compliance with the time limit should be waived as:
  1. The delay is only one month.
  2. The applicant was not aware the body corporate would proceed with the disputed works in circumstances where the applicant notified the committee that they believed the April Decisions were invalid.
  3. The applicant would otherwise be successful in its application.
• [25] The body corporate submits there is no good reason to waive the time limit in circumstances where:
  1. The works subject of the April Decisions have been carried out and contractors paid.
  2. The Switchboard Works were necessary to secure a renewal of the building's insurance.
  3. The applicant has provided no reason to justify the delay.
  4. The body corporate was within its rights to proceed with April Decisions.
• [26] I am not convinced that the applicant has provided good reason to waive compliance with the time limit. However, technically, while the orders sought all relate to voiding the April Decisions, there are several orders sought that go beyond this. Further, there is a clear breakdown in relationship between parties and history of dispute at this scheme. I find there is good reason to waive compliance to explain why the application must still fail, as otherwise it seems the dispute is likely to continue.

Proposals failed to pass by ordinary resolution

• [27] The applicant advances the argument that the committee should not have resolved to proceed with the Switchboard Works or Apollo Works as the same proposals previously failed to pass by ordinary resolution at a general meeting.
• [28] I am not satisfied that a failure of a proposal at a general meeting alone is sufficient basis to render the April Decisions void. Section 106 of the Accommodation Module provides that a resolution without dissent, special resolution, majority resolution or ordinary resolution, once passed may only be revoked or amended by the same resolution type. Where a motion fails to pass by ordinary resolution, it may still be open to the committee to pass a motion to the same effect, so long as the proposal is not otherwise a restricted issue for the committee or unlawful for another reason (such as being unreasonable, which I discuss at paragraph 51).

• [29] The applicant says the April Decisions were restricted issues for the committee pursuant to section 44(1)(d) of the Accommodation Module. This section provides that a decision is a restricted issue for the committee if it may only be made by resolution without dissent, special resolution, majority resolution or ordinary resolution of the body corporate.
• [30] The applicant submits that the Switchboard Works and the Apollo Works may only be approved by ordinary resolution pursuant to section 162 of the Accommodation Module (thus making it a restricted issue), as the proposals involve spending above the relevant limit for committee spending.
• [31] The legislation provides that the relevant limit for committee spending is either:

(a) the amount last set as the relevant limit for committee spending by ordinary resolution of the body corporate at a general meeting; or > > (b) at any time there is no amount set, an amount worked out by multiplying $200 by - > > ... (ii) for another scheme - the number of lots included in the scheme.[11] [emphasis added]

• [32] In the initial application the applicant submitted that the committee's spending limit was $8,000 (which would be the default amount under the legislation for a scheme with 40 lots).[12] However, the applicant has since changed their position.
• [33] It is not disputed that on 30 September 2021 the body corporate passed an ordinary resolution increasing the committee's spending limit to $25,000.
• [34] However, the applicant now says an extraordinary general meeting was held on 24 August 2023 (Purported August EGM), and that a subsequent ordinary resolution was passed reducing the committee spending limit to $4,800 (Alleged Limit).
• [35] The body corporate submits that the decision regarding the Alleged Limit is invalid and not recognised by the body corporate as:
  1. The Purported 2023 EGM was not properly requisitioned or called.[13]
  2. The voting papers and directions to submit votes were invalid where they were directed to be given to someone other than the secretary.[14]
  3. The required quorum of two voters being present was not met where one of the two persons present was not listed as a representative of an owner of a lot on the roll. [15]
• [36] The body corporate submits that the applicant was aware that the Purported 2023 EGM and Alleged Limit were not recognised by the body corporate due to the above. The application includes a letter dated 22 August 2023 from legal representatives of the Opposing Owners to the applicant advising that all other owners, the committee and the body corporate manager would not recognise the Purported 2023 EGM or any alleged resolutions.
• [37] The applicant argues that, if the committee disputed the Purported 2023 EGM, it should have applied for appropriate orders through adjudication. While that may have been prudent, in my view, the onus was on the the applicant to seek orders confirming the validity of the meeting and its purported outcomes, in the circumstances where the applicant intended to rely on resolutions it was aware the body corporate does not acknowledge.
• [38] Ultimately, the onus is on the applicant to prove that they are entitled to the relief they seek, which for this application includes satisfying me that the committee's spending limit is $4,800.
• [39] The applicant has not provided me with evidence or submissions that rebut the body corporate's arguments that there were several defects in the way the meeting was called and conducted. On the material in front of me, I am satisfied those deficiencies exist.
• [40] Technical deviations from the legislation will not necessarily render a decision of the body corporate invalid.[16] However, defective resolutions should not be upheld unless the applicant can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist.[17] Exceptional circumstances may be where the irregularity was trivial and has no material impact, and the irregularity caused no prejudice or disadvantage to other parties.[18] In the circumstances it is difficult to say that this was, in fact, a meeting of the body corporate, or that the other owners were not disadvantaged. The notice had such defect that other owners did not consider it legitimate.
• [41] I am not satisfied that the relevant limit for committee spending is $4,800, nor the applicant's previous submission that it is $8,000. On the material in front of me I am satisfied the relevant limit for committee spending is $25,000.

