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austlii:qld/QBCCMCmr/2026/33
General information, not legal advice.
QBCCMCmr
2026-02-12
Original judgment source is linked above.
The Village Chancellor Park [2026] QBCCMCmr 33
The Body Corporate for The Village Chancellor Park (respondent)
Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (Act), sections 227(1)(b) and 229(3)(a)
Body Corporate and Community Management (Accommodation Module) Regulation 2020 (Accommodation Module)
INTERIM ORDER - whether an interim order that the body corporate not recover an alleged debt for electricity is justified - whether an interim order that the body corporate not permit a committee member to liaise with the applicants is justified.
[1] While on paper this application appears to be between the owners of a lot and the body corporate, it is not so clear-cut. The applicant lot owners are also the representatives of the caretaking and letting service contractor, Thompson & He Group Pty Ltd.
[2] The application emerges in the context of a deteriorating relationship between the applicants and the committee, fuelled by disagreements over the performance of the caretaking service contractor agreement.
[3] The final orders sought raise the topics of electricity costs, remedial action notices issued to the caretaker, maintenance obligations, actions of committee members and the payment of third party contractor invoices.
[4] Here, I am deciding whether interim orders are warranted. The applicants seek orders that, until the dispute is finally determined, the body corporate must not:
[5] I have made an interim order related to the electricity charges as, on my preliminary review:
[6] I have dismissed the rest of the application for interim orders as, on my preliminary review:
[7] I have not determined whether there is a prima facie case related to the other final orders, as they were not directly relevant to the interim relief. However, on a quick review, some of the final orders sought are at risk of being outside of an adjudicator's jurisdiction.
[8] Ultimately, it seems both parties are attempting to deal with two very complicated and circumstance-dependent issues - being electricity billing and caretaking agreements - with little legal or expert guidance. There is a reason why there are various professionals who specialise in electricity billing services and caretaking disputes within bodies corporate. The potential consequences for both parties are not insignificant, and I would encourage both parties to seek guidance from relevant professionals.
[9] The scheme is a building format plan subdivision (BFP) of 63 lots and common property. The community management statement shows the Accommodation Module applies.
[10] There is a caretaking service contractor engaged at the scheme, Thompson & He Group Pty Ltd (Caretaker). It is not disputed that the applicants, who are lot owners, are the agents of the Caretaker.
[11] The relationship between the parties appears to have declined primarily due to the alleged non-performance of the caretaking service contractor agreement and differing views on the responsibilities the Caretaker is required to fulfil.
[12] For instance, the body corporate currently interprets the Caretaker's duties to include maintaining the chemical balance of the pool. It is alleged by the body corporate that the applicants were engaging third-party contractors to perform these services, which in itself is not an issue. However, the applicants were allegedly instructing these contractors to invoice the body corporate directly. The body corporate contends that it already remunerates the Caretaker for this work and believes it is the Caretaker's responsibility to cover these invoices.
[13] The body corporate has also issued remedial action notice (RAN) against the Caretaker, for various reasons. Non-compliance with a RAN by the Caretaker can result in termination of the agreement,[1] so this is obviously a concern to the applicants.
[14] The body corporate's committee has also decided to change the way electricity is charged to lot owners at the scheme, by setting a rate based on the number of bedrooms in a lot and the use of the lot. This has resulted in a significant increase in electricity costs to the applicants.
[15] It is not apparent that either party has sought legal advice on any of these issues.
[16] The final orders the applicants seek, which are not being determined at this time, are extensive. I will not repeat them in their entirety. In summary, the applicants seek orders that:
[17] The interim orders that the applicants seek, which are being determined at this time, are also extensive. In summary, the applicants seek interim orders that, until the matter is finally determined:
[18] Interim orders may be made without submissions from the respondent. In the circumstances and in the interest of natural justice, I invited submissions from the respondent on the interim application. I have considered those submissions.
[19] The applicants submitted further materials without invitation.
[20] Interim orders are temporary measures put in place to maintain the status quo until a final decision can be made. The main purpose is to preserve a party's rights or interest, usually by preventing a party from taking certain actions.
[21] The ability for an adjudicator to issue an interim order is provided for in the legislation. An adjudicator can make such an order where satisfied, on reasonable grounds, that the order is necessary due to the nature or urgency of the circumstances.[2] Adjudicators often follow the test applied by courts in interlocutory applications. The test requires the adjudicator to be satisfied of two key points:
[22] While I am not determining the final orders sought, determining whether there is a genuine legal issue at the interim stage requires some consideration of them.
[23] It is the applicants' responsibility to show there is a prima facie case to justify the relief they seek. This does not mean the applicants need to prove that they are more likely than not to succeed in obtaining final orders. Instead, this means they must show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the interim orders pending a final determination of the matter.[4] How strong the possibility of success that is needed depends upon the nature of the rights the applicant asserts, and the consequences of the order sought.[5]
3.1.1. Final orders relating to electricity charges
[24] The applicants seek a final order that an alleged debt for electricity be deemed unlawful or invalid, as well as an order around not seeking payments of similar debts in the future.
[25] The material before me suggests the committee has decided to charge lot owners a set amount for electricity based on:
[26] The applicants say decision has increased their electricity charges significantly and they are aggrieved.
[27] Whether an adjudicator has jurisdiction to determine this aspect of the dispute may be questioned. An adjudicator will not have jurisdiction where the matter is a debt dispute, or a related dispute.[6] Narrower interpretations of the definition of a debt dispute under the Act support the conclusion that disputes about whether a debt is payable remain within an adjudicator's purview.[7] On my preliminary review, I am currently satisfied I may determine this aspect of the dispute.
