(These reasons were delivered extemporaneously on 29 August 2025. They have been amended to correct matters of language.)
[2]
On 17 June 2025, the State of Western Australia applied for a restriction order in respect of the respondent, Mr Pearson, under the High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA) (HRSO Act). Mr Pearson is currently in custody serving a term of imprisonment of 9 years and 9 months that commenced on 10 December 2015.
He is due to be released from custody on 9 September 2025. The term of imprisonment comprised the initial sentence of 8 years and 9 months imposed by Hall J on 28 April 2016 and a further sentence of 1 year to be served cumulatively imposed by Gething DCJ on 7 October 2016. The sentence of 8 years and 9 months was imposed in respect of, from what I can ascertain, 67 offences, six of which were charged in the Supreme Court. The remainder were Magistrates Court charges.
The Supreme Court offences included one count of aggravated stalking contrary to s 338E(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) and one count of armed robbery contrary to s 392(c) of the Criminal Code. These are both serious offences as defined in the HRSO Act. Mr Pearson is therefore a serious offender under custodial sentence within the meaning of that phrase as defined in s 3 of the HRSO Act. Thus, s 35(1) applies to him.
Section 35 of the HRSO Act only permits the State to make its application if there is a possibility that he might be released from custody within the period of one year after the application is made. That possibility arises here. Section 43(1) requires that there be a preliminary hearing in respect of the State's application, which is the hearing listed before me today. The State also seeks an interim detention order pending the final determination of the application.
The State has provided helpful written submissions for the purposes of today's preliminary hearing. The main purpose of the preliminary hearing is to decide whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the court might find, pursuant to s 7 of the HRSO Act, that Mr Pearson is a high risk serious offender within the meaning of that Act. If I am not so satisfied, then, I cannot fix a date for the hearing of the State's application for a restriction order.
A high risk serious offender is a person in relation to whom the court is satisfied by acceptable and cogent evidence and to a high degree of probability that it is necessary to make a restriction order to ensure adequate protection of the community against an unacceptable risk that the person will commit a serious offence. A restriction order is made under s 48 of the HRSO Act in the form of either a continuing detention order or a supervision order.
Section 7 of the HRSO Act sets out the matters to which the court must have regard in assessing whether the person is a high risk serious offender. These matters are comprehensively addressed in the State's submissions. Mr Pearson is represented today by counsel, Mr McCulloch, who is experienced in this area. And Mr McCulloch quite properly concedes that the criterion set out in s 46 of the HRSO Act is met, and also, that an interim detention order should be made.
For the relatively brief reasons which follow, I am satisfied that the criterion in s 46 is met. I will therefore make an order setting a hearing date for the restriction order application and ancillary orders to facilitate the hearing of that application. I am also positively satisfied that it is appropriate to make an interim detention order.
In support of the application, the State predominantly relies upon an affidavit of Ms Allen, affirmed 17 June 2025. Ms Allen's affidavit contains the detail of Mr Pearson's criminal history, as well as several reports and assessments in relation to him. Mr Pearson has an extensive criminal history. He has committed a total of 14 serious offences. In addition to the offences for which Mr Pearson was sentenced by Hall J, he has committed serious violent offences and serious sexual offences. The circumstances of the offending for which Hall J sentenced Mr Pearson were described as follows.
In respect of the stalking, threats, assaults, and breaches of restraining orders that were in place, Mr Pearson's conduct constituted a campaign of terror, his Honour saying that Mr Pearson wanted the victim, his ex-partner, to live in fear of him. His Honour described Mr Pearson's conduct as persistent, aggressive conduct, where Mr Pearson did not stop at threats, but also perpetrated actual violence and damage. His Honour described the armed robbery as involving the use of a knife and comprising highly threatening behaviour by Mr Pearson.
In respect of the other offences for which his Honour sentenced Mr Pearson, there was an offence of 'steal motor vehicle and drive recklessly'. This involved Mr Pearson driving in a highly dangerous manner to avoid police, which placed the life of other road users at a serious risk.
His Honour made the following remarks regarding the factors that have led to Mr Pearson's offending at [21] of his Honour's sentencing remarks:
[3]
The psychologist's report states that your problems are personality-based rather than mental health-related. You have an antisocial personality. In conjunction with excessive drug and alcohol use, this leads to poor decision-making and violent behaviour. You are assessed as being at relatively high risk of committing further violent and general offences. Whether that risk can be modified depends on you being motivated to change. Programs and past improvement have not achieved this. The only realistic hope is that you stop using drugs and alcohol and commit to long-term abstinence.
[4]
In terms of Mr Pearson's personal circumstances, I will touch on those briefly. His background was troubled, and he started using drugs at around 12 years of age, which progressed to LSD, ecstasy and intravenous drug use at around 15 years of age. Mr Pearson left school after year 9 and was able to read and write. In terms of his employment, for about five years before he was sentenced by Hall J, he had employment, which included work as a welder, in construction and as a tree lopper.
The most recent psychological report available is that of Ms Martin, dated 11 April 2016. She said then that Mr Pearson presents a relatively high risk of both violent and generalist offending. She also said that management of this risk is uncertain, unless Mr Pearson is motivated to engage in strategies to lessen the risk.
Since then, on the material before me, Mr Pearson has not made any substantive rehabilitative gains. He did do about three months of the Violent Offender's Treatment Program. However, the Post‑Sentence Supervision Order report states Mr Pearson has said he was falling behind with 'an inability to meet content'. He also expressed a willingness to engage in individual and substance abuse counselling in the community.
Mr Pearson's conduct in prison has at times been troubling over the last five years. He has twice been found guilty of fighting, and twice been found guilty of not submitting himself for the taking of a urine sample. Also while in prison, Mr Pearson has engaged in self‑harm, which has resulted in him being hospitalised. In terms of the support available in the community, Mr Pearson has said he has some support in the community through his parents, and another person who is a positive influence. He does not have any accommodation available to him.
In all of these circumstances, and having regard to the matters outlined in the State's written submissions, I am satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe that the court might find that Mr Pearson is a high risk serious offender within the meaning of the HRSO Act. The following matters are of particular importance in coming to that view. The prolonged and extensive nature of his offending, that he has made little gains in rehabilitation, especially in respect to his drug use, and that he has no accommodation available if released.
As I have said, the State also seeks an order that Mr Pearson remain in custody pending the determination of these proceedings. I have the power to make that order under s 46(2)(c)(i) of the HRSO Act. To make an interim detention order, I must be positively satisfied that such an order is appropriate.
Having regard to the same matters I summarised in coming to the view that the preliminary hearing threshold was met, I am positively satisfied it is appropriate to make the interim detention order. For these brief reasons, then, I am satisfied that the criterion in s 46 of the HRSO Act is met. I will therefore make an order fixing the date for hearing of the State's application for a restriction order. Further, I will order that Mr Pearson undergo examination by a psychiatrist and a psychologist, and I will make orders facilitating the preparation of their reports. I will also make an interim detention order.
[5]
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia.