[2020] WASC 96
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of WA
2020-03-25
Smith J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) whether Mr Pickett is a serious danger to the community, within the meaning of the Act; and
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> (b) if so, whether he should be detained in custody for an indefinite term for control, care, or treatment by a detention order, or, alternatively, be released into the community subject to conditions that the court considers appropriate by a supervision order.
The length of time Mr Pickett has been incarcerated since the commission of the index offences
(a) material relating to Mr Pickett's past offending and antecedents prior to June 2000;
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> (b) psychiatric, psychological and pre-sentence reports prepared prior to the sentencing of Mr Pickett in June 2000;
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> (c) post-sentence, psychological and treatment reports prepared whilst Mr Pickett was in custody between 2005 and 2017;
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> (d) offender incidents and occurrences reports;
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> (e) substance use test results reports from 1998 to February 2020;
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> (f) medical progress notes from 1995 to 4 February 2020;
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> (g) psychiatric reports and a pre‑sentence report prepared in 2019 for the Court of Appeal;
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> (h) psychiatric and psychologist reports, together with a neuropsychological assessment report prepared for this div 2 hearing; and
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> (i) proposed DSO management plan and community supervision assessment report.
7. Serious danger to community
(1) Before the court dealing with an application under this Act may find that a person is a serious danger to the community, the court must be satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence.
(2) The DPP has the onus of satisfying the court as described in subsection (1) and the court must be satisfied -
(a) by acceptable and cogent evidence; and
(b) to a high degree of probability.
(3) In deciding whether to find that a person is a serious danger to the community, the court must have regard to -
(a) any report that a psychiatrist prepares as required by section 37 for the hearing of the application and the extent to which the person cooperated when the psychiatrist examined the person; and
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the person; and
(c) information indicating whether or not the person has a propensity to commit serious sexual offences in the future; and
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour on the part of the person; and
(e) any efforts by the person to address the cause or causes of the person's offending behaviour, including whether the person has participated in any rehabilitation program; and
(f) whether or not the person's participation in any rehabilitation program has had a positive effect on the person; and
(g) the person's antecedents and criminal record; and
(h) the risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence; and
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk; and
(j) any other relevant matter.
(4) In considering whether it is satisfied as required in subsection (1), the court must disregard the possibility that the person might temporarily be prevented from committing a serious sexual offence by imprisonment, by remand in custody or by the imposition of bail conditions.
(a) Section 7(1) of the DSO Act provides that before the court may find that a person is a serious danger to the community, it must be satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if the person was not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence. The expression 'serious sexual offence' has the meaning given to that term in s 106A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) (s 3 of the DSO Act).
(b) The DPP carries the onus of satisfying the court about that matter and the court must be satisfied by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability. The expression 'high degree of probability' is incapable of further definition. Clearly, it connotes a standard that is more than the civil standard but less than the criminal standard of proof: Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v GTR [2008] WASCA 187; 38 WAR 307 [28] (Steytler P and Buss JA; and see at [34] for a further elaboration on what the expression means in its application).
(c) In deciding whether to find a person is a serious danger to the community the court must have regard to each of the matters specified in s 7(3) of the DSO Act.
(d) It will necessarily and automatically follow that a person is a serious danger to the community if the court is satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that, if the person was not subject to a continuing detention order or a supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence: DPP v GTR [21].
(e) The term 'unacceptable risk' is not defined in the DSO Act. However, a finding of fact that there is an unacceptable risk is an evaluative and predictive finding of fact involving a balancing exercise in which the court is required, on the one hand, to have regard to, among other things, the nature of the risk (the commission of a sexual offence with serious consequences for the victim) and the likelihood of the risk materialising and on the other hand, the serious consequences for the offender (either detention, without having committed an unpunished offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order) if an order is made: Italiano v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 116 [4] and [46] (Buss JA).
(f) In a passage that expressly approved in DPP v GTR, Wheeler JA stated in Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Williams [2007] WASCA 206; 35 WAR 297 [63] ‑ [64]:
'In my view, an "unacceptable risk" in the context of s 7(1) is a risk which is unacceptable having regard to a variety of considerations which may include the likelihood of the person offending, the type of sexual offence which the person is likely to commit (if that can be predicted) and the consequences of making a finding that an unacceptable risk exists. That is, the judge is required to consider whether, having regard to the likelihood of the person offending and the offence to be committed, the risk of that offending is so unacceptable that, notwithstanding that the person has already been punished for whatever offence they may have actually committed, it is necessary in the interests of the community to ensure that the person is subject to further control or detention.'
(g) The powers conferred by the DSO Act are not to be exercised for the purpose of imposing additional punishment on an offender but rather, for the ultimate purpose of protecting the community. The community will be protected by control continuing to be exercised over the offender; it may also be protected by the provision of care and treatment to the offender while in custody in the hope that the danger posed to the community or sections of it will be reduced: DPP v GTR [97] (Murray AJA).
(h) The court must identify what, if anything, constitutes the risk and factor or factors makes that risk unacceptable and then consider whether or not that factor has, or those factors have, been proved to a high degree of probability by acceptable and cogent evidence: DPP v GTR [34].
(i) The court must make a continuing detention order or a supervision order once it is found that the respondent is a serious danger to the community: Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia [2008] WASCA 188; 38 WAR 217. The paramount consideration in deciding between the orders is the protection of the community. That does not mean that there is a pre-disposition to making a continuing detention order. As Hall J observed in Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Decke [2009] WASC 312, '[i]t cannot simply be assumed that the most assured preventative is detention and therefore, the protection of the community will always favour such an order' [14].
(j) The court should choose the order that is least invasive or destructive of the respondent's right to be at liberty while, at the same time, ensuring an adequate degree of protection of the community: The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235 and Decke.
In choosing between an indefinite detention order or a supervision order, the fact that the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community does not exclude other considerations. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. In considering whether a supervision order would adequately protect the community, account must be taken of conditions which can be placed on a supervision order so as to ensure the adequate protection of the community, the rehabilitation of the respondent and his care and treatment. The Act does not require that there be no risk of reoffending. Such a requirement could never be met and would mean no person to whom the Act applies would ever be released. The question is whether the risk is reduced to a reasonably acceptable level that ensures adequate protection of the community. That requires a weighing of the nature and degree of risk in the context of methods for the management and reduction of that risk.
(a) report to a community corrections officer at the place, and within the time, stated in the order and advise the officer of the person's current name and address; and
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> (b) report to, and receive visits from, a community corrections officer as directed by the court; and
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> (c) notify a community corrections officer of every change of the person's name, place of residence, or place of employment at least 2 days before the change happens; and
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> (d) be under the supervision of a community corrections officer, which includes, comply with any reasonable direction of the officer (including a direction for the purposes of section 19A or 19B); and
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> (e) not leave, or stay out of, the State of Western Australia without the permission of a community corrections officer; and
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> (f) not commit a sexual offence as defined in the Evidence Act 1906 section 36A during the period of the order; and
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> (g) be subject to electronic monitoring under section 19A.
The court and the community expect that a person released on a supervision order will comply with the conditions of the order strictly. However, it is realistic to recognise, as s 23(1B) does in effect, that there may be missteps from time to time, particularly given the very onerous nature of the conditions required to adequately manage the person's risk. The question is whether, notwithstanding such missteps, I can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the respondent will substantially comply with the standard conditions of the supervision order.
(1) The words 'will substantially comply with' should be given their ordinary meaning, consistent with the purposes of the legislation and of the general conditions of a supervision order, the overall object of which is to achieve the adequate protection of the community by appropriate management and mitigation of the unacceptable risk that the respondent will commit a serious sexual offence.
(2) The question of what will be substantial compliance will be a matter of judgment that will depend on the circumstances of each particular case.
(3) The assessment is to be made in the context that it is one aspect of the broader exercise of determining whether the community can be adequately protected if the respondent is released again subject to a supervision order.
(4) It is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the language of the section, in context, that the word 'substantially' is used in a relative sense and involves an assessment of the degree of compliance that the respondent is likely to achieve.
(5) While the prospect of trivial or minor contraventions will not (and ordinarily should not) preclude a finding that the respondent will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order, the assessment of whether the respondent will substantially comply involves considerations other than simply whether any potential breach will be trivial or minor.
(6) The court must be satisfied that the respondent will comply with the standard conditions in a manner and to an extent that is consistent with and will enable the attainment of the general object of the supervision order and the legislation, namely the adequate protection of the community by management and mitigation of the risk that the respondent will commit a serious sexual offence.