• [42] Even if I was to accept the applicant's argument that the relevant limit for committee spending is $4,800 (which I do not), none of the costs for the Apollo Works are over this amount. The applicant argues that the Apollo Works should be considered as a series of proposals forming a single project. In those circumstances, section 162(2) of the Accommodation Module provides that any proposal forming part of the project is a restricted issue if the cost of the project as a whole is over the relevant limit.
• [43] I indicated in the interim decision that it would be difficult for the applicant to argue that securing loose fence panels in the pool area forms part of the same project where speed bumps are being installed on the driveway. The applicant has not made further submissions on this point in the final application. I remain unsatisfied that the Apollo Works form one project, and the applicant would fail on this argument even if I accepted $4,800 is the relevant limit for committee spending.

• [44] The applicant submits that it is relevant the Switchboard Works were not provided for in the sinking fund budget. While there may be some circumstances where the spending may not be appropriate due to the budgets, this alone is unlikely to render the decision invalid. It has been held by several adjudicators, and I agree, that that there is nothing in the legislation that prevents a body corporate from proceeding with expenditure on this basis.[19] Budgets are an estimate of anticipated expenses only, they do not operate as a decision either that the anticipated spending is approved or that spending on unbudgeted items is not allowed, and special levies may be raised where there is inadequate provision for the liability.
• [45] Nevertheless, the body corporate has provided evidence of the adopted budget. The costs of the Apollo Works and Switchboard Works are within the budgeted cost items of maintenance and electrical.

• [46] The applicant argues that the committee breached section 100(5) of the Act when making the April Decisions. Section 100(5) of the Act provides that the committee must act reasonably when making a decision.[20] Acting reasonably in decision making involves the body corporate considering the known facts and circumstances that tend to have a rational bearing on the issue and disregarding irrelevant ones.[21] In these matters, an adjudicator's role is to firstly assess the decision-making process and whether the body corporate has failed to consider any relevant factors or relied on irrelevant factors. Importantly, there may be more than one reasonable decision that could be made on the same set of facts.[22]
• [47] The general law also requires that the decision must not be legally unreasonable. A legally unreasonable decision is one that is not conflicted, arbitrary, absurd or plainly unjust.[23] If there is no defect in the decision-making process, then the decision of the body corporate will stand unless I find the outcome of the decision is legally unreasonable.
• [48] The applicant says the conduct of the body corporate was unreasonable as the committee did not:
  1. give an undertaking that it would not act on the April Decisions,
  2. put the applicant on notice that it was relying on the spending limit being $25,000.
• [49] The applicant says that if the body corporate did do those things, the applicant would have made different pleadings in submissions. I do not see how these arguments show that the body corporate acted unreasonably in the April Decisions, which is the matter being determined.
• [50] The application does not expressly articulate arguments showing the committee relied on irrelevant factors or failed to consider relevant factors when making the April Decisions. Rather, the application generally implies the committee acted unreasonably due to the issues I have already found do not apply. For the avoidance of any doubt, I am not satisfied that the committee relied on irrelevant considerations or failed to consider relevant factors based on the arguments already discussed.
• [51] The general sense of the application is that the committee could not have reasonably passed a motion that the majority owner did not agree to. There is nothing to say that the previous vote was not considered by the committee, and I cannot say it is such a relevant consideration that the only outcome would be for the committee to not make the April Decisions in the circumstances. The body corporate is a separate legal entity to the applicant with distinct obligations under the Act - it is not the case that the body corporate automatically acts unreasonably because a majority owner has a different view. This is particularly the case where the works were recommended due to safety risks or required maintenance, and the body corporate must maintain common property in good condition.[24] The Apollo Works were identified in a safety report obtained in 2019 and another in 2022.
• [52] Those same reports indicated the electrical safety switch testing was not up to date. It appears the Switchboard Works went beyond testing and there were installations of safety devices. Without any evidence that this was unnecessary or not the body corporate's responsibility, I cannot say the committee was not reasonably able to decide to proceed with such works.
• [53] I am therefore not satisfied the committee have acted unreasonably or made a legally unreasonable decision in making the April Decisions.

