[2023] WASC 83
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2023-03-21
Derrick J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Having decided that the respondent is a high-risk serious offender it is necessary to determine whether he should be detained pursuant to a continuing detention order or released into the community pursuant to a supervision order. Before I can make a supervision order I must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent would substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order and that the totality of the conditions would provide adequate protection of the community against the risk that the respondent would commit a serious offence. The respondent bears the onus of establishing that he would substantially comply with the standard conditions.
In this case, the State accepts that a supervision order would be appropriate because the risk of reoffending can be adequately managed in the community. However, that concession is subject to the availability of suitable accommodation. That conclusion is supported by the evidence of Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Yewers.
I take into account that the respondent is now aged 78 and has spent over 10 years in prison. To impose a continuing detention order on a man of the respondent's advanced years is a significant matter because it deprives him of his liberty in circumstances where his remaining life must be comparatively short and because his ability to adjust to a life in the community will be more difficult as he further ages. However, there are a number of factors that weigh against a supervision order. These include the respondent's stance of denial, the failure of past treatment, his unmet treatment needs and the lack of accommodation. I accept that the first three factors may be capable of being addressed by suitably restrictive conditions on a supervision order. However, the unavailability of suitable accommodation is a critical factor that stands in the way of release on a supervision order. It would be impossible for the respondent to substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order in the absence of permanent suitable accommodation.
The significance of depriving a person of their liberty, not for something that they have done but for something that they may do, is such that the risk must be regularly reassessed. That factor also requires that every reasonable effort be made to ensure that the respondent has his treatment needs assessed and that options for release are explored, so that the chances of him being released at the next review date are optimised.
At the hearing it was apparent that the principal impediment to the respondent's release was the unavailability of suitable accommodation. One of the factors that limits the respondent's options in this regard is his advanced age. That, of course, is not a problem that will decrease in the future; indeed it emphasises the need for some degree of urgency in exploring possible options. I accept that Ms Serrano and Uniting WA have expended significant effort in this regard. However, it was apparent from the hearing that other options may be available. It was also apparent that there may be some benefit in psychological counselling, if not to reduce risk, at least in assisting the respondent to formulate viable plans for release and develop skills relevant to compliance with a supervision order.
There is a risk that once a detention order has been made the prison authorities will default to treating the respondent as if he is simply another prisoner serving a sentence. A person detained under the HRSO Act is not a prisoner and should not be treated as such. One of the reasons such a person is detained is to receive treatment. In my view, every effort should be made to ensure that the following things are done before the next review;
Relevant statutory provisions and applicable legal principles
As will emerge from the outline below of the statutory framework under the DSO Act and [the Act], the concepts and criteria with which the court is concerned in determining an application of this kind are substantially the same under both statutes. Although I have reached that view on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the provisions of both statutes, having regard to the context of the provisions within the statutes and the objects underlying the statutes, the construction is confirmed, in my opinion, by the second reading speech made to the Legislative Assembly in respect of the High Risk Offenders Bill 2019 by the Honourable Attorney General. The Attorney informed the House that the bill was intended to 'extend the Supreme Court's ability to make a continuing detention order or supervision order to serious violent offenders in the same manner as the provisions contained in the [DSO Act]'. He went on to say:
'In doing so, this bill fully preserves the provisions that apply in respect of dangerous sexual offenders in the [DSO Act].'
Whether or not that has been achieved remains to be seen upon analysis of the provisions. However, in my opinion, as the concepts and criteria in both statutes are substantially the same, the jurisprudence established in respect of the DSO Act remains relevant in construing and applying [the Act], with appropriate adaptation in cases involving non-sexual offences.
The purpose of this Part is to ensure that an offender's detention under a continuing detention order is regularly reviewed.[18]
Review of detention under continuing detention order
(1) On a review under section 66 of an offender's detention -
(a) if the court does not find that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must rescind the continuing detention order; or
(b) if the court finds that the offender remains a high risk serious offender it must -
(i) affirm the continuing detention order; or
(ii) subject to section 29, rescind the continuing detention order and make a supervision order.
(2) In deciding whether to make an order under subsection (1)(b)(i) or (ii), the paramount consideration is to be the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community.
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The [DSO Act] does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the [DSO Act] applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk. If, after considering all the evidence, the court is left in doubt as to whether the conditions of a supervision order would adequately protect the community, because the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the court must expressly decline to rescind the continuing detention order.
(a) any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
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> (b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
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> (c) information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
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> (d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
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> (e) any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
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> (f) whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
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> (g) the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
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> (h) the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
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> (i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
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> (j) any other relevant matter.