(7) Factors that are relevant to that assessment would include the respondent's history of compliance and non-compliance and the factors set out at [50] above (being an assessment of past compliance or non-compliance with the conditions of a past supervision order, in particular whether the person is likely to deliberately flout the conditions, his or her capacity to comply with the conditions, what measures there are in place to ensure he or she would substantially comply, and the relative importance of any breach that might occur. In particular, where engagement in counselling is to be a condition of the supervision order, the person's willingness to engage in a meaningful way, rather than just attend the counselling session, will be a relevant consideration, given the significance of counselling as a means of monitoring risk as well as assisting in the reduction of risk).
The first question ‑ is Mr Pickett a serious danger to the community? Factors under s 7(3)
Count 1 was an offence of aggravated burglary involving the appellant breaking and entering into the complainant's home in company with a co-offender. Count 2 was an offence of armed robbery involving the appellant stealing from the complainant the sum of $55 with threats of violence while pretending to be armed with a knife. Count 3 was an offence of aggravated indecent assault involving the appellant unlawfully and indecently assaulting the complainant while pretending to be armed with a knife. Count 5 was an offence of aggravated sexual penetration without consent involving the appellant introducing his penis into her mouth while pretending to be armed with a knife. Count 6 was an offence of aggravated sexual penetration without consent involving the appellant penetrating the complainant's vagina with his finger while pretending to be armed with a knife. The appellant was acquitted of counts 4 and 7 on the indictment.
The facts may be broadly summarised as follows. In the early hours of 29 November 1998, the 27‑year‑old female complainant was at home alone. Her husband had gone to work. She was woken by the sound of the appellant breaking a sliding glass door of her house (count 1). She called the police and hid in her bedroom. The appellant entered the complainant's bedroom and pretended that he was armed with a knife. He demanded money from the complainant. She gave him $55 in cash (count 2). The appellant made the complainant remove her nightdress, so that she was naked. He compelled her to sexually touch herself (count 3). He then compelled her, while she was still naked, to walk outside to a storeroom past the co‑offender, who was keeping watch. The appellant then sexually penetrated the complainant by putting his penis in her mouth without her consent (count 5). Finally, he then sexually penetrated her vagina with his finger without her consent (count 6).
It was accepted that the appellant had entered the house with intent to steal property, and that the sexual offending was not premeditated.
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The appellant committed four other violent home burglary offences against four different complainants over the period of five days between 29 November and 3 December 1998:
(1) On Monday 30 November 1998, the appellant committed an aggravated burglary at the home of the complainant. The complainant and his wife came home at 9.30 pm and found that their house had been ransacked. As they began to look through the house they were confronted by the appellant, who was holding a star picket which he raised at the complainant. The complainant and his wife ran from the house and the appellant ran into a bedroom and left via a window. Some credit cards and money were taken.
(2) On Tuesday 1 December 1998, the appellant committed an aggravated burglary at the home of the complainant. At about 9.50 pm, the complainant and his sister-in-law were sitting in their lounge room in their house in Cloverdale. They heard a noise and looked up to see that the curtain and sliding door had been opened and the appellant was standing watching them. The appellant was holding a brick, which he raised as he demanded that they hand over their wallets. The complainants refused. The appellant threw the brick at the two complainants and ran off.
(3) On Wednesday 2 December 1998, the appellant committed an aggravated burglary and an attempted stealing with violence against the complainant. The 55-year-old complainant was at home alone reading in bed at about 11.55 pm when she heard a loud crashing noise. The complainant went to investigate and found a glass sliding door smashed. The complainant returned to her bedroom to call police and activated her duress alarm. She was then confronted by the appellant holding a garden stake. The appellant jabbed at the complainant with the stake demanding that she give him money. The appellant left when the duress alarm began to sound, stealing a black sports bag which was later returned to the complainant.
(4) On Thursday 3 December 1998, the appellant committed an aggravated burglary and an assault occasioning bodily harm offence against the complainant. At about 1.15 am, the complainant and his wife were asleep at their residence in Cloverdale. The complainant was woken by the sound of smashing glass and went to investigate, arming himself with an axe handle. The complainant saw the appellant standing on the rear patio. The complainant's wife retrieved the cordless phone from the kitchen and went to the bedroom to call police. The appellant entered the house holding a brick in his right hand above his head. He then walked to the bedroom where the complainant's wife was waiting. The complainant approached the appellant and hit him to the back of the head with the axe handle. The appellant then punched the complainant in the face and a struggle ensued. The appellant managed to leave the premises.