• [54] The applicant seeks for me to dismiss part of their application, where they seek orders that the body corporate take steps to recover certain costs from committee members, to a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction. The order they seek to be dismissed reads:

That the Body Corporate should take all reasonable steps to recover from the Committee members who decided to proceed with or took steps in furtherance of the [Switchboard Works] the following: > > (A) Any Unapproved Costs paid by the Body Corporate; > > (B) Reinstatement Costs;

• [55] With some exceptions,[25] adjudicators have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between certain parties. Where it appears I do not have jurisdiction, I may dismiss the application pursuant to section 270(1)(a) of the Act. On the other hand, where I am satisfied I have jurisdiction and I am satisfied the dispute should be dealt with in a court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction, I may dismiss pursuant to 270(1)(b) of the Act.[26] Generally, other jurisdictions will require such dismissals before hearing the matter (due to exclusivity of jurisdiction). The applicant pursues a dismissal under the second option, 270(1)(b).
• [56] I am satisfied I have jurisdiction over the particular order sought because:
  1. I am satisfied it relates to a dispute within the ordinary meaning, [27]
  2. it is an order against the body corporate sought by a lot owner, which satisfies the correct combination of parties under section 227 of the Act.
  3. it relates to the exercise of powers by the body corporate in deciding to pursue recovery, and the underlying question to that is whether there has been contravention of the Act when the committee decided to proceed with the Switchboard Works. [28]
  4. Taking a narrow reading of the words 'about the recovery', and that the dispute relates to persons acting in their capacity as committee members rather than lot owners, I do not believe section 229A of the Act applies. [29]
• [57] The wording of section 270(1)(b) suggests some discretion may be exercised as to whether it should be delt with in another jurisdiction. It has been said that this would at least require an adjudicator to form the view, on reasonable grounds, that this jurisdiction is inappropriate, or another jurisdiction is substantially better placed, to decide the matter.[30]
• [58] I am not satisfied that this part of the application should be dismissed to a different forum under section 270(2)(b) as:
  1. I find this jurisdiction is appropriate to determine the underlying questions about a contravention of the Act or exercise of powers, and
  2. the applicant has not satisfied me that there has been a contravention of the Act when the committee decided to proceed with the Switchboard Works.

• [59] The body corporate and Opposing Owners seek for me to dismiss the application for being frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or without substance, pursuant to section 270(1)(c) of the Act.
• [60] The applicant says the application should not be dismissed pursuant to section 270(1)(c) of the Act because:
  1. The Switchboard Works and the Apollo Works 'grossly exceeded' the relevant limit for committee spending.
  2. The April Decisions were in conflict with decisions made at the Purported 2023 EGM and December 2023 AGM.
  3. If the committee disputed the outcome of the Purported 2023 EGM and/or the December 2023 AGM, it ought to have applied to the Commissioner's Office for orders that those motions be treated as not carried or carried.
  4. The committee wilfully and deliberately acted contrary to wishes of lot owners, as expressed at the Purported 2023 EGM and December 2023 AGM.
• [61] I am left unconvinced by the applicant's submissions, for reasons already explained.
• [62] I am satisfied the application should be dismissed pursuant to section 270(1)(c) of the Act. It appears to me that this application frivolous, vexatious, misconceived and without substance as:
  1. In the interim decision, I advised it is against the interests of natural justice to seek orders against a party that is not a named respondent. Despite being legally represented and on notice that this is not appropriate, the applicant continued to pursue such orders.
  2. The applicant initially brought the application on the basis that the relevant limit for committee spending was $8,000 despite being aware that the relevant limit for committee spending had been altered, and later changed their position to the spending limit being $4,800. The applicant was also aware that the body corporate does not recognise the alleged resolution that it was relying upon and brought little evidence to justify their position.
  3. Despite being on notice following the interim decision that several arguments were frivolous,[31] the applicant pursued the matter with a largely unchanged application.
• [63] The Opposing Owners have subsequently incurred legal costs in defending themselves and the body corporate from this application.
• [64] Where I dismiss an application under this section, I may order costs (of not more than $2,000) against the applicant to compensate the respondent, the body corporate or an affected person for loss resulting from the application. This may include legal expenses reasonably incurred.[32] When making such a decision, I may have regard to previous applications made by the applicant.[33]
• [65] Having regard to the interim application, the applicant was put on notice that there was little prospect of success based on the current arguments. Yet, they chose to continue with little amendment. I have been provided with evidence of the costs incurred by the Opposing Owners, which exceeds $2,000. I am satisfied they are affected persons.[34] In these circumstances I am satisfied an order for costs against the applicant made in Opposing Owners' favour is just and equitable.