(1) A court cannot make, affirm or amend a supervision order in relation to an offender unless it is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the offender will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the order as made, affirmed or amended.
(2) The onus of proof as to the matter described in subsection (1) is on the offender.
The clear intention of the review process is to allow for the possibility of a change of circumstances. Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious sexual offending from being realised. If circumstances change such that the risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
The justification for making a detention order is the existence of an unacceptable risk of serious sexual offending that cannot be adequately controlled by conditional release. However, detention also serves the purpose of allowing treatment and care in a secure environment: s 17 DSO Act. This confirms an obligation on the part of the prison authorities to facilitate change by offering programs and access to counselling.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions then the need for detention may dissipate. In these circumstances continuing detention may be unjust.
The review process is intended to ensure that detention only continues where necessary. It mitigates the otherwise potentially draconian effect of imprisoning people for crimes that they have not committed. Reviews are not, therefore, merely a welfare check, rather they are an exercise of judicial power to affirm, vary or rescind a detention order. Continuing detention should not be ordered unless that course is justified by the circumstances existing at the time of the review. The court should choose the order that is least invasive of the person's right to be at liberty, whilst ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community.
The respondent's personal circumstances and antecedents - s 7(3)(g)[38]
The respondent's history of offending - s 7(3)(g)[39]
Efforts by offender to address causes of offending behaviour including participation in rehabilitation programmes - s 7(3)(e) and s 7(3)(f)
A Desktop Spatial Analysis was conducted ... on 24/02/2023. One of the findings was that there are four convicted sexual offenders currently residing at the [proposed accommodation].
Information previously provided by COMU was that there was one sexual offender who is managed under [the Act] already living at the property. COMU has subsequently advised that this individual is compliant with his Order conditions and relatively stable. He is a 70-year-old man who served a custodial sentence at Acacia Prison, overlapping with [the respondent's] imprisonment between 2017 and 2022. The degree that they are known to each other is unclear.
Information pertaining to the remaining three individuals is sparse. However, it is known that they all have convictions for contact or non-contact child sexual offences. One of these individuals was briefly located at Hakea Prison at the same time as [the respondent] in 2011, however it is not known if they are acquainted.
... Concerns appear to relate to the potential for [the respondent's] contact with these persons to escalate to a situation whereby he sexually reoffends.
It is my opinion that [the respondent] is unlikely to engage in discussion with others regarding either his offending or sexual interests. He denies and minimises much of his offending and presents himself as haplessly falling into criminal behaviours in carrying out a caregiving role. It is therefore also unlikely that he will actively connive with other sexual offenders to reoffend. Further, given his offending profile also includes meeting his emotional and intimacy needs via children, he is most likely to offend in the context of having developed a relationship with a potential victim.
[The respondent's] residence with other sexual offenders is less than ideal and may create practical issues in managing the consorting-related conditions of his Order. However, from a risk perspective, it is my view that, based on the available information, there are currently no obvious or imminent risk issues with [the respondent] sharing lodgings with these persons. Notwithstanding, [the respondent's] contact and interactions with these individuals should be well monitored and, where possible, kept to a minimum.
The recommendations for [the respondent's] management set out in my earlier report, dated 28/12/2022, apply to this situation. His adult relationships should be scrutinised for the potential for him to have contact with children and to develop relationships with them. His living circumstances can be addressed with him by his [senior CCO] and/or psychologist, framed as a risk scenario that he should be coached to navigate.
Other assessments of the respondent not undertaken specifically for the purposes of the application - s 7(3)(b)
Other assessments of the respondent undertaken specifically for the purposes of the application - s 7(3)(b)
Propensity to commit serious offences in the future - s 7(3)(c)
Pattern of offending behaviour - s 7(3)(d)
Risk of committing serious offences if not subject to a restriction order - s 7(3)(h)
The need to protect the community - s 7(3)(i)
Any other relevant matters - s 7(3)(j)
Does the respondent remain a high risk serious offender?
The purpose of a legislative regime, such as the DPSO Act or the HRSO Act, is discernibly distinct from the imposition of retribution or deterrence pursued by the criminal law. To the extent that detention or supervised release is part of the legislative regime, the character of the curtailment of the liberty of the individual offender under the regime can be seen to be protective rather than punitive because any curtailment of liberty must be supported by the risk evaluation contemplated by s 7 of the HRSO Act. In that evaluation, considerations of retribution and deterrence, central to sentencing by way of punishment under the common law, have no part to play. In addition, any curtailment of liberty must be no greater than is necessary adequately to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community...