The appellant committed the Subject Offences and the other offences referred to in the previous paragraph in breach of his CRO and less than eight weeks into his home detention bail.
Mr Pickett currently resides in Unit 2 on a Standard Supervision Regime. Unit Officers report that he abides by unit and prison regimes, is polite and respectful to officers, maintains an acceptable standard of cell and personal hygiene and is not generally considered to be a management problem.
Mr Pickett is employed in Unit 2 as a cleaner and receives level 3 gratuities. Unit staff state that he is an average worker who requires minimal supervision, completes his duties as required to a good standard and appears to interact well with staff and his peers in the workplace.
During an unforeseen incident in unit 1 of uniform block Kingsley put the safety of others above himself. Kingsley attempted to assist staff in deescalating a challenging situation.
Kingsley approached the prisoner in a calm respectful manner with a view to reducing the prisoner's anger and frustration towards staff. Although aware of the potential threat to himself and above his own safety, Kingsley put the welfare of the prisoners and staff first.
I believe that Kingsley demonstrated not only significant level of courage but a deep sense of maturity in confronting such a challenging situation.
We recognise that prisons can be challenging environment for both staff and prisoners. Kingsley's actions support a safer and healthier community where we work together to support one another.
(a) he had been in company with older peers when offending and often took the sole responsibility because the 'youngest bloke used to take the blame for the older guys';
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> (b) people he hung around with put him up to it and he had to do it to fit in with them; and
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> (c) he minimised his role during the Casuarina Prison riot of 1998. Although he acknowledged that he had behaved in a violent manner, he said that he followed everyone that was there, and he was just young and silly.
(a) has a past medical history of hepatitis C that has been treated but has left him with associated cirrhosis (of the liver);
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> (b) has type 2 diabetes; and
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> (c) has refused to attend medical and nursing appointments for his general and mental health, including refusing to attend offsite appointments which led to his discharge from the Royal Perth Hospital liver clinic.
(a) at the time of Mr Pickett's assessment, apart from his diabetes medication, his medications were methadone 85 mg daily (opiate), sodium valproate 1500 mg nocte (antiepileptic/mood stabiliser), quetiapine 500 mg nocte (antipsychotic major tranquilizer) and desvenlafaxine 200 mg daily (SNRI antidepressant/antianxiety medication);
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> (b) antisocial personality disorder has been consistently diagnosed throughout Mr Pickett's time in prison;
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> (c) psychiatrists assessing Mr Pickett as an adolescent and as an adult reveal that no diagnosis has been made of a major mental illness;
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> (d) Mr Pickett has had episodes of mood change and deliberate self‑harm associated with adjustment to external circumstances, and mood states that have resolved within a short time frame. This pattern is in keeping with a personality structure, with limited coping skills, and problems dealing with negative emotions, that is, Mr Pickett has a pattern of reactive mood changes based on the circumstances. His mood fluctuations over time are in keeping with the personality structure unable to tolerate and/or manage negative emotion resulting. Recently, his behaviour has varied when stressed by matters such as prison transfers, loss of relatives, the end of his long-term relationship (marriage in 2018) and preparing to appeal his indefinite sentence;
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> (e) it is unclear why he is prescribed, in the long-term, high doses of antidepressants, mood stabilisers or antipsychotic medications. His inability to self-manage negative affective states is a significant risk factor for future offending, and strategies to manage these will not be developed while relying on medications, prescribed or illicitly sourced;
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> (f) as Mr Pickett was not opiate dependent when methadone treatment was commenced in 2007, it must be assumed that the treatment was implemented as a harm minimisation strategy to reduce his risk of ongoing prison-based polysubstance abuse and related health risks. If so, this strategy has been manifestly ineffective, not only does he now have long-term well‑established opiate dependency, he did not stop using other substances for a further 10 years;
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> (g) no testing of Mr Pickett's structured psychological assessment of his intellectual/cognitive functioning had been made since 2000, but the tests used prior to that date offered a surprisingly inconsistent picture of his cognitive and intellectual function. One test had assessed him as having borderline level of intellectual functioning, another test had assessed him as having a low average range of intellectual functioning and another test assessed him in the average range of intellectual ability.
(a) no insight into his pattern of violent behaviour (and denial of poor emotion management);
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> (b) significant cognitive distortions by externalising blame to others;
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> (c) substance abuse/use; and
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> (d) relationship skills and an understanding of what constitutes a healthy relationship.
