[2022] WASC 298
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2022-09-12
Solomon J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) whether Ms Underwood is a high risk serious offender, within the meaning of the HRSO Act; and
(b) if so, whether she should be detained in custody for an indefinite term of control, care or treatment (continuing detention order), or released into the community subject to conditions the court considers appropriate (supervision order).
The evidence reveals that Ms Underwood has a long history of offending, including violent offending. While many of the violent offences for which she has been convicted are not classified as 'serious offences' within the meaning of the Act, they nevertheless provide relevant evidence in relation to Ms Underwood's risk generally.
The offence for which she was most recently sentenced was that of doing an act causing bodily harm with intent to cause harm, contrary to s 304(2) of the Criminal Code.
The circumstances of that offence were as follows:
On 20 November 2018 at approximately 6.40 pm, the victim was standing near the loading bay of the Coles supermarket in Galleria Shopping Centre, Morley, when he saw Ms Underwood approaching from the other side of the carpark and yelling at him. The victim told Ms Underwood to go away. Ms Underwood returned to a nearby shopping trolley containing a backpack and retrieved a silver serrated knife from the backpack. The knife was approximately 30 cm long with a sharp, two‑pronged end.
Ms Underwood ran at the victim and began stabbing and slashing him. Ms Underwood and the victim were not known to one another and the attack was entirely unprovoked. The victim eventually managed to grab the knife off Ms Underwood, and Ms Underwood walked away.
The victim received lacerations to his hand, ear, lip, left upper arm, right arm and puncture wounds to his left abdomen and chest. He required significant treatment, including stitches and surgery for his hand and ear. As the learned sentencing judge recognised, the nature of the attack was such that the effect on the victim could have been much worse.
The offence was committed within a week of Ms Underwood having been released from an earlier term of imprisonment for violent offending.
Ms Underwood pleaded guilty and was sentenced on 13 November 2020. It is apparent from the transcript of the hearing and the psychiatric report of Dr Harding that, while Ms Underwood did not seek a trial of issues and accepted that she fell to be sentenced on the basis of the facts stated by the State, she did not accept those facts. Rather, as Dr Harding reported, Ms Underwood maintained that she had been 'defending herself' and that her victim was the brother of a policeman who had arrested her in the past. Other material in evidence before me (such as a pre-sentence report) record that Ms Underwood was suspicious of the victim's behaviour and believed she was being 'set up'. None of Ms Underwood's accounts of the offence appear to have any basis in reality.
Ms Underwood was sentenced to 3 years 2 months imprisonment, backdated to 20 November 2018.
The random nature of the offence committed by Ms Underwood on 20 November 2018 was not an isolated event. Ms Underwood's offending dates back to 1995 and includes unlawful wounding in circumstances of aggravation, acts or omissions causing bodily harm, unlawful act with intent to cause harm, unlawful assault causing bodily harm in circumstances of aggravation, assault of a public officer, armed robbery, criminal damage by fire and indecent assault.[2]
An offender is a high risk serious offender if the court dealing with an application under this Act finds that it is satisfied, by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability, that it is necessary to make a restriction order in relation to the offender to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the offender will commit a serious offence.
(2) The State has the onus of satisfying the court as required by subsection (1).
(3) In considering whether it is satisfied as required by subsection (1), the court must have regard to the following -
(a) any report prepared under section 74 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the offender cooperated in the examination required by that section;
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the offender;
(c) information indicating whether or not the offender has a propensity to commit serious offences in the future;
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour by the offender;
(e) any efforts by the offender to address the cause or causes of the offender's offending behaviour, including whether the offender has participated in any rehabilitation programme;
(f) whether or not the offender's participation in any rehabilitation programme has had a positive effect on the offender;
(g) the offender's antecedents and criminal record;
(h) the risk that, if the offender were not subject to a restriction order, the offender would commit a serious offence;
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk;
(j) any other relevant matter.
Detention under the DSO Act is not a punishment for past offending, rather it is a protective mechanism designed to prevent the risk of future serious ... offending from being realised. If circumstances change or that risk of reoffending reduces or can be better managed in the community, then the continuing need for detention must be considered.
The risk of reoffending may change over time. It may be affected by age, health or the successful completion of treatment. The availability of new technology or resources in the community may also affect whether the risk of reoffending can be managed on a supervision order.
If the risk changes or resources improve to enable more efficacious conditions, then the need for detention may dissipate.[11]
It cannot simply be assumed that the most assured preventative is detention and therefore, the protection of the community will always favour such an order.[12]
The purpose of a legislative regime, such as the DPSO Act or the HRSO Act, is discernibly distinct from the imposition of retribution or deterrence pursued by the criminal law. To the extent that detention or supervised release is part of the legislative regime, the character of the curtailment of the liberty of the individual offender under the regime can be seen to be protective rather than punitive because any curtailment of liberty must be supported by the risk evaluation contemplated by s 7 of the HRSO Act. In that evaluation, considerations of retribution and deterrence, central to sentencing by way of punishment under the common law, have no part to play. In addition, any curtailment of liberty must be no greater than is necessary adequately to protect the community from the demonstrated unacceptable risk of harm to the community. Further, any curtailment of liberty is subject to regular review to ensure that the evaluation of risk and response remains current. Where detention can be justified only by that evaluation and cannot be continued beyond the currency of such an evaluation, the purpose of detention and of the regime under which it is imposed can readily be seen to be distinct from the purpose of punishment.[17]
Other than in what is truly an exceptional case, and other than as an incident of the adjudgment and punishment of criminal guilt, conferral on a court of a function that involves the creation of a liability to detention in custody through an act of adjudication is not simply antithetical to the character of that court as an institution for the administration of justice. Conferral of such a function is antithetical to the very conception of justice which it is the responsibility of courts to administer.[18]
(1) Psychiatric Report of Dr Natalie Pyszora dated 27 April 2022;
(2) Psychological Report of Dr Dylan Galloghly dated 26 April 2022;
(3) Neuropsychological Report of Dr Mandy Vidovich dated 26 April 2022;
(4) Community Supervision Assessment of Emma Cashmore dated 9 May 2022; and
(5) Proposed DSO Management Plan of Dr Ben Bannister dated 4 May 2022.