ANNEXURE A STANDARD CONDITIONS REQUIRED BY THE ACT
('Contact' under this condition and the following two conditions means any form of interaction or communication whether by word, gesture, expression or touch and whether in person, in writing, by telephonic or electronic means, but does not include the bare minimum of interaction or communication necessary between an adult and child to promptly and civilly terminate any inadvertent or uninvited interaction or communication);
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
Research Associate to the Honourable Justice Derrick
[1] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 78.
[2] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [2021] WASC 444 (The State of Western Australia v Woodward).
[3] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [4], [85].
[4] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [93].
[5] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [86] - [88].
[6] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [90] - [92].
[8] Exhibit 1, vol 3, 666. Dr Yewers is a 'qualified expert' as defined in s 3 of the Act. Her report was prepared and obtained pursuant to s 67(1) of the Act in accordance with s 74 of the Act.
[16] The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [2020] WASC 330 [30] ‑ [31].
[17] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [2022] HCA 30 [55], [103], [104], [106].
[18] The respondent is an 'offender' for the purposes of the relevant provisions of the Act: Act, definition of 'offender' and 'serious offender under restriction' in s 3.
[21] Any further references to a 'serious offence' or to 'serious offences' should be read as references to a serious offence or serious offences as defined in the Act.
[22] The State of Western Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93 [28] - [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [44].
[23] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [72].
[25] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [2019] WASC 427 [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[26] The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [24]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [47].
[27] Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [46]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [2018] WASC 344 [12]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 40 [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226].
[28] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [227]. As Quinlan CJ recognised in The State of Western Australia v D'Rozario [No 3] [2021] WASC 412 [21] there may be rare situations in which a court will find that it is not necessary to make a restriction order notwithstanding a finding that the offender poses an 'unacceptable risk', for example, where other external restraints (such as a post-sentence supervision order under the Sentence Administration Act 2003 (WA)) are sufficient to ensure adequate protection of the community from the risk.
[29] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; (2007) 35 WAR 297 [63]; GBT v The State of Western Australia [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [22]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [45]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [73], [226] - [227], [279]
[30] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [84].
[31] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [63] ‑ [64]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14]; The State of Western Australia v Newland [21]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [51]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [106].
[32] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v DAL [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. Also adopted in The State of Western Australia v Narkle [2019] WASC 404 [13] and The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [26].
[33] The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [24]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 5] [2022] WASC 61 [56]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [85], [229] - [230].
[34] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [102], [231].
[35] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52]; The State of Western Australia v West [No 6] [29]; The State of Western Australia v ZSJ [56] ‑ [58]; The State of Western Australia v Patrick [No 4] [2020] WASC 48 [109]-[111].
[36] The State of Western Australia v ACJ [2021] WASC 219 [416]; Garlett v The State of Western Australia [103] - [104], [233].
[37] The State of Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen also known as Paul Alan Francis Deverell [No 5] [2019] WASC 359 [7] ‑ [11].
[38] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what was written by Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Woodward [41] - [49] updated to take account of the contents of the psychological report prepared by Dr Yewers (exhibit 1, vol 3, 666, par 16 - 22) and the Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 2, 8 - 9).
[39] This section of my reasons substantially reproduces what was written by Hall J in The State of Western Australia v Woodward [6], [28] - [39].
[40] Proposed High Risk Serious Offender Management Plan prepared by Dr Dylan Galloghly dated 28 June 2021 (exhibit 1, vol 2, 578, par 18); Community Sex Offender Treatment Completion Report dated 7 May 2006 (exhibit 1, vol 3, 663); High Risk Serious Offender Report prepared by Dr Ewers dated 24 June 2021 (exhibit 1, vol 2, 589, par 53 - 58).
[41] FPIT Treatment Progress Report prepared by Mr Summerton (exhibit 1, vol 3, 686); Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 2, 2).
[47] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [50] - [61].
[48] The State of Western Australia v Woodward [85].
[52] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [178].
[53] Psychological report prepared by Dr Yewers (exhibit 1, vol 3, 672 - 673, par 37 - 39); Community Supervision Assessment Report prepared by Ms Serrano (exhibit 2, 4).
[60] Garlett v The State of Western Australia [55].
[61] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [62].
[63] The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [2019] WASC 463 [147].
[64] The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [148] - [149]; The State of Western Australia v JXK [No 3] [2023] WASC 23 [184].
(2008) 38 WAR 307
(2007) 35 WAR 297