(a) using the VRAG, a total score of 13 was calculated for Mr Pickett. This score is in risk category 6 (being a high risk of future violent offending) (there are seven categories) (being a 44% risk of reoffending violently within seven years after release);
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> (b) Mr Pickett's STATIC-99 R score is in the Level IVa or 'Above Average Risk' range;
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> (c) a number of RSVP risk factors were identified in Mr Pickett which are known to increase the likelihood of future sexual offending which, if addressed, and effective treatment is given, can potentially contribute to a reduced risk of future offending. The risk factors and issues identified as treatment targets (consistent with previously identified outstanding treatment needs of Mr Pickett) include: serious problems with self‑awareness; problems with stress or coping; serious problems with substance use; and problems with intimate relationships and non‑intimate relationships; and
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> (d) in relation to manageability, the RSVP identifies that he has problems with planning; problems with supervision; and problems with treatment, that need to be taken into account in management planning.
Well, certainly it seems that after a pattern of serious violent ‑ property and violent offending, there has been a sexual offence that has led to this long period of imprisonment. That, in my opinion, is an escalation of violent offending, and the sexual offence has occurred in the context of that violent offending. So the two are intrinsically linked. I mean, I've talked about it subsequently, but in the absence of sexual deviance, in the absence of particular sexual intent in the antecedents to the offence itself, it seems that the violent offending is the most significant component of this.
(a) sexual offending is a form of violent offending, and there had been a trajectory of increased or escalating violent offending by Mr Pickett; and
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> (b) the fact that the final escalation included sexual offending increases the likelihood that future violent offending would include sexual offending.
(a) intoxication is a risk factor of significance in Mr Pickett's previous violent and sexual offending, as alcohol is something which increases libido, as well as increases the risk of violence;
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> (b) managing stress with substances is something which Mr Pickett has done over a long period of time; and
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> (c) the risk is that, should Mr Pickett be under distress and return to substance abuse, his risk of committing future violent and/or sexually violent offences will become higher.
(a) irrespective of whether Mr Pickett remains in prison or is released, he should receive one-to-one counselling with a specialist forensic psychologist to address his outstanding treatment needs, including undertaking a deniers program (which could entail participation in a group or individual program). A one-to-one program is said to be desirable as such a program is better tailored to his auditory information issues as information in a one‑to‑one program can be conveyed to him in a way that he is likely to learn from, as he clearly has the capacity to learn; and
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> (b) if he is to be released there should be some preparation for release to address his outstanding treatment needs as his past history of supervision on release has been poor, and he is clearly showing difficulty in managing stress in a medium secure environment and attending scheduled appointments. For these reasons, he would benefit from a period of time in a less structured safe environment such as a minimum security prison (which still provides a structured environment) which will enable him to learn the skills that he will need to survive (not to offend) upon release.
(a) Mr Pickett was below the threshold scores usually required to confirm a diagnosis of psychopathy;
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> (b) Mr Pickett's score on the STATIC‑99 R suggests that he is within the high risk category of sexual reoffending. Twenty five per cent of offenders with the same score as Mr Pickett reoffended within five years;[52]
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> (c) using the 3-Predictor model, two of the three factors that best predicted sexual reoffending were identified, which were, unrealistic long-term goals and poor coping skills before release. However, he did have some feasible release plans in that he has suitable accommodation where he is likely to be supported and supervised;
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> (d) in terms of his long-term goals, Mr Pickett did not appreciate that a lifestyle of staying at home and watching TV would not be sustainable. He had no specific plans as to his future employment and development of social connections or pro‑social activities. He did not perceive that he may struggle to remain drug and alcohol free and did not anticipate major problems with adjustment to the community after 21 years in prison;
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> (e) in terms of Mr Pickett's coping skills before release, he had spent the last 21 years in a highly structured and contained environment. He required moderate levels of support to function and high doses of psychotropic medications to assist with self-regulation. His random drug and alcohol screens have been positive over the years; and
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> (f) she identified a number of risk factors in Mr Pickett using the RSVP, which are associated with an increased risk of sexual reoffending including: psychological coercion in sexual violence; extreme minimisation/denial of sexual offending; problems with self‑awareness; problems with stress and coping; substance use; violent or suicidal ideations (possible); problems with intimate and non-intimate relationships; problems with employment; problems with planning; problems with treatment; and problems with supervision.