(a) previous violence;
(b) other antisocial behaviour;
(c) relationships;
(d) employment;
(e) substance use;
(f) major mental disorder;
(g) personality;
(h) traumatic experiences;
(i) violent attitudes; and
(j) treatment or supervision response.[34]
(a) insight;
(b) violent ideation or intent;
(c) symptoms of major mental disorder;
(d) instability; and
(e) treatment or supervision response.[35]
(a) professional services and plans;
(b) living situation;
(c) personal support;
(d) treatment or supervision response; and
(e) stress or coping.[36]
(a) lack of stability in family upbringing;
(b) early violent offending;
(c) juvenile criminal record;
(d) experiencing violence throughout her life; and
(e) history of order violations.[57]
(a) violent lifestyle;
(b) criminal personality traits;
(c) attitudes and associates;
(d) work ethic issues;
(e) interpersonal aggression problems;
(f) violence while in custody;
(g) problems with emotional control;
(h) weapon use (particularly carrying knives);
(i) mental disorder (e.g., Delusional Disorder);
(j) substance use problems;
(k) lack of stability in relationships;
(l) having a violent cycle (i.e., responding to perceived threats while intoxicated);
(m) impulsivity issues;
(n) cognitive distortions (including not taking responsibility for offending); and
(o) poor history of compliance with supervision.[58]
Section 48(2) provides that the paramount consideration in the decision to make a restriction order is the need to ensure adequate protection of the community. At the same time, s 8 makes plain that the objects of the Act are not limited to the protection of the community but include the care or treatment of the offender. It might sometimes be observed that the community's understandable concern for the former object is not matched by its enthusiasm for the latter. That is all the more reason to be reminded that the care and treatment of offenders must also be at the forefront of the application of the statutory regime. The importance of that object is all the more evident given that the Act provides for the detention or curtailment of the liberty of a person who has fully served his or her sentence. The Act reflects a delicate balance between the necessary protection of the community and the rights of an individual offender. That balance will be unjustly skewed if proper attention is not given to the statutory object of the care and treatment of people who come within the reach of the Act.[119]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[1] The State of Western Australia v Underwood [8].
[2] The State of Western Australia v Underwood [2022] WASC 1 [15] - [26].
[3] Cornwall v Attorney-General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 374 [21] (Mason P, Giles and Hodgson JJA) following TSL v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2006] VSCA 199; (2006) 14 VR 109 and Tillman v Attorney-General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 327 (Giles and Ipp JJA).
[4] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; (2008) 38 WAR 307 [28] (Steytler P & Buss JA).
[5] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [34].
[6] Garlett v The State of Western Australia & Anor [2022] HCA 30 [73].
[8] Garlett v The State of Western Australia & Anor [2022] HCA 30 [70] - [75].
[10] Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 [49] (Murray J).
[11] Western Australia v Paul Douglas Allen (aka Paul Alan Francis Deverell) (No 5) [2019] WASC 359
[12] DPP (WA) v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14].
[13] DPP (WA) v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [50] - [52].
[14] State of Western Australia v ACW (No 2) [2020] WASC 480 [30];15 State of Western Australia v Lewis (No 3) [2022] WASC 148 [37].
[16] Garlett v The State of Western Australia & Anor [2022] HCA 30.
[17] Garlett v The State of Western Australia & Anor [2022] HCA 30 [55].
[18] Garlett v The State of Western Australia & Anor [2022] HCA 30 [135].
[25] Transcript, The State of Western Australia v Bianca Marie Underwood, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 25 May 2022, 52.
[30] BoM, 709; Allan A and Dawson D, 'Developing a unique risk of violence tool for Australian Indigenous offenders' (2004) 280 Australian Institute of Criminology; M Gower et al., 'The prediction of recidivism with Aboriginal offenders: A theoretically informed meta-analysis' (2013) Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 55 - 59.
[31] Gower M et al., 'The predictive validity of risk assessment tools used in Australia for female offenders: A systematic review' (2020) Aggression and Violent Behaviour, 53.
[54] Day A et al., 'Assessing violence risk with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander offenders: considerations for forensic practic' (2018) 25(3) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 452 - 464.
[59] BoM, 637; Weizmann-Henelius G et al., 'The PCL-R and violent recidivism in a prospective follow-up of a nationwide sample of female offenders' (2015) 26(5) The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 667 - 685.
[63] BoM, 636; Kennealy P et al., 'Do core interpersonal and affective traits of PCL-R psychopathy interact with antisocial behaviour and disinhibition to predict violence? (2010) 22(3) Psychological assessment, 569; Leistico A M R et al., 'A large-scale meta-analysis relating the Hare measures of psychopathy to antisocial conduct' (2008) 32(1) Law and human behaviour, 28 - 45.
[64] BoM, 636; Nicholls T L et al., 'Psychopathy in women: A review of its clinical usefulness for assessing risk for aggression and criminality' (2005) 23(6) Behavioural sciences & the law, 779 - 802.
[92] Affidavit of Martyn James Clancy-Lowe (sworn 20 May 2022) [7].
[119] The State of Western Australia v Atkinson [No 3] [2022] WASC 231 [82].
(2006) 14 VR 109
(2008) 38 WAR 307