[28] Notably, the body corporate is agreeable to the interim order relating to the electricity charges. Nevertheless, I will make some preliminary comments on the body corporate's current approach.
[29] The difficulty with electricity billing is that there are different ways a network may be physically and legally set up in a body corporate, which can then impact how the billing is to be handled.
[30] The applicants rely on section 196 of the Act. This section is entitled "utility services not separately charged for". However, the heading suggests a potentially wider application than is accurate. It provides way that electricity may be supplied and billed in certain circumstances. Things that will impact whether section 196 applies includes whether there is an embedded network, whether the body corporate buys the electricity from the grid and then sells it to lots, or whether the utility service provider is the supplier directly to lots, whether the body corporate has an arrangement to take on the liability for the service to lots, and whether there are meters. Importantly, there are other sections of the Act and Accommodation Module that are also relevant to electricity supply and billing. There is also section 195 and 158 of the Act, as well as section 200 of the Accommodation Module.[8]
[31] There are also several pieces of legislation that may impact the process, and different bodies at different levels of government that may regulate how electricity should be supplied and billed. For example, if the setup is considered an embedded network, generally the body corporate would need to be registered with the Energy & Water Ombudsman in Queensland and comply with various regulations, including billing requirements. Commonly, bodies corporate appoint an embedded network manager to assist.
[32] Currently, I have very little information about the scheme's electricity network and how supply is arranged. I cannot be sure that section 196 applies. However, on my preliminary review of the materials currently available to me, the body corporate's approach of deciding a set fee for owners to each pay, which varies by number of bedrooms within the lot, whether there is air-conditioning, and how the lot is used, does not seem to be clearly in-line with any possible relevant sections of the Act or Accommodation Module. I am therefore currently satisfied there is a prima facie case for challenging these charges.
[33] I will caution the body corporate that the final orders may not require me to determine what is the correct way for the body corporate to recover electricity costs. I may only need to find that the current approach is not appropriate to justify the order. Therefore, the body corporate may be well advised to seek expert and/or legal advice as to whether its current approach is a desirable, appropriate or indeed a lawful way for the body corporate to conduct its billing for electricity usage.
3.1.2. Final orders relating to a committee member
[34] I am not currently satisfied there is a prima facie case for orders that seek the removal of a committee member, and other orders relating to how they are to communicate with the applicants.
[35] It appears that this committee member is the body corporate's appointed "nominee" for liaising with the Caretaker under the caretaking service agreement.
[36] This is not an application where this particular committee member is named as a respondent. It would be against the principles of natural justice to make an order against someone who is not a respondent.
[37] To the extent that certain orders are phrased as "the body corporate must ensure" that the individual's conduct aligns with a specific standard, this appears to be little more than a subtle attempt to impose an order on that individual, which is not appropriate.
[38] The remaining final orders, of which there are several, appear to not be directly related to the interim relief.
[39] At this juncture, I will only caution the applicants that, on a very quick review, several of these orders appear to be at risk of being outside of the jurisdiction of an adjudicator,[9] or may not be related to a current dispute as defined in the Act, or the applicants may not have standing to seek such orders,[10] or the orders may simply not be justified for being of little utility.
[40] I am currently satisfied that there is a prima facie case in relation to the alleged electricity debt.
[41] Though, before granting an interim order, I must balance the inconvenience to the respondent body corporate if I were to grant the interim relief now, in the knowledge that final orders might ultimately be refused, against the inconvenience to the applicant if I were to not grant relief now, in the knowledge that final orders might ultimately be granted.[11]
[42] I am satisfied the balance justifies the interim order, as the recovery of the alleged debt could incur additional costs and financial loss that may be unjustified. It is not clear to me if the body corporate treats these charges as a body corporate debt,[12] or as a contribution that may incur penalty interest or recovery costs,[13] but if it does, such an alleged debt can impact various rights, including voting rights, of the applicants.[14] The body corporate says it is agreeable to the interim order sought. There is no obvious disadvantage to the body corporate, other than a delay in recovering the funds if they are justified.
[43] The application appears to stem from a breakdown in the relationship between the applicants and the committee, primarily concerning the caretaking service contractor agreement involving the applicants. A breakdown in relationship can manifest in multiple connected disputes, which appears to be the case here.
[45] What is clear is that the topics argued in the application are not straight forward, can be legally complex, and are highly dependent on the unique circumstances. It does not appear that either party has sought legal advice relating to caretaking agreements, maintenance obligations or electricity billing issues.
[46] At this interim stage, I am only currently satisfied there is a prima facie case raised in relation to the electricity billing, and that the circumstances justify interim relief. I will make an order in relation to this.
[47] The request for the other interim order must fail as I am not currently satisfied there is a prima facie case for the relevant final order.
[3] SDW2 Pty. Ltd. V JLF Corporation Pty Ltd [2017] QSC 1 at [21].
[4] Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at [622-623].
[5] Australian Broadcasting Corp v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, at [65], [19].
[7] 11 Joseph' CTS 33588 v Desarrollo Pty Ltd ATF The Cove Trust 1 and anor [ 2022] QCATA 41.
[8] The application of the then-equivalent of section 200 of the Accommodation Module has also been considered by the Supreme Court in Henderson & Anor v The Body Corporate for Merrimac Heights [2011] QSC 336.
[9] See Act ss 149B, 270, 229A, and definition of 'contractual matter' in Sch 6.
[10] See: Act, ss 227, 238; Somerset Gardens [2025] QBCCMCmr 297.
[11] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] citing Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618 at [5].
[12] For a definition, see Accommodation Module, Sch 4.
[14] See, for example, Accommodation Module ss 11, 18, 56, 92.
[15] Act, definition of 'contractual matter' Sch 6.
(1968) 118 CLR 618
(2006) 227 CLR 57