(a) Mr Pickett had in the past received fortnightly individual counselling between December 2012 and March 2013, and completed a structured, manual‑based program titled 'Break Your Cycle of Recidivism';
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> (b) in March 2017, Mr Pickett was found to have significant outstanding treatment needs, and it was recommended that individual counselling should be provided to him again. He was referred to a specialist psychological service. However, Mr Pickett declined to participate and it was observed that at that time he tended to disengage from assistance services at times of heightened stress or low mood;
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> (c) Mr Pickett was enrolled in the Pathways program between May 2011 and August 2011. Mr Pickett was reported by program facilitators to have been conscientious, and was able to recognise that he used drugs in prison in order to cope with his circumstances. However, program staff reported that he had some difficulties in accomplishing actual behaviour change in relation to his substance use, and that his relapse prevention plan consisted largely of having support from his wife and family;
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> (d) although Mr Pickett was scheduled to participate in the Think First program, he refused to do so. This is because the course participation list was restricted to sex offenders only, and Mr Pickett had continued to deny his sex offending. In 2011 and 2012, it was recommended he complete a mainstream Think First program that was not restricted to sex offenders only. Mr Pickett was to be assessed for suitability to engage in the Sex Offender Deniers program upon successful completion of the Think First program. Although Mr Pickett attended sessions of the Think First program between October 2015 and January 2016, he refused to participate in the Deniers program; and
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> (e) program facilitators of the Think First program in 2016 reported that Mr Pickett often required help to understand activities, but once he was provided with appropriate explanations, he was able to understand directions and complete work to a satisfactory level. His treatment gains were reported by facilitators as: improved understanding and application of consequential thinking skills; demonstrated understanding of all aspects of problem-solving, and an ability to apply these concepts to his own experience; recognised signs of anger and strong emotion as a trigger to need to use emotion management; and addressed impulsivity treatment need.
(a) Intimacy deficits: records indicate that while Mr Pickett has spent a limited time in the community, he was able to form a relationship in his late teenage years that included about 18 months of cohabitation. However, this relationship was reportedly characterised by some instability as a result of infidelity and drug use by both parties. Mr Pickett stated he is currently in a relationship with a woman with whom he intended to live with upon his release. He had known her from a much earlier time in their lives and they had reconnected in or about late August 2019, but this relationship has not been tested in the community setting;
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> (b) General social rejection/loneliness: Mr Pickett admitted that he often felt lonely and preferred to keep to himself. He acknowledged that there was no one in prison he felt he could talk to as a friend;
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> (c) Lack of concern for others: Mr Pickett's offending behaviour is the clearest evidence of this. He has historically demonstrated dishonesty, manipulative behaviour, a lack of guilt, remorse or empathy. His antisocial actions, both in the community and in prison, have demonstrated that he may be indifferent to the rights and well‑being of others;
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> (d) General self-regulation: there appears to be evidence of a degree of impulsive acts in Mr Pickett's history across a range of life domains, as noted in a range of professional assessments across a long period of time. This impulsivity has been demonstrated in Mr Pickett's offending, his behaviour in prison, his interpersonal interactions and his substance use;
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> (e) Poor cognitive problem-solving: previous assessors have also noted that Mr Pickett's lifestyle in the community and history of offending indicates a chronic history of poor problem-solving as evidenced by difficulties in areas such as substance use, post‑release plans and offending;
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> (f) Negative emotionality: there is clear evidence that Mr Pickett has experienced this; he has previously discussed feeling victimised and mistreated by others, particularly those in positions of authority, such as police officers and prison staff; and
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> (g) Co‑operation with supervision: Mr Pickett has previously been convicted of various breaches of probation, bail or conditional release orders. At the time of his index offences, he was on home detention bail. When asked about his intention to abide by the conditions of a supervision order, he said that he would do whatever was required of him in order to be released. However, he may still react negatively towards people in positions of authority, such as community corrections officers or Sex Offender Management Squad officers (police officers).