• [66] The applicant has sought several orders against parties who are not named respondents. I have found these should be dismissed on grounds of natural justice.[35] Insofar as the applicant disputes decisions of the committee in proceeding with the Apollo Works and Switchboard Works,[36] I have not been satisfied that these works were beyond the committee's relevant spending limit, nor beyond the committee's powers for any other reason. The applicant has also not satisfied me that the decisions were unreasonable. In these circumstances I was also not satisfied part of the application should be dismissed to a different court or tribunal.[37] The application must fail.
• [67] I have found the application to be frivolous, vexatious and without substance. I am satisfied an order for costs made against the applicant is just and equitable in the circumstances.

[1] I noted that interim orders for contractors to not be paid for works that they have completed raises a natural justice issue. Further that section 310 of the Act may apply. No relevant arguments were raised by the applicant regarding these issues.

[2] This formed part of the dispute in The Wellington Boutique Apartments [2024] QBCCMCmr 423.

[4] Act, s 239(1)(a).

[6] https://www.publications.qld.gov.au/dataset/adjudication-application/resource/77f393d1-5fd3-47ec-b79a-4d4c935b57d2

[8] Sought orders marked (v), (vi) (viii).

[9] Act, s242(2)(b).

[10] Weeks v Commissioner for Body Corporate, 20 September 1999, (Unreported) [5].

[11] Accommodation Module, Schedule 1 Dictionary, definition of 'relevant limit for committee spending'.

[12] Paragraph 38(a)(i) of the application.

[13] The meeting should be called by the secretary (or in the secretary's absence, the chairperson) pursuant to section 74 of the Accommodation Module .

[14] Accommodation Module s 95(1)(b); Van Deurse v Q1 Management Pty Ltd [2017] QCATA 113 at [91-93]; Whitsunday Waters Resort [2020] QBCCMCmr 84; Although I note legislative amendment Accommodation Module s 211 since these decisions.

[15] Accommodation Module, ss 89(5), 91.

[16] Carroll & Ors v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 [2013] QCATA 21, at [22-23]; Wei-Xin Chen v Body Corporate for Wishart Village CTS 19482 (QDC, unreported, Bolton, 4080-2000, 29 May 2001) at [27].

[17] Finger v Dickie [2015] QCATA 113 at [10].

[18] Finger v Dickie [2015] QCATA 113 at [10] citing Carroll & Ors v Body Corporate for Palm Springs Residences CTS 29467 [2013] QCATA 21.

[19] See, for example, Parkwood Villas [2010] QBCCMCmr 52; Evolution Apartments [2019] QBCCMCmr 647 at [34-38]; Pier One Hervey Bay [2018] QBCCMCmr 238 at [12-13]; Surfair Central Tower [2020] QBCCMCmr 131 at [29-31].

[20] This is also a requirement under the general law, see Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [34].

[21] Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [42].

[22] Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [47] citing Woden Valley Glass v Psaila ( 1993) 122 ALR 378, 391.

[23] Body Corporate For Beaches Surfers Paradise v Backshall [2016] QCATA 177 at [34].

[24] Accommodation Module, s 170(1).

[25] See, for example, Act, ss 229(2), 229A.

[26] Enderley Gardens [2024] QBCCMCmr 60 at [15]; Victoria Square [2024] QBCCMCmr 387 at [62].

[27] Walden v Broadwater Tower Body Corporate [2015] QCATA 28 at [23].

[28] Act, s 276; Crown Towers [2024] QBCCMCmr 95 at [7]- [9].

[29] 11 Joseph' CTS 33588 v Desarrollo Pty Ltd ATF The Cove Trust 1 and anor [2022] QCATA 41 at [49]; Q1 [2010] QBCCMCmr 433.

[30] Victoria Square [2024] QBCCMCmr 387 at [62].

[31] For example, that the Apollo Works were unlikely to be considered a single project.

[34] Act, Sch 6, definition of affected person.

[35] Sought orders marked (v), (vi) (viii).

[36] Sought orders (i), (ii), (iii), (iv).

[37] Sought order (ix) relating to (vii).