(a) Mr Pickett proposes to live with his younger brother, and his brother's partner, in their rented home. Mr Pickett's brother confirmed that he and his partner remained supportive of Mr Pickett and will allow him to reside with them;[66]
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> (b) the Sex Offender Management Squad have no concerns regarding Mr Pickett's brother and his partner. A Desktop Spatial Analysis of the proposed address has been completed and police have identified a number of places/areas/persons of concern within a 2 km radius of the property, none of which are of such significance as to render it unsuitable as a residence for Mr Pickett;[67]
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> (c) Mr Pickett's mother will visit the property frequently to spend time with her son and support Mr Pickett;[68]
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> (d) Mr Pickett commenced a new relationship with a woman in or about September 2019, whom Ms Comery had spoken to who confirmed that she had known Mr Pickett since the age of 15 years and that they now identify as being in a relationship. Mr Pickett's younger brother (with whom he intends to reside) is aware that Mr Pickett would like his new partner to stay at their home;[69]
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> (e) although Mr Pickett's new partner appeared to be aware of Mr Picket's offending, she did not appear to be aware of his convictions for sexual offending. Nevertheless, she stated that she will support and assist him in any way she can in regard to compliance with a supervision order;[70]
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> (f) Mr Pickett has not given advice of any plans to commence employment if released, however, this can be explored after his release;[71]
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> (g) the victim of Mr Pickett's sexual offending does not appear to reside in close proximity to the address at which it is proposed that he reside with his younger brother and his younger brother's partner;[72]
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> (h) although Mr Pickett is not a reportable offender under the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004, the proposed supervision order contains a condition that the respondent report to the Sex Offender Management Squad within 48 hours of his release, and thereafter report to and receive visits from police at times and locations as directed;[73] and
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> (i) other proposed conditions of a supervision order include a curfew, prohibition on the use of illicit drugs and alcohol, as well as testing for illicit drugs and substances, and other requirements to ensure compliance, including keeping a diary, most of which are included in the orders for other dangerous sexual offenders who are released into the community.[74]
[M]eans that the offender has an inclination or tendency, a disposition to commit serious sexual offences generally, in a particular way, or upon a particular type of victim. The word refers to some identifiable characteristic of the offender, something in his makeup or personality which may or may not be of a quality of a diagnosable mental illness or personality disorder.
(a) an Intensive Substance Use program in mid‑1996;
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> (b) Skills Training for Aggression Control program completed in December 1996;
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> (c) Violent Offender Treatment program in November 2005;
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> (d) individual counselling in 2006 to 2007;
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> (e) Moving on from Dependencies program in April 2007;[82]
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> (f) Think First program in December 2007;
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> (g) Pathways program in September 2011;
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> (h) Break your Cycle of Offending program in 2013;
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> (i) Think First program from October 2015 to January 2016; and
>
> (j) Cognitive Skills program in 2017.
(a) despite engaging in numerous group treatment programs, Mr Pickett demonstrated no insight into his pattern of violent behaviour. He was unable to identify the factors which contributed to his violent behaviour and denied the role of poor emotion management and antisocial peers in his violent behaviour, though he acknowledged the role of antisocial peers in his general offences;
>
> (b) Mr Pickett was lacking in personal responsibility and evidencing a pattern of playing the victim, with inadequate risk management strategies; and
>
> (c) Mr Pickett displayed a sense of hopelessness.
Conclusion as to whether Mr Pickett is a serious danger to the community
The second question - continuing detention order or supervision order?
Once a court has concluded that an offender is a serious danger to the community it must make either an indefinite detention order or a supervision order (DPP v Williams per Wheeler JA at 68). In deciding between those two possibilities the paramount consideration is the need to ensure the adequate protection of the community (s 17(2)). That does not exclude other considerations. Nor does it necessarily favour an indefinite detention order. The use of the word 'adequate' indicates that a qualitative assessment is required. It cannot simply be assumed that the most assured preventative is detention and, therefore, the protection of the community will always favour such an order.
In The State of Western Australia v Latimer [2006] WASC 235, Murray J expressed the view that the court would not make a detention order if an adequate degree of protection of the community could be obtained by making a supervision order. His Honour noted that a detention order is for an indefinite term whereas a supervision order is for a defined period. Given the more onerous nature of a detention order, Murray J concluded that the Act requires the court to do no more than is necessary for the continuing control, care, or treatment of the offender to achieve an adequate degree of protection for the community. I agree.
(a) Mr Pickett has unmet treatment needs which need to be addressed prior to release from prison;
>
> (b) Mr Pickett is on prescribed psychotropic medications (one of which is unlikely to be prescribed outside of prison) and methadone, all of which Dr Wynn Owen and Dr Wojnarowska agree should be gradually withdrawn prior to release from prison;
>
> (c) Mr Pickett needs to show that he can self-manage his anxiety, emotions and negative moods, without psychotropic medications and illicit drugs, whilst in a regulated environment, to assist him to make a transition to the community;
>
> (d) in the past Mr Pickett (albeit when he was significantly younger) has previously shown a disregard of supervision orders as he has been convicted of various breaches of probation, bail or conditional release orders, and at the time of his index offences, he was on home detention bail; and
>
> (e) Mr Pickett's reluctance from time to time to attend appointments;
I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Pickett will substantially comply with the standard conditions of a supervision order, set out in s 18(1)(b) and s 18(1)(d) of the Act.
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.
[2] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [1].
[3] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [99].
[4] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [96] - [98].
[6] The State of Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14 [52].
[7] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Dal [No 2] [2016] WASC 212 [33]. (footnotes omitted)
[8] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52].
[9] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [51].
[10] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Hart [2019] WASC 4 [52].
[11] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychological Report of Catherine Korda, page 1825.
[12] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [18].
[13] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [19].
[14] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [20] ‑ [21].
[15] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [22].
[16] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [23].
[17] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [24].
[18] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychological Report of Peta Smith, dated 12 June 2000, pages 1704 ‑ 1706; Pre‑sentence Report of Sally Parsons, dated 14 June 2000, pages 1707 ‑ 1712.
[19] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [25].
[20] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Wojnarowska, dated 17 October 2019, page 1927.
[21] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [26].
[22] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [27].
[23] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [13] ‑ [14], [15], [29] - [30].
[24] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [35].
[25] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [1], [12].
[26] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [20] - [31].
[27] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [33].
[28] Pickett v The Queen [2019] WASCA 178 [36].
[29] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Supervision Assessment of Kimberley Comery, pages 1990 ‑ 2002.
[32] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Supervision Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1991.
[33] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Report of Dr Peter A Wynn Owen, page 1968.
[34] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska [16.6] page 1927; see also Report of Dr Peter Wynn Owen, page 1964.
[35] Exhibit 2; Neuropsychological Assessment Report by Dr Mandy Vidovich, dated 17 January 2020, pages 13, 16.
[36] Exhibit 1, vol 1; pages 618 ‑ 619.
[37] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Supervision Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1994.
[40] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Supervision Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1991.
[42] ts 13 February 2020, pages 81 ‑ 82.
[46] ts 13 February 2020, pages 76 ‑ 77.
[48] ts 13 February 2020, pages 77 - 80, 85.
[49] ts 13 February 2020, pages 84, 92.
[50] ts 13 February 2020, pages 86 ‑ 88.
[52] When giving oral evidence Dr Wojnarowska stated that there was no significance in the difference of the score that she gave of high risk compared with the above average risk score assessed by Dr Wynn Owen.
[53] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska, page 1938.
[54] Exhibit 2; Supplementary Book of Materials, page 5.
[55] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska, page 1939.
[57] ts 13 February 2010, pages 115 - 118.
[60] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychological Report of Ben Bannister, pages 1872 ‑ 1876.
[61] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Proposed DSO Management Plan of Dr Ben Bannister, page 1989.
[65] ts 13 February 2020, pages 135 ‑ 136.
[66] Exhibit 3, email from Ms Kara Cassam to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, sent 10 February 2020.
[67] Exhibit 3, email from Ms Kara Cassam to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, sent 10 February 2020.
[68] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1993.
[69] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, pages 1993 ‑ 1994.
[70] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, pages 1994 ‑ 1995.
[71] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1995.
[72] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, page 1995.
[73] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, pages 1996, 1999.
[74] Exhibit 1; vol 3, Community Suspension Assessment of Kimberley Comery, pages 1990, 2002.
[79] Exhibit 2; Supplementary Book of Materials, pages 26 - 27, 35.
[80] Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187 [178]; this construction of the word 'propensity' was applied to s 7(3)(c) of the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Griffiths [2015] WASC 393 [66] (Hall J) and in The State of Western Australia v Jonsson [No 3] [2019] WASC 463 [66] (Archer J).
[81] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska, page 1920.
[82] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Moving on from Dependencies Treatment Completion Report of Jayne Carver, pages 1853 ‑ 1855.
[83] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska, page 1921.
[84] Exhibit 1, vol 3; Psychiatric Report of Dr Gosia Wojnarowska, page 1921.
[85] Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia v Decke [2009] WASC 312 [14] - [15].
[86] The State of Western Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93 [129].
[89] The State of Western Australia v Rao [2019] WASC 93